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Economic issues permeate many reports in the media today. The 
financial crisis that has rippled across the globe has caught everyone’s 
attention. There have been speculations about the stability of the European 
market, which has famously included talk about Greece’s future within that 
market and the eventual departure the UK will make from that economic 
(and political) union, while the United States of America begins to come to 
terms with a new administration on the heals of recovering from an 
economic crisis so severe that it is now called the Great Recession. 
Politicians, economists, sociologists and journalists have given their 
opinions about how best to recover from the global reality of more and 
more people succumbing to various levels of poverty despite working in 
earnest. Those people are being overcome by hunger, homelessness, lack of 
education, and overall loss of dignity. Greater numbers of people are living 
on the fringes – on the other side of the tracks; there is a much smaller 
segment that controls most of the world’s wealth: they are a small 
population of people who flourish, thrive and grow wealthier. 
The disparity between those who have a secure future (clean water, food, 
shelter, medicine, education, employment and a sustained feeling of 
personal worth) and those whose futures depend on the turn of the 
economic trends is great. There are movements around the world, however, 
that have the goal of closing the gap; people are working to create 
infrastructures that support opportunities for sustainable living: food 
security, which includes agricultural development; clean and potable water; 
immunizations as part of a wider medical program; affordable housing; and 
education. These are vital elements that contribute to the greater cause of 
promoting, supporting and protecting human dignity – the precious and 
unique gift that is intrinsic to being human, a self-aware being in a world of 
other such beings. In short, these are elements that contribute to man’s 
experience of justice. 
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Providing the elements of clean water, food, medicine, education and 
shelter also inherently require action based on a value system, an ethic that 
guides voluntary human action. How (and if) we close the gap between the 
haves and have-nots will be based on the value system that we employ; 
how we see ourselves and our neighbors in the greater world picture; and 
how we define responsibility as well as justice. How we close the gap 
depends on how ethics permeates human action. 
The effort of one man1 can inspire many, but usually it is the many that 
affects lasting change and encourages progress. By the same token, the 
ethics of one man can shape the ethics of a group, community, government 
or corporation; but it is also the ethics implicit in the group that determines 
its behavior and the impact that it has on the greater community and on the 
global level.  
In other words, the ethics of the individual person does indeed influence 
the behavior of any group to which that person belongs; but, reciprocally, it 
is also clear that the ethics and behavior of a group of people cannot but 
affect the individual person. Because two or more people working together 
can have a greater impact on the community around them than a single 
person, it is incumbent on that group (community, government or 
corporation) to act responsibly – that is, to act in such a way that attention 
is given not only to the group itself and the individuals that comprise the 
group, but also to outside groups and society in general.  
This responsibility extends to environmental issues and sustainability. If 
communities, groups, governments, and both private and public 
corporations truly take responsibility for themselves, understanding that 
their actions have far-reaching implications, the gap between the haves and 
the have-nots would, consequently, be reduced and justice a greater aspect 
of reality. This thesis will most certainly not be an endorsement for 
communism, socialism or fascism, but rather a simple acknowledgement of 
the role and importance of social responsibility.  
The purpose of this study is to develop a system of corporate ethics 
based on an understanding and interpretation of the ethical demand of 
human beings who are in relation with each other according to Emmanuel 
                                           
1  For the duration of this project, I will use man and men as grammatically 
appropriate to refer to the human being. I will not indulge in the tedious, repetitive and 
unnecessary reference to “woman” and “women” to indicate the whole of humanity or 
the human being. We understand that “man” and “men” when used in general terms 




Levinas’ teachings and the responsibility man has to and for himself and 
others whom he encounters based on Paul Ricoeur’s teachings on human 
action, text and hermeneutics. While the philosophies to which we will be 
referring may not overtly present a normative ethic, we shall convey them 
in such a way that is reasonably germain to the development of our system 
of corporate ethics that would, indeed, demonstrate why (and, perhaps, how 
in some instances) man must act in response to the demand of the other 
whom with whom he is in relation.  
We continue to witness the consequences of the lack of a strong 
commitment to human dignity and responsibility to and for the other 
person; we see that the integrity of many decisions in the world of business 
wane and humanity is robbed of its inherent dignity while at the same time 
the economy enters into a state of uncertainty and eventual decline. The 
result of our study, therefore, is to establish a system of corporate ethics 
that is based on the call to responsibility and respect for the human person 
(dignity). Our assertion is that the corporate ethic must be based on the 
responsibility one man has to and for himself and other men; ultimately, the 
goal is to develop a system that is relevant and applicable to all persons 
who comprise a corporation because each person is responsible for the 
corporate action. (For the purposes of this project, we shall define the 
corporation as two or more people working together to produce a good or 
render a service for an agreed benefit.) 
As we progress in this endeavor, our argument will be grounded in the 
conviction that we must study the relationship between man and his 
neighbor as well as man and the third person. Hence, there is a need to 
understand the human being both in self-reflection as well as in 
consideration of the world around him; most importantly, we will explore 
the notion of responsibility in particular and clarify, as much as possible, 
what it is to be in human relation, the I-other relation. We will also develop 
a working definition of justice based on the notion of responsibility. 
We will approach the project in three distinct parts. In the first part, we 
will use Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenology of the human face and his 
exploration of the I-other relation to comprehensively establish 
responsibility as the basis for ethics (just human action) in general, and the 
ethics of the corporation in particular. Following Levinas’ analysis, we will 
accept that “responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and 
what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the 
unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-
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interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can 
substitute himself for me.”2 We will use this teaching of responsibility as 
one of the bases upon which we will construct our own vision of a system 
of corporate ethics for today because, as we will see, the ought of the ethic 
is in the very demand that the other makes to the I. 
In the first part of the dissertation we argue that all ethical behavior (or 
just human action) is based on man’s call to be responsible for himself, the 
other, and, no less, the environment. We shall include an investigation into 
a contemporary understanding of justice and how the idea of justice is an 
answer to the call to be responsible for oneself, the other and the 
environment. Besides a good number of secondary texts on Levinas’ 
thoughts, the main references at this moment of our reflection will be the 
two major texts of Emmanuel Levinas: Totality and Infinity and Otherwise 
than being or Beyond Essence. 
In the second part we will examine the hermeneutical implications of an 
understanding of human action within the framework of the dialectic, 
which is to say the transition from one state of being to another. The 
understanding of human action will be studied analogously to the 
understanding of the qualities and characteristics of the text as presented by 
Paul Ricoeur in his theory of interpretation. By endeavoring to interpret 
human action as an analogy to the interpretation of a text, and thus studying 
it under a hermeneutical lens, we will make the case that human action can 
indeed be interpreted as if it were a text. In the course of the discussion, we 
will submit that this is an approach that is destined to demonstrate or make 
evident an alternative context capable of fostering an open and creative 
conversation on ethics in the face of some of the major ethical challenges 
of our time. In any case, our rationale is to be found in the following of 
Paul Ricoeur’s words: “… action itself, action as meaningful, may become 
an object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, 
through a kind of objectification similar to the fixation which occurs in 
writing.”3 Although we shall use the relevant secondary literature on Paul 
Ricoeur, the main sources for the construction of the second part of the 
                                           
2  E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Originally 
published as Ethique et infini. Duquesne University Press. Pittsburgh, PA. 1985. p. 101. 
3  P. RICOEUR, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. Edited & translated by John B. Thompson. 




thesis will be the following works: The Conflict of Interpretation: Essays in 
Hermeneutics, Oneself as Another and The Just. 
In the third part of the project, we will bring our understandings and 
interpretations of the philosophies of Levinas and Ricoeur together to form 
a proposal for a new system of corporate ethics based on responsibility and 
just human action. We will do this in order to define a standard of behavior 
for corporations and organizations to adopt with the aim of providing 
guidance in how persons comprising the corporation can promote, support 
and protect the human dignity of those with whom the corporation is 
engaged. 
To conclude the study, we will look at the policies and practices of one 
organization in particular in an effort to apply the proposed definition and 
standards of corporate ethics. We will evaluate the corporate action using 
Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical approach and offer suggestions of alternative 
actions that are ethical, responsible and just based on Levinas’ theory of 
responsibility. In carrying out this last exercise, we will aim to demonstrate 
how corporations might be called upon to act in response to the call of the 
other person and third persons (community) with whom it is engaged, 
including taking a look at its responsibility for the environment. 
There are many organizations, government action committees and 
community groups that work to provide what is necessary for people to live 
with dignity. Similarly, there are various university research groups, think-
tanks and privately and publicly funded projects that study the availability 
of each element (food, water, medicine, education and affordable housing) 
in order to determine where the supplies are in abundance, where they are 
lacking and how to either transport supplies or create an infrastructure 
within communities to promote (or grow in the case of agricultural 
development) that which is lacking. Prime examples of these activities, in 
both outreach and research programs, can be found within the various 
organizations and agencies of the United Nations. We know, for example, 
that the UN and its specialized agencies conduct rigorous studies on food 
and clean water supply and agricultural development to determine how best 
to ensure global food security; it works with public and private 
organizations all over the world to combat disease by conducting research, 
providing immunizations and creating infrastructure to support medical 
programs in communities that would otherwise not have any; it promotes 
educational programs, provides learning opportunities and spreads the 
wealth of knowledge from developed countries to developing countries; its 
financial institutions research and provide funding for communities in 
developing countries to have affordable housing for its people. 
12  HUMAN ACTION AS TEXT AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 
 
 
There are indeed many organizations and agencies doing this kind of 
work and more. But fundamental to these acts, as to any means of 
promoting justice, is what we might call a system of ethics. Moreover, the 
people that comprise those entities are called to live and work in such a 
way that their actions promote, support and protect the dignity of others. 
And yet the question remains: Who is studying this problem in a systematic 
way that can yield useful conclusions to be then implemented in practical 
ways? What resources do groups have to which they can turn for guidance 
in self-governance? Where can a group go for guidance in determining 
their human responsibilities? 
In developing a working definition of corporate ethics and identifying 
human dignity as a stakeholder, the goal of this project is to provide a 
starting point for a comprehensive study of ethics and values used to guide 
corporate action. Once that is done, we shall then move towards exploring 
the kind of ethical system that could help the corporation respond to the 
call to be responsible to itself, the larger community and the environment. 
As a central pillar of providing a pragmatic and useful conclusion to the 
question of systematic (and normative) corporate ethics, we shall turn to the 
human person as the ultimate and fundamental resource in measuring that 
ethical response. Responsibility for the human person and the promotion, 
support and protection of human dignity will be the driving force of our 
approach. 
Many people are working together for a common goal – those people 
have an understanding of right and wrong, of what is good for themselves, 
their families, their community and the environment. But many times they 
do not know how to employ that same set of values as a system of ethics by 
which their group (corporation) may act in a more just and responsible 
manner. Many people do not even know that this is possible. Before 
approaching the “how”, our task will be to approach the hermeneutical 
demands implied in the very idea that any authentic corporation has to 
always be responsible for itself, the larger community (even in global 
terms) and the environment. Indeed, we shall defend that the corporation is 
called to act in a way that promotes, supports and protects the dignity of 
those for whom it is responsible so that corporate ethics will always have to 
be based on a set of values centered on the human person. 
The idea that a corporation works in a way that promotes and supports 
human dignity is not new. There are plenty of companies that maintain a set 
of core values, which promotes fiscal responsibility, environmental 
awareness and human dignity. But the assertion of the present thesis, that 




because traditionally and historically, business ethics and the ethics of 
economics tend to focus on striving for the good with the beneficiary of the 
goods being largely society at large. 
While the project serves to capitalize on an opportunity to develop open, 
constructive and fresh philosophical dialogue as it pertains to ethics, it will 
strive to tackle several points that are relevant to the human condition – the 
integrity of human dignity – in an age of advanced technology, medicine, 
globalization and communication. 
Many governments around the world are trying to calm and reassure 
their citizens that even though times are hard, conditions will get (or are 
getting) better. But while the economy may be used as an indicator to 
gauge the overall wellbeing of people around the globe, it is only one of 
many indicators. It should also be noted that there have been times in the 
last five centuries where the Western World has experienced economic 
booms and continued success while many people, the various populations 
who drive the economic success of others, suffer having their personal 
dignity systematically stolen from them. 
I do not suggest, however, that we should abandon the discussion as it 
relates to the economy but rather include it in a broader and more 
comprehensive dialogue about working to promote, support and protect the 
human dignity of all people using the advancements of technology to 
improve the human condition. I submit that the broader discussion, 
therefore, include but not be limited to developing a working definition of 
corporate ethics. If we are going to engage in discussions about the 
economy as an indicator for human success, we must speak openly and 
honestly about all stakeholders that participate and are affected by the 
economy. Without forsaking other stakeholders, we find the corporation – 
the entity whose actions have the farthest reaching and, in some cases, 
longer lasting impact on the human condition – to be an appropriate point 
of departure for this endeavor. 
As we are reminded by Pope Francis in Laudato Sì4,  
Modern anthropocentrism has paradoxically ended up prizing technical 
thought over reality… The intrinsic dignity of the world is thus compromised. 
When human beings fail to find their true place in this world, they 
misunderstand themselves and end up acting against themselves… Modernity 
has been marked by an excessive anthropocentrism which today, under 
                                           
4
 POPE FRANCIS. Laudato Sì, Encyclical Letter on care for our common home. 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Vatican City. August 2015.  
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another guise, continues to stand in the way of shared understanding of any 
effort to strengthen social bonds.5 
The project is a humble attempt to do just that – draw our attention to the 
richness of human experiences as we relate to each other as persons and 
beings in this world. We shall do that within the context of the corporation, 
and yet the overarching goal remains the same: develop a system of ethics 
in which the dignity of the human person is supported, protected and 




                                           
5 Ibid., §115-116. 
 
PART ONE 
The Ethical Demand: 
Emmanuel Levinas 
In order to establish the impetus for the corporate ethic (and the quest for 
justice) that we intend to develop throughout the course of this endeavor, 
we must enrich our understanding of the human relationship: man in 
relation with other men as well as man in relation with himself. More 
specifically, we will refer to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas to gain 
insight into why, how and to what effect man relates to other men, other 
persons who are like him in nature while utterly different from him in 
being. While Levinas discusses the nature of the human relation – the face-
to-face encounter – it may be argued that his study is not necessarily 
intended to be read strictly in ontological terms. Despite this, for the 
purposes of our endeavor, we will indeed study and refer to Levinas’ 
teachings with a particularly ontological interpretation and application. 
The question of man’s being and the being of his relation with other men 
shall form the foundation for a system of ethics that begins and ends with 
the question of how ought man behave when relating to other men and how 
ought man behave as he takes responsibility for the other’s wellbeing. To 
do this, we will consider the metaphysics of man as a being who is similar 
in nature to the other while at the same time remaining wholly strange. The 
metaphysics that Levinas presents is the cornerstone to the ethical demand 
upon which human relation is grounded. Our intention, therefore, is to 
study the elements that enable and facilitate human relation: interaction, 
first of all, the face and language; then we will explore the notion of 
proximity and the subsequent responsibility that is imposed by the 




metaphysical trait of man in relation with the other. Subsequently, we shall 
also address the problematic of freedom and responsibility – a dynamic that 
superficially appears to be mutually exclusive but instead proves to be one 
facilitating the other. Finally, we will turn to the question of justice, to what 
it means and how it may be attained in terms of the paradigm of human 
relations as understood in the Levinasean approach to metaphysics. 
This first part of our project is intended to provide grounding for our 
venture in developing a corporate ethic that provides guidance to how man 
ought to behave when relating to the otherness and strangeness of others 
while at the same time contributing to an authentic and fulfilling human 
experience. Equally important, we will be doing this with the goal of 
identifying the qualities of a just relation between men for further 
application in the corporate ethic.  
We are attempting to establish a standard by which we may hold 
ourselves accountable as we confront the other in the face-to-face 
encounter. Because the standard is based on the personal ethical demand, 
the challenge of holding another accountable becomes incumbered by the 
inter-personal relationship. The system of corporate ethics that we are 
developing does not appeal to society at large but rather to the individual 
person (and to their quest for justice). So the moment of accountability 
happens between the I and the other and other others; the moment of 
accountability is when the I hears the call of the other and knows that he 
must respond and chooses his course of action accordingly. Likewise, the 
moment of accountability is when the other calls the I and demands an 
explanation of the I’s response (or even lack of response).  
The plausibility of a system of ethics founded in Levinas’ personal 
ethical demand lies in the I-other relation. According to Levinas, the I 
should treat the other according to the personal demand precisely because 
the other demands it – the ought of that ethic lies in the other’s very 
demand. This ethic may be applied to various areas of human interaction 
and institution, but we will stay within the realm of the corporation as we 
examine how man interacts with others while scrutinizing those actions 




The Ethical Demand 
In order to develop a system of corporate ethics that sets a standard of 
corporate action capable of promoting, supporting and protecting human 
dignity, we must first look at those who comprise the corporation or 
organization. We understand that a corporation is comprised of men 
working together to render a service or produce a good – in return for the 
service or product, those men receive something which they perceive as 
beneficial, i.e. payment, reimbursement, etc. As we develop this standard 
of how corporations should/ought to act, we must approach the discussion 
with an understanding that the corporation is comprised of men and women 
– persons. And at the base of every corporation are those persons who 
comprise it. This is to say that we must begin by examining the nature of 
man and that of his relation with other men whom he encounters in his 
experience of life and the world around him. 
So to develop a working understand of the ought1 between persons who 
are in relation with each other, we will depend on the writings and 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. In particular, we will be referring to his 
major works Totality and Infinity2 and Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
                                           
1 As we will see in greater development and detail, the ought is the behavior man 
should engage in with respect to his self and his neighbor. The ought reflects how he 
should act, what he should do out of respect for himself and his neighbor as he responds 
to the call of the other. 
2
 E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity. Originally published as Totalite et Infini in 1961. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
1969. 
18 PART ONE: THE ETHICAL DEMAND 
 
 
Essence3 and his minor works and interviews including Humanism of the 
Other4, Ethics and Infinity5 and Conversations with Emmanuel Levinas, 
1983-19946 to explore what he calls the ethical demand. In establishing the 
ethical demand between persons, human beings in relation with each other, 
we will consider the problematic of totality, the face of the other and the 
ethical command. In other words we will be studying the ontologies of the 
human person, the relation with other persons and the origins of that 
relation. It will then be from the “ethical demand” that we will begin to 
formulate the system of ethics that promotes, supports and protects human 
dignity. 
1. The Problem of Totality 
Levinas approaches the ontology of the human person, which he refers to 
as totality, by way of the question of metaphysics. Right away in Totality 
and Infinity, he introduces the problematic of the ontology of the human 
person in terms of the desire for the invisible:  
“The true life is absent.” But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is 
maintained in this alibi. It is turned toward the “elsewhere” and the 
“otherwise” and the “other.” For in the most general form it has assumed in 
the history of thought it appears as a movement going forth from a world that 
is familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that it 
hides from view, from an “at home” [“chez soi”] which we inhabit, toward an 
alien outside-of-oneself [hors-de-soi], toward a yonder.7 
What Levinas proposes in this paragraph is that the human being seeks to 
make that which is other a part of himself. Man desires the other, that 
which is seen and unseen, and desires it in such a way that the other 
becomes object to man’s desires. Levinas is quick to distinguish between 
                                           
3
 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Originally published as 
Autrement qu’être. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Duquesne University Press, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 1981. 
4
 E. LEVINAS, Humanism of the Other. Originally published as Humanisme de l’autre 
humme in 1972. Translated by Nidra Poller. University of Illinois Press. 2003. 
5
 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. Originally published as Ethique et infini in 1982. 
Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
1985. 
6
 DE SAINT CHERON, Michaël. Conversations with Emmanuel Levinas, 1983-1994. 
Originally published as Entretiens avec Emmanuel Lévinas. Duquesne University Press, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 2010. 
7 E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity. p. 33. 
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the desire of objects that may be appropriated by man and the desire for the 
other man or an-other. I submit that he takes an unconventional approach as 
he discusses the study and understanding of metaphysics:  
The other metaphysically desired is not “other” like the bread I eat, the land in 
which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate, like, sometimes, myself for 
myself, this “I,” that “other.” I can “feed” on these realities and to a very great 
extent satisfy myself, as though I had simply been lacking them. Their alterity 
is thereby reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor.8 
Here Levinas acknowledges that there is a difference between the objects 
of man’s desire, which fall into two categories. The first category may be 
regarded as that of the objects, that which can be assumed, consumed, 
enjoyed, contemplated, incorporated, etc. This category refers to the likes 
of food or things that would sustain man’s being in the world.  
The other category of man’s desires is not an object at all, but what 
Levinas calls absolutely other. He speaks of the alterity of the absolutely 
other in terms of the metaphysical desire: “The metaphysical desire tends 
towards something else entirely, toward the absolutely other.”9 It is here 
that we begin to understand that the movement towards a yonder is not the 
desire to sustain himself with the objects found in his world, but rather the 
movement is toward a being that is absolutely other-wise than the being 
that he himself is.  
What does this mean? Is this a tautological statement? In order to answer 
these questions, we must follow Levinas on his metaphysical journey, 
which includes an understanding of desire as the base upon which one and 
the other10 come into relation. Levinas acknowledges the desire that may be 
quenched but contends that that desire differs from the metaphysical desire 
that brings man into relation with the other. He says that metaphysical 
desire cannot be satisfied11, rather “it desires beyond everything that can 
simply complete it. It is like goodness – the Desired does not fulfill it, but 
deepens it.”12 According to Levinas, the desire that can be quenched or 
                                           
8 Ibid., p. 33. 
9 Ibid., p. 33. 
10  From now on I will use other (the italicized word “other”) to mean man’s 
neighbor, the being who refers to himself as I just as man does in the first person; that is 
to say that I will use other to reference other human beings in relation with man as the 
first person, the point of departure for an ontological study into the nature of man’s 
being and his relationship with other human beings. 
11 Ibid., p. 34. 
12 Ibid., p. 34. 
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satiated is desire for an object that is inconsequential to the intrinsic being 
of he who desires; on the other hand, the desire for that which cannot be 
used for satisfaction or satiation, represents a desire for that which cannot 
be truly anticipated or replicated.  
Levinas discusses it in terms of remoteness, as something toward which 
man moves not truly understanding the implications of the movement and 
where it may take him.13 Man moves towards the Desired anyway. Levinas 
then explains that which man desires and the implications it has on his 
being in terms of visibility [and invisibility]. In short, that which is visible 
may satisfy man’s desires in the now, but it is a desire that has no lasting 
effect or impact on man’s being. But the desire for that which man cannot 
readily see or perceive is the metaphysical desire that may not be quenched 
but rather deepened and consequently enriching man’s being; in this case 
he says the desire is absolute.14 For Levinas “[i]nvisibility does not denote 
an absence of relation; it simply implies relations with what is not given, of 
which there is no idea. Vision is an adequation of the idea with the thing, a 
comprehension that encompasses.”15 In not being able to see or perceive 
that which man desires, the implication is that man desires that which 
cannot satisfy him in any way that may be articulated in terms of his 
senses. That which satisfies man’s thirst, hunger or urges cannot inspire 
him to transcendence, that is to say, move beyond a state of being where he 
is focused on satisfying those senses.16 
According to Levinas, “[B]esides the hunger one satisfies, the thirst one 
quenches, and the senses one allays, metaphysics desires the other beyond 
satisfactions, where no gesture by the body to diminish the aspiration is 
possible, where it is not possible to sketch out any known caress nor invent 
any new caress.”17 Levinas then explains that man’s desire for that which 
cannot simply satisfy him is an understanding of the remoteness of the 
                                           
13 “This remoteness is radical only if desire s not the possibility of anticipating the 
desirable, if it does not think it beforehand, if it goes toward it aimlessly, that is, as 
toward an absolute, unanticipatable alterity, as one goes forth unto death” (Ibid., p. 34). 
14 “Desire is absolute if the desiring being is mortal and the Desired is  invisible” 
(Ibid., p. 34). 
15 Ibid., p. 34. 
16 While transcendence is not the aim of our system of corporate ethics, we must 
admit that the I who acts in accordance with his responsibility to and for the other 
participates in the experiential world in such a way that his transcendence is actualize. 
17 Ibid., p. 34. 
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other, the absolute alterity of the other18; in other words, in man’s desire 
for the other, he understands on an existential level that the other is wholly 
other and may only enrich his experience of the world and enrich the being 
that he is. Levinas relates the depth and enrichment that man may 
experience in his desire for the other in terms of height: “The very 
dimension of height is opened up by metaphysical Desire. That this height 
is no longer the heavens by the Invisible is the very elevation of height and 
its nobility.”19 The very desire for the other, while enriching his experience 
of the world, enables a moment of transcendence for him, a movement 
from the being that did not have a metaphysical desire, a desire that cannot 
simply be quenched, to a being that desires that which is absolutely other 
than his being. 
In fact, the metaphysical desire is the very foundation of ethics. It is in 
his metaphysical desire that man is freed from the objects that satisfy, 
quench and satiate him. And it is from this vantage point that Levinas 
points out the folly and dangers of contemporary man:  
Demented pretension to the invisible, when the acute experience of the human 
in the twentieth century teaches that the thoughts of men are borne by needs 
which explain society and history, that hunger and fear can prevail over every 
human resistance and every freedom! There is no question of doubting this 
human misery, this dominion the things and the wicked exercise over man, 
this animality. But to be a man is to know that this is so. Freedom consists in 
knowing that freedom is in peril.20 
Without delving into the problematic or ontology of freedom per se, let us 
look at this statement in terms of a desire for things that may satisfy, 
quench and satiate versus the metaphysical desire for that which is 
absolutely other and, therefore, unattainable in se. Why does the 
metaphysical desire release or free us from the desires that may be 
satisfied? The response is in Levinas’ use of the term “animality.” Man is a 
thinking, self-aware being that is always on a quest to improve (transcend) 
himself. Even if the individual person does not or cannot articulate this 
truth, it remains that he is constantly moving towards being qua being, 
unlike animals that, as far as we know, are occupied with the work of 
satisfying, quenching and satiating their basic needs.  
                                           
18  “A desire without satisfaction which, precisely, understands [entend] the 
remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority of the other” (Ibid., 34). 
19 Ibid., p. 34. 
20 Ibid., p. 35. 
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The movement towards being as such frees man from his animal-like 
physical nature and appeals to his metaphysical nature; that movement 
frees him, and that freedom is in peril because he can choose desires that 
satisfy over the metaphysical desire. In this way, freedom is not free and it 
is not guaranteed, but it is a possibility and within reach by way of the 
desire for that which is absolutely other. 
To better understand the other, his alterity and the metaphysical desire, 
we must understand the other in terms of transcendence, as radically non-
totalizing. We must understand the other in terms of transcendence because 
it is in transcendence that we have an idea or notion of him as a being that 
is beyond an object or an instrument to be used. In doing so, we must take 
into account the vocabulary that Levinas uses in his explanation: the 
metaphysician is man in the first person, the I whose relation with the other 
is under investigation. Levinas leads into this use of vocabulary by first 
discussing transcendence saying, “This absolute exteriority of the 
metaphysical term, the irreducibility of movement to an inward play, to a 
simple presence of self to self, is, if not demonstrated, claimed by the word 
transcendent. The metaphysical movement is transcendent, and 
transcendence, like desire and inadequation, is necessarily a 
transcendence.”21 Transcendence can then be characterized as the I seeking 
a better, more adequate self. 
1.1  The Metaphysician 
Levinas introduces the importance of the “metaphysician” saying,  
The transcendence with which the metaphysician designates it is distinctive in 
that the distance it expresses, unlike all distances, enters into the way of 
existing of the exterior being. Its formal characteristic, to be other, makes up 
its content. Thus the metaphysician and the other can not be totalized. The 
metaphysician is absolutely separate.22  
Levinas relates the metaphysician, the I in the proper sense of the term, to 
the other perceived as exteriority, to that distance that the exteriority of the 
other demands. 
Levinas takes care to clarify that the metaphysician and the other cannot 
be totalized, which is to say that they cannot and do not complete each 
other or bring each other to a state of total [or absolute] being. They cannot 
                                           
21 Ibid., p. 35. 
22 Ibid., p. 35. 
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do this for one another because they are absolutely other and strange 
entities as they regard each other. Transcendence is a movement toward an 
acceptance of the alterity of the other who is absolutely other; it is in the 
desire for the alterity of the other that the metaphysician realizes and 
appreciates his own alterity not just in his presentation to the other, but in 
relation to his own self-awareness. One and the other are not to be 
considered as correlative or reversible:  
The metaphysician and the other do not constitute a simple correlation, which 
would be reversible. The reversibility of a relation where the terms are 
indifferently read from left to right and from right to left would couple them 
the one to the other; they would complete one another in a system visible from 
the outside.23  
The metaphysician and the other are not correlative or reversible; indeed, if 
that were the case, the transcendence they would experience would actually 
be “reabsorbed into the unity of the system, destroying the radical alterity 
of the other.”24 In other words, if the metaphysician and the other were 
reversible and correlative, neither would be absolutely other to each other. 
As it is, both the metaphysician and the other are absolutely other to each 
other; they both perceive each other’s alterity, exteriority and the distance 
that alterity and exteriority demand. According to Totality and Infinity, the 
metaphysician and the other are both absolute in their existence – neither is 
dependent on the other for their existence. 
But while the metaphysician and the other are the same in nature, they 
must always be considered separately because they exist regardless25 of 
each other. They are the same in this regard but contemporaneously wholly 
separate: 
Irreversibility does not only mean that the same goes unto the other differently 
than the other unto the same. That eventuality does not enter into account: the 
radical separation between the same and the other means precisely that it is 
impossible to place oneself outside of the correlation between the same and 
the other so as to record the correspondence or the non-correspondence of this 
                                           
23 Ibid., p. 35. 
24 Ibid., p. 35. 
25 When I say regardless of the other, I mean that one is not contingent 
on the other; this does not take into account parental relationships. We are 
talking about the ontological nature of man, not his biological generation. 
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going with this return. Otherwise the same and the other would be reunited 
under one gaze, and the absolute distance that separates them filled in.26 
The sameness resides in that they both have characteristics of alterity, 
exteriority, metaphysical desire and shared transcendence. As Levinas 
points out, if the metaphysician and the other were indeed the same and 
reversible, there would be no alterity or exteriority, and, in turn, there 
would not be any distance between one and the other. They would not only 
be correlative and reversible, but they would be complementary beings. 
Instead, according to Levinas, the metaphysician and the other maintain 
their separate alterity. 
1.2  The I 
We come to a more elaborate understanding of the alterity of both the 
metaphysician and the other as Levinas explores the significance of the I in 
their regard. The I is the universal point of departure for every being who 
recognizes themselves with respect to the others whom they encounter. 
Levinas writes,  
The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other 
is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of 
departure, so serve as entry into the relation, to be the same not relatively but 
absolutely. A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of 
relationship only as I.27 
In identifying the I that is relative [and necessary] for all beings who can 
designate themselves as I when in relation with another, Levinas hones in 
on the key to man’s alterity and sameness. Man has the unique capability of 
identifying himself as the I of his world – that will never change. For as 
long as he exists as the manifestation of the being that he is, he will always 
refer to himself as I because he is always going to be his own point of 
departure, his own first and most authentic point of reference. Therefore, he 
can never shed this quality of self-designation, identification and reference, 
especially in relation with the other. Levinas explains the nature of the I as 
follows: 
To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be derived from a 
system of references, to have identity as one’s content. The I is not a being 
that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in 
                                           
26 Ibid., p. 36. 
27 Ibid., p. 36. 
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identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It 
is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification.28 
The sameness comes in the fact that the other too is a metaphysician 
referring to himself as I. And because both the metaphysician and the other 
both refer to themselves as the I of their world and experience, they oppose 
each other. This is where we can perceive the natural distance and the 
exteriority of the metaphysician and the other, in their mutual insistence on 
the self-designation of the I. Never will one concede the confrontation and 
refer to himself as anything other than I. 
Additionally, it is in the I that the metaphysician begins to distinguish his 
place in the world versus his home within himself:  
Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se tenir], not as the famous 
serpent grasping itself by biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth 
exterior to it, holds itself up [se tient] and can. The “at home” [Le “chez soi”] 
is not a container but a site where I can, where, dependent on a reality that is 
other, I am, despite this dependence or thanks to it, free.29 
The home of the I is in the very act of self-identification, but it is while in 
relation with the other that the locus of the metaphysician is designated. 
The site or the metaphysician’s place in the world is relative to the other, 
not to himself. He has already established in the self-designation of the I 
that he is his own point of departure and reference. His home is dependent 
on the other insofar as the other inspires him to self-designation; if there 
were no other, would the metaphysician need to designate himself as the I 
of his world? Probably not. Therefore, only in this way does the home 
depend on the other. 
Furthermore, home continues to highlight the alterity of the other insofar 
as home has a connotation and an expectation of possession. We have 
already demonstrated that the other, being absolutely other and designating 
himself as an I from his point of departure in relating to the world, cannot 
be assumed or made to satisfy the desires of the metaphysician. As such the 
other cannot be possessed. For Levinas,  
The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is 
only at first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the same. I am at 
home with myself in the world because it offers itself to or resists possession. 
                                           
28 Ibid., p. 36. 
29 Ibid., p. 36. 
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(What is absolutely other does not only resist possession, but contests it, and 
accordingly can consecrate it.)30  
As we will come to appreciate later in the chapter, while the metaphysician 
can invite the other into his home (as he grapples with his metaphysical 
desires for the other), the metaphysician will never possess the other in his 
home because the other has every right and possibility to reject the 
invitation or, after having accepted, decide to leave. The alterity of the 
other makes possessing him an impossibility. Again, in man referring to 
himself as I, he is stating that he is already at home; you cannot possess 
someone who is already at home within their very self. 
It is in man’s totality as a being in se that he has the means by which he 
may be in relation with the other and have the other present his face. The 
totality of man’s being is made manifest in the face. 
2.  The Face of the Other 
As we delve into Levinas’ philosophy of the face, we will keep the 
concept of the absolute other and the relation between the same and other 
at the fore of the conversation. We will make the connection between the 
absolute other and “the face” by way of linguistic expression – 
conversation, which we will see is the manifestation of the relation between 
the metaphysician and the other. This is key to the philosophy of the face 
because, for Levinas, “The absolutely other is the Other. He and I do not 
form a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not a plural 
of the ‘I.’ I, you – these are not individuals of a common concept.”31 This 
gives us more evidence of each person’s autonomy, both of the 
metaphysician32 and of the other, with respect to each other. By means of 
his philosophy of the face, Levinas highlights the separateness of the 
metaphysician and the other despite the sameness they share. He makes a 
distinction between the two when he refers to the other as a stranger 
saying, “I, you – these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither 
possession nor the unity of number nor the concepts link me to the Stranger 
[l’Etranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le 
                                           
30 Ibid., p. 38. 
31 Ibid., p. 39. 
32 The metaphysician is the I who realizes who and what he is in the face of self-
awareness and reflection as well as in the face of the other. 
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chez soi].”33 We understand the I to be the metaphysician and the you to be 
the other. He takes the opportunity to use common pronouns to 
demonstrate the very concept of sameness and separateness.  
2.1  The Stranger 
Beyond reiterating the point of the metaphysician never being able to 
refer to himself as anything other than I, Levinas extends the separateness 
to the extreme of calling the other a stranger. What does he mean by 
stranger? The stranger is not just the other who disturbs the I’s being at 
home within himself, but the stranger is also he whom the I cannot 
dominate. Levinas writes, 
But Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power. He escapes 
my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is 
not wholly in my site. But I, who have no concept in common with the 
Stranger, am, like him, without genus. We are the same and the other.34  
The other is not only absolutely other, the other is a stranger because the 
metaphysician, the I, has no power over the other. The inability to wield 
power over the other, or rather the impotency of the I with respect to the 
other creates a strange situation in which the I must confront the other as a 
being of the same genus but of absolutely separate existents. Moreover, it is 
not necessarily the case that the metaphysician has no power over the other 
but rather that they are both confronting each other from their own I as 
point of view, which points to the fact for each of them, they are their own 
I and the encounter with the other, an encounter with an other of absolute 
alterity.  
In other words, the power that they each have to approach objects in their 
world based on desire, satisfaction, quenching and satiation stops when they 
confront each other because neither of them may be used for these ends. 
Rather, in their confrontation, they are seeking within each other a 
transcendental experience. Transcendence is not about power; rather it is 
about enriching the experience of being. The transcendence that each person 
seeks is the enrichment of the way in which they exist in the exteriority of 
their being, or better yet, the way in which they exist in relation to other 
beings. 
                                           
33 Ibid., p. 39. 
34 Ibid., p. 39. 
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2.2  Language 
At this point we must consider how the metaphysician and the other 
relate to each other, what the means are by which their transcendence is 
realized. The answer to the question “how” is language, but Levinas also 
explains why when he says,  
… the relation between the same and the other – upon which we seem to 
impose such extraordinary conditions – is language. For language 
accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within this 
relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains 
transcendent to the same.35 
Levinas says that language is the relation, but I would argue that language 
is not the relation but rather the means for relating; I would even go so far 
as to say that language is the manifestation of the relation. Beyond referring 
to the relation as language, Levinas also refers to it as metaphysics when he 
says that the relation between the same and the other “is primordially 
enacted as conversation…”36 The metaphysics is realized when either the 
metaphysician or the other go beyond themselves, beyond their home, to 
engage in conversation with the other.37 
As we have already witnessed in Levinas’ philosophy, the I and the other 
never form a whole together because, while of the same genus, their 
absolute alterity makes them absolutely other in relation to each other. 
Even in conversation, they cannot form a totality, but instead of a totality, 
they establish an understanding of each other, an understanding of their 
sameness and separateness, thus forming a basis for mutual respect [and 
co-existence]. Levinas writes, 
A relation whose terms do not form a totality can hence be produced within 
the general economy of being only as proceeding from the I to the other, as a 
face to face, as delineating a distance in depth – that of conversation, of 
goodness, of Desire – irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the 
understanding establishes between the diverse terms, other with respect to one 
another, that lend themselves to its synoptic operation.38 
                                           
35 Ibid., p. 39. 
36 Ibid., p. 39. 
37 “The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted 
as conversation, where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an ‘I,’ as a particular 
existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself” (Ibid., p. 39). 
38 Ibid., p. 39. 
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The mutual respect that they have for one another originates in their 
common metaphysical desire, so they move towards each other and come 
face-to-face, neither having power over the other. They approach each 
other as if attracted by transcendence:  
The I is not a contingent formation by which the same and the other, as logical 
determinations of being, can in addition be reflected within a thought. It is in 
order that alterity be produced in being that a “thought” is needed and that an I 
is needed. The irreversibility of the relation can be produced only if the 
relation is effected by one of the terms as the very moment of transcendence, 
as the traversing of this distance, and not as a recording of, or the 
psychological invention of this movement.39 
As such, the I is the expression of the reality of their totality as beings. The 
I is not contingent on anything, let alone the other because the I is already 
fully realized in the realization and identification of the metaphysician on 
his side as well as the other on his side. Both beings are I in their own right, 
which means that they also understand that for another I, they are a you. 
The psychological movement is towards this understanding and eventual 
respect for the other. 
2.3  Moving Towards the Other 
Moving towards the other based on a metaphysical desire implies in the 
very least that the metaphysician perceives something towards which he 
can move – he ascertains that there is something other than himself. At this 
point Levinas guides us through the quagmire of man’s sensibility, the 
language man uses to express it and the reasons why that language is 
inappropriate and feeble with respect to the other. He starts with 
objectification – man objectifies other beings that he encounters in his 
experience of the world insofar as he uses them to satisfy, quench and 
satiate base desires40, those desires that, unlike metaphysical desire, cannot 
inspire him to transcendence. For Levinas “[t]his mode of life is not to be 
interpreted in function of objectification. Sensibility is not a fumbling 
objectification. Enjoyment, by essence satisfied, characterizes all 
sensations whose representational content dissolves into their affective 
                                           
39 Ibid., p. 39. 
40 Base desires include but are not limited to wanting things like chocolate, sex, 
alcohol, etc. 
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content.”41 As such that which man objectifies may be enjoyed [and later 
discarded] because that which satisfies appeals to man’s senses. He writes: 
The very distinction between representational and affective content is 
tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other 
than that of perception. But we can speak of enjoyment or of sensation even in 
the domain of vision and audition, when one has seen or heard much, and the 
object revealed by the experiences is steeped in the enjoyment – or suffering – 
of pure sensation, in which one has bathed and lived as in qualities without 
support. The notion of sensation is thus somewhat rehabilitated.42 
The distinction between representational and affective content is the 
distinction between the desires that may be satisfied and the metaphysical 
desire. The object of the former may be enjoyed insofar as it satisfies, 
quenches and satiates, but on the other hand, the latter may be enjoyed 
insofar as it enables man to have an enriched experience of being as such.  
Man desires food because it satiates hunger, and in this way it may be 
enjoyed, but food does not inspire transcendence; conversely, the relation 
with the other may still be enjoyed because it is through the relation with 
the other that the I may enjoy and appreciate his own existence in a way 
that inspires him to move beyond his desires towards being qua being. 
2.4  The I and his senses 
Levinas further clarifies the assertion when he refers to the sensation of 
enjoyment as a becoming, a movement towards being as such:  
[…] sensation recovers a “reality” when we see in it not the subjective 
counterpart of objective qualities, but an enjoyment “anterior” to the 
crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and object. This 
crystallization occurs not as the ultimate finality of enjoyment but as a 
moment of its becoming, to be interpreted in terms of enjoyment.43 
The question of I and non-I and subject/object relationship comes into play 
in this exact moment because if man sees things in terms of his enjoyment, 
he will tend to objectify in order to be satisfied, quenched and satiated.  
As man sees what he desires, he tends to grasp for it, apprehend it and 
comprehend it. But the other may not be seen, grasped at, apprehended or 
comprehended:  
                                           
41 Ibid., p. 187. 
42 Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
43 Ibid., p. 188. 
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As Heidegger, after St. Augustine, pointed out, we use the term vision 
indifferently for every experience, even when it involves other senses than 
sight. And we also use the grasp in this privileged sense. Idea and concept 
cover with the whole of experience. This interpretation of experience on the 
basis of vision and touch is not due to chance and can accordingly expand into 
a civilization.44 
As Levinas (and his predecessors) have noted, we use sensory vocabulary 
to describe our experiences of the other beings we encounter in our world 
as well as the other himself. Before becoming too critical of man and his 
use of vocabulary, we must admit that man speaks of the world in terms 
that are relative to how he experiences it.  
So he says, he touches, he hears, etc; as such man does not set out to 
objectify that which he encounters in his experience of the world, but rather 
he is speaking from the only perspective that he has, which is that of the 
first person and perceives through his senses. Levinas too justifies this 
tendency when he says, “It is incontestable that objectification operates in 
the gaze in a privileged way; it is not certain that its tendency to inform 
every experience is inscribed, and unequivocably so, in being.” 45  But 
Levinas also says that just because the objectification originates from the 
privileged I does not necessitate that the I has objectified every being 
whom he encounters. 
2.5  Seeking the Other 
There is a certain wisdom that originates from the I’s tendency to seek 
the other: “The comprehension of an existent consists in precisely going 
beyond the existent, into the open. To comprehend the particular being is to 
apprehend it out of an illuminated site it does not fill.”46 As the I reaches 
for the other, he also recognizes the autonomy and absolute otherness of 
the other as he goes outside of himself to do so; there is an intrinsic 
understanding that in having to go beyond his own being to reach and relate 
to the other, the other is completely separate from the I and cannot be made 
to be incorporated, assumed, apprehended or otherwise fully comprehended 
by the I. Not only that, the existence of the other illuminates the space in 
                                           
44 Ibid., p. 188. 
45 Ibid., p. 188. 
46 Ibid., p. 190. 
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which he exists.47 The existence of the other gives the space, the opening in 
which the I is reaching out, form or light because, as Levinas explains it, it 
is through the I’s vision (his point of view and sense of sight) that he 
attempts to see and understand.  
Levinas further elaborates saying that vision is not the only tool seeking 
a relation with the other; the sense of touch is particularly relevant in the 
process by means of which the I takes hold of things: 
Illuminated space is not the absolute interval. The connection between vision 
and touch, between representation and labor, remains essential. Vision moves 
to grasp. Vision opens upon a perspective, upon a horizon, and describes a 
traversable distance, invites the hand to movement and to contact, and ensures 
them.48 
However, contrary to the information that the I’s senses provide him, the 
other still eludes his grasp and his vision insofar as the other does not 
assume a form that may be seen or grasped. Levinas explains, “The forms 
of objects call for the hand and the grasp. By the hand the object is in the 
end comprehended, touched, taken, borne and referred to other objects, 
clothed with a signification, by reference to other objects.”49 So not only 
does the other not have a form that may be grasped, seen, comprehended or 
apprehended by the I, but the other may not be understood or perceived in 
reference to other objects that the I sees or grasps. 
It is in traversing space that the I and other relate to each other50, and it is 
through the relation that the I experiences transcendence. This is to say, the 
I is not inspired to transcendence by way of perception (vision and 
awareness) or the grasping of an object that he encounters in his world:  
Vision is not a transcendence. It ascribes a signification by the relation it 
makes possible. It opens nothing that, beyond the same, would be absolutely 
other, that is, in itself. Light conditions the relations between data; it makes 
possible the signification of objects that border one another. It does not enable 
one to approach them face to face.51 
                                           
47 Levinas uses the word “illuminate,” but perhaps “inform” may be equally useful in 
explaining this concept. 
48 Ibid., p. 191. 
49 Ibid., p. 191. 
50  “Empty space is the condition for this relationship; it is not a breach of the 
horizon” (Ibid., p. 191). 
51 Ibid., p. 191. 
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In other words, the other may not be ascribed any category or 
denomination by the I or the sense he uses to bring objects to himself. The I 
cannot bring the other to himself because the other is wholly separate and 
absolutely other. The only way in which the I may approach the other and 
enjoy an encounter, a relationship, is through a face-to-face encounter. The 
face-to-face encounter is the meeting in which the I approaches the other 
with the awareness and recognition of the other’s intrinsic and natural 
autonomy. 
2.6  The I, the Other and Intuition 
Finally, as it relates to space and the perception of the other’s existence 
and presence, we must consider how Levinas introduces intuition as a 
means of acknowledging a connection between the I’s vision and his 
awareness of having to traverse space to reach the other with whom he 
seeks relation: 
Intuition, taken in this very general sense, is not opposed to the thought of 
relations. It is already relationship, since it is vision; it catches sight of the 
space across which things are transported toward one another. Space, instead 
of transporting beyond, simply ensures the condition for the lateral 
signification of things within the same.52 
Intuition, as Levinas describes it, is the point at which vision, recognition 
of space and the sense of the other’s alterity come together. This 
connection allows the I to perceive the difference between an object that 
may be seen and grasped and ultimately used to satisfy his desires in 
contrast to the other whom he cannot objectify but with whom he may be 
in relation in an attempt to satisfy the metaphysical desire for 
transcendence. 
2.7  The Face 
At this point we move away from the perception of the other and discuss 
the other in terms of the face he presents in and of itself. As we have 
already acknowledged based on Levinas’ writings, neither the I nor the 
other take a form that may be seen, grasped, comprehended or 
apprehended; it is in their total alterity that they remain foreign to these 
types of objectification. But the question persists: how does the I perceive 
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the other and vice versa? The answer begins to emerge in the following 
explanation given by Levinas: 
Total alterity, in which a being does not refer to enjoyment and presents itself 
out of itself, does not shine forth in the form by which things are given to us, 
for beneath form things conceal themselves. The surface can be transformed 
into an interior: one can melt the metal of things to make new objects of them, 
utilize wood of a box to make a table out of it by chopping, sawing, planing: 
the hidden becomes open and the open becomes hidden. ... But in fact the 
depth of the thing can have no other meaning than that of its matter, and the 
revelation of matter is essentially superficial.53 
The form that the I and the other take cannot be relegated to the form given 
objects that can satisfy, quench or satiate man’s desires; instead the form 
that the I and the other take is one that is intrinsically transcendent. The 
form is intrinsically transcendent because it cannot be made into anything 
other than what it is. The form is cast by the very being of the I and other, 
but it is cast in such a way that renders the being of the I and other present 
to each other and available for relationship. 
Levinas explains the form of man’s being by drawing on the metaphor of 
architecture and the façade of a building: 
It is art that endows things with something like a façade – that by which 
objects are not only seen, but are as objects on exhibition. The darkness of 
matter would denote the state of a being that precisely has no façade. The 
notion of façade borrowed from building suggests to us that architecture is 
perhaps the first of the fine arts. But in it is constituted the beautiful, whose 
essence is indifference, cold splendor, and silence.54 
Here we begin to see how the forms of the I and other relate to the being 
itself – the façade does not make the architecture what it is; intead, it allows 
the architecture to be realized and perceived as such. As with the form of 
the I and other the façade is indeed indifferent, cold and silent to the 
observer. In other words, while recognizing the limitations of this 
metaphor, we can say that like the form of man, the façade is what it is 
regardless of who or what encounters it, it does not change or bend and it 
may not be grasped or apprehended.  
Going beyond the confines of the metaphor of the façade and 
architecture, the I is affected by the encounter with the other insofar as he 
is inspired to transcendence: “The relation with the Other alone introduces 
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a dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally different 
from experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist.”55 
And what is transcendence but being open to that which is unknown and 
perhaps other to the I? In explaining transcendence, Levinas says that it 
“cuts across sensibility” and is open “preeminently.”56 This encounter can 
only happen when the two façades meet. It is through the presentation of 
the façade or the manifestation of the face of the I and other that the two 
similar and separate beings can relate to each other, and this is so because 
the I and other offer these façades to the other as a means of relation: 
“Inasmuch as the access to beings concerns vision, it dominates those 
beings, exercises a power over them. A thing is given, offers itself to me. In 
gaining access to it I maintain myself within the same.”57 In this sense, the 
face of man (the I and the other) is a representation of the metaphysical 
desire for transcendence as well as the separateness and absolute alterity of 
the other. 
2.8  The ontology of the face 
So far we have discussed the face as it relates to it being presented to and 
perceived by the I or the other according to the point of view of the 
relation. To clarify Levinas’ philosophy of the face, we must dig deeper 
into the ontology of the face as it relates to the being who it represents. 
Levinas contends that the face as manifestation in the world is not an 
accident to the soul or essence of the being, but rather is part and parcel to 
the being as such. Referring to the body, the outward expression and 
manifestation of the being that is man, he says: “The body does not happen 
as an accident to the soul. … Appearing to representation as a thing among 
things, the body is in fact the mode in which a being, neither spatial nor 
foreign to geometrical or physical extension, exists separately.”58 But if the 
face (or body) is not an accident of the soul, then what is it? 
In an attempt to provide an answer, let us return to the idea of 
transcendence as Levinas explains it. He says, “…if its vision is the vision 
of the very openness of being, it cuts across the vision of forms and can be 
stated neither in terms of contemplation nor in terms of practice. It is the 
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face; its revelation is speech.” 59  The face is transcendence, and it is 
revealed in speech.  
Levinas’ explanation becomes more intelligible as we take into account 
the section entitled “The Same and the Other”: 
The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to contemporary 
ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression: the 
existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread 
out in its “form” the totality of its “content,” finally abolishing the distinction 
between form and content.60 
The face is neither the form nor the content of the being that is man; 
instead, the face is the realization and manifestation of man’s being in the 
world. And the truth to which Levinas refers is simply man’s existence; the 
truth that the face asserts is the alterity and autonomy of man’s being from 
the other whom he encounters. 
2.9  The Invitation 
The face welcomes the other as he approaches him in conversation, in an 
invitation to be in relationship. It is in his very expression that this 
invitation is extended: “To approach the Other in conversation is to 
welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a 
thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the Other 
beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of 
infinity.”61 And it is based on this reciprocal invitation (that may always be 
refused or rejected) that Levinas presents us the idea of infinity. What is 
infinity but the very openness to the other and the metaphysical desire for 
transcendence? 
In this way, the face is nude because it is the utter disclosure of man’s 
being to the world. The presentation of the face in an encounter with the 
other is a revelation and epiphany – the face of the other simply is 
regardless of any reference that the I may be inclined to assign to it: “The 
nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me because I disclose it, 
what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my eyes, to my 
perceptions, in a light exterior to it. The face has turned to me – and this is 
its very nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to a system.”62 Levinas 
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60 Ibid., p. 51. 
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contends that the nakedness of the face extends to the nakedness of the 
body of which it is ashamed.63 But perhaps it is not so much ashamed as it 
is protective and demanding? 
It is in this nakedness, protectiveness, shame and utter vulnerability that 
the face makes the ethical demand as he relates to the other. 
3. The Ethical Demand 
3.1  The Face and Transcendence 
Given that the face, in its nakedness, is destitute, hungry and absolutely 
other64, it demands to be recognized for its alterity and separateness. As 
Levinas put it, the “gaze” that passes between the I and the other in a face-
to-face encounter is the origin of the supplication and demand to be 
recognized: “This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate 
only because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to 
everything, and which one recognizes in giving (as one ‘puts the things in 
question in giving;) – this gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face as a 
face.” 65  Yet the gaze is more than a supplication or a demand to be 
recognized, it is a demand to be respected, honored and treated as the 
absolutely other being that it is (always as it relates to the other). 
In representing its absolute alterity, the face does several things, the first 
being a refusal to be objectified: “The face is present in its refusal to be 
contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It 
is neither seen nor touched – for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of 
the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a 
content.”66 The face of the other may be perceived by the I in terms of 
stimulating visual and tactile sensation (seen and touched) but it cannot be 
otherwise objectified on account of its absolute alterity, because of the 
absolute alterity of the being it represents. 
The face also resists objectification insofar as it cannot be owned or 
possessed in any way: “The face resists possession, resists my powers. In 
its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total 
                                           
63 “The nakedness of his face extends into the nakedness of the body that is cold and 
that is ashamed of its nakedness” (Ibid., p. 75). 
64 “The nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to recognize 
a hunger” (Ibid., p. 75). 
65 Ibid., p. 75. 
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resistance to the grasp.”67  While the face may be seen and touched, it 
resists and eludes capture because it is not the being that it represents; 
rather it is a manifestation of that being. And even as it is the form that 
represents the being, the face is “still a thing among things, breaks through 
the form that nevertheless delimits it. This means concretely: the face 
speaks to me and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a 
power exercised, be it enjoyment or knowledge.”68 So even as it refuses 
and resists, the face speaks and invites the face it encounters to relation and 
to the possibility of transcendence. 
The opportunity for transcendence is in the face-to-face encounter since 
it is in that encounter that the I and other recognize their similarity and the 
absolute alterity. And it is in their alterity that the encounter appears to be 
imbalanced – the I perceives the alterity of the other and is unsure of how 
to proceed in the relation because in the alterity of the other the other is his 
very identity. The I perceives that the other identifies himself based on that 
which sets him apart: 
… the relation between me and the other commences in the inequality of 
terms, transcendent to one another, where alterity does not determine the other 
in a formal sense, as where the alterity of B with respect to A results simply 
from the identity of B, distinct from the identity of A. Here the alterity of the 
other does not result from its identity, but constitutes it: the other is the Other. 
The Other qua Other is situated in a dimension of height and of abasement – 
glorious abasement; he has the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow, and 
the orphan, and, at the same time, of the master called to invest and justify my 
freedom.69 
Since the I cannot objectify the other and, therefore, does not fully 
comprehend the existence and manifestation of the other, he cannot help 
but elevate the other to a height greater than that of the objects he possesses 
and uses to satisfy, quench and satiate his desires. The quality of the alterity 
of the other that inspires that elevation is the mystery.70 The I can never say 
that he knows or understands the other. The I may perceive (see and touch) 
                                           
67 Ibid., p. 197. 
68 Ibid., p. 198. 
69 Ibid., p. 251. 
70 “And it is only man who could be absolutely foreign to me – refractory to every 
typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification – and 
consequently the term of a ‘knowledge’ finally penetrating beyond the object” (Ibid., p. 73). 
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the face of the other, but he may never grasp, comprehend or apprehend the 
other’s face or his being.  
It is in the face of the other that he is made known to the I, but like the 
very being of the other, his face is not an object and, therefore, may not be 
objectified or used to satisfy, quench or satiate the I’s desires. In contrast, 
the face may facilitate the transcendence of both the I and the other, the 
movement towards a deeper and more acute sense of being as it relates to 
the experience of the world and realization of being qua being. 
3.2  The Face, Absolute Alterity and Infinity 
According to Levinas, the imbalance between the I and the other, the 
mystery that exists between them as they relate to each other is in their very 
ability to oppose each other, to make the demand and the obligation to 
abide by that opposition and demand. Equally disturbing or perplexing to 
the I is the other’s infinity as it relates to his transcendence. Because the 
face cannot be contained and indeed resists objectification, this presents an 
infinity of alterity as well as an infinity to openness: “The Other remains 
infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face which his epiphany is 
produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be 
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed 
by our existence.”71 The face is the expression of the infinity that Levinas 
has described because it expresses the overflow of openness and 
transcendence, it expresses an unending welcome to the other and it also 
expresses an indefinite demand to be recognized, respected and honored as 
the being that it is:  
The idea of infinity, the overflowing of finite thought by its content, 
effectuates the relation of thought with what exceeds its capacity, with what at 
each moment it learns without suffering shock. This is the situation we call 
welcome of the face… The relation with the face, with the other absolutely 
other which I can not contain, the other in this sense infinite, is nonetheless my 
Idea, a commerce.72 
The idea of infinity is the source and summit of the ethical demand because 
it encompasses the things on which the I and the other cannot deny or 
oppose each other – the truth of being, the absolute separateness despite 
being similar, the absolute alterity, the fulfillment of the metaphysical 
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desire for transcendence and the inability to relegate any of this to an object 
that may serve or be used to satisfy, quench and satiate. 
To illustrate this point, Levinas refers to the ultimate opposition, namely, 
murder: “Neither the destruction of things, nor the hunt, nor the 
extermination of living beings aims at the face, which is not of the world… 
Murder alone lays claim to total negation.”73 In this sense, the destruction 
of a being does not dominate that being, rather it only negates the being as 
such.  
That negation does not mean the being never existed; instead it means 
the being’s demand for respect and honor for its alterity and absolute 
otherness was too much and the assassin could satisfy the desire for 
domination only by annihilation. As Levinas writes, “To kill is not to 
dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. 
Murder exercises a power over what escapes power… The Other is the sole 
being I can wish to kill.”74 The other is the only being who the I encounters 
that may defy or oppose him. It is only by murder that the other’s defiance 
or opposition may be silenced – it is the only way in which the demand 
may be quieted: “The Other who can sovereignly say no to me is exposed 
to the point of the sword or the revolver’s bullet, and the whole 
unshakeable firmness of his ‘for itself’ with that intransigent no he opposes 
is obliterated because the sword or the bullet has touched the ventricles or 
auricles of his heart.”75 However, before resorting to murder, there may be 
a struggle between the I and the other, a struggle against each other’s 
alterity and demand as well as the mystery of his response or reaction.76 
The opposition, as Levinas explains, is not in terms of having more or 
less strength or force, but in the very infinity of the face: “He thus opposes 
to me not a greater force, an energy assessable and consequently presenting 
itself as though it were part of a whole, but the very transcendence of his 
being by relation to that whole; not some superlative of power, but 
precisely the infinity of his transcendence.” 77  The opposition may be 
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76 “The Other who can sovereignly say no to me is exposed to the point of the sword 
or the revolver’s bullet, and the whole unshakeable firmness of his ‘for itself’ with that 
intransigent no he opposes is obliterated because the sword or the bullet has touched the 
ventricles or auricles of his heart” (Ibid., p. 199). 
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considered a challenge to be in relation with the other and the proposition 
of transcending a state that was comfortable and at home.  
3.3  The Face Welcomes and Resists the Other Infinitely 
In terms of infinity and the face-to-face encounter, the question is not 
about power but rather acknowledgement of the other as absolutely other 
and recognizing what may be taken for vulnerability as an opportunity for 
transcendence: 
This infinity, stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is 
the primordial expression, is the first word: “you shall not commit murder.” 
The infinite paralyses power by its infinite resistance to murder, which, firm 
and insurmountable, pleams in the face of the Other, in the total nudity of his 
defenceless eyes, in the nudity of the absolute openness of the Transcendent. 
There is here a relation not with a very great resistance, but with something 
absolutely other; the resistance of what has no resistance – the ethical 
resistance.78 
As Levinas suggests, the resistance that we may perceive is not necessarily 
a violent opposition but rather a discomfort with the unknown and 
absolutely other other. The resistance may be a question of opening one’s 
home to the other and not knowing how one may be affected – if the 
invitation will be accepted and abused or refused or accepted with a 
reciprocal invitation to openness and transcendence. The ethical resistance 
is not always violent or a threat to the existence of the other, it is resistance 
because an inner change may be in the works. 
Nevertheless, that resistance may be perceived by the other as a threat to 
his existence, to his being – a challenge to the “no” that he expresses in his 
face. At the same time, the “no” is always accompanied with “welcome.” 
These two messages are infinitely expressed in the face, and it is to positive 
effect. Again, Levinas relates this signification or meaning to the prospect of 
murder: 
The impossibility of killing does not have a simply negative and formal 
signification; the relation with infinity, the idea of infinity in us, conditions is 
positively. Infinity presents itself as a face in the ethical resistance that 
paralyses my powers from the depths of defenseless eyes rises firm and 
absolute in its nudity and destitution.79 
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The positive effect is in what Levinas calls the “paralysis” of powers. The I 
lays down his sword against the other when he perceives the infinite 
welcome that is accompanied by the infinite demand for respect because he 
recognizes in the other a similarity. He recognizes in the eyes of the other 
the welcome that he is giving the other as well as the demand for respect. In 
this recognition, the perceived need to kill or annihilate is relieved and 
replaced by the metaphysical desire that can be fulfilled in the face-to-face 
encounter. 
3.4  Beyond the Demand 
Beyond the demand of “you shall not commit murder against me,” is the 
command to take responsibility for the other. I have referred to the face as 
a manifestation of the being that is man, and it is in the explanation of the 
command to take responsibility that this reference will also be defined. The 
face is the phenomenological realization of a metaphysical reality; it is an 
imposition of the self in a phenomenological representation in a world that 
is spoken of and experienced in terms of signs and reference: “The 
phenomenon is the being that appears, but remains absent. It is not an 
appearance, but a reality that lacks reality, still infinitely removed from its 
being.”80 The face as it appears in the phenomenological world may be 
destroyed but that does not destroy the reality of the being that is manifest 
in the face. The face is not of the world but is a manifestation of being in 
the world. The face is, therefore, a point of departure from which man’s 
being relates to the world.  
In terms of an appeal to phenomenology, the face is the means by which 
man expresses his being; however, insofar as we are discussing a 
metaphysical realization, the face is the manifestation of being in an 
experiential world: 
To speak to me is at each moment to surmount what is necessarily plastic in 
manifestation. To manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and 
beyond the manifested and purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a 
mode irreducible to manifestation, the very straightforwardness of the face to 
face, without the intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity, that is, in one’s 
destitution and hunger.81 
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The manifestation of the face in the world of phenomenological 
representation is the realization of man’s poverty and vulnerability in this 
world. However, man as being is not reducible to the face in which his being 
is made manifest. 
As the I “speaks” to the other and they engage in dialogue, they as 
interlocutors reveal themselves to each other, and in doing so, they reveal 
their poverty and vulnerability. (To be clear, their poverty and vulnerability 
refer to their nakedness and to the metaphysical desire for transcendence 
and their search for being qua being; poverty and vulnerability refer to the 
expression of their selves in the manifestation of the face; their poverty and 
vulnerability refer to the exposure of these qualities in the face itself.82) 
According to Levinas, “To manifest oneself in attending one’s own 
manifestation is to invoke the interlocutor and expose oneself to his 
response and his questioning. Expression does not impose itself as a true 
representation or as an action. The being offered in true representation 
remains a possibility of appearance.” 83  It may remain a possibility of 
appearance, but it is still a phenomenological realization of an intrinsic 
truth, that is the being that is man and his relation with being qua being. 
3.5  Freedom and the Exile of Being 
In the experience of the face, expression of and exposure to the other, a 
key component of the ethical demand emerges – freedom: “Thus in 
expression the being that imposes itself does not limit but promotes my 
freedom, by arousing my goodness…”84 How does this happen? How can 
the expression of being promote freedom? The expression of being is the 
expression of the being’s very alterity or, in Levinas’ terms, the strangeness 
of the other. He says, “The strangeness of the Other, his very freedom! Free 
beings alone can be strangers to one another. Their freedom which is 
‘common’ to them is precisely what separates them.”85 The freedom of the 
I and the other as this regards their interaction, engagement and face-to-
face encounter is precisely their separateness and metaphysical desire 
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because it is in their alterity that they are able to welcome each other and 
fulfill each other’s metaphysical desire for transcendence.  
It is in that transcendence that beings can leave the confines of the 
phenomenological experience, the world of sensibility, and enter into what 
Levinas calls the exile of being: “The transcendence of the face is at the 
same time its absence from this world into which it enters, the exiling 
[depaysement] of a being, his condition of being stranger, destitute, or 
proletarian. The strangeness that is freedom is also strangeness-destitution 
[étrangeté-misère].”86 Freedom is the realization of the transcendence by 
accepting and recognizing the alterity of the other; likewise, freedom is in 
the very alterity of the other, in his ability to assert himself to the I and 
present an opposition to the will of the I.  
Levinas brings the idea of freedom back to the presence of being when he 
writes that “[f]reedom presents itself as the other to the same, who is always 
the autochthon of being, always privileged in his own residence. The other, 
the free one, is also the stranger.”87  Freedom as the autochthon of being 
means that it is intrinsic to being, that in and of itself, freedom is inextricably a 
part of being in such a way that no one can violate it without resorting to 
annihilation. 
Without going into the details of Levinas’ discussion about the 
spontaneity of freedom88 and the moral obligation that freedom entails89, 
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88 “For an obstacle to become a fact that requires a theoretical justification or a 
reason the spontaneity of the action that surmounts it had to be inhibited, that is, itself 
put into question. It is then that we move from an activity without regard for anything to 
a consideration of the fact. The famous suspension of action that is said to make theory 
possible depends on a reserve of freedom, which does not abandon itself to its drives, to 
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89 “The spontaneity of freedom is not called in question; its limitation alone is held to be 
tragic and to constitute a scandal. Freedom is called into question only inasmuch as it 
somehow finds itself imposed upon itself: if I could have freely chosen my own existence 
everything would be justified. … The critique of spontaneity engendered by failure, which 
calls in question the central place the I occupies in the world, implies then a power to reflect 
on its failure and on the totality, an uprooting of the I torn up from itself and living in the 
universal. It founds neither theory nor truth; it presupposes them: it proceeds from 
knowledge of the world, is already born from a knowledge, the knowledge of failure… The 
critique of spontaneity engendered by the consciousness of more unworthiness, on the 
contrary, precedes truth, precedes the consideration of the whole, and does not imply the 
sublimation of the I in the universal. The consciousness of unworthiness is not in its turn a 
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suffice it to say for now that freedom, because of its spontaneity and moral 
implications places on the I and the other as they relate to each other a 
responsibility for each other’s good and welfare. The good and welfare of 
the other is directly related to his transcendence insofar as we are 
discussing his metaphysical desire for transcendence. Levinas explains that 
it is not the freedom of the other that “accounts for the transcendence, but 
the transcendence of the Other that accounts for freedom – a transcendence 
of the Other with regard to me which, being infinite, does not have the 
same signification as my transcendence with regard to him.”90 Bringing this 
all together, we begin to see that the subject of the ethical demand of the I 
is not necessarily himself, but rather his freedom and transcendence in 
relation to the other and, equally, the freedom and transcendence of the 
other who is in relation to him. The ethical demand then becomes more 
than just “Thou shalt not kill [or harm] me”; as such, it is an imposition of 
signifies the call to freedom and the opening to transcendence. The demand 
is in the very face of both the I and the other. The demand, considering that 
both the I and the other make it in the face-to-face encounter, is 
transformed from a demand as such into a realization of responsibility. 
3.6  The Face and Language 
What does this mean, and how does it unfold? Responsibility begins 
with language – the discourse; it is in discourse that the I is obliged to 
recognize and heed the other’s demand for respect:  
In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my 
theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that 
seemed a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my 
interlocutor. The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical 
inviobility of the Other and, without any odor of the “numinous,” his 
“holiness.”91 
But in understanding discourse as it relates to responsibility, we have to 
understand language and speech as it concerns the relation between the I 
and the other.  
Language, like the face, is the expression of the I’s alterity, his 
strangeness to the other: “Absolute difference, inconceivable in terms of 
                                                                                                                           
truth, is not a consideration of facts. The first consciousness of my immorality is not my 
subordination to facts, but to the Other, to the Infinite” (Ibid., p. 83). 
90 Ibid., p. 225. 
91 Ibid., p. 195. 
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formal logic, is established only by language. Language accomplishes a 
relation between terms that breaks up the unity of a genus. … Language is 
perhaps to be defined as the very power to break the continuity of being or 
of history.”92 Language is the system by which the I and the other may 
relate to each other, but it remains a system of separate terms and 
references: 
Language is a relation between separate terms. To the one the other can indeed 
present himself as a theme, but his presence is not absorbed into his status as a 
theme. The word that bears on the Other as a theme seems to contain the 
Other. But already it is said to the Other who, as interlocutor, has quit the 
theme that encompassed him, and upsurges inevitably behind the said. Words 
are said, be it only by the silence kept, whose weight acknowledges this 
evasion of the Other. The knowledge that absorbs the other is forthwith 
situated within the discourse I address to him.93 
Both the I and the other use language to express themselves and address 
one another, but the question remains if they will understand each other and 
interpret the language and what is being said in a way that will enable 
transcendence. The use of language is not intended to give or garner 
knowledge; instead, it is directly or indirectly intended to elicit and grant 
wisdom as it relates to being qua being. 
Moreover, although language tends to objectify94 due to the system of 
references and signs, the exercise between the I and the other as they enter 
into dialogue is to appreciate and recognize each other as more than an 
object or a theme or means of achieving transcendence. Rather, both the I 
and the other experience language as dialogue equally, and it is in the 
reciprocity of the encounter that language is made useful and transcendence 
becomes possible. 
So if language is an expression of absolute alterity, then speech or the act of 
expression necessarily proceeds from that alterity. Levinas says it in this way: 
“Speech proceeds from absolute difference. Or, more exactly, an absolute 
difference is not produced in a process of specification descending from genus 
to species, in which the order of logical relations runs up against the given, 
                                           
92 Ibid., p. 195. 
93 Ibid., p. 195. 
94 “Objectification is produced in the very work of language, where the subject is 
detached from the things possessed as though it hovered over its own existence, as 
though it were detached from it, as though the existence it exists had not yet completely 
reached it” (Ibid., p. 209). 
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which is not reducible to relations.”95 All of this to say that both the I and the 
other are approaching each other and entering into the face-to-face encounter 
as completely separate beings who are absolutely strange to one another. 
The relation between the two, the language that they employ and the 
speech act do not reduce the separation and strangeness but rather express 
it and maintain the distance. The way in which the I and the other can 
traverse the distance is not through language or speech but through their 
very openness to one another as strange and absolutely other beings. 
Paradoxically, it is in employing language and speech that the I and the 
other may express their openness and metaphysical desire for 
transcendence – “Speaking, rather than ‘letting be,’ solicites the Other.”96 
In this way, the ethical demand is complete. 
3.7  The Contemporaneous and Equal Command 
The ethical demand is complete as both the I and the other speak – in 
speaking to each other, they contemporaneously and equally demand to be 
recognized, respected and honored; they simultaneously demand of the 
other not to be killed but to be cared for. It is in the demand that the 
demand is demanded or as Levinas puts it, “the command that commands 
me to command.” As the I is in relation with the other, they approach each 
other as masters of their own being; as a result, when the I commands the 
other, Levinas says, “This command can concern me only inasmuch as I 
am master of myself; consequently this command commands me to 
command.” 97  Levinas writes “consequently,” but where does this 
consequence originate? He explains that as the I approaches the other, he 
approaches him in his own poverty, strangeness and vulnerability, but 
because the other approaches the I in the same manner, they are 
encountering each other as equals.98  So it is as equals that they “join” 
                                           
95 Ibid., p. 194. 
96 Ibid., p. 195. 
97 Ibid., p. 213. 
98 “The face in its nakedness as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor one 
and the stranger; but this poverty and exile which appeal to my powers, address me, do 
not deliver themselves over to these powers as givens, remain the expression of the face. 
The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality within this 
essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus present at the encounter, 
whom in the midst of his destitution the Other already serves” (Ibid., p. 213). 
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together99 and equally command each other as Masters of their own being, 
commanding each other to respect and honor them and to not kill one 
another 
At the same time, the presence of the face in its infinity, destitution and 
poverty represents the presence of the other who is not readily present to 
the discourse or face-to-face encounter between the I and the other; it is 
precisely in the understanding that there is another other whom the I must 
consider and with whom he is in indirect relation by virtue of his relation 
with the other who is present at hand, that the I is commanded to 
command. Levinas explains: “The presence of the face, the infinity of the 
other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole 
of humanity which looks at us), and a command that commands 
commanding.”100 This is precisely the point at which the ethical demand is 
made whole; that is when the I and the other respond to their respective 
demand or command with an equal command; when the I finds in the other 
an-other, the third person that is the whole of humanity, all of the others 
with whom the I is in relation by virtue of his very relation with the other, 
his interlocutor in dialogue. 
In order to conclude the present discussion on the ethical demand, we 
need to acknowledge the responsibility of the I towards the other. In order 
to do so, I will now link my thoughts to a series of conversations that 
Levinas had with Philippe Nemo and published under the title Ethics and 
Infinity. After all, the connection between the ethical demand and 
responsibility is something we must not forget. We have looked a the face 
as a manifestation of man’s being in this world of sense and experience and 
taken a critical look at the means by which the I goes beyond himself into 
the open and overcomes separation in order to establish a dialogue. It is by 
the manifestation of the face that the I and the other are able to relate to 
each other; in using language and speech, which issue forth from the face, 
they command each other as masters of their own beings. But according to 
Levinas, it is not the face nor language or speech that bond the I and the 
other; rather, it is responsibility. 
In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas says, “… as a ‘first person,’ I am he who 
finds the resources to respond to the call.”101 As soon as the I hears the 
                                           
99 “He comes to join me. But he joins me to himself for service; he commands me as 
a Master” (Ibid., p. 213). 
100 Ibid., p. 213. 
101
 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 89. 
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command of the other, it is incumbent upon him to respond to that 
command; it is this paradigm that bonds the I to the other in responsibility. 
The ethical demand is not merely an acquiescence to the demand for 
respect and honor, but it is also a responsibility to the other. Indeed, as 
Levinas writes, “The very node of the subjective is knotted in ethics 
understood as responsibility.”102 In our next chapter, we shall go forward 
and make it clear that ultimately the ethical demand can only be understood 
in terms of responsibility for the other. 
 
 
                                           




Proximity and Responsibility 
To better understand the relationship between the I and the other as well 
as how human relationships form the basis of the corporation (which is 
fundamentally a community of human beings), we will look at Levinas’ 
philosophy of proximity and responsibility. The discussion of proximity 
and responsibility may appear to be a circular one insofar as we will refer 
to responsibility when discussing proximity and vice versa. But the reason 
for this is simply because, according to Levinas, there is not one without 
the other. As we will see later in the chapter, responsibility is based on an 
understanding of the human being as one-for-the-other, the proper basis for 
a philosophy of proximity. We will use Levinas’ work Otherwise than 
Being, or Beyond Essence1 as the main point of reference; when necessary, 
we will defer to the wisdom Levinas offers in minor works such as Ethics 
and Infinity, Conversations with Emmanuel Levinas2 and, naturally, we will 
also make reference to Totality and Infinity. 
As the title of the chapter states, we will be exploring both proximity and 
responsibility, but responsibility will be examined within the context of 
proximity. Before delving directly into the question of proximity, we must 
understand the context in which Levinas develops his philosophy. He 
                                           
1E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso 
Lingis. Originally published as Autrement qu’être. Duquesne University Pres. 
Pittsburgh, PA. 1998. 
2
 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Emmanuel Levinas. Translated 
by Richard A. Cohen. Originally published as Ethique et infini. Duquense University 
Press. Pittsburgh, PA. 1985. 
52 PART ONE: THE ETHICAL DEMAND 
 
 
introduces the concept of the-one-for-the-other as a means of articulating 
the ethical human relation between the I and the other as well as the 
implications of that ethical relationship. In explaining the-one-for-the-
other, Levinas demonstrates the ought that, according to his philosophy, 
necessarily exists between men. He explains it in terms of enjoyment and, 
more to the point, spoiling one’s enjoyment for the benefit and wellbeing of 
the other. Taking a couple of steps back to understand the greater picture 
that Levinas is illustrating, let us consider these concepts: signification and 
sensibility, the one-for-the-other. 
1. Signification and The-One-For-The-Other 
Signification acquires its significationness from man’s senses and the 
possibility for his immediate, bodily desires to be satisfied. The lack of 
satisfaction and the fulfillment always attached to satisfaction relate to 
sensibility in terms of consciousness of being; Levinas refers to it as 
“consciousness of…” as a subjective validation of being: “The exteriority 
that this way of speaking presupposes is already borrowed from 
thematization, consciousness of…, the self sufficient correlation of the 
saying and the said. The ‘access to being’ states a notion as tautological as 
the ‘manifestation of being,’ or ontology.”3 So in order to avoid making a 
tautological statement, Levinas clarifies his “consciousness of…” by 
explaining it in terms of man’s psyche and intentionality toward the other.  
1.1  Recognizing the Other 
Of the psyche, he says that it “is the form of a peculiar dephasing, a 
loosening up or unclamping of identity: the same prevented from 
coinciding with itself, at odds, torn up from its rest, between sleep and 
insomnia, panting, shivering.” 4  It is here that Levinas mentions 
responsibility without having mentioned proximity per se; the intentionality 
that the I has in relation to the other ensures that the face-to-face encounter 
“is not an abdication of the same, now alienated and slave to the other, but 
an abnegation of oneself fully responsible for the other.” Within the 
encounter he recognizes himself, as subject, in the other whom he 
recognizes as subject of his own being. This recognition is a designation of 
identity. The intentionality that the I has for the other is a recognition of his 
                                           
3
 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence. p. 68. 
4 Ibid., p. 68. 
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very self, his status as subject inasmuch as he recognizes the identity of the 
other as subject; he recognizes himself in the other. Levinas says, “This 
identity is brought out by responsibility and is at the service of the other. In 
the form of responsibility, the psyche in the soul is the other in me, a 
malady of identity, both accused and self, the same for the other, the same 
by the other.”5 How does this relate to the signification? 
Signification resides in the very perception, awareness and consciousness 
of that which satisfies the senses and causes suffering; signification resides 
in the sensibility of the I for the other. Levinas distinguishes between the 
sensing, perception and awareness from the thematization of the other in an 
effort to gain access and know the other when he says that “The-one-for-the-
other which constitutes their signifyingness is not a knowing of being, nor 
some other access to essence. These significations do not draw their 
signifyingness from knowing nor from their condition of being known.”6 In 
other words, neither the I nor the other give meaning to each other, but rather 
their meanings or significance are fixed in their being and ability to sense 
and perceive; however, their significance is made significant in their very 
encounter, in their perception of each other. Levinas refers to this as a 
system when he says, “In a system signification is due to the definition of 
terms by one another in the synchrony of a totality, where the whole is the 
finality of the elements.”7 The synchrony is the relation between the I and 
the other, and in taking this discussion to another level, I would suggest that 
the synchrony is the very ought between the I and the other on which the 
sense of responsibility that Levinas talks about rests. The totality, as we 
complete the idea, is the point at which the system is no longer closed within 
itself but rather creates a context and makes sense as a whole taking on a 
phenomenological quality; in this way, the totality is experiential, and it is 
significant. 
So in the synchronized system that exists between the I and the other as 
they perceive and encounter each other, they recognize that each is the 
subject of his own experience of the world, and is, therefore, responsible 
for the subject as subject: “In the form of responsibility, the psyche in the 
soul is the other in me, a malady of identity, both accused and self, the 
same for the other, the same by the other.” 8  Therefore, because the I 
                                           
5 Ibid., p. 69. 
6 Ibid., p. 69. 
7 Ibid., p. 69. 
8 Ibid., p. 69. 
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identifies himself in the other, he can also relate to the suffering and 
satisfaction of the other; but in this self-identification in the other, the 
wellbeing of the other does not become his responsibility but rather is his 
responsibility.  
1.2  Satisfaction and Enjoyment 
Now returning to the concept of the for-the-other, let us consider it in 
light of the brief discussion on sensibility and significance [and, of course, 
responsibility]. Speaking about sensibility in terms of satisfaction and life 
presents what initially appear to be tautological statements, Levinas writes, 
“Satisfaction satisfies itself with satisfaction. Life enjoys its very life, as 
though it nourishes itself with life as much as with what makes it live, or, 
more exactly, as though nourishing oneself had this twofold reference.”9 
However, instead of falling into a tautology, Levinas calls his assertion a 
“twofold reference” because he is asserting that satisfaction can only be 
fulfilled with that which it enjoys fully – satisfaction; likewise, enjoying 
life can only be done by living life. In other words, one cannot be satisfied 
by that which is not the fulfillment of what it would take to satisfy. This is 
not tautological but a demonstration of fulfillment. 
Why does this matter? What does the for-the-other have to do with 
proximity and the relation between the I and the other? Satisfaction and 
enjoyment are the lynchpins in the relation between the I and the other; 
according to Levinas, it is in satisfaction and enjoyment that man finds 
fulfillment in both his being as such and within the phenomenological 
manifestation of that being in the world. Man’s intrinsic quest for 
satisfaction and enjoyment betrays in him a vulnerability – it is an 
admission that he is unsettled within himself, within his understanding and 
knowledge of who and what he is in respect to being qua being. And it is 
the search for fulfillment, satisfaction and enjoyment that exposes the I’s 
vulnerability to the other. Levinas explains enjoyment as it relates to the 
ego in this way: “Enjoyment and the singularization of sensibility in an ego 
take from the supreme passivity of sensibility, from its vulnerability, its 
exposedness to the other, the anonymousness of the meaningless passivity 
of the inert.”10 In the I’s quest for satisfaction and enjoyment, he admits 
                                           
9 Ibid., p. 73. 
10 Ibid., p. 74. 
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that he is not complacent with himself or even within himself11, and in that 




1.3  Exposedness and Vulnerability 
What the I is vulnerable to the other or what he is exposing to the other 
is not only that he is not complacent within himself, within his being, but 
that he may find something in the other that may help him to arrive at a 
state of complacence, satisfaction and enjoyment. The vulnerability lies in 
the possibility that the other may deny him that which he is seeking. The 
vulnerability is in the very fact that he has to be in relation with the other, 
expose himself to the other in a face-to-face encounter, to begin to 
appreciate and even apprehend that which will contribute to his 
complacency. 
This exposedness and vulnerability can only take place among sensible 
beings, beings who can perceive their own sense of being fulfilled, and 
likewise, their own sense of lacking. With this statement we will begin to 
complete the explanation of the significance of the one-for-the-other: 
according to Levinas, as the I perceives of his enjoyment and satisfaction, 
he is also acutely aware of what he feels he is lacking, both in the sense of 
metaphysical desire and in the sense of the phenomenological 
manifestation of his being. As such, to be in relation with the other 
precisely means to perceive his enjoyment, satisfaction and complacency 
within the context of the face-to-face encounter. Therefore, it is within the 
relation between the I and the other that man may give of himself, receive 
from the other, be violated or annihilated.  
1.4  The giving 
It is here that we begin to understand why the commandment “Do not 
kill” is such a significant demand. In the face-to-face encounter, both the I 
and other are approaching each other to quench the metaphysical desire, but 
they also tend to engage each other in terms of satisfying the 
                                           
11  “Enjoyment in its ability to be complacent in itself, exempt from dialectical 
tensions, is the condition of the for-the-other involved in sensibility, and in its 
vulnerability as an exposure to the other” (Ibid., p. 74). 
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phenomenological experience in which their beings are manifest. This is to 
say, they may find satisfaction, enjoyment and fulfillment in each other on 
both levels, but it is only in the face-to-face encounter that man may be 
“taken care of.” Levinas writes, “This sensibility has meaning only as a 
‘taking care of the other’s need,’ of his misfortunes and his faults, that is, as 
a giving.”12 But the crux of this statement is in the giving: man cannot give 
what he does not have, and he only has himself, his being as such and the 
manifestation of that being.  
So in order for him to “give” to the other he must “tear” from himself 
that which he offers as a gift because according to Levinas, “… giving has 
meaning only as a tearing from oneself despite oneself, and not only 
without me.” 13  Does Levinas intend to say that in man’s tearing from 
himself to give to the other, he creates a void within himself from where or 
which he tore from himself? I would discourage that conclusion because 
Levinas continues by saying, “And to be torn from oneself despite oneself 
has meaning only as a being torn from the complacency in oneself 
characteristic of enjoyment, snatching the bread from one’s mouth.” 14 
Notice that Levinas does not say that the tearing has a negative effect on 
the complacency of the self; the tearing does come from the complacency 
of the I, but it does not damage or ruin the complacency in se. 
At the same time, let us not conflate the complacency that is indicative 
of metaphysical desire fulfilled with satisfaction and enjoyment of the 
manifestation of being in a phenomenological expression. Levinas gives the 
example of taking care of the other by feeding him from the one’s own 
cache of bread. In this sense, it could be understood that the I is tearing 
from his own wellbeing to promote the wellbeing of the other. Levinas uses 
the imagery of tearing, however, to indicate to us that there is a sense of 
disruption and perhaps loss to man when he gives to the other. As Levinas 
says, giving is not truly giving unless it is given from a place where it will 
be missed. So even as we said that giving cannot create a void within 
complacency of self, there has to be a sense of disturbance to that 
complacency. Perhaps that disturbance is in the very act of going outside 
oneself, beyond the realm of home to engage with the other, to face the 
other in all of each other’s nakedness and vulnerability. 
                                           
12 Ibid., p. 74. 
13 Ibid., p. 74. 
14 Ibid., p. 74. 
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The key to understanding the one-for-the-other is the very discomfort of 
the action of tearing from oneself and giving:  
The immediacy of the sensible is the immediacy of enjoyment and its 
frustration. It is the gift painfully torn up, and in the tearing up, immediately 
spoiling this very enjoyment. It is not a gift of the heart, but of the bread from 
one’s mouth, of one’s own mouthful of bread. It is the openness, not only of 
one’s pocketbook, but of the doors of one’s home, a “sharing of your bread 
with the famished,” a “welcoming of the wretched into your house” (Isaiah 
58).15 
As we see in this illustration, the discomfort is in giving the gift and 
allowing it to be used [torn] according to the will, enjoyment, satisfaction 
and metaphysical desire of the other. There is no guarantee that the other 
will appreciate the gift in the spirit that it was given by the I or according to 
how the I feels it should be appreciated. I submit that this contributes to the 
sense of being “torn from oneself.” 
1.5  Incarnation and Sensitivity 
Before proceeding to the discussion on proximity, let us expand on the 
explanation of Levinas’ philosophy of the face so as to complete the 
discourse on the relation between the I and the other and how that relation 
defines the ethical demand. It is at this point that Levinas  begins to present 
his philosophy in a way that contributes to an understanding about how the 
I ought to act with respect to his relationship with the other. Taking for 
granted that the face is a manifestation of the being that is man, or, in other 
words, an incarnation of a reality that would otherwise not be realized in an 
experiential way, Levinas writes, “Incarnation is not a transcendental 
operation of a subject that is situated in the midst of the world it represents 
to itself: the sensible experience of the body is already and from the start 
incarnate.” 16  The face as the incarnation of the being that is man is, 
therefore, sensitive – it can perceive and sense and experience the 
phenomenon of the world in which it is manifest.  
But as Levinas explains, the face is not materialization; it is more than a 
materialization because it is the fulfillment of the manifestation or the 
realization of the being that is man in a way that is significant to him as an I 
and to the other(s) whom he encounters. More specifically, Levinas says, 
                                           
15 Ibid., p. 74. 
16 Ibid., p. 76. 
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“The subject called incarnate does not result from a materialization, an 
entry into space and into relations of contact and money which would have 
been realized by a consciousness, that is, a self-consciousness, forewarned 
against every attack and first non-spatial.”17 The face is not bound by space 
and time because the being that it realizes is not bound by time and space. 
Time and space only serve as references in a context in which the I 
approaches the other in a face-to-face encounter. 
It is by way of the face, the phenomenological realization of man’s being 
in an experiential world, that the I and the other encounter each other; it is 
as being made incarnate or beings of flesh and blood that they may relate to 
each other; and it is in the face that is experienced within the confines of 
the phenomenon of space and time that man appreciates reference and 
meaning. It is in the face, the face-to-face encounter, the sensual experience 
of the flesh and the continuity in time that the blood renders that 
significance significant. Levinas says:  
It is because subjectivity is sensibility – an exposure to others, a vulnerability 
and a responsibility in the proximity of the others, the-one-for-the-other, that 
is signification – and because matter is the very locus of the for-the-other, the 
way that signification signifies before showing itself as a said in the system of 
synchronism, the linguistic system, that a subject is of flesh and blood, a man 
that is hungry and eats, entrails in a skin, and thus capable of giving the bread 
out of his mouth, or giving his skin.18 
We must not misunderstand Levinas’ teaching to mean that the I must 
identify or empathize with the other in his experience of the world; rather, 
the other demands that his experience and his subjectivity is recognized 
and respected by the I (in the presentation of his face). At the same time, 
there are some things that the I may only experience through his enteraction 
and relationship with the other and is then able to reflect on it in terms of 
himself. One example of this is death because it only has meaning to man 
because he experiences the death of other men; he senses their loss and 
grieves their passing. Death would not have meaning if he did not 
experience it in the face-to-face encounter. Furthermore, as it relates to 
death, the I will ever only experience it in terms of dying, but he will never 
experience his own death. Lastly, death can only be experienced in terms of 
the cessation of the face manifesting the being that is man. 
                                           
17 Ibid., p. 77. 
18 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Finally, we should also highlight the additional characteristic Levinas 
gives for subjectivity: along with self-awareness and presence within 
oneself is the sensibility of the self. The I is subject insofar as he is 
sensitive to not only his own existence but in his sensitivity, perceives and 
is aware of the existence of the other. His subjectivity resides in the 
manifestation of his being in the face, it resides in the incarnation of his 
being, the sensibility that incarnation, that the face affords him in 
perceiving and encountering the other; his subjectivity lies in his ability to 
sense the vulnerability, exposedness and nakedness of the other as well as 
his sensitivity to his own vulnerability, exposedness and nakedness with 
respect to the other. The subjectivity of the I is the wellspring from which 
Levinas’ ethic develops, it is the source for the question of how the I ought 
to act when he is confronted by the other. 
2. Proximity 
I shall lay out the thesis for the present section on proximity in these few 
words: Proximity is the metaphysical reality that is realized in the 
manifestation of the face. Proximity is, therefore, the openness that is 
expressed in the face and can only be realized within the phenomenon of 
the face-to-face encounter, which is not to say that it is limited by the 
immediacy or reference of time and space. 
 
2.1  What Proximity Is Not 
I would like to initially discuss proximity in terms of what it is not. In his 
explanation of proximity, Levinas leads us to his thesis on proximity by 
asking about the relation between entities in terms of time and space. He 
poses this question and follows with a provocative suggestion:  
Would proximity be a certain measure of the interval narrowing between two 
points or two sectors of space, toward a limit of contiguity and even 
coincidence? But then the term proximity would have a relative meaning and, 
in the space inhabited by Euclidean geometry, a derivative sense. Its absolute 
and proper meaning presupposes “humanity.”19 
In other words, proximity, when using it in reference to man the relation 
between the I and the other, is an indication of what Levinas refers to as 
“humanity.” It is human to be in relation and thus within proximity of the 
other. So when Levinas talks about proximity, between the I and the other, 
                                           
19 Ibid., p. 81. 
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he is not referring to distance in terms of time and space; he is referring to 
their very relation, their face-to-face encounter. 
More specifically, Levinas contends that space and time are 
inconsequential to the relation between the I and the other – perhaps we 
could even say that space and time are mere accidents of the phenomenon 
of the world in which they encounter each other. These accidents are based 
on the physical manifestation of the being that is man, but we must be 
careful not to give them too much importance beyond the 
phenomenological representation of the world in which man’s face is 
manifest: “Space and nature cannot be posited in an initial geometrical and 
physical impassiveness and then receive from the presence of man, from 
his desires and passions, a cultural layer that would make them signifying 
and speaking.” 20  According to Levinas, the accidents of the 
phenomenological realization of the world in which the I and the other 
encounter each other are significant insofar as they remain referential, but 
they do not contribute to the significance of the being of man in se.  
 
2.2  The Subjective Approach 
According to Levinas, the pitfall of this type of interpretation and 
understanding of proximity, furthermore, contribute to the I encountering 
the other in terms of and in reference to only himself – narcissism. 
“Narcissism would then find in the granite of things but a surface that 
would refer to men the echos and reflection of their humanity.”21 Proximity 
based on space and time leads to a narrow view of the phenomenological 
realization of the human relationship; it is based on the point of view of the 
I (focusing on him as the sole point of reference) as he relates to the other, 
and it does not allow him to relate to the other in terms of being qua being. 
Levinas writes, 
In fact, the impassiveness of space refers to the absolute coexistence, to the 
conjunction of all the points, being together at all points without any privilege, 
characteristic of the words of a language before the mouth opens. It refers to a 
universal homogeneity derived from this assembling, from being’s 
nonsubjective essence. But the synchrony of the words of a language before a 
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21 Ibid., p. 81. 
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mount that opens refers to man that speaks, and to justice, which derives from 
the first signification.22 
Levinas points out that using space as a means of defining proximity is a 
faulty practice in understanding the ontology of man as man and the 
ontology of his relationship with other men: using space to define 
proximity means that if two men do not occupy points in space that are 
relative to each other (and this really refers to time too), then they do not 
have a point of relation – there is no proximity. It also infers that the 
determined distance between their points in space affect their ability to 
relate or be in relation – it affects the manner in which they relate to each 
other, the depth of that relation and even its significance. As we have noted 
in Levinas’ discussion of the face or rather the face-to-face encounter, none 
of these factors can be true in the system of ontology that he presents. 
The face-to-face encounter does not necessarily take place in a space and 
time that are common to the I and the other. A good example of this is the 
dialogical relation between the author as the I and the reader as the other. 
The face-to-face encounter, therefore, happens within the transmission of 
the message by way of the text. The questions remain: how are the author 
and reader to appear in a face-to-face encounter? The answer is in their 
openness to each other; the author is open to the reader and demonstrates 
that openness in the very act of writing a text (an intended message) for the 
unseen and, perhaps, unknown reader. Likewise the reader is open to the 
author in the very act of reading and attempting to interpret the author’s 
intention. The face-to-face encounter between two men who do not share a 
common space and time is no less significant because it still relies on the 
openness, one to the other and one-for-the-other. 
To this end, Levinas says that the subject, the I, is not reducible to the 
confines of space because of the spiritual nature of man. The spiritual 
nature to which Levinas refers is man’s metaphysical desire for 
transcendence: “In proximity a subject is implicated in a way not reducible 
to the spatial sense which proximity takes on when the third party troubles 
it by demanding justice in the ‘unity of transcendental consciousness,’ 
when a conjuncture is sketched out in a theme which, when said, is garbed 
with the sense of a contiguity.” 23  Even as Levinas asserts that man’s 
spirituality refers to his metaphysical desire for transcendence, Levinas also 
admits that not all spirituality is a search or a seeking of truth and an 
                                           
22 Ibid., p. 81. 
23 Ibid., p. 82. 
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understanding of being per se; instead, spirituality in its metaphysical 
desire for transcendence is more related to openness to that which is 
mysterious to the I.24 
Therefore, with the understanding of man’s spirituality as an openness to 
that which is unknown to him, proximity refers to his openness to the other 
rather than a measurement based on space and time. Levinas relates 
proximity to a state of restlessness, a desire for that which is unknown: 
“Proximity is not a state, a repose, but, a restlessness, null site, outside of 
the place of rest. It overwhelms the calm of the non-ubiquity of a being 
which becomes a rest in a site. No site then, is ever sufficiently a proximity, 
like an embrace.”25 So in understanding the nature of proximity as it relates 
to man and his relation with other men, it does not refer to the physical 
encounter but rather to the openness that each has toward the other. 
However, considering that the I will always ever be the I as the term 
relates to him from his point of view, and he will never be the other 
regardless of his openness to the other, Levinas says that the proximity 
between the two men in relationship is never close enough26, which is to 
say that there will always remain an element of mystery between the two. 
And as Levinas explains it, proximity, then, gains a quality of being 
subject insofar as it is a means by which the I and the other welcome each 
other and offer the possibility of being in relation; proximity is the term by 
which the two beings relate to each other. Proximity based on “closeness” 
demonstrates a recognition of the subject as subject in such a way that can 
be described as a fraternity 27 : “Proximity, as the ‘closer and closer,’ 
becomes subject. … Proximity is the subject that approaches and 
consequently constitutes a relationship in which I participate as a term, but 
where I am more, or less, than a term. This surplus or this lack throws me 
                                           
24 “But every spirituality is also not comprehension and truth of Being and openness 
of a world. As a subject that approaches, I am not in the approach called to play the role 
of a perceiver that reflects or welcomes, animated with intentionality, the light of the 
open and the grace and mystery of the world” (Ibid., p. 82). 
25 Ibid., p. 82. 
26  “Never close enough, proximity does not congeal into a structure, save when 
represented in the demand for justice as reversible, and reverts into a simple relation” 
(Ibid., p. 82). 
27 “The subjectivity of the approaching subject is then preliminary, anarchic, prior to 
consciousness, an implication, a being caught up in fraternity. This being caught up in 
fraternity which proximity is we call signifyingness,” (Ibid., p. 82). 
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outside of the objectivity characteristic of relations.” 28  But again the 
closeness of which Levinas speaks is not just in the I recognizing the other 
as a subject in his own right, but already acting according to that 
recognition. Levinas says that proximity is not a matter of consciousness29 
or consciously making an effort to recognize the other as a subject in his 
own right; instead, proximity is acting on the recognition that the other is a 
subject, which is an intrinsic part of man’s humanity. 
The assertion that proximity goes beyond the analytics of ontology and is 
rather part and parcel to the authentic nature of man as an individual being 
and humanity as a community is evidenced in Levinas’ own words: 
“Proximity is no longer in knowing in which these relations with the 
neighbor show themselves, but do so already in narration, in the said, as an 
epos and a teleology.” 30  According to Levinas, proximity refers to 
humanity insofar as it is the recognition of the one-for-the-other in the 
significance each man perceives within their encounter: “Humanity, to 
which proximity properly so called refers, must then not be first understood 
as consciousness, that is, as the identity of an ego endowed with knowledge 
or (what amounts to the same thing) with powers.” 31  While Levinas 
promotes a more nuanced definition of proximity, he also begins a 
discussion on another relational problematic: obsession. In referencing 
“ego” and “power” he begins to articulate the skewed side of proximity, the 
subject that has taken their subjectivity too far as it relates to the self as the 
I encounters the other. 
2.3  Obsession and the Pitfalls of Subjectivity 
According to Levinas, “Obsession as non-reciprocity itself does not 
relieve any possibility of suffering in common. It is a one-way irreversible 
being affected, like the diachrony of time that flows between the fingers of 
Mnemosyne.”32 Levinas specifies that this attitude or way of interacting is 
“tied up into an ego that states itself in the first person, escaping the 
                                           
28 Ibid., p. 82. 
29 “Proximity does not resolve into the consciousness a being would have of another 
being that it would judge to be near inasmuch as the other would be under one’s eyes or 
within one’s reach, and inasmuch as it would be possible for one to take hold of that 
being, hold on to it or converse with it, in the reciprocity of handshakes, caresses, 
struggle, collaboration, commerce, conversation,” (Ibid., p. 83). 
30 Ibid., p. 83. 
31 Ibid., p. 83. 
32 Ibid., p. 84. 
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concept of an ego in an ipseity – not in an ipseity in general, but in me.”33 
What we can take away from Levinas’ statement is that subjectivity is the 
I’s expression and experience of its being the same and distinctly different 
than the other, which is to say, it simply is. When subjectivity becomes a 
problem is when it is not tempered by the acknowledgment, recognition, 
acceptance and welcome of the other. The balanced demonstration of 
subjectivity is the I engaging with the other in an encounter that allows the 
other to be himself as the subject of his own being manifest in his face 
without any pressure from the I to be anything other than what he is. 
Levinas talks about this balance in terms of movement: “The knot of 
subjectivity consists in going to the other without concerning oneself with 
his movement toward me.”34 But not only is the balance of subjectivity 
about not being overly concerned with the other’s movements towards me, 
but it is about the manner in which I move towards him. 
Levinas says the I is to move towards the other taking responsibility for 
the other when he says, “…it consists in approaching in such a way that, 
over and beyond all the reciprocal relations that do not fail to get set up 
between me and the neighbor, I have always taken one step more toward 
him – which is possible only if this step is responsibility.”35 Not only does 
the I approach the other with an authentic sense of responsibility for the 
wellbeing of the other, but he takes the concept of responsibility a step 
further when he asserts that the I has “always one response more to give, I 
have to answer for his very responsibility.”36  
Subjectivity becomes obsessive when either the I or the other rejects or 
ignores their responsibility for the one whom he approaches in favor of his 
own satisfaction and enjoyment. If we take Levinas’ assertion that “Neither 
conjuncture in being, nor reflection of this conjuncture in the unity of 
transcendental apperception, the proximity of me with the other is in two 
times, and thus is a transcendence,”37 as true, then obsession cannot even be 
considered a singular focus on the person’s quest to quench the 
metaphysical desire because it is precisely counter to it. This is because, 
according to Levinas, subjectivity is the manifest reality of the I and the 
other’s irreplaceability within the face-to-face encounter: subjectivity as it 
                                           
33 Ibid., p. 84. 
34 Ibid., p. 84. 
35 Ibid., p. 84. 
36 Ibid., p. 84. 
37 Ibid., p. 85. 
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relates to proximity is “more determinate than the relations that are ordered 
into a totality. Signifyingness, the-one-for-the-other, exposedness of self to 
another, it is immediacy in caresses and in the contact of saying. It is the 
immediacy of a skin and a face, a skin which is always a modification of a 
face, a face that is weighted down with a skin.”38 Subjectivity, therefore, is 
uniquely related to the phenomenon that is man’s manifestation in the 
experiential world; it is a product of the phenomenological realization of 
man’s being. 
Moreover, subjectivity, limited by obsession, is a referential expression 
that gains significance within the context of time and space39, therefore, it 
is not particularly equipped within the context of being as such to enable 
man to experience transcendence in either the experiential world in which 
his being is manifest or the metaphysical reality of being qua being. But 
because subjectivity is man’s means of self-orientation (in time and space 
but always looking towards the other), there is no way for him to eliminate 
it in favor of a more authentic relation with the other. Yet eliminating 
subjectivity is not the answer because it is through subjectivity that 
proximity is realized:  
For subjectivity is not called, in its primary vocation, to take the role and place 
of the indeclinable transcendental consciousness, which effects syntheses 
straightway before itself, but is itself excluded from these syntheses, is 
implicated in them only through the detour of incarnation, which is hardly 
intelligible in so much indeclinable straightforwardness. It is an irreplaceable 
oneself.40 
To understand subjectivity is to understand it within the context of the 
relation or the face-to-face encounter of the I and the other; and subjectivity 
is born from the face-to-face encounter insofar as it is [balanced] 
subjectivity that will eventually allow the I to transcend his current state of 
being through his relation with the other. Its meaning is the one-for-the-
other. For Levinas, “The proper signification of subjectivity is proximity, 
but proximity is the very signifyingness of signification, the very 
establishing of the-one-for-the-other, the establishing of the sense which 
                                           
38 Ibid., p. 85. 
39 “It temporalizes itself, but with a diachronic temporality, outside, beyond or above, 
the time recuperable by reminiscence, in which consciousness abides and converses, an 
in which being and entities show themselves in experience” (Ibid., p. 85). 
40 Ibid., p. 85. 
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every thematized signification reflects in being.” 41  Still, why is this? 
Because it is through subjectivity that the I is able to recognize that the 
other, too, refers to himself as I.  
2.4  Subjectivity as a Means 
It is significant because it enables the I to relate to the other within the 
confines of totality, which is to say that the I relates to the other as a being 
who is the same in nature and while absolutely other and strange.42 This is 
true because “[i]t is not enough to speak of proximity as a relationship 
between two terms, and as a relationship assured of the simultaneity of 
these terms.”43 And Levinas goes on to explains what subjectivity is when 
he says,  
Subjectivity counts by virtue of hypostasis showing itself in the said, not, to be 
sure, under a name, but nonetheless like entities, as a pro-noun. It is both the 
relation and the term of the relation. But it is as subject to an irreversible 
relation that the term of the relation becomes subject. This relation is not a 
return to oneself: as an incessant exigency, an incessant contraction, a 
recurrence of remorse, it disengages the one as a term which nothing could 
rejoin and cover over.44 
So if subjectivity is the relation and the term of the relation that does not 
return on itself, then it is the means by which the I relates to the other as 
subject who recognizes the subject who is also the other. Therefore, when 
Levinas says that “subjectivity is not antecedent to proximity,” 45  he is 
distinguishing subjectivity as the incarnate realization of proximity in space 
and time; that is to say, subjectivity is the manifestation of the means that 
enables the realization of the proximity in the experiential world. I suggest 
this is true inasmuch as the I and the other encounter one another in the 
experiential world of phenomenon, so that the subjectivity can necessarily 
be realized only in that world; it is necessary for the I to identify himself as 
subject (and I) in order to encounter the other. 
                                           
41 Ibid., p. 85. 
42 “It is necessary to emphasize the breakup of the synchrony, of this whole, by the 
difference between the same and the other in the non-indifference of the obsession 
exercised by the other over the same” (Ibid., p. 85). 
43 Ibid., p. 85. 
44 Ibid., p. 86. 
45 Ibid., p. 86. 
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With that said, Levinas explains that subjectivity is only extended within 
the notion of the subject46, the I who encounters the other in a face-to-face 
relation – this is proximity. Therefore, it is only in the face-to-face 
encounter that the subject emerges and subjectivity is extended. This gives 
rise to the paradox of subjectivity and proximity: “one would like a subject 
to be obstinately free, and yet even an intentional subject gives itself a non-
ego in representations, and paradoxically finds itself caught up in its own 
representation.”47 The paradox, to be precise, resides in the very fact that 
the I as subject is only subject as he relates to the other; the I’s subjectivity 
is tied to his relation with the other. The crux of the paradox is tied to the 
notion of freedom as we reflect “on the state of soul of the ego which 
approaches a neighbor.” Is the ego (I) enslaved to the neighbor (other) in its 
subjectivity, or is the relation with the neighbor the means of demonstrating 
the subject’s freedom? 
2.5  Immediacy and Contact 
As a means of clarifying his position, Levinas introduces two key words, 
immediacy and contact. Proximity [and subjectivity] are contingent on the 
immediacy of the relation between the I and the other and the contact they 
have with each other. He says that proximity does not take place or is not 
realized within the soul of either the I or the other, but is a result of the 
relation between the two: “As signification, the-one-for-the-other, 
proximity is not a configuration produced in the soul. It is an immediacy 
older than the abstractness of nature. Nor is it fusion; it is contact with the 
other. To be in contact is neither to invest the other and annul his alterity, 
nor to suppress myself in the other.”48 Immediacy is the term of the relation 
between the I and the other, it does not happen within time or space but 
happens immediately within the context of the face-to-face encounter. As 
soon as they encounter each other, the relation of the I and the other is 
precisely about the-one-for-the-other; it is immediate because there is no 
term of waiting or until – the proximity of the I and the other is the-one-
for-the-other which simply is upon their encounter. 
In discussing contact, Levinas refers to it in terms that expand the 
understanding of the metaphysical when he explains that contact further 
                                           
46 “Proximity is to be described as extending the subject in its very subjectivity” 
(Ibid., p. 86). 
47 Ibid., p. 86. 
48 Ibid., p. 86. 
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demonstrates the separateness of the I and the other, which is to say that 
there is no contact in the phenomenological world that will ever unite the 
beings of the I and the other. “In contact itself the touching and the touched 
separate, as though the touched moved off, was always already other, did 
not have anything common with me. As though its singularity, thus non-
anticipatable and consequently not representable, responded only to 
designation.”49 Contact is a means of designating that which Levinas has 
already identified as wholly other; at the same time, contact demonstrates 
the commonality, the sameness within the nature of the beings of the I and 
the other – they can contact or touch each other because they share the 
sense and realization of the self, granted that the two selves are wholly 
separate and absolutely other. 
It should be noted, even if only briefly, that contact and touch are used 
while taking exception to the confines of space and time; this is a return to 
the concept of the face, which is realized in space and time in the 
experiential world but manifests a reality that is entirely beyond 
phenomenology. Therefore, contact and touch remain relative to the 
encounter between the I and the other, which we have already admitted is 
not bound to the confines of the phenomenological experience of space and 
time. 
So we can take for granted that for Levinas subjectivity gives rise to 
proximity while at the same time it is proximity that gives subjectivity 
signification because since it is only by encountering the other that the I 
realizes himself as an I as such and therefore a subject in se. Furthermore, 
Levinas maintains that subjectivity is not “antecedent” to proximity but is 
committed to it50 – there can be no subjectivity without proximity, but by 
the same token, it is as subject that the I approaches the other and 
experiences the proximity between the two. 
2.6  Obsession as an Abdication 
Now, speaking specifically of obsession as it relates to proximity, 
Levinas says it is the abdication of responsibility for the other and a 
relation with the other in such a way that denies his subjectivity. But it is 
more than a simple non-reciprocity of recognition of subjectivity in the 
                                           
49 Ibid., p. 86. 
50 “Subjectivity is not antecedent to proximity, in which it would later commit term, 
that every commitment is made. And it is probably starting with proximity that the 
difficult problem of an incarnate subjectivity has to be broached” (Ibid., p. 86). 
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other: it is an assumption by the I that the other can be known as an object 
and, therefore, regarded as a creation of the I’s own consciousness that may 
be annihilated according to his will.51 According to Levinas, obsession is 
the result of the I’s consciousness insofar as it perceives the other’s face as 
a phenomenon that is merely an object present in the his experience of the 
phenomenological world, rather than the manifestation of the being that 
transcends the phenomenon of the face-to-face encounter. Levinas explains 
it as a process of the consciousness designating what it knows as ideas that 
may be manipulated:  
Consciousness which knows how to multiply its correlates in innumerable 
images, enriching the world, penetrating into apartments, leaves these 
correlates intact, unapproached. One makes concepts out of them. 
Consciousness is not interposed between me and the neighbor; or, at least, it 
arises only on the ground of this antecedent relationship of obsession, which 
no consciousness could annul, and of which consciousness itself is a 
modification.52 
Obsession is not recognizing the neighbor for the being qua being that he is 
but rather assigning or placing him in a mold that is static and unyielding 
according to the will and volition of the I. Levinas says,  
The extreme urgency of the assignation precisely breaks up the equality or 
serenity of consciousness, which espouses its visible or conceivable object. 
The neighbor does not stand in a form, like an object abides in the plasticity of 
an aspect, a profile or an open series of aspects, which overflows each of them 
without destroying the adequation of the act of consciousness…53 
Obsession marks a distinct struggle between the I and the other because the 
other as neighbor refuses to be placed in the world of the I according to an 
approximation of what or who the I narrowly perceives the other to be. 
It is in the “extreme urgency” that we begin to segue into the fuller 
discussion on responsibility because it is here that we begin to see the 
imbalance or disproportionate way in which the I and other approach each 
other. This is to say that it is from the inequity of the relation between the I 
and the other that the call to respond emerges. As Levinas says, “[E]xtreme 
                                           
51 “The neighbor assigns me before I designate him. This is a modality not of a 
knowing, but of an obsession, a shuddering of the human quite different from cognition. 
Knowing is always convertible into creation and annihilation; its object lends itself to a 
concept, is a result” (Ibid., p. 87). 
52 Ibid., p. 87. 
53 Ibid., p. 87. 
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urgency is the modality of obsession – which is known but is not a 
knowing.”54 We may interpret this to mean that in the I’s extreme urgency 
as he relates to the other, he does not take the time (the authentic personal 
investment in the face-to-face relation) to truly appreciate the face of whom 
he is encountering55; therefore, he relates to the other as an approximation 
of who and what the other is in their encounter.  
According to our conclusions from Chapter I, we understand that the I 
and the other are to approach each other with respect for their sameness in 
the nature of their beings while aware of the profound and complete alterity 
of their respective beings. As such, approaching each other in urgency or 
extreme urgency is not acceptable because one or the other or even both 
automatically reduces the other to that approximation that we just 
mentioned. The extreme urgency renders the perception of the other plastic 
and the resulting relation is, therefore, one-sided, inadequate for 
transcendence and potentially abusive. 
More immediately, however, the extreme urgency in which the I 
approaches the other sets the stage for the I to refuse to take responsibility 
for the other – responsibility for the other’s person, well-being and 
opportunity for transcendence. This occurs from the disproportionate 
commitment between the I and the other to fulfill the obligation to honor 
the command and heed the demands of the other, which are “Do not kill 
me” and “Love me.” Not only does the I ignore the demand of the other, 
but he perceives the other as a burden. Levinas says, “Obligations are 
disproportionate to any commitment taken or to be taken or to be kept in a 
present. In a sense nothing is more burdensome than a neighbor.” 56 
Interestingly, Levinas’ reference to the obligation incumbent on the I in a 
relation with the other as a burden highlights that it is precisely by ignoring 
the responsibility and the proximity of the other that the I himself renders 
them burdensome. The inequitable relation between the two becomes 
obsessive precisely because of the burden the I perceives the other to be 
when he does not approach the other with respect to the fundamental 
demands “Do not kill me” and “Love me.” 
3. Responsibility 
                                           
54 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 88. 
55 “I do not have time to face it. Outside of conventions (so many poses of theatrical 
exposition), no welcome is equal to the measure I have of a neighbor” (Ibid., p. 88). 
56 Ibid., p. 88. 
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Instead of perceiving the other as burdensome, the I as subject is called 
to respond to the demand of the other. But not only is he called to respond 
to the other, he is called to respond for the other.57 The I is responsible for 
the other’s responsibility. 58  This is the full definition of responsibility, 
according to Levinas. Responsibility, in terms of this system of man’s 
ontology, is the exact opposite of obsession; whereas obsession is a 
demonstration of the I’s passive attitude and interaction with the other, 
responsibility is an active response to and for the other (and even the 
response to the call to which the other must respond).59 
3.1  Communication and the response 
Referring to Ethics and Infinity, where Levinas says, “The tie with the 
Other is knotted only as responsibility…”60 we begin to see or visualize the 
definition of responsibility as conceptualized and understood by Levinas. 
Admittedly, what Levinas says here can be construed as off-the-cuff, but he 
is nevertheless leading us to an important point about responsibility. When 
we look at everything that we have been studying as it pertains to the face-
to-face encounter, the relation between the I and the other and proximity, it 
comes down to communication. Relation is communication because in the 
face-to-face encounter, both the I and other are communicating to the other 
their fundamental demands, “Do not kill me” and “Love me.” The relation 
may evolve beyond the issuance [and adherence] of these commands, but 
regardless of how or if the relation between the I and the other evolve, the 
very issuance of these commandments originates in the face-to-face 
encounter and constitutes communication. Furthermore, in the commands, 
                                           
57  “Responsibility for another is not an accident that happens to a subject, but 
precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom, in which a commitment to another 
would have been made” (Ibid., p. 114). 
58 “I have not done anything and I have always been under accusation – persecuted. 
The ipseity, in the passivity without arche characteristic of identity, is a hostage. The 
word I means here I am, answering for everything and for everyone” (Ibid., p. 114). 
59 “Responsibility for the others has not been a return to oneself, but an exasperated 
contracting, which the limits of identity, breaking up the principle of being in me, the 
intolerable rest in itself characteristic definition. The self is on the hither side of rest; it is the 
impossibility to come back from all things and concern oneself only with oneself. It is to 
hold on to oneself while gnawing away at oneself. Responsibility in obsession is a 
responsibility of the ego for what the ego has not wished, that is, for the others” (Ibid., p. 
114). 
60 Ibid., p. 97. 
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the intentionality and references immediately designate the I as subject of 
his command (and, likewise, the other as subject of his respective 
command). 
The I relates to the other in terms of self; it is from the sense of the self 
that the subjectness of the I emerges. Levinas refers to the sense or 
assertion of the self in the psychological term of the ego when he says, “It 
is with subjectivity understood as self, with the exciding and dispossession, 
the contraction, in which the ego does not appear, but immolates itself, that 
the relationship with the other can be communication and transcendence, 
and not always another way of seeking certainty, or the coinciding with 
oneself.” 61  The psychology of the ego becomes important when we 
consider the arche and telos of communication; Levinas admonishes other 
philosophers as he explains that communication begins with an inner 
dialogue within the self (between the self and the realized subject that is the 
ego), saying “Paradoxically enough, thinkers claim to derive 
communication out of self-coinciding. They do not take seriously the 
radical reversal, from cognition to solidarity, that communication 
represents with respect to inward dialogue, to cognition of oneself, taken as 
the trope of spirituality.”62 This is to say that the arche of communication is 
not a matter of two selves coming together but rather a recognition of the 
distinction between the self as being and the subjective ego. 
Levinas goes further in his explanation saying “…communication would 
be impossible if it should have to begin in the ego, a free subject, to whom 
every other would be only a limitation that invites war, domination, 
precaution and information.” 63  Therefore, we come to understand that 
communication is not a concept that is born from the very existence of the 
ego; instead communication emerges as a realization of the relation 
between the self and its subjectivity, which becomes manifest in the form 
of dialogue. The dialogue is not limited to the relation taking place within 
the I but also occurs with the other in the face-to-face encounter, the other 
as subject of his own being. Levinas also asserts that communication is an 
openness of the self; this must be applied in the first place to the relation of 
the ego with the self and then subsequently to the relation between the I and 
the other. He says, “To communicate is indeed to open oneself…”64 In this 
                                           
61 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being of Beyond Essence. p. 118. 
62 Ibid., p. 119. 
63 Ibid., p. 119. 
64 Ibid., p. 119. 
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return to the openness of the face to face that it encounters, communication 
is the very openness of the I as ego to its very self and openness of the I 
subject to the other who is also subject of his own being. 
It is from here that Levinas’ explanation of responsibility as a response is 
made clear. He says that communication constitutes an openness but is 
incomplete in the need or desire for recognition 65 ; communication is 
complete or rather, the openness is completely (or shall we say absolutely) 
open when the I accepts responsibility for the other.66  What does this 
mean? When the I stops looking at himself and considering the other as a 
means for quenching his own thirst, satiating his desires and achieving his 
own transcendence and instead relates to the other in a way that is open to 
the other’s subjectivity, only then is he completely and absolutely open to 
the other. Based on this understanding of the ontology of communication, it 
is in this manner of relation that the I necessarily, and perhaps even 
naturally, responds to the other’s call.  
But the openness to responding to the call is not limited to an openness 
just to the other. On the contrary, having admitted that communication 
begins within the relation between the I as ego and its very self, then the 
openness to responding necessarily has to extend to or begin with the self. 
This is to say, the I is responsible to and for itself: it must be open to and 
respond to its own call.  
Having identified the arche of communication as the relation between 
the ego and the self of the I67, I submit that the telos of communication is 
the openness to respond to the call of the other (or the self) – the telos is 
responsibility. We will continue to draw more concrete conclusions about 
communication and responsibility when we look at substitution and the 
hostage, but for now let us say that communication as it relates to 
responsibility is the complete (and absolute) openness to subjectivity, in 
                                           
65 “…but the openness is not complete if it is on the watch for recognition” (Ibid., p. 
119). 
66 “It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of or the recognition of the other, 
but in becoming a responsibility for him” (Ibid., p. 119). 
67 “Communication with the other is transcendence only in so far as the sovereignty 
of consciousness is displaced. … The self-possession of self-consciousness rules as an 
arche and is not submitted to the other’s challenge as described in Totality and Infinity. 
It was already clear from Totality and Infinity that the relation with the stranger was not 
conducted through a representation of the other, but in ‘Substitution’ Levinas radicalizes 
this account by insisting that one does not know from whom the summons comes” (R. 
BERNASCONI, “What is the question to which ‘substitution’ is the answer?” p. 236). 
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both the I himself and in the other; it is the openness to responding to and 
for the other. 
3.2  Substitution 
In our investigation into the ontology of communication, we talked 
around the concept of proximity; we used different words to describe the 
connection or the contact between the I and the other. In its purest form, 
communication signifies what Levinas refers to as fraternity; he says, 
“Responsibility for the other, this way of answering without prior 
commitment, is human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom.”68 The 
prior commitment to which Levinas refers is the “watch for recognition”69 
that he mentions when he explains the ontology of communication. And 
being in relation with the other goes beyond the desires of the self and the 
desire to be recognized as a subject in his own right; being in relation is 
being in contact with the other or rather being in proximity with the other. 
Not looking or seeking recognition as I and encountering the other as a 
being that is the same in nature but absolutely other is the proximity and 
openness to responding to the call of the other that is the foundation for 
responsibility. 
The concept of responding to the call goes back to the original concept 
of the one-for-the-other; it is in the one-for-the-other that the I is in 
proximity with and has concern for the other, which is active. According to 
Levinas, the I actively responds to the call because “… as a ‘first person,’ I 
am he who finds the resources to respond to the call.”70 As we look at this 
statement, we can see several things: the immediacy of responsibility 
insofar as the statement is in active voice and that the resources are found 
from within the I meaning he cannot pass the responsibility to any other. 
The immediacy is another return to the idea of proximity: when the I is 
called to give of himself to the other, the gift represents an immediate 
spoiling of his enjoyment71 of himself and what he perceives to have in his 
possession for his own wellbeing and survival. 
                                           
68 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 116. 
69 Ibid., p. 119. 
70 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 89. 
71 “The immediacy of the sensible is the immediacy of enjoyment and its frustration. 
It is the gift painfully torn up, and in the tearing up, immediately spoiling this very 
enjoyment” (E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 74). 
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The immediacy of responsibility is also a result of proximity as such 
insofar as there is no one else to whom the I may put in his own place as he 
relates to the other.72 This is to say, in the one-for-the-other, the I is the 
only one who may be for the other whom he encounters. Because the I 
cannot pass on to another the action of responding to the call, he must 
respond – it is only he who can respond to the call. But Levinas addresses 
the obvious question of “why me?” when he says, 
Why does the other concern me? What is Hecuba to me? Am I my brother’s 
keeper? These questions have meaning only if one has already supposed that 
the ego is concerned only with itself, is only a concern for itself. In this 
hypothesis it indeed remains incomprehensible that the absolute outside-of-
me, the other, would concern me. But in the “prehistory” of the ego posited for 
itself speaks of responsibility. The self is through and through a hostage, older 
than the ego, prior to principles. What is at stake for the self, in its being, is 
not to be. Beyond egoism and altruism it is the religiosity of the self.73 
Why me? Because I am the only one in whom I can ensure the demand is 
heeded and the call is answered. It is in this way that the I is a hostage to 
the responsibility: there is no one else to whom the I may assign the task of 
responding and ensuring that it will be done.74 
It is in the condition of hostage that the I can empathize with the other; 
the I as a hostage responds to the call of the other because he, as a subject, 
has put himself in the place of the other.75 The I, in the psychology of the 
ego and in relation to the other, gives of himself that which no one else can 
give – it is the I who holds the door open for the other saying, “After you, 
sir.” This sense of having to respond because there is no one else to do it is 
constant. We could ask at what point the I, in this system of ontology, can 
finally say enough and give the task of responding to the call to someone 
                                           
72 “In this non-reciprocity, in this ‘not thinking of it’ is announced, on the hither side 
of the ‘state of nature’ (from which nature itself arises), the-one-for-the-other, a one-
way relationship, not coming back in any form to its point of departure, the immediacy 
of the other, more immediate still than immediate identity in its quietude as a nature – 
the immediacy of proximity” (Ibid., p. 84). 
73 Ibid., p. 117. 
74 “Against the traditional notion of responsibility Levinas can claim that I am for the 
other without having chosen or acted…” (R. BERNASCONI, “What is the question to 
which ‘substitution’ is the answer?” p. 239). 
75 “It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, 
compassion, pardon and proximity – even the little there is, even the simple ‘After you, 
sir’” (E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 117) 
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else knowing that the other person will indeed respond. The answer is 
never. The I would never know with certainty that the call is being 
answered if he himself is not answering it. The responsibility to and for the 
other, therefore, is infinite, which is to say there is never a point at which 
the I can release his responsibility. The I always has one more degree of 
responsibility – he is responsible for the other’s responsibility.76 It is in this 
way that he is a hostage. He is not a hostage to the other or to the call itself 
but rather to responsibility, the incumbence of responding. According to 
Levinas, it is the constant state of being a hostage to responding to the call 
that creates the solidarity77 between men; it is proximity; it is fraternity. 
Within the common conception and colloquial use of the word hostage, 
it is a taking of one for another – a person held until a demand is met. But 
in Levinas’ thought, the hostage appears as constantly being responsible to 
and for the other, a standard imposed on the I himself. The hostage does 
not mean taking one being for another but instead the hostage substitutes 
himself for the other.  
Substitution does not mean that the I substitutes his subjectivity for that 
of the other or substitutes himself in the place of the other in terms of 
metaphysical being or phenomenological manifestation; instead, 
substitution means the I, in answering the call to and for the other, is indeed 
responsible for the other’s responsibility. If the other does not fulfill his 
responsibility, it is still incumbent on the I to fulfill that responsibility. 
For Levinas, “Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, 
and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the 
unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-
interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can 
substitute himself for me.”78 The I is a substitute for the other insofar as the 
I is responsible for the responsibility of the other. Levinas goes further to 
say that substitution belongs to the I79 insofar as it comes from within the I, 
from the ego as a realized subject80; substitution is that which no one else 
                                           
76 “To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree of 
responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other” (Ibid., p. 117). 
77 “The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the 
condition for all solidarity” (Ibid., p. 117). 
78 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 101. 
79 “My substitution – it is as my own that substitution for the neighbor is produced” 
(E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 126). 
80 “It is in me – in me and not in another, in me and not in an individuation of the 
concept of Ego – that communication opens” (Ibid., p. 126). 
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can do because it comes from himself as ego81 as he gives of himself to 
respond to the call, and he does this for all82 with whom he has contact or 
with whom he is in proximity.  
There is a particularity to Levinas’ concept of substitution because he 
admits that it is neither noun or verb83 because it represents the I divesting 
itself, turning itself inside out and emptying itself84 in order to respond to 
the call. Substitution is what the I does or is when he has given of himself 
in such a way that he has disturbed his own comfort and enjoyment. 
Substitution represents the tear that the I feels when he gifts of himself as 
the hostage who is always responsible. 
However, we must be clear that Levinas does not suggest that in 
substitution the I remands itself to the possession, will or desire of the 
other. Instead, he contends that the uniqueness of the I as substitute and 
hostage for the other is in the fact that he remains master of himself – his 
being remains his85, which is to say he always has full possession of his 
being (self and ego). The I is a substitute because of his subjectivity as 
ego86 – he renders himself hostage in his recognition that it is only he who 
can answer the call and know that it has been answered. But, Levinas says, 
not even in the instance of free will can the I refuse or denounce his 
responsibility because as hostage, 87  he cannot refuse or denounce that 
                                           
81 “The ego involved in responsibility is me and no one else, me with whom one 
would have liked to pair up a sister soul, from whom one would require substitution and 
sacrifice” (Ibid., p. 126). 
82 “It is I who am integrally or absolutely ego, and the absolute is my business. No 
one can substitute himself for me, who substitutes myself for all” (Ibid., p. 126). 
83 “Substitution is not an act; it is a passivity inconvertible into an act, the hither side 
of the act-passivity alternative, the exception that cannot be fitted into the grammatical 
categories of noun or verb, save in the said that thematizes them” (Ibid., p. 117). 
84 “[The ego’s] exceptional uniqueness in the passivity or the passion of the self is 
the incessant event of subjection to everything, of substitution. It is a being divesting 
itself, emptying itself of its being, turning itself inside out, and if it can be put thus, the 
fact of ‘otherwise than being’” (Ibid., p. 117). 
85 “The uniqueness of the ego, overwhelmed by the other in proximity, is the other in 
the same, the psyche. But is it I, I and no one else, who am a hostage for the other. In 
substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone, and it is through 
this substitution that I am no ‘another,’ but me” (Ibid., pp. 126-127). 
86 “Subjectivity is being hostage. This notion reverses the position where the presence of 
the ego to itself appears as the beginning or as the conclusion of philosophy” (Ibid., p. 127). 
87 “Strictly speaking, the other is the end; I am a hostage, a responsibility and a 
substitution supporting the world in the passivity of assignation, even in an accusing 
persecution, which is undeclinable” (Ibid., p. 128). 
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which he has already acknowledged namely his proximity to the other, the 
look of the other88, and the call that commands a response. It is always his 
subjectivity that enables and demands of him to substitute himself and be a 
hostage to responsibility. 
3.3  Freedom 
If it is incumbent on the I to respond to the call of the other, then his 
experience of responsibility is not based on the freedom to choose to 
answer the call.89 How do we rectify the incumbency of responsibility with 
freedom? Let us take for granted what we have already understood about 
freedom from the first chapter, “The strangeness of the Other, his very 
freedom! Free beings alone can be strangers to one another. Their freedom 
which is ‘common’ to them is precisely what separates them.”90 However, 
this understanding of freedom, while related to our discussion at hand, has 
more to do with the freedom enjoyed between the I and the other insofar as 
their alterity or strangeness to each other grants them freedom from each 
other’s will. But in terms of the I being a hostage insofar as he cannot not 
be responsible to and for the other and also for the other’s responsibility: 
within this context, what does it mean to be free, or rather, what is 
freedom? 
In this context, Levinas talks about freedom distinguishing infinite and 
finite freedom, which we must understand before delving into the 
discussion. He makes the distinction when he says,  
In the accusative form, which is a modification of no nominative form, in 
which I approach the neighbor for whom, without having wished it, I have to 
answer, the irreplaceable one is brought out (s’accuse). This finite freedom is 
not primary, is not initial; but lies in an infinite responsibility where the other 
is not other because he strikes up against and limits my freedom, but where he 
can accuse me to the point of persecution, because the other, absolutely other, 
is another one (autrui). That is why finite freedom is not simply an infinite 
                                           
88 “Positively, we will say that since the Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, 
without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is 
incumbent on me” (E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 96). 
89 “The experience of responsibility is not the experience of a free choice, but rather 
‘the impossibility of evading the neighbor’s call’ (BPW)” (R. BERNASCONI, “What is the 
question to which ‘substitution’ is the answer?” p. 236). 
90 E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity. p. 73. 
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freedom operating in a limited field. The will which animates wills in a 
passivity it does not assume.91 
Infinite freedom, therefore, is the freedom related to being qua being; it is 
the freedom that is intrinsic to being absolutely; it is the freedom that is 
evident in the being’s very demand for love and respect; it is the freedom 
that is demanded by the I to the other in his self assertion with respect to 
the other – the I’s being is not dependent on any other being who is like 
himself but utterly other and strange.  
Finite freedom, on the other hand, is the freedom that the I enjoys with 
respect to his relationship with the other; therefore, the I’s finite freedom is 
subsequent to his responsibility to and for the other. Levinas writes, 
What of the notion of finite freedom? No doubt the idea of a responsibility 
prior to freedom, and the compossibility of freedom and the other such as it 
shows itself in responsibility for another, enables us to confer an irreducible 
meaning to this notion, without attacking the dignity of freedom which is thus 
conceived in finitude.92 
So Levinas is setting up the context of the explanation of finite freedom, 
the context, which is an understanding that there is a coexistence of 
freedom and responsibility – neither of the two usurps the position of the 
other, but responsibility remains prior to finite freedom. While 
responsibility is prior to freedom, they always exist within the face-to-face 
encounter between the I and the other. The I is not called and may not 
respond without the other who calls, the other who demands; likewise the I 
is not free without the other in whom he recognizes his own alterity and 
asserts his subjectivity. Freedom and responsibility exist only in terms of 
the other, the relation the I has with the other, the face-to-face encounter. 
However, Levinas also admits a problem with such an approach to 
freedom, namely when he says that “In finite freedom, there can then be 
disengaged an element of pure freedom, which limitation does not affect, in 
one’s will. Thus the notion of finite freedom rather poses than resolves the 
problem of limitation of the freedom of the will.”93 The will of man is 
intrinsically free since the will is wholly of man’s being; in this instance we 
return to the concept of infinite freedom. Taking it back to the 
understanding of freedom from Chapter I, it is in man’s alterity, his 
strangeness, subjectivity and realization of self that he has a will. And it is 
                                           
91 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. p. 124. 
92 Ibid. p. 123. 
93 Ibid. pp. 123-124. 
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in the will’s inextricable connection with man’s being as such, freedom of 
will is more than a simple freedom of volition but rather a freedom related 
to the persistence of man’s existence or essence. But if the will is 
intrinsically free, how can we accept limitations on the I’s freedom as he 
relates to the other? 
Levinas addresses this problem by going further to explore the 
relationship between freedom and responsibility: 
Freedom is borne by the responsibility it could not shoulder, an elevation and 
inspiration without complacency. The for-the-other characteristic of the 
subject can be interpreted neither as a guilt complex (which presupposes an 
initial freedom), nor as a natural benevolence or divine “instinct,” nor as some 
love or some tendency to sacrifice.94 
This is a demonstration as well as an explanation: Levinas is demonstrating 
that through being for-the-other, the I who is inherently responsible to and 
for the other is elevated and inspired, which is to say, the I experiences 
transcendence. He explains that freedom borne by responsibility is not 
about sacrifice but rather is the transcendence that takes place when the I 
responds to the call of the other.  
Levinas expands his explanation of how freedom is limited in relation to 
the other when he brings the discussion back to the I as substitute, the 
irreplaceable subject:  
But in the irreplaceable subject, unique and chosen as a responsibility and a 
substitution, a mode of freedom, ontologically impossible, breaks the 
unrendable essence. Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the 
enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological 
way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and sleep 
in a movement that never wears out.95 
Within this paradigm, there are two qualities of finite freedom: the freedom 
that is limited and second to responsibility; that same freedom that when 
second to responsibility is experienced by the I in his letting go of himself 
and not focusing on only his ego or self. The freedom remains finite 
because of the I’s subjectivity, because the I cannot replace himself with 
any other, but instead may substitute himself for the other.  
Levinas attempts to remedy the problem of finite freedom with the 
prospect or promise of transcendence through the I’s response to the call of 
                                           
94 Ibid., p. 124. 
95 Ibid., p. 124. 
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the other. When the I no longer looks at the other as a burden or an 
opportunity [to satiate his desires], and when the I relates to the other as a 
being that is the same as him in nature and absolutely other, then the I is 
able to respond within the authentic relation that is the face-to-face 
encounter and experience the finite freedom that is transcendence. 
At this point we return to communication as a means of relation: instead 
of communication being understood solely in terms of relationship (the 
face-to-face encounter), we may also understand communication as the 
totality of the call and response. The totality of the call and response then 
yield transcendence: “It is with subjectivity understood as self, with the 
exciding and dispossession, the contraction, in which the ego does not 
appear, but immolates itself, that the relationship with the other can be 
communication and transcendence, and not always another way of seeking 
certainty, or the coinciding with oneself.”96 The relation between the I and 
the other, the responsibility that the I has to and for the other is the 
transcendence of the I.  
Levinas describes it as a means to the infinite when he says, “The face of 
the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an 
unrepresentable trace, the way of the infinite.” 97  He asserts that in 
recognizing the face of the other as such, there is an acknowledgement and 
acceptance of the contact or proximity between the two; that proximity is 
not just a representation of their relationship but rather a means by which 
the I may transcend himself and realize a greater communion within being 
as such. Levinas is never ambiguous about this point – the other is never a 
means to the I’s anything, let alone transcendence. 
Furthermore, Levinas relates freedom to man’s will or to the persistence 
of man’s being, with accounting for responsibilities taken and 
compensations made when he says,  
Essence, in its seriousness as persistence in essence, fills every interval of 
nothingness that would interrupt it. It is a strict book-keeping where nothing is 
lost nor created. Freedom is compromised in this balance of accounts in an 
order where responsibilities correspond exactly to liberties taken, where they 
compensate for them, where time relaxes and then is tightened again after 
having allowed a decision in the interval opened up.98 
                                           
96 Ibid., p. 118. 
97 Ibid., p. 116. 
98 Ibid., p. 125. 
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The I as subject is neither free from or bound by the other because it is not 
the other who calls him to responsibility; it is the very subjectivity of the I, 
the recognition of the other as a subject in his own being and relation with 
the other who calls him – that is what binds the I and limits his freedom. 
This is also the persistence of his essence. But according to Levinas, in the 
balanced account of the responsibilities taken and compensations made, the 
I may enjoy finite freedom. In more practical terms, if the I hears the other 
pleading with him for help, the I is pursued by the responsibility of 
responding to the call of the other. As long as the other calls, the I is 
responsible for responding. As soon as the I hears the call, it is incumbent 
on him to respond; the I is never free from responsibility. 
Taking this approach to responsibility and freedom, it would seem that 
responsibility is out of control, but Levinas provides a solution when he 
says that responsibility itself must be limited. The I cannot substitute 
himself for all and cannot be hostage for every other. Levinas says,  
To be sure – but this is another theme – my responsibility for all can and has 
to manifest itself also in limiting itself. The ego can, in the name of this 
unlimited responsibility, be called upon to concern itself also with itself. The 
fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, 
who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice and 
philosophy.99 
The I must accept that he is limited in his ability to respond to all calls that 
are incumbent on him to respond; he has to accept the limitations of the 
responsibility that is incumbent on him. While he is responsible to and for 
the other, he must also respond to the call that originates within himself; he 
must also exercise responsibility to and for the self that is he. Within the 
paradigm of the ego and the self, there must necessarily be a 
disinterestedness that enables the I to relate to himself, not in an egotistical 
way (egoism) but in a way that recognizes his person as an other and cares 
for it. It is in this instance that a weakness in Levinas’ philosophy is 
exposed: how does the I reconcile the responsibility to and for the other 
with the responsibility he has to and for himself? 
Perhaps there are two means of transcendence as man encounters the 
other: the transcendence he experiences when he lets go of his ego and 
relates authentically to the other; and as he finds a balance within himself 
between the infinite responsibility he has to and for the other and the 
                                           
99 Ibid., p. 128. 
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infinite responsibility he has to and for himself. I suggest that both 
instances, giving way to man’s transcendence, frees him from his ego and 
enables his self satisfaction in its metaphysical desire for being as such. 
The responsibility that the I cannot meet because of its limitation does 
not mean that he is nonetheless concerned for the call to which he cannot 
respond. That concern gives way to the realizations of justice and 
philosophy100, which he employs to address the calls to which he cannot 
respond in authentic relation with the other. 
Rounding out the definition of ethical demand that we began to formulate 
in Chapter I, we refer to Levinas when he says that “the very node of the 
subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility.”101 Allow me to 
apply the ethical demand to myself: it is more than heeding the demand of my 
neighbor to love them and not kill them; it is the demand, which is only a 
demand insofar as it is incumbent on me, to respond to the call of the other 
who is my neighbor whom I may never ever meet but with whom I 
nevertheless have contact (proximity); it is in my being responsible to and for 
my neighbor even to the point of assuming or acknowledging my 
responsibility for his responsibility. Finally, the ethical demand is the 
responsibility I have to myself to respond to the call from within my own 
being. 
With this said, however, we must also be cognizant of the limitations 
that must necessarily be imposed on the I responding to the call of the 
other. Namely, in accordance with the understanding that, ethically, one 
man may not sacrifice himself for an-other in order to respond to the call of 
that other, the I cannot ignore the call that he makes to himself, the call that 
he also must answer. Likewise, in responding to the call of the other (and 
himself), the I must not exhaust his own resources in a way that would 
jeopardize his quality of life nor his dignity and wellbeing. In other words, 
the I has a responsibility to himself not to impoverish and overwork himself 
or fatigue his body to ill health for the sake of the other. There remains a 
limit to what he can realistically and practically do for the other. In 
recognizing his limitations, the I must ask for help when he needs it, take a 
                                           
100  “The unlimited initial responsibility, which justifies this concern for justice, for 
oneself, and for philosophy can be forgotten. In this forgetting consciousness is a pure 
egoism. But egoism is neither first nor last. The impossibility of escaping God, the 
adventure of Jonas, indicates that God is at least here not a value among values” (Ibid., p. 
128). 
101 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and infinity. p. 95. 
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break when he must and enjoy his life as he should – all of these being the 
ethical demand that he imposes on himself. 
Therefore, for the sake of the question we are asking in this thesis, 
namely, in accordance with this understanding of ethics, does my 
experience of the ethical demand change when I begin to work for a 
corporation or even when I may own that corporation? Understanding that 
the corporation is two or more persons working together to render a service 
or provide a product for a benefit that they have agreed upon, and given 
that it must necessarily be comprised of people working together, we can 
then understand that the corporation is also the context in which men relate 
to each other as I and other. This is to say that while men working together 
for a common end constitutes a corporation, it does not form an entity that 
has the same qualities of sameness and strangeness; the corporation is not a 
being that is aware of its phenomenological experience; and it is not 
susceptible to desire, metaphysical or otherwise. Therefore, the relation 
between men from which an ought is born only takes place in the face-to-
face encounter, in proximity that is not limited by the phenomena of time 
and space.  
More to the point, in applying the preceding understanding of Levinas’ 
philosophy of the face and the resulting I-other relation, we must reject the 
notion that the corporation [as an entity of enterprise that lacks personhood 
(subjectivity, strangeness, individual reflection among others) and even as a 
context for human action] provides the I a reasonable and sustainable 
opportunity or is the means by which the I may divorce himself from his 
responsibility to and for the other. The I-other relation proceeds the 
corporation in such a way that the corporation is subordinate to the relation. 
Whether we concider the corporation as a being that is comprised of 
persons working together or as a context for human action, it remains 
subordinate to the I-other relation because it is that very relation which 
brings the corporation into being. 
As we move towards developing a comprehensive proposal for a system 
of corporate ethics based on the ontology of man and the human relation, 
we recognize that responsibility to and for the other is carried out and 
provided for by an I and only an I, which is to say by a human being. It is 
the person, the human being, who is subject and must recognize the other 
as subject of his own phenomenological experience. As such, only man can 
respond to the call that is incumbent on him; the corporation as such 
cannot, and yet as a conglomeration of persons who hear and respond to the 
call of the other can inasmuch answer the call. The difference is subtle: the 
corporation as an entity is not self-aware and has no singular experience as 
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subject, but those who comprise it do and may work together to respond to 






Moving from an understanding of proximity and responsibility as it 
pertains to the human relation (and eventually that relation within the 
context of the corporation), we will now embark on analyzing the concept 
of justice so that we may establish an understanding of how it can be 
applied to man, human relation and the corporation. The aim is to provide a 
definition of justice so that we may apply it to the corporation, or rather, 
implement the responsibility of the I to and for the other when they 
participate in the corporation. 
As we discuss the responsibility that the I has to and for the other even to 
the point that the I is responsible for the responsibility of the other, we 
must also discuss justice exploring its ontology as it relates to responsibility 
and its implication to the I and the other. Interestingly enough, I had a 
conversation with a friend (in Italian) about this very thing, but it was 
framed in terms of the difference between diritti, which are rights and 
dovere, which translates to duty or obligation (also to have to, must and 
ought) between the I and the other. His question was this: based on the 
present philosophical system that we are developing, which is based on 
Levinas’ philosophy of the ethical demand, what distinguishes the rights 
versus obligation owed to the I and the other as they relate to each other? 
My answer to him was this: between two persons in relation with each 
other, there is only the duty, the obligation of the I to respond to the call of 
responsibility to and for the other; it is only when the third person enters 
the scene that the duty must be codified into rights in order to manage both 
calls and responses.  
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The rationale for my response is based on the principle of the one-for-
the-other made explicit by Levinas and present in the question of proximity 
between the I, the other and the others who comprise the community. If the 
I is responsible to and for the other and also for the other’s responsibility, 
then within the paradigm of the I and other relation, the other’s welfare and 
responsibility are incumbent upon the I. What does this mean? If we lived 
in a vacuum where only two persons existed in their own isolated 
community (outside the context of the family), then it would be incumbent 
upon each of them to be responsible for the other’s wellbeing and 
responsibility. If one were to be responsible for the hunting and gathering 
while the other was responsible for the shelter, then they would still be 
equally responsible for the other’s responsibility.1  
This is extended to the instance in which one fails to fulfill their 
obligation: the I who is responsible for hunting and gathering fails to bring 
home anything to eat, either for lack of trying or lack of resources, it is still 
incumbent on the other who is responsible for shelter to provide shelter to 
the I and see if there is anything to eat. Likewise, if the other who is 
responsible for shelter does not provide or maintain the shelter, it is still 
incumbent upon the I to hunt and gather for food and also see if there is a 
way to provide shelter too. Why is this? Even to the point that one fails to 
fulfill their part of the agreement between the two, their bodily survival 
depends on the obligation. (Based on the system that Levinas has outlined, 
their metaphysical desire is quenched by it.) They may negotiate the way in 
which the obligations are fulfilled, but there always remains a question of 
duty between the I and the other, as long as there is not an-other who enters 
the scene. 
On the other hand, if there is a third person, an-other who enters the 
scene, or even many others, then the question of obligation becomes 
obscured by the plurality of instances of responsibility or rather the 
incumbence of responding to the many calls from the others. Whose call 
does the I respond to first when there are many others with whom he is in 
                                           
1  It should be noted that a parallel could be drawn between the family and the 
community/society at large. The family could be viewed as a microcosm of societ. 
While within the context of the family, it would seem that meeting certain 
responsibilities  is a given, but in some families those responsibilities are nonetheless 
neglected. The point, in short, is that the family [bond] does not guarantee that 
responsibilities will be met and that all members’ demands are respected and fulfilled. It 
can be argued that the community or society at large at times reflects the family insofar 
as society sometimes meets the needs of the individual and sometimes it does not.  
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relation, and when all of their calls are urgent? I suggest that this is the 
point when men begin to codify the obligation in the I-other relation and 
present them as rights within the community of I-other-others. The 
obligation to the other remains the same, but the I must manage his 
responsibility according to the many calls that he perceives as he 
participates in the community of beings manifested in their faces. 
It is at this point, within the context of the community, that the I (and the 
other) may claim that they have a right for their call to be responded to by 
someone individually or someone as the collective community. The 
following questions then emerge: how does the community balance the 
codified duty with the needs of all others in the community who encounter 
their neighbor in a face-to-face paradigm instead of face-to-community, 
where their calls are one of many but nevertheless important and urgent; 
how do we determine when the code is sufficient to provide the appropriate 
and adequate responses to the calls; how do we determine if the response is 
sufficient to the call; how do we determine when the code is sufficiently 
written to respond to all of the calls of the persons represented in the 
community; are all persons represented by the code within the community? 
Finally, at what point does the code sufficiently provide for the I to respond 
to his own call without recrimination and accusation of ignoring the call of 
the community? 
I suggest that based on the preliminary discussions formed by Levinas’ 
philosophy of the ethical demand that these questions lead to a working 
definition of justice. Throughout his development of his understanding and 
philosophy of justice, Levinas refers to it in different ways, in terms of dis-
interestedness; awareness of the third party; the I overcoming obsession; 
and representation and judgment. Based on Levinas’ proposed philosophy 
of justice, I submit that justice can be defined as the result of the I honoring 
his responsibility to and for the other (and the other’s other), even to the 
extent of taking responsibility for the responsibility of the other, despite the 
obsession of the face; justice is the responsibility that is realized and acted 
upon either in the vacuum of the isolated I-other relation or in the plurality 
of responsibility in the community of the I, the other and the many others. 
1. The Idea of Justice 
We will answer the questions above and consider others while 
continuing to refer to Levinas’ for guidance because, although not 
explicitly stated, the idea of justice as it relates to the I-other relation 
begins with this kind of questions. In order to understand Levinas’ idea of 
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justice as it pertains to the I-other relation, we must consider the conditions 
from which justice emerges. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, 
when a third person enters the scene, the question of the duty becomes a 
question of rights. In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas says, “… it is the fact of 
the multiplicity of men and the presence of someone else next to the Other, 
which condition the laws and establish justice. If I am alone with the Other, 
I owe him everything; but there is someone else.” 2  The someone else 
diverts the I’s attention where he can no longer focus solely on responding 
to the call of the other; the I must then respond to both calls of the other 
and the other other, the third person. The call of the other other is still 
incumbent on the I because, “The interpersonal relation I establish with the 
Other, I must also establish with other men,”3 and because of the plurality 
of the relations, “there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the 
other.”4 Justice, therefore, emerges from this need to manage or moderate 
the obligation between the I and the other as well as the I and the other 
other. This also confirms that the ontology of the relations between the I 
and the other as well as the I and the third person are one-on-one or face-
to-face because the I hears each of their calls and must respond to each call. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas continues to explain justice in terms of 
the ontology of the I-other relation saying, “Justice consists in recognizing 
in the Other my master. Equality among persons means nothing of itself; it 
has an economic meaning and presupposes money, and already rests on 
justice – which, when well-ordered, begins with the Other.” 5  Here we 
already see that Levinas positions the concept of justice well within the 
relationship that the I has with the other, and that justice is only possible 
when the I recognizes the other as master. Although Levinas uses the 
language, “my master,” we must be careful, not to misunderstand his 
meaning: the other is not master over the I but rather he is master over his 
own being, over self; this is something that the I must recognize. 
Levinas goes on to describe justice as the “recognition of [the I’s] 
privilege”6 as it relates to the other as master; the privilege is what the I 
enjoys once he approaches the other as such without seeking anything from 
                                           
2 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 90. 
3 Ibid., p. 90. 
4 Ibid., p. 90. 
5 E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity. p. 72. 
6 “Justice is the recognition of his privilege qua Other and his mastery” (Ibid., p. 72). 
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the other.7 Then Levinas turns around and talks about justice in terms of 
work saying, “The work of justice – the uprightness of the face to face – is 
necessary in order that the breach that leads to God be produced – and 
‘vision’ here coincides with this work of justice.”8 Here he defines the work 
of justice as the uprightness of the face-to-face, uprightness that is the 
approach as equal beings who are the same in nature and yet completely 
strange to each other. But why does Levinas refer to it as the work of justice? 
I suggest that it is because it is work for the I to encounter the other as an 
equal, shaking off the impulse to use the other as a reference in his world 
and an object to be used for his own satisfaction. It is work for men to 
encounter each other, be in relation with each other and be responsible to 
and for each other because the first impulse is the obsession of the I, to take 
care of the other’s self; the I is in its self and yet must be for the other, and 
that is work! 
If it were a matter of the I existing in and of itself without having to 
encounter the other, then there would never be an understanding of 
proximity as the one-for-the-other. Levinas says that it is proximity, being 
in relation with, that makes the I responsible to and for the other, and this is 
fine: the I and the other can negotiate their relation on their own terms. But 
when the other other or an-other or third person enters the scene, the 
situation of the one-for-the-other becomes more complex 9 ; it is who 
Levinas designates as the third party that truly challenges the I’s 
responsibility to and for the other because the third party is also calling and 
demanding – the third party is not just an-other10, he is an other to whom 
the I must respond because the I is encountering him as a face.  
But what about the other who the I does not see – the other who is in 
relation with the other with whom the I is in direct contact, person-to-
person? Levinas says, “The other stands in a relationship with the third 
                                           
7  “…is access to the other outside of rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and 
exploitation” (Ibid., p. 72). 
8 Ibid., p. 72. 
9 “If proximity ordered to me only the other alone, there would have not been any 
problem, in even the most general sense of the term. A question would not have been 
born, nor consciousness, nor self-consciousness. The responsibility for the other is an 
immediacy antecedent to questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a 
problem when a third party enters” (E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond 
Essence. p. 157). 
10 “The third party is the other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also 
a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow” (Ibid., p. 157). 
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party, for whom I cannot entirely answer, even if I alone answer, before 
any question, for my neighbor.”11 In other words, there is a limit to the 
responsibility of the I based on his relative proximity to the other in 
question. The proximity between the I and the other other is there, but it is 
limited not based on time and space but based on the relation(s) with the 
other.12 
It is with the introduction of the third party that the direction of the 
response to the call begins to bend: “The third party introduces a 
contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other until then 
went in one direction.”13 It is precisely at this point, according to Levinas, 
that the idea of justice begins to take shape as we address this relational 
complexity. The relational complexity is the limit to which the I can (and 
should) respond to the call that is issued from an-other with whom he has 
limited proximity or rather a proximity based on his direct contact with the 
other. What is the responsibility the I has to and for the other whom he 
does not see or touch (contact), but is only related to based on his relation 
with an other whom he can see and touch? Levinas poses the question and 
answer in this way: “It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of 
the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of 
consciousness.”14 For Levinas, this all boils down to a question of justice or 
rather, a question of awareness of the other other. 
As long as there is a face-to-face encounter between the I and the other, 
then they can negotiate their relationship based on the ethical demand 
(responsibility) with relatively little drama. But as soon as the other other 
enters the scene, there comes a question of co-existence. The question of 
co-existence does not refer to the persons existing together; instead it refers 
to the co-existence of the relations between the persons, which is to say, the 
existence of the I-other relation, the existence of the other-third person 
relation as well as the problematic I-third person relation. In this instance of 
co-existence, Levinas says,  
Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, 
assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality 
and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a 
                                           
11 Ibid., p. 157. 
12 “The other and the third party, my neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put 
distance between me and the other and the third party” (Ibid., p. 157). 
13 Ibid., p. 157. 
14 Ibid., p. 157. 
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system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a court of 
justice. Essence as synchrony is togetherness in a place.15 
The presentation of the many faces in a single instance requires that the I, 
the other and the third person recognize and respect each other as beings of 
the same nature but with an intrinsic alterity; but equally important in this 
instance is that they recognize and respect the relationships that are present 
in this plural encounter. The significance of proximity, within this more 
complex16 paradigm, is amplified17 because the implications of the various 
relations become greater and the impact further reaching. The successful 
co-existence of relations in a community can mean that a community 
thrives instead of simply surviving; it could mean that the welfare of 
individual persons within the community is attended to properly or that 
they founder and die or at least suffer. 
The system by which justice is ensured is institutional, meaning that the 
system itself must be governed by a body of rules and regulations (laws), 
which has been agreed on by the persons whom it serves. Levinas cautions, 
however, that the system or institution must be checked or scrutinized by 
the very inter-personal relations from which it comes: “Justice, exercised 
through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by 
the initial interpersonal relation.”18 This is to say that when justice ceases to 
serve the persons from whom it is instituted, then it is no longer justice, and 
those persons must be capable of revising the system. 
2. The Third Person 
We have discussed the third person, the other other, as it pertains to the 
emersion of justice within the plural face-to-face encounter, but we must 
also gain a greater appreciation for who that third person is in relation to 
the I and how it impacts responsibility. 
Let us take the following statement as a point of departure: 
The entry of a third party is the very fact of consciousness, assembling into 
being, and at the same time, in a being, the hour of the suspension of being in 
possibility, the finitude of essence accessible to the abstraction of concepts, to 
                                           
15 Ibid., p. 157. 
16 “But pure contiguity is not a ‘simple nature’” (Ibid., p. 157). 
17 “Proximity takes on a new meaning in the space of contiguity” (Ibid., p. 157). 
18 Ibid., p. 90. 
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the memory that assembles in presence, the reduction of a being to the 
possible and the reckoning of possibles, the comparison of incomparables.19 
The problematic of the relation between the I and the other other remains 
within the realm of proximity: it is a matter of contact and how the two 
manage it. In the above quote, Levinas says that it is a matter of 
consciousness or awareness. As soon as the I is aware of the existence of 
the third person, either in the capacity of the other other or the other who is 
not seen by the I but is nevertheless affected by the I because of their 
proximity, the I has a responsibility to and for that third person. 
The awareness of the other other may not originate from the paradigm of 
a first-person or person to person encounter20; instead it may originate from 
within the I-other relation – the I comes to be aware of the other other 
through the other with whom he is in direct contact. In this case, the being 
of the third person is not necessarily a given to the I: the I must abstract a 
conception of the being of the other other from the other with whom he is 
in direct contact. But in doing so, he cannot reduce the other other to the 
simple abstraction; through his direct contact with the other, the I must 
acknowledge the integrity of the essence of the third person; the essence of 
the third person is the same in nature as that of the I (and the other) but has 
an absolute alterity or strangeness to the I. 
This is indeed a feat for the I because he has to maintain a disinterested 
or unbiased response to the call of the other other of whom he is aware but 
may not be in direct contact. He must be responsible to and for the other 
other as if he were in direct contact, a person-to-person encounter. Levinas 
says, “It is the thematization of the same on the basis of the relationship 
with the other, starting with proximity and the immediacy of saying prior to 
problems, whereas the identification of knowing by itself absorbs every 
other.”21 In other words, the I must not respond to the call of the other other 
as if he were responding to the call of the other because they are two 
different calls originating from two different persons, beings. They cannot 
be categorized within the references the I uses to navigate the 
                                           
19 E. LEVINAS, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. pp. 157-158. 
20 I am not referring to this as a face-to-face encounter because we have already 
admitted that the face-to-face encounter can take place between persons who do not 
share a common time or space as in the situation of the author and reader. Instead, I am 
using the terminology of person to person in order to invoke a sense of presence among 
the persons involved, i.e. they are sharing a common time and/or space. 
21 Ibid., p. 158. 
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phenomenological world in which his face is manifest; their demand not to 
be killed and their call to be loved must be respected based on their 
individual beings that are same in nature but otherwise completely strange 
to the I. 
As Levinas discusses the requisite that the I avoid themaziting the other 
other, he begins to outline the limitation of obsession that befalls the I 
when relating to the other: 
It is not that the entry of a third party would be an empirical fact, and, that my 
responsibility for the other finds itself constrained to a calculus by the “force 
of things.” In the proximity of the other, all the others than the other obsess 
me, and already this obsession cries out for justice, demands measure and 
knowing, is consciousness.22 
When Levinas says that all the other others obsess him, he means that the I 
has to make a conscious effort to remain disinterested in the face of the 
other with whom he may not have direct contact. To be disinterested or 
unbiased in the face of someone whom the I never sees or has direct 
contact is problematic because, at least in a situation of direct contact, the I 
and the other can confront each other with their demands; they can grapple 
over the demands together and negotiate the relation. The other shares a 
common time, space or even medium, as is the case of text, with the I in the 
phenomenological world in such a way that the I is forced to deal with the 
other. The other other who the I does not see or with whom he has indirect 
contact is not there (sharing time, space or medium) to stand up for himself 
saying, “Do not kill me,” and “Love me.” The obsession that the I must 
confront in the problematic of his proximity with the other other is 
recognizing the same sense of being in him as he recognizes in the other 
with whom he has direct contact. Levinas concludes his statement saying 
that with the possibility (and probability) of the I succumbing to obsession, 
it is from this obsession that justice must be employed to ensure that the I’s 
obsession does not supersede the call of the other other and impede it from 
being answered. 
According to Levinas, it is in the I as a hostage to his responsibility that 
the third person’s call is answered; it is through being hostage to his 
responsibility that justice becomes justice: “A face obsesses and shows 
itself, between transcendence and visibility/invisibility. Signification 
signifies in justice, but also, more ancient than itself and than equality 
                                           
22 Ibid., p. 158. 
96 PART ONE: THE ETHICAL DEMAND 
 
 
implied by it, justice passes by justice in my responsibility for the other, in 
my inequality with respect to him for whom I am hostage.” 23  The I 
responds to the call of the third person truly as a hostage to his own 
responsibility because the third person is not there in common time, space 
and medium (direct contact) to confront the I (there is only proximity that 
may also be limited). 
So the I’s response to the call of the third person is not because the third 
person is demanding it of him, rather because he is bound by his own 
responsibility, the responsibility to and for the other and even responsible 
for the responsibility of the other, to respond to an-other with whom he has 
no direct contact. The contact that establishes their proximity is the other in 
whom the face of the third person is made present to the I. Levinas says, 
“And it is because the third party does not come empirically to trouble 
proximity, but the face is both the neighbor and the face of faces, visage 
and visible, that, between the order of being and of proximity the bond is 
unexceptionable.”24 In this way, the phenomenon of the face is significant 
because while it is a manifestation of the being that is man, it represents the 
relations that are not readily seen, i.e. the face of the other signifies for the 
I the proximity with the third person not present in the face-to-face 
encounter in the phenomenological manifestation of the face, but is present 
in his contact with the other.25 The third person appears in the face of the 
other; in turn, the I becomes aware of the being of the third person.26 
Furthermore, when Levinas says, “the face obsesses and shows itself, 
between transcendence and visibility/invisibility,”27 the transcendence he 
refers to is the realization and openness or better yet, the openness to the 
being that is otherwise than what the I sees, touches and perceives with his 
senses; the face that obsesses and yet overcomes its obsession to respond to 
the call because it is open to the being who is otherwise than him with 
whom the I has direct contact – he experiences transcendence. 
But beyond the scope of the I being a hostage to his responsibility in the 
face of the other other with whom he has no direct contact or does not see 
or touch, the very awareness of the other other means something: it means 
                                           
23 Ibid., p. 158. 
24 Ibid., p. 160. 
25  “Order, appearing, phenomenality, being are produced in signification, in 
proximity, starting with the third party” (Ibid., p. 160). 
26 “The apparition of a third party is the very origin of appearing, that is, the very 
origin of an origin” (Ibid., p. 160). 
27 Ibid., p. 158. 
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that proximity is not limited to direct contact or a person-to-person 
encounter, and because of this, the incumbency of the I to respond 
broadens the scope of his responsibility. Part and parcel to the I’s 
incumbence to respond to the call of the other other or third person is his 
relation to the other whose brother or neighbor is the third person28; couple 
this with the I’s responsibility for the responsibility of the other, he is then 
responsible for the third person with whom he has no direct contact. The 
awareness and openness to the third person originates from within the 
openness to the I-other relation and not from direct contact. 
In overcoming his obsession of the third person, transcendence for the I 
occurs when he is open to the inequality of the one-for-the-other where he 
does not know the person for whom he is substituting himself and yet his 
being takes on meaning or significance because his action of responding to 
the call means something to someone who cannot see him either. Levinas 
says, “In proximity the other obsesses me according to the absolute asymetry 
of signification, of the-one-for-the-other: I substitute myself for him, 
whereas no one can replace me, and the substitution of the one for the other 
does not signify the substitution of the other for the one.”29 Accepting that no 
one can replace him in responding to the call of the third person with whom 
he has no direct contact, whom he cannot see, means that he is authentically 
conscious of a being who has a face like his but is utterly strange to him; it 
means that he hears their call through the beings with whom he does have 
direct contact; it means that even in blindness, the I is capable of justice – 
responding to the demand “Do not kill me” and the command “Love me.”  
There is an asymmetry in the relation between the I and the other, but 
Levinas notes the inequality in the relation between the I and the third 
person who calls for justice or what he refers to as “correction” when he 
says, “The relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the 
asymetry of proximity in which the face is looked at. There is weighing, 
thought, objectification, and thus a decree in which my anarchic 
relationship with illeity is betrayed, but in which it is conveyed before 
us.” 30  The correction to which Levinas refers is the I resisting the 
temptation and relative ease of obsession, of being interested only in 
                                           
28 “The other is from the first the brother of all the other men. The neighbor that 
obsesses me is already a face, both comparable and incomparable, a unique face and in 
relationship with faces, which are visible in the concern for justice” (Ibid., p. 158). 
29 Ibid., p. 158. 
30 Ibid., p. 158. 
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himself and that which he can see. The correction is the I’s very awareness 
of the being that is beyond his sight and direct contact; the correction is his 
openness to that being; the correction is recognizing and responding to the 
demand and call that is issued from a being that is so utterly strange to him 
because he does not see him or have direct contact with him; the correction 
to the asymmetry of the relation between the I and the other other is the 
responsibility that the I has to and for him whom he does not see, with 
whom his proximity is limited to contact with the other and whose being is 
made present to him through the other. 
 
3. Representation 
Levinas also refers to justice in terms of representation when he talks 
about the “comparison of the incomparable” insofar as the I, other and 
other other are beings who are the same in nature but otherwise absolutely 
strange to each other. Their similarities are categorized in such a way that 
the I, when relating to his neighbor or the third person, may abstract 
meaning from those relations. Levinas says,  
In the comparison of the incomparable there would be the latent birth of 
representation, logos, consciousness, work, the neutral notion being. 
Everything is together, one can go from the one to the other and from the other 
to the one, put into relationship, judge, know, ask “what about...?”, transform 
matter.31 
The representation is “latent” because it is not intrinsic to being qua being 
and only contingent on the I perceiving the comparison; this is to say that 
the I, other and third person are beings in se and not representations as 
such. But it is as representations that the I is able to relate to those beings 
because he cannot see, touch, grasp or know those beings for their intrinsic 
selves or the beings insofar as they participate in being as such.  
The representation that the I perceives is the result of the phenomenon of 
the manifested face in the experiential world; the understanding and 
awareness of the other who the I has is an approximation of the being of 
the other because the I compares what he encounters to himself – he 
compares his face to that which he encounters. Therefore, representation 
gives the I a proximity to the being in se that is the other and the third 
person. Consequently, in comparing faces, the I categorizes, assigns labels 
                                           
31 Ibid., p. 158. 
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and judges the representation against what he has come to know; the 
comparison is then understood as judgment. 
From representation and the subsequent judgment, emerges the order of 
justice insofar as it is a determination of whether the I sufficiently 
substituted himself for the other.  Levinas says,: 
Out of representation is produced the order of justice, moderating or 
measuring the substitution of me for the other, and giving the self over to 
calculus. Justice requires contemporaneousness of representation. It is thus 
that the neighbor becomes visible, and, looked at, presents himself, and there 
is also justice for me. The saying is fixed in a said, is written, becomes a book, 
law and science.32 
When Levinas says “justice requires contemporaneousness of 
representation,”33 we should not interpret this to mean the calls of the other 
and his neighbor, the third person, are issued simultaneously, rather the 
representations are contemporaneous insofar as the other other is 
represented in the representation of the other; in other words, the I is aware 
of the third person through the other or via his proximity to the other. In 
this case, the I hears the call of the other and is aware of the call of the 
other other through the other. This goes back to the idea that if the I and the 
other were to exist in a vacuum, where they encountered each other and 
only each other because there is no other, then they would be bound to each 
other by responsibility alone; but when the third person enters the scene, 
their responsibility becomes more complex because they must manage their 
responsibility to and for others in the face of calls being issued by more 
than one person. 
Justice, therefore, is only realized when the I acts in accord to the 
incumbence of his responsibility to and for the many others whom he 
encounters person-to-person (direct contact) as well as the many third 
persons with whom he does not have direct contact, but nevertheless enjoys 
a face-to-face encounter by virtue of the proximity of the relation of the – I 
to the other and the other to the other other or third person.  
4. Dis-inter-estedness 
Let us clarify the concept of dis-inter-estedness: what Levinas means by 
dis-interested is not that the I does not care or is un-interested but rather 
                                           
32 Ibid., p. 159. 
33 Ibid., p. 159. 
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that he is indifferent, not having invested his personal interest. Levinas 
argues that it is from a place of indifference where the I is not concerned 
with being recognized, lauded or hailed, that he can respond to the call of 
the other with an authentic concern for the wellbeing of the other. Keeping 
this in mind, we can then consider this statement: “… justice only has 
meaning if it retains the spirit of dis-interestedness which animates the idea 
of responsibility for the other man.” 34  According to Levinas, justice 
emerges in a plural face-to-face encounter only when the faces are dis-
interested, when they are not seeking satisfaction for their own desires; 
justice emerges when persons in proximity with each other recognize each 
other’s calls and work together to find a way to ensure that all of their calls 
are answered. 
For further clarity on Levinas’ use of dis-interest and dis-inter-estedness 
as it relates to the concept of otherwise than being, we consider the 
following:  
The ontological condition undoes itself, or is undone, in the human condition 
or uncondition. To be human means to live as if one were not a being among 
beings. As if, through human spirituality, the categories of being inverted into 
an “otherwise than being.” Not only into a “being otherwise”; being otherwise 
is still being. The “otherwise than being,” in truth, has no verb which would 
designate the event of its un-rest, its dis-inter-estedness, its putting-into-
question of this being – or this estedness – of the being.35 
According to Levinas, the I’s approach to the other (and the other other) in 
the face-to-face encounter must be dis-interested so that he may respond to 
the call of the other without inflicting the bias of his own being on the 
other. And it is only in this manner that justice may emerge as the I, the 
other and the other other can negotiate the plurality and co-existence of 
their relations in a way that all of their demands (“Do not kill me”) are 
respected and their calls (“Love me”) are answered. 
Levinas explains that only in this dis-interested approach to the other 
does the I ever see the other; without the bias of his own interests, the I 
approaches the other in authentic concern for the wellbeing of the other – 
in this way, the other “becomes visible.”36 Levinas contends that in this 
mode of relation between the I and the other (and, of course, the other 
                                           
34 E. LEVINAS, Ethics and Infinity. p. 99. 
35 Ibid., p. 100. 
36 “It is thus that the neighbor becomes visible, and, looked at, presents himself, and 
there is also justice for me” (Ibid., p. 159). 
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other with whom the I does not have direct contact), that the I too 
experiences justice. Moreover, justice too is represented in the said; 
according to Levinas, it becomes represented in its annunciation. 
Announcing the responsibility of the I for the other and more particularly, 
the third person, is an articulated awareness and admission of that 
responsibility (which becomes the measure by which man holds himself 
accountable). In this way, responsibility as justice may be codified 
assuming an objective quality by which the I may be judged as to whether 
or not he fulfilled his responsibility to and for the other and the other other 
with whom he is in relation solely by means of his relation with the other.  
Having asserted that justice emerges when the third person enters the 
scene, and that it becomes represented when the responsibility is said, we 
must not conflate this idea of justice with the sense of accountability to 
society as a whole. What I mean is this: yes, justice emerges when the I has 
fulfilled his responsibility to and for the other other (having 
contemporaneously answered the call of the other), and yes, there are many 
other others, but this is not to say that justice should be understood in terms 
of humanity as a whole. According to the tenants of the ethical demand as 
outlined by Levinas, justice may be understood only within the confines of 
the face-to-face encounter, the I-other relation as well as the I-third person 
relation. 
To explain this point, Levinas writes:  
The others concern me from the first. Here fraternity precedes the 
commonness of a genus. My relationship with the other as neighbor gives 
meaning to my relations with all the others. All human relations as human 
proceed from disinterestness. The one for the other of proximity is not a 
deforming abstraction. In it justice is shown from the first, it is thus born from 
the signifyingness of signification, the-one-for-the-other, signification.37 
For justice to be justice, the I has to be concerned with the other and by 
proximity, with the other other, the third person. Here we must note that it 
is only by proximity and concern for the other that fraternity is born, that 
humanity takes form. But fraternity and humanity that are based on the I-
other and I-third party relations must not be misunderstood or 
misinterpreted for the impersonal categorization of a group of people like 
the State. So even looking at justice from what we would perceive as a 
larger scale of application, with a wider distance in proximity between the I 
                                           
37 Ibid., p. 159 
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and the third persons for whom he is responsible, it remains a question of 
the I responding to the calls of third persons. 
Justice, then, must be understood in terms of to what extent the I can 
respond to the call of the third persons, those with whom he has no 
personal contact. In other words, if the I becomes aware of third persons on 
the other side of the world who are suffering, justice becomes a question of 
him answering their call in the best way he can considering his capacity to 
answer that call. For example: if I am in Italy and I know that there are 
people in South America starving from a hunger and malnutrition, what is 
my responsibility to them; how should I respond to their demand and call 
considering several things: my physical location; my ability to change that 
physical location; the calls that are incumbent on me to respond to from the 
other and other others in my immediate sphere of influence? The question 
then becomes, how do I respond and what is that response to the calls of 
those persons starving in South America? The question of justice, then, 
becomes: did I respond to the calls of those many others? Did I respond 
adequately and sufficiently to those calls according to the needs of the 
persons who are calling?  
Because the I is in relation with the other and third person, beings that 
are the same in nature as the I but absolutely strange to the I, the I then 
cannot be in the relation or proximity with the whole of humanity as a mass 
of persons. The I does not relate to humanity38 as such the way he relates to 
the other and the third persons; humanity as such does not demand not to 
be killed or call to be loved; consequently, humanity does not present to the 
I the incumbence of responding to its call – there is no call, humanity as 
such does not call or demand. 
Going further, justice and responsibility remain intrinsically tied to the 
dis-interestedness of the I; the I must respond to the call of the other and 
the other others because they are calling, not because the I has an interest in 
responding to the call. The I must respond because that is what is 
incumbent upon him as a hostage to his responsibility to and for the other. 
The inter-personal relation is source of justice since it is there that the I 
gleans meaning or significance from his experiences of being; in the 
relation between the I and the other, his being qua being begins to mean 
something to him – he is able to compare himself to the being of him with 
whom he encounters face-to-face. He becomes aware of the nature that 
                                           
38 Here we are making a distinction between humanity as fraternity (proximity) and 
humanity as the entire human population. 
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they share while being acutely aware of the strangeness of the other. As 
such the I’s concern for the other becomes more than a curiosity that he 
must satisfy: it becomes an interest in the other that is obsessed with his 
own being and face. However, in the face of the other, he must refuse his 
obsession and respond to the other by substituting himself for the other. 
Justice means being one-for-the-other. 
Taking this understanding of significance and the one-for-the-other as a 
given in this argument, how could justice be anything but an inter-personal 
realization of the responsibility fulfilled by the I for the other? Levinas 
answers: 
This means concretely or empirically that justice is not a legality regulating 
human masses, from which a technique of social equilibrium is drawn, 
harmonizing antagonistic forces. That would be a justification of the State 
delivered over to its own necessities. Justice is impossible without the one that 
renders it finding himself in proximity. His function is not limited to the 
“function of judgement,” the subsuming of particular cases under a general 
rule. The judge is not outside the conflict, but the law is in the midst of 
proximity.39 
He draws a distinction between justice and judgment: justice is, as we have 
said, the realization and fulfillment of the responsibility the I has to and for 
the other. Justice requires the foundation of the inter-personal relation, the 
awareness and concern of the I for the other and third persons. But 
judgment, on the other hand, is the categorization and appraisal by the 
institution of human masses (the impersonal State, society at large) of the 
responsibility and the actions taken based on the institutional understanding 
of responsibility. 
5. Law and Proximity 
Levinas also draws a distinction between the judge and the law: the 
judge is the person who represents the impersonal institution of human 
masses when categorizing and appraising the responsibility and subsequent 
actions, but he cannot divorce himself from the face-to-face encounter, 
which is to say he cannot remove himself from the I-other or I-third person 
relations. Instead, the law is the representation of justice in the articulation 
of the responsibility and the subsequent expected actions based on that 
responsibility. It is a representation of the perceived responsibility that 
                                           
39 Ibid., p. 159. 
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exists between the I and the other and the third person. However, although 
the law is a representation of justice, because it is said, it remains static in 
the time and place of its articulation40; therefore, the law may not always 
represent the ever-changing or evolving responsibility that the I has to and 
for the other and the other other.  
Consequently, laws must change according to the actual inter-personal 
relation that it is supposed to represent. This means that I and other and other 
others must constantly review and revise the laws according to their calls 
and the appropriate responses. The must can be understood as their 
responsibility to do so. Fore Levinas, “This means that nothing is outside of 
the control of the responsibility of the one for the other.”41 In other words, 
man’s responsibility is not limited by laws; rather it is his very responsibility 
that informs the laws that are then instituted and enforced. The law must not 
supervene his responsibility, and if managed properly, they will not 
supervene his responsibility. Therefore, the I must respond to the call of the 
other and the third person even when the articulated code of responsibility is 
out of date; moreover, the incumbence of his responsibility requires that he 
modify the law to ensure the law remains representative of the actual 
relations. 
Levinas cautions us to keep proximity or the relation between persons 
central to all understanding of the codified articulation of responsibility: “It 
is important to recover all these forms beginning with proximity, in which 
being, totality, the State, politics, techniques, work are at every moment on 
the point of having their center of gravitation in themselves, and weighing 
on their own account.”42 Man cannot lose focus of what drives the human 
institution, which is always the interpersonal relation: the relations between 
the I and the other, the I and the third person and the other and the third 
person. Without those relations, there is no reason to institute laws or a 
codification of responsibility: laws serve those relations to ensure that each 
person’s call is answered, that justice is done insofar as the I acts according 
to his responsibility to and for the other, his responsibility for the 
responsibility of the other and his responsibility to and for the third person 
with whom he has no contact but maintains proximity through their 
respective relations with the other whom they have in common. 
                                           
40  “Justice, society, the State and its institutions, exchanges and work are 
comprehensible out of proximity” (Ibid., p. 159). 
41 Ibid., p. 159. 
42 Ibid., p. 159. 
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For Levinas, “In no way is justice a degradation of obsession, a 
degeneration of the for-the-other, a diminution, a limitation of anarchic 
responsibility, a neutralization of the glory of the Infinity, a degeneration 
that would be produced in the measure that for empirical reasons the initial 
duo would become a trio.”43 Even as the I honors his responsibilities and 
justice emerges from his actions, he is still aware of his own interests. 
While justice is not the magic want to rid the I of his obsession, it is a 
testament that he resisted succumbing to self-interest; justice is evidence 
that the I has chosen to be open to the other in the face of his own urges 
and desires for satisfaction and satiation. 
Levinas establishes another point about justice that once stated seems to 
be a given: justice is only justice when the calls of all persons in a society 
are answered regardless of their physical distance from the center of the 
community and regardless of the remoteness of their proximity to any I 
within the community.44 For example, justice is only justice when the most 
disenfranchised of the community are cared for according to their personal 
call. Disenfranchise could be understood as something that is socially 
unacceptable or even a physical removal where a person either chooses to 
live at a distance from the community or has been sent away by the 
community (i.e. imprisonment). With this in mind, we could even say that 
some forms of disenfranchisement are simply unjust, i.e. lack of shelter or 
homelessness, lack of education, lack of adequate food and nutrition or 
hunger, lack of potable water or thirst, lack of clothing, or anything else 
that would deprive a person of the dignity of their personhood and ignore 
or refuse to see the manifested face of their being.45 
Levinas refers to this slant of justice in terms of equality and inequality: 
the I experiences inequality insofar as he is responsible to and for the other 
and even responsible for the responsibility of the other – this is something 
he cannot shirk; meanwhile, the I cannot or should not expect that his call 
                                           
43 Ibid., p. 159. 
44 “But the contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied about the diachrony of two: 
justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those 
close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by 
the closest” (Ibid., p. 159). 
45 For example, recent reports have highlighted the disenfranchisement of young girls 
and women in rural and developing countries and communities. Once young women 
(girls) reach puberty, they tend to stop going to school because they do not have proper 
access to menstrual hygiene. See www.menstrualhygieneday.org or 
www.sswm.info/content/enstrual-hygiene-management for more information. 
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will be answered because he must be dis-interested as he approaches the 
other.46 The other and third party, on the other hand, are equal insofar as 
their calls must be recognized and responded to by the I. 
All of this, justice, rights and equality, is a direct result of the entrance of 
the third person because as soon as the I becomes aware of the third 
person’s presence (existence), then the call becomes incumbent on the I. 
This is because regardless of the distance of the proximity (the I relates to 
the third person by way of the other with whom they both enjoy a relation), 
their very proximity means there is a face-to-face encounter insofar as the I 
is aware of the third person’s being that is manifested in his face.47 And the 
concern that the I has for justice within the human institution that is society 
at large (or the State) is nothing other than the I’s concern for the 
responsibility to and for the other and the third person that is incumbent on 
him48, which is always based on the face-to-face encounter, an encounter 
that may even be by way of the relation with the other. 
6. Consciousness 
We continue to touch on one of the central concepts to the authentic 
realization of the I’s responsibility to and for the other and the third person: 
consciousness or awareness. While the third person appears in the face of 
the other, the I is only responsible for that third person when he is 
conscious of that person’s being. The crux of the concept of consciousness 
is that proximity does not necessarily presume awareness, which is to say, 
just because the third person is in contact with the other and the he appears 
in the face of the other does not necessarily mean that the I is aware of the 
third person. Levinas writes: 
                                           
46 “The equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. 
The forgetting of self moves justice. It is then not without importance to know if the 
egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled (and which is to be set up, and especially 
to be maintained) proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the irreducible 
responsibility of the one for all, and if it can do without friendships and faces” (Ibid., p. 
159). 
47 “Consciousness is born as the presence of a third party. It is in the measure that it 
proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a 
permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face to face” (Ibid., p. 160). 
48 “The concern for justice, for the thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on 
the said, from the bottom of the saying without the said, the saying as contact, is the 
spirit in society” (Ibid., p. 160). 
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The foundation of consciousness is justice. Not that justice makes a 
preexisting mediation intervene. An event like mediation – synchronization, 
comparison, thematization – is the work of justice, an entry of the diachrony 
of proximity, of the signifyingness of saying into the synchrony of the said…49 
This is to say that even in the absence of immediate consciousness of the 
third person as realized when the I relates to the other, justice, when the I is 
absolutely open to responding to the call of the other, recognizes the 
possibility that the other with whom he is in direct contact is in contact 
with an-other who is unknown (unseen) to him; as a hostage to his 
responsibility he must then respond or be ready to respond to the call that 
can only be perceived through the face of the other with whom he has 
direct contact. 
The face of the other is significant or has meaning to the I because it 
represents the possibility (and probability) of others; likewise, it represents 
the relations between the other and other others as well as relations 
between other others and their neighbors. The face of the other represents 
the plurality of existence in terms of being and being in relation. 
Referring to synchronization and thematization, Levinas writes: 
Synchronization is the act of consciousness which, through representation and 
the said, institutes “with the help of God,” the original locus of justice, a 
terrain common to me and the others where I am counted among them, that is, 
where subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and rights measured and 
measurable which the equilibrated ego involves, or equilibrating itself by the 
concourse of duties and the concurrence of rights.50 
In synchronizing, man, in his own crude and imperfect way, orders and 
categorizes that which he encounters, abstracting meaning from it and 
aligning it with this stated responsibility. Nevertheless, within the 
synchronization that the I does as he encounters the other, he is opening 
himself to the other and the possibility of other others. Levinas calls this 
the locus of justice because it is in synchronizing, being open to the third 
person with whom he has no direct contact and aligning it to his articulated 
responsibilities, that the I is aware of the third person and open to his call. 
It is also within the terms of synchronization that the distinction between 
dovere and diritti becomes clearer: the I has a dovere that he must honor as 
he is always a hostage to his responsibility, and the other and as well as the 
                                           
49 Ibid., p. 160. 
50 Ibid., p. 160. 
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third party have the right (diritti) to be recognized as beings in se and 
heard, having their calls answered. 
Again, justice prevails in inequality or as Levinas explains it, “… justice 
can be established only if I, always evaded from the concept of the ego, 
always desituated and divest of being, always in non-reciprocatable 
relationship with the other, always for the other, can become an other like 
the others.”51 The inequality of this paradigm is that the I must respond to 
the calls of the other and the third person but cannot expect that his call 
will be answered; the inequality lies in him remaining dis-interested as he 
approaches and responds to the other and the third person.  
The latter part of Levinas’ explanation returns us to the responsibility 
that the I has to and for himself because in divesting himself of his 
interests, he is nonetheless aware of his self and can hear the call of his self 
just as he hears the call of the other or of the third person. In consciousness, 
he synchronizes the representation and his articulated responsibility; from 
here, he must respond to the call. In this way, the I becomes an other like 
the other with whom he is in proximity. Levinas asks the leading question: 
“Is not the Infinite which enigmatically commands me, commanding and 
not commanding, from the other, also the turning of the I into ‘like the 
others,’ for which it is important to concern oneself and take care?”52 To 
which he answers, yes.53 But he explains that the answer yes does not come 
from within the being of the I; instead it comes from the incumbence of his 
responsibility54  “despite the danger in which it puts this responsibility, 
which it may encompass and swallow up, just as the State issued from the 
proximity of the neighbor is always on the verge of integrating him into a 
we, which congeals both me and the neighbour.”55  In other words, the 
responsibility that the I has to and for its self could be at risk of being 
consumed by the responsibility he has to and for the other; in a similar 
way, the proximities between the I and other, the other and third person 
and the I and the third person could be consumed by the institution of the 
State. But we also must remember that justice depends on two things: 
openness to responding to the call of all persons (selves) whom the I 
                                           
51 Ibid., p. 160. 
52 Ibid., p. 160. 
53 “My lot is important” (Ibid., p. 160). 
54 “But it is still out of my responsibility that my salvation has meaning…” (Ibid., p. 
160). 
55 Ibid., p. 160. 
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encounters, including his own self; and the interpersonal relation (not on 
the dictates of the State or institution). In the absence of either or both of 
these, justice cannot emerge. 
It is in approaching the other as otherwise than the being that the I 
knows himself to be and that he approaches the other in an ethical way. 
Within the authentic, disinterested face-to-face encounter, the I recognizes 
the other as having the same nature, as a being who is the subject of his 
own experience, and as such, is completely other; in recognizing this, the 
I then is able to hear the demand (“Do not kill me”) and the call (“Love 
me”) of the other and respond. The I responds according to the call, 
providing what the other demands. 
This is the ethical demand: the authentic response of the I who 
encounters the other in the open and disinterested face-to-face encounter. 
And as a result of acting responsibly based on the ethical demand, the I is 
able to experience transcendence, a moment when the I comes to know and 
understand being as such as he participates in it rather than attempting to 
apprehend or acquire being through domination, manipulation or obsession. 
Let us take just a moment to note the significance this chapter has for our 
discussion and development of a corporate ethic based on personal 
responsibility: Because the corporation is comprised of persons who are in 
relation with each other, their relation necessarily mandates responsibility, 
the I to and for the other. The responsibility to respond to the call of the 
other is something the I cannot escape, according to Levinas. As such, if 
the persons who comprise the corporation can never escape or divorce 
themselves from their responsibilities, it becomes a matter of a 
responsibility that is multiplied and magnified by the proximity of the I to 
the others and third persons. If justice emerges when the I responds to the 
call of the other and other others authentically, dis-interestedly and 
immediately, then within the context of the corporation, justice emerges 
when each I comprising the corporation works together to respond to the 
call of the other and third persons who are affected by the corporation or 
rather the actions committed by those who comprise the corporation in the 
name of that same corporation.  
An incongruity my be perceived between the responsibility the I has to 
and for the other in other institutions such as in government/politics and 
other larger social spheres versus the family and smaller, more intimate 
community settings. However, when applying Levinas’ philosophy, that 
incongruity is demolished as soon as the I hears the call of the other. Let us 
think about it in more practical terms: the effects of injustice are personal – 
if a person is thirsty and has no access to clean, potable water, then that 
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lack of water is personal to them. (A community of people may be thirsty, 
but it is the individual person who suffers the lack of water, and it is those 
individual persons who comprise the community.) Likewise, the person or 
persons who, by one manner or another, deprive others of clean, potable 
water are personally responsible for that deprivation as soon as they 
become aware of it, as soon as they hear the calls of those who have no 
clean, potable water. That responsibility is personal whether the I is a 
member of a larger government or a smaller community or family. There 
are more real life examples of this incongruity being demolished one being 
the effort in the United States to maintain laws that provide healthcare to 
more people – more and more Americans are demanding healthcare as a 
guaranteed right because lack of access to healthcare is personal. They 
have petitioned individual lawmakers who comprise the governing body 
and protested in an effort to make their voices heard. The lawmakers, as a 
result, have had to take their constituents’ calls into consideration as they 
make decisions about how the federal government will move forward with 
legislation on healthcare. The issue is personal – the demands are personal. 
The other’s call is personal; the I must respond. 
In Part Two, we shall how the philosophies of Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, 
while not identical in the principles and application of the ontology and 
phenomenology of man and his relationships, complement each other. I 
will not always refer to Levinas or draw explicit parallels throughout 
Chapters IV through VI, but I will bring their philosophies together in Part 
Three as it pertains to establishing a philosophy of corporate responsibility 




Human Action As Text: 
Paul Ricoeur 
In the following three chapters, we will look at Paul Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of language to establish the use and value of text in human 
relations. This will serve as the basis on which we propose that human 
relations can be scrutinized and critiqued using a hermeneutical approach 
that removes the tendency to blame while identifying the agent responsible 
for a particular action. 
We shall connect the teachings of Levinas and Ricoeur by identifying the 
dialectic as Hegel defines it in The Encyclopaedia of Logic, Part I of the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze.1 Initially, Hegel 
gives an indirect explanation of the dialectic saying it “is often no more 
than a subjective seesaw of arguments that sway back and forth, where 
basic import is lacking and the [resulting] nakedness is covered by the 
astuteness that gives birth to such argumentation.”2 The “subjective seesaw 
of arguments” and the “back and forth” makes the dialectic sound like it is 
a method for debate or a rhetorical device.3 
                                           
1
 G.W.F. HEGEL, The Encyclopaedia Logic, Part I of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze. Originally published as Encyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften. Teil I, Wissenshaften der Logik. Translated by T.F. 
Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris. Library of Congress. Indianapolis, IN. 1991. 
2 Ibid., § 81. 
3 Refer to Annex I for a more comprehensive discussion on the dialectic, human 
relation and human action. 
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The point of a hermeneutical approach is to be able to establish a basis 
for an open dialogue with regard to human action, intentionality and 
responsibility. Hermeneutics allows us to examine, interpret and understand 
text (and human action) in a way that is not bound to the limiting 
perception of a fixed message and context. This will be useful for us as we 
develop a corporate ethic that is based on personal responsibility, the I for 
the other. In removing the immediate tendency to blame and focus on one 
specific cause and effect, we are able to read and interpret a corporate (or 
human) action (as text) in a manner that acknowledges the ever changing 
context, understanding and ultimate message (reading and interpretation). 
The ultimate benefit is to encourage human relation, facilitate responsibility 
and enable the emergence of justice by engaging in corporate action that 
promotes, supports and protects human dignity in such a way that does so 
for all persons involved. 
Moving from the metaphysical implications of the human face as we 
explore the relation between the I and the other in Emmanual Levinas’ 
teachings as it relates to the ethical demand, we shall tackle the 
phenomenology of language and text as discourse by studying Paul 
Ricoeur’s philosophy of language as a system or means by which human 
beings relate to one another. In doing so, we shall also explore the 
possibility of language (langue) and speech (la parole) as a dialectic of 
human relation, or rather the means by which man as a Being-in-the-world 
relates to other men as equal Beings-in-the-world. 
While taking a different approach from that in Part One, the present 
discussion complements the philosophy of Levinas that we have already 
explored inasmuch as it establishes a hermeneutical basis for human 
relation via text and discourse. We will rely on Levinas’ admission of a 
relation between the face and language to segue from establishing the 
ethical demand to the hermeneutical exercise of understanding and 
interpreting human action as text. The point of this exercise is to create a 
foundation for critical analysis of man’s actions within a corporate 
environment based on Ricoeur’s philosophy of human action as text. We 
are taking this approach because it shall facilitate a more organic discussion 
about the ethical demand of the corporation to ensue. 
Additionally, for the sake of clarity, we shall provide a brief working 
definition of human action as text and explanation for how we will employ 
this Ricoeurian concept. As we will see in the following two chapters, 
Ricoeur promotes a philosophy that human action may be regarded, 
evaluated, scrutinized and even referred to as if it were a text, discourse 
fixed by writing. This goes back to his assertion that discourse is an event; 
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human action, also regarded or understood or perceived as an event, while 
not fixed by writing may take on the characteristics of text insofar as it 
happens in what we perceive as a sequential order.   
Moreover, it is worth noting at the outset that throughout the following 
three chapters, we may encounter the problematic of what may be deemed 
a circular discussion; however, I ask the reader to be patient as we define 
terms and explain concepts with terminology that has yet to be defined or 
explained, or will be defined or explained by way of the definition or 
explanation of other terminology. So as we immerse ourselves in a study of 
topics such as language, discourse, text and hermeneutics, we shall 
inevitably come across and discuss issues related to terms such as 
reference, ipse and idem (self and same, respectively), distanciation, 





Language and Text 
We shall initiate this study with an exploration into Ricoeur’s teaching of 
language, its structure and the self. In order to do this, we shall refer to 
works and writings such as The Conflict of Interpretation, Essays in 
Hermeneutics 1 , “Structure, Word, Event”; Hermeneutics & the Human 
Sciences2, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation,” and “The model 
of the text: meaningful action considered as text”; and the “Second Study: 
Utterance and the speaking subject, a pragmatic approach” from Oneself as 
Another.3 Since Ricoeur’s interest in language and discourse is the overall 
theme of each essay, we shall rely on the common context that each essay 
shares with the other as the rationale for connecting the pieces of evidence 
garnered from the essays in order to establish a coherent thread between 
them and present a general picture of Ricoeur’s philosophy on language 
and discourse.4 Additionally, we will refer to Martin Heidegger’s Being 
                                           
1
 P. RICOEUR, The Conflict of Interpretation, Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Don 
Ihde. Originally published as Le Confit des interprétations: Essais d’hérméneutique. 
Northwestern University Press. 1974. 
2
 P. RICOEUR, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. Edited & translated by John B. 
Thompson. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. 1981. 
3
 P. RICOEUR, Oneself as Another. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Originally 
published as Soi-même comme un autre. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 
Illinois. 1992. 
4 We will cite from the various essays with little regard for a particular methodology 
in exhausting the evidence given in one essay before referring to another. 
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and Time5 in order to maintain the integrity of the context of Ricoeur’s 
philosophy. 
Drawing from the essay, “The model of the text: meaningful action 
considered as a text,”6 we will first examine Ricoeur’s philosophy about the 
ontology of language and then move towards a clearer understanding of 
language by exploring his teachings on the structure of language. But in 
order to embark on an intelligible discussion about language, we must do 
so within the context of discourse, speech and text.  
1. Language and discourse 
As a start, let us consider the following statement by Paul Ricoeur: “It is 
as discourse that language is either spoken or written.”7 In other words, it is 
through speech and text – discourse – that language is realized. He further 
explains that, “Discourse is the counterpart of what linguists call language-
systems or linguistic codes. Discourse is language-event or linguistic 
usage.”8 By way of the context of discourse, we begin to understand the 
nature of language, but not necessarily its ontology.  
To gain an understanding of the ontology of language, we shall work 
backwards in terms of the chronology of statements and explanations 
Ricoeur gives in the essay. He says, “Whereas language is only the 
condition for communication for which it provides the codes, it is in 
discourse that all messages are exchanged.”9 Based on Ricoeur’s choice of 
verbs, we can perceive by his use of “is” that he describes the ontology of 
language; it is not an action verb but rather a being verb. He says language 
is a condition for communication; language is the means by which man 
engages in discourse with the other. 
Having established a preliminary understanding of the ontology of 
language, we still need to understand what constitutes language so that we 
can competently discuss the relation between language and discourse and 
further uncover the dialectic as it relates to human action. According to 
Ricoeur, “Whereas the signs in language only refer to other signs within the 
                                           
5
 HEIDEGGER, MARTIN, Being and Time. Originally published as Sein und Zeit. 
Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Harper One. New York, NY. 
1962. 
6 P. RICOEUR, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. pp. 197-221. 
7 Ibid., p. 197. 
8 Ibid., p. 198. 
9 Ibid., p. 198. 
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same system, and whereas language therefore lacks a world just as it lacks 
temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about something.”10 In 
order to better understand the nature of discourse, let us now go to 
Ricoeur’s essay “Structure, word, event.” 
Ricoeur says, “Whereas the signs in language only refer to other signs 
within the same system, and whereas language therefore lacks a world just 
as it lacks temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about 
something.”11 Language as a system or means of communication has no 
context of its own but is used in the context of man’s world – in time and 
with reference to a place – giving rise to the phenomenological dimension 
to language. That is to say, language is experienced; it is only as discourse, 
man’s uttering of the word, that language is actualized as a 
phenomenological event. “Discourse is always realised temporally and in 
the present, whereas the language system is virtually and outside of time.”12 
In other words, it is in discourse that man gives breath to language and so 
achieves the conditions for an authentic phenomenological dimension. 
1.1  Word, Sign and Language 
In order to expand on the explanation of the relationship between sign 
and language, let us consider the last quote where Ricoeur juxtaposes the 
two against discourse a bit more; he is saying that the sign is a part of 
language that is wholly abstract outside of the concrete experience of 
discourse. Indeed, Ricoeur implies that the sign is transparent and perhaps 
without substance as long as it remains within the confines of language. It 
is here that we will introduce the concept of the word as it provides a more 
accessible illustration of the sign. In his essay “Structure, Word, Event” 
Ricoeur writes:  
In the dictionary, there is only the endless round of terms, which are defined 
circularly and revolve in the closure of the lexicon. But then someone speaks 
and someone says something. The word leaves the dictionary; it becomes 
word at the moment when man becomes speech, when speech becomes 
discourse and discourse a sentence.13 
                                           
10 Ibid., p. 198. 
11 Ibid., 198. 
12  P. RICOEUR, “The model of text: meaningful action considered as text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 198. 
13 P. RICOEUR, “Structure, Word, Event.” The Conflict of Interpretations, Essays in 
Hermeneutics. p. 93. 
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Signs or terms are parts of the language system that, outside of being 
uttered as a word, have neither meaning to man nor a place in his world.  
To better understand the concept of word for the purposes of this study, 
we will turn briefly to the explanation proposed by Martin Heidegger in 
Being and Time. He mentions the metaphysics of λόγος and segues into a 
more discursive approach to the phenomenon or experiential characteristic 
of discourse: 
Λόγος as “discourse” means rather the same as δηλουν: to make manifest what 
one is “talking about” in one’s discourse... The λόγος lets something be seen 
(φαινεσθαι), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so for the one 
who is doing the talking (the medium) or for persons who are talking with one 
another, as the case may be. Discourse “lets something be seen”απο...: that is, 
it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In 
discourse (αποφανσις), so far as it is genuine, what is said [was geredet ist] is 
drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what 
it says [in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus 
makes this accessible to the other party.14 
According to Heidegger, word or λόγος, is effectively the 
phenomenological realization of a metaphysical potentiality. The word 
makes apparent the discursive intentionality of man. 
But we need to return to Ricoeur’s text. The author describes the use of 
language as a moment when the sign transcends the mere system that is 
language. He explains, “The moment when the turning from the ideality of 
meaning to the reality of things is produced is the moment of transcendence 
of the sign.”15 That moment is an event and within the event subsists the 
word. The sign that is uttered is the word bringing forth all the significance 
of which the sign is teeming. The word emits the discursive intentionality 
of the speaker so that he may relate to the other. 
Returning to Ricoeur’s example of the dictionary, the word becomes 
such in the moment man chooses a sign (from this proverbial dictionary) 
and utters it to convey a message to the other. The word is “the intersection 
of language and speech” and “words are signs in speech position”16; that is 
to say, words are the uttered signs strung together in such a way that the 
structure of the order also conveys a meaning – the sentence. Therefore, 
                                           
14 M. HEIDEGGER, Being and Time. p. 56. 
15 P. RICOEUR, “Structure, Word, Event.” The Conflict of Interpretations, Essays in 
Hermeneutics. p. 93. 
16 Ibid., p. 92. 
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word has a semantic value in terms of the meaning of each sign and 
structural value in terms of how it is placed among other words to convey a 
particular meaning.17 
For Ricoeur, indicators are the personal pronouns and deictic signs 
(within the language system) that man uses in discourse to distinguish 
himself as the subject,18 the speaker, and thus gives indication to that of 
which he speaks. The indicators provide the direction of the intentionality 
of man’s speech. Ricoeur explains that the indicator starts with the subject 
since he identifies the “I” as the “first and foremost among the indicators” 
because “it indicates the one who designates himself or herself in every 
utterance containing the word ‘I’.” 19  The signs that follow “I” in the 
hierarchy of indicators (as they are intrinsically related to the subject as 
speaker) are the deictic terms such as “this,” “that,” “here,” and “there” 
since they point to the elements or entities that comprise the world of the 
subject.20 
As the first and foremost of indicators, the I remains sufficiently 
ensconced at the top of the hierarchy because it is the one indicator that 
may not be substituted by any other indicator or sign without changing the 
meaning or intentionality of the discourse. The I is irreplaceable. Ricoeur 
explains,  
There is no equivalence from a referential point of view between “I am happy” 
and “the person who designates himself in speaking is happy.” The failure to 
pass the test of substitution is decisive here; it confirms the fact that the 
expression does not belong to the order of entities capable of being identified 
by the path of reference.21 
Given that discourse is always about something, and constitutes a human 
action, i.e. since man’s speech is discourse within discourse, there is always 
                                           
17 “Thus the word is, as it were, a trader between the system and the act, between the 
structure and the event. On the one hand, it relates to structure, as a differential value, 
but it is then only a semantic potentiality; on the other hand, it relates to the act and to 
the event in the fact that its semantic actuality is contemporaneous with the ephemeral 
actuality of the utterance” (Ibid., p. 92). 
18  P. RICOEUR, “The model of text: meaningful action considered as text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 198. 
19 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 45. 
20 “The other indexes – that is, the deictic terms (‘this,’ ‘here,’ ‘now’) are grouped 
around the subject of the utterer” (Ibid., p. 45). 
21 Ibid., p. 46. 
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an I even if it is never explicitly spoken as in the case of a command. 
Whether or not the speaker utters the word I, the intentionality of his 
discourse is always coming from the source of the I. If the discourse is, for 
whatever reason, shifted so that someone else is speaking, then the 
intentionality of the discourse shifts as well.  
The fact that the indicator I cannot be shifted to another subject without 
fundamentally changing the discourse is the very reason that Ricoeur calls 
the I strange as it relates to the other. The I will always be particular unto 
itself in such a way that there is no substitution. Ricoeur writes: 
By becoming the pivotal point of the system of indicators, the I is revealed in 
all its strangeness in relation to every entity capable of being placed in a class, 
characterized, or described. I so little designates the referent of an identifying 
reference that what appears to be its definition – namely, “any person who, in 
speaking, designates himself or herself” – cannot be substituted for the 
occurrences of the word I.22 
Indicators, therefore, may be defined as individualizing operators or an 
articulation of the intention to designate, categorize and individualize.23 
This ultimately enables the speaker to distinguish himself as the subject of 
the world in which he relates with the other. Let us note here that this is 
complementary to Levinas’ assertion of the absolute alterity of the I from 
the other. 
1.2  Reference and the Language System 
Moving from signs, words and indicators to the idea of reference as it 
pertains to the ontology of language, Ricoeur relates reference to the 
opacity that utterance brings to language by means of reflexivity. He states, 
“… the reflexivity characteristic of the fact of utterance resembles an 
inverted reference, a retroreference, to the extent that the referral is made to 
the factuality that makes the statement opaque.”24 In other words, the fact 
                                           
22 Ibid., p. 45. 
23 “To designate one and only one individual is the individualizing intention. The 
privilege accorded the human individual in our choice of examples – the first man 
who…, Socrates, I, you, and so forth – comes from the fact that we are especially 
interested in individualizing the agents of discourse and of action” (P. RICOEUR, “First 
Study: ‘Person’ and Identifying Reference, A Semantic Approach.” Oneself as Another. 
p. 28). 
24 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 47. 
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that the uttered word reflects the facts of the world in which the speaker 
engages in discourse, is the very reality of reference. Reference would not 
exist without the thing to which the speaker was referring, the thing upon 
which language is reflected (or even represents). Reference and indicator 
are not one in the same because the speaker can refer to this or that which 
would require the use of indicators, but reference provides a specificity 
that, going beyond an indication of a mere relation with his subjectivity and 
place in the world in which he speaks, identifies the thing to which the 
speaker points in his use of language. More to the point, reference is an 
uttered reflection of the situation in which the interlocutors find 
themselves.25 The reference can be as small as a term or indicator and as 
great as an identifying or specifying sentence. 
Language, as it is actualized in discourse, gains a phenomenological 
dimension, or an experiential realization; this is because discourse is a 
human action and may, therefore, be given the characteristic within the 
phenomenological expression of the metaphysical reality as an event.26 In 
other words, while language in and of itself, as a system of signs and 
indicators, does not have a context, it gains meaning within the context of 
an experience as a person employs the system to convey a message 
(conveying the message is an event in se). There are three arguments 
supporting this assertion: 1. discourse is language realized in time and always 
in reference to something; 2. the utterance is an event insofar as it is doing, it is 
an action; and 3. utterance is interlocution, an exchange of messages between the 
I and the other, the first and second persons. 
1.3  Discourse in the World 
The sentence that man utters is the actualization of language; that 
actualization brings language into the world thereby giving context to 
indicators and signs that otherwise have none. The sentence is the 
foundation of discourse,27 which in turn is an event as it is realized in 
                                           
25 “… the reflection of the act of utterance in the sense of the statement is an integral 
part of the reference of most of the statements of everyday life in the ordinary situation 
of interlocution” (Ibid., p. 42). 
26  “For discourse as an act as its mode of presence – the instance of discourse 
(Benveniste), which, as such, is of the nature of an event. To speak is a present event, a 
transitory, vanishing act” (P. RICOEUR, “Structure, Word, Event.” The Conflict of 
Interpretation, Essays in Hermeneutics. p. 86). 
27 “The sentence is the basic unit of discourse” (P. RICOEUR. “The model of text: 
meaningful action considered as text.” Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 198). 
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reference to a time and place. That time and place is the world of man’s 
experiences, which is to say it is where he actualizes language in discourse.  
According to Ricoeur, “The linguistics of the sentence underlies the 
dialectic of event and meaning…”28 Moreover, he also considers that “the 
signs of language refer only to other signs in the interior of the same 
system so that language has no more a world than it has a time and a 
subject, whereas discourse is always about something.” 29  Actualizing 
language in the utterance is effectively in itself an event insofar as it brings 
concrete meaning to the signs that, as a part of the system of 
communication that is language, otherwise remain abstract. 
Instead of using the terms concrete and abstract, Ricoeur uses opaque, 
absent and present to explain the actualization of language in discourse. He 
argues, “There are circumstances in which the sign does not succeed in 
making itself absent as a thing; by becoming opaque, it attests once more to 
the fact of being a thing and reveals its eminently paradoxical structure of 
an entity at once present and absent.”30  
The sign derives its meaning from the utterance as it is present in the 
thing to which it refers. It also refers to the subject that uttered it into 
presence in terms of having relativity to the he who utters. 
1.4  Saying is Doing 
Discourse is an event to the extent that the utterance is an action – in 
saying man is doing, he is acting. “If saying is doing, it is indeed in terms 
of acts that we must speak of saying.”31 In this way language is tied to 
action and event; “language is included on the very plane of action.”32 To 
be clear, language in and of itself is not action, but it is the utterance, the 
use of reference, the saying of the sign that brings it into man’s world and 
gives meaning to that which would otherwise have no meaning without a 
world of its own. It is in the action of uttering that language may be 
considered in terms of action. 
                                           
28 P. RICOEUR, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation.” Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences. p. 133. 
29 Ibid., p. 133. 
30 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 41. 
31 Ibid., p. 43. 
32 Ibid., p. 43. 
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In the essay “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as 
text” found in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences33, Ricoeur refers to the 
act of speaking as having three distinct levels within a hierarchy of 
subordinate acts: the locutionary or propositional act, the illocutionary act 
or force and the perlocutionary act. Referring to the philosophy of the 
speech act as developed by J.L. Austin and John Searle, Ricoeur describes 
the locutionary act as the “act of saying,” the illocutionary force as “that 
which we do in saying,” and the perlocutionary act as “that which we do by 
saying.” 34  The point may be better illustrated here when considering 
Ricoeur’s assertion, “it is not statements that refer to something but the 
speakers themselves who refer in this way.”35 The utterance, therefore, has 
two qualities: the saying qua saying, and then the implication of what the 
speaker is doing in so saying. The act of saying is the speaker acting in 
time as he refers to something by using the signs and indicators of language 
to convey his message that ultimately is a reference to his world – or better, 
the world of the interlocutors. The “force” of the saying is the very act that 
is event – the event is being done in the saying, uttering or referencing.36 
1.5  Utterance Equals Interlocution  
Utterance is event insofar as it “equals interlocution,”37 an exchange of 
messages between the I and the other, the exchange in and of itself is an 
event.38 “Facing the speaker in the first person is a listener in the second 
person to whom the former addresses himself or herself – this fact belongs 
                                           
33  P. RICOEUR. “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. pp. 197-221. 
34  “The act of speaking, according to [Austin and Searle], is constituted by a 
hierarchy of subordinate acts which are distributed on three levels: (1) the level of the 
locutionary or propositional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of the illocutionary act or 
force, that which we do in saying; and (3) the level of the perlocutionary act, that which 
we do by saying,” (Ibid., p. 199). 
35 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 43. 
36  “The notion of illocutionary force thus allows us to generalize beyond 
performatives, properly speaking, the implication of doing in saying” (Ibid., p. 43). 
37 Ibid., p. 44. 
38 “Whereas language is only the condition for communication for which it provides 
the codes, it is in discourse that all messages are exchanged” (P. RICOEUR, “The model 
of the text: meaningful action considered as text.” Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. 
p. 198). 
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to the situation of interlocution.”39  Ricoeur concludes this statement by 
saying, “So, there is not illocution without allocution and, by implication, 
without someone to whom the message is addressed.”40 As man utters, 
what he utters is about something and inherently refers to him as the 
speaker41 and is addressed to someone, the listener. It is in this utterance, 
systematically stringing together signs and indicators in a sentence, and 
referring to oneself by using language that discourse actualizes language 
and gives it the phenomenological dimensions constituting an event. 
Utterance has what Ricoeur calls a self-referential quality. As soon as 
man strings together the signs or indicators to give meaning, to convey a 
message, he has used a language that intrinsically “has no subject insofar as 
the question ‘who speaks?’”42 but is automatically self-referential in the 
indicators and pronouns he uses. With indicators and pronouns, there are 
two sides of the self-referential quality, that of the I of the speaker, and the 
you to whom the speaker addresses his utterance. “The utterance that is 
reflected in the sense of the statement is therefore straightaway a bipolar 
phenomenon: it implies simultaneously an ‘I’ that speaks and a ‘you’ to 
whom the former addresses itself. ‘I affirm that’ equals ‘I declare to you 
that’; ‘I promise that’ equals ‘I promise you that’.” 43  This bipolar 
phenomenon is self-referential insofar as it evidences the I referring to 
himself in addressing the other; it identifies the other as the reason for 
which the I utters anything at all. Without the second person, the first 
person would not need to refer to anything as it relates to himself; there 
would be no relation. Since this is a crucial part of how man relates to the 
other, we will come back to this part of the phenomenon of language and 
discourse when we make the connection between language and discourse 
[and Levinas’s ethical demand]. 
In the act of uttering, man uses language to refer to something, putting 
himself as the subject and addressing the other as the you or the second 
                                           
39 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 43. 
40 Ibid., p. 43. 
41 “… discourse refers back to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators, 
such as personal pronouns. We can say, in this sense, that the instance of discourse is 
self-referential” (P. RICOEUR, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 133). 
42 Ibid., p. 133. 
43 P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking Subject, A Pragmatic 
Approach.” Oneself as Another. p. 43. 
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person. In doing this, in his action of uttering and in the event of discourse, 
what he says always refers to something. Ricoeur writes, “Discourse cannot 
fail to be about something,”44 or more positively stated, “… discourse is 
always about something.”45 There is no discourse that is meaningless or 
that is without reference because as soon as man utters something, he is 
using language to reference something as it relates to him. 
Since discourse or the utterance is ever self-referential and always about 
something addressed to an-other, its exchange of messages (between the I 
and the other) is the basis for interlocution. Ricoeur points out that “In 
spoken discourse… what the dialogue ultimately refers to is the situation 
common to the interlocutors.”46 That is to say that “discourse not only has a 
world, but it has an other, another person, an interlocutor to whom it is 
addressed.”47 Discourse, therefore, is an event of interlocution; it is self-
referential and intentional while identifying and reflecting the world in 
which it takes place. 
In understanding the phenomenology of discourse as event as was just 
described, another quality to this phenomenological experience becomes 
apparent, that of intentionality. Because utterance is a dialectic between the 
first and second persons since it is an exchange of messages between the 
two persons, it is ever changing. Ricoeur says that the exchange of 
messages is an exchange of intentionalities between the interlocutors.48  
Returning to the assertion that discourse is always about something, and 
that language, when uttered, refers to a particularity in man’s world as it 
relates to him, we contend that discourse always has meaning. That 
meaning has intentionality or rather it is always directed at something and 
addressed to someone. Therefore, discourse is the utterance or articulation 
of man’s intentionality as it relates to the other. Language in and of itself 
has no phenomenological dimension, but in uttering, the indicators are 
                                           
44  P. RICOEUR, “The model of text: meaningful action considered as text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 201. 
45 Ibid., p. 198. 
46 Ibid., p. 201. 
47 P. RICOEUR, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation.” Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences. p. 133. 
48  “Interlocution… is revealed to be an exchange of intentionalities, reciprocally 
aiming at one another. This circularity of intentions demands that the reflexivity of 
utterance and the otherness implied in the dialogic structure of the intentional exchange 
be placed on the same level” (P. RICOEUR, “Second Study: Utterance and the Speaking 
Subject, A Pragmatic Approach.” Oneself as Another. p 43). 
126  PART TWO: HUMAN ACTION AS TEXT, PAUL RICOEUR 
 
 
realized as they identify man and his world, and language is actualized. In 
this way, language gains a phenomenological dimension as discourse and 
event and is directed at something and addressed to someone; it has 
intentionality but is only actualized in discourse and realized in event. 
1.6  An Analogy, the Face and Language 
In order to establish or recognize a commonality between the 
philosophies of Ricoeur and Levinas, we will look at an analogy between 
Levinas’ philosophy of the face and Ricoeur’s philosophy as it relates to 
language, both with respect to the human interpersonal encounters and 
ensuing relation. By identifying this subtle analogy, we will set a 
foundation for examining ethics from the relational side of humanity (the 
face) and the action of humanity (discourse). Both the face and discourse 
afford us the opportunity to examine the nature of man’s relation to the 
other – the relation between the I and the other, the invitation and openness 
to discourse and ultimately the call to responsibility. 
Instead of referring to language as a system of communication, as 
Ricoeur does, for Levinas it is clear that,  
Language does not exteriorize a representation preexisting in me; it puts in 
common a world hitherto mine. Language effectuates the entry of things into a 
new ether in which they receive a name and become concepts. It is a first 
action over and above labor, an action without action, even though speech 
involves the effort of labor, even though, as incarnate thought, it inserts us into 
the world, with the risks and hazards of all action.49 
Here Levinas refers to language itself as an action that precipitates the 
labor of speech whereas Ricoeur calls language a system. It is apparent 
from this citation as well as the work referred to in Part One that Levinas 
perceives a certain momentum in language, a point from which the human 
person identifies himself to the other. Levinas goes on to say, “Language 
accomplishes a relation between terms that breaks up the unity of a 
genus… Language is perhaps to be defined as the very power to break the 
continuity of being or of history.” 50  Considering Levinas’ position on 
language and man, I have to wonder if there is a disjunction in vocabulary 
between the two philosophers: what Levinas calls language, would Ricoeur 
                                           
49 E. LEVINAS, Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Duquesne 
University Press. Pittsburgh, PA. 1969. p. 174. 
50 Ibid., 195. 
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call it discourse? But if this is the case, what would Levinas call Ricoeur’s 
definition of language? Perhaps he would call it the face itself. 
Referring to the conclusions drawn from Part I, we can say in an 
analogical manner that for Levinas, language is the face and the face is 
language. How does this relate to our earlier study about Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of language and discourse? As the face is the manifestation of 
man’s being, discourse appears as the actualization of language. In 
Levinas’s philosophy, the face is what brings man’s being into the 
phenomenological world. The face makes man present in this world or 
rather manifests his being in a way that he too achieves the 
phenomenological dimensions; the face manifests man in this world in such 
a way that he may relate to the other in an eventful and meaningful way. 
Analogously, language, like man’s being, has to be actualized as discourse 
in order to be brought into the phenomenological world and experienced as 
an event. By way of analogy, the being of man is to the face as language is 
to discourse. 
2. Text, Discourse Fixed by Writing 
Let us now delve into Ricoeur’s philosophy to understand in greater 
depth language as a means of human relation. We shall do so by referring 
to language in terms of text and discourse. For Ricoeur text is “any 
discourse fixed by writing,”51 but it cannot “be purely and simply identified 
with writing.”52  Text cannot be strictly identified with writing because 
there is a dialectic that prohibits that narrow definition from being wholly 
true. Ricoeur identifies three dialectics that contribute to this prohibition: 
the dialectic of speaking and writing; the dialectic of distanciation; the 
realization of discourse as a structured work.53 The overarching dialectic is 
                                           
51 P. RICOEUR, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding.” Hermeneutics & 
the Human Sciences. p. 145. 
52 P. RICOEUR, “The hermeneutical function of distanciation.” Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences. p. 132. 
53 “Firstly, it is not writing as such which gives rise to the hermeneutical problem, 
but the dialectic of speaking and writing. Second, this dialectic is constructed upon a 
dialectic of distanciation which is more primitive than the opposition of writing to 
speaking which is already part of oral discourse qua discourse; we must therefore search 
in discourse itself for the roots of all subsequent dialectics. Finally, between the 
realisation of language as discourse and the dialectic of speaking and writing, it seems 
necessary to insert the fundamental notion of the realisation of discourse as a structured 
work” (Ibid., p. 132). 
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the relation between man and the intentionality of the discourse – how man 
uses discourse to achieve his goal in communicating with and relating to 
the other. (In terms of the dialectic, language is the means by which man 
transcends the sole being of himself to the being that is in relation, in 
community, with the other.) 
Indeed, text is more than just discourse fixed by writing. As Ricoeur 
points out, “writing adds nothing to the phenomenon of speech other than 
the fixation which enables it to be conserved.”54 Writing as such is much 
like language in that it has no meaning if it is not directed at something or 
addressed to someone. So in this way, writing is akin to discourse insofar 
as it is always about something. Writing takes the place of speech – the act 
of writing, while subsequent to speech, is on par with the act of uttering or 
saying.55 While writing adds nothing to the phenomenon of speech, it is not 
without meaning. The act of writing demonstrates an intentionality of the 
author that may not necessarily be the same intentionality represented in 
the text that is produced by that act. 
As a written form of discourse, the text indicates that the writing has 
meaning and is, in a phenomenological sense, a manifestation of man’s 
intentionality in using language. Text, like speech, has to be about 
something and addressed to someone because it is a discourse (that is fixed 
by writing). As Ricoeur writes, the “text is really a text only when it is not 
restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, when instead it inscribes 
directly in written letters what the discourse means.”56 Therefore, text, like 
speech, has meaning. Given that text is discourse [fixed by writing], it too 
can never fail to be about something. 
Text differs from speech inasmuch as, while it has meaning, it is about 
something, is addressed to someone and is self-referential, it does not have 
the benefit of interlocution. There is a speaker, the writer – the author of the 
speech or text – but there is no immediate hearer of the speaker’s word. 
Ricoeur says, “The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is 
absent from the act of reading.” 57  Because with text the listener is 
transformed into a reader, there is no opportunity for an exchange of ideas. 
                                           
54 P. RICOEUR, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding.” Hermeneutics & 
the Human Sciences. p. 146. 
55 “What is fixed by writing is thus a discourse which could be said, of course, but 
which is written precisely because it is not said. Fixation by writing takes the very place 
of speech, occurring at the site where speech could have emerged” (Ibid., p. 146). 
56 Ibid., p. 146. 
57 Ibid., p. 146. 
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Rather, text offers the intentionality of the writer alone, which may or may 
not be received as it was intended depending on the reader (including the 
reader’s understanding and manner of interpretation – or hermeneutical 
approach). The writer inscribes in written letters what he means and that 
delineates the boundary for discourse between writer and reader, between the 
I and the you.  
With text, there is no dialogue, no exchange of ideas.58 Instead text then 
becomes the subject of the reader’s interpretation. The you to whom the 
writer addresses the text has many opportunities to interpret the meaning or 
intention of the writer’s discourse: “writing preserves discourse and makes it 
an archive available for individual and collective memory,”59 so that, as 
compared to speech, it offers a broader opportunity to draw meaning and 
lasting significance from what the author intends to communicate with the 
other. 
2.1  Proximity and Paradox 
Not only are the writer and reader absent of each other, they are absent 
of their respective situations (or worlds); that is to say, the reader is absent 
from the situation in which the writer pens his words, and the writer is 
absent from the situation in which the reader “hears” him. Ricoeur calls 
that absence an upheaval when he states, “The emancipation of the text 
from the oral situation entails a veritable upheaval in the relations between 
language and the world, as well as in the relation between language and the 
various subjectivities concerned (that of the author and that of the 
reader).”60 This upheaval constitutes the very necessity for interpretation of 
the word or actualized language as text. The author’s intentionality in using 
language is not readily discernable to the reader as it may be in a face-to-
face oral situation or confrontation.  
Ricoeur argues that it is in the face-to-face encounter that discourse is 
fully meaningful, where the intentionality of both speakers (the I and the 
you) is made plain or in less need of interpretation by either party because 
they are indeed present to one another.61 That to which the speakers refer is 
                                           
58 “Dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this 
sort between the writer and the reader,” (Ibid., p. 146). 
59 Ibid., p. 147. 
60 Ibid., p. 147. 
61 “When the text takes the place of speech, something important occurs. In speech, 
the interlocutors are present not only to one another, but also to the situation, the 
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always the world in which they are actualizing language.62 To take one of 
the interlocutors out of the world in which the speaker actualizes language 
is to augment the context of discourse. The situation is the world, the very 
context of actualized language, of discourse. Therefore, it is in 
interpretation that the reader is able to reconstruct a context of the world in 
which the author actualizes language63 and discerns a meaning.  
The text, then, becomes the sole representation of the author, whereas in 
the situation of proper interlocution, the speaker represents himself but 
demonstrates his intentionality in the way that he actualizes language, 
which may not be limited to the use of words per se. According to Ricoeur, 
“This proximity of the speaking subject to his own speech is replaced by a 
complex relation of the author to the text, a relation which enables us to say 
that the author is instituted by the text, that he stands in the space of 
meaning traced and inscribed by writing.” 64  In the act of transcribing 
directly into written letters his intentionality, the author conserves his 
discourse65 in the place where speech, instead, could have emerged; in that 
transcription the author gives a direct inscription of his intentionality and in 
fact, “is the very place where the author appears.”66 It is in the text as 
written discourse that the first person relies solely on the text to convey, not 
just the meaning of what he intends to say, but the context or world of that 
actualized language which includes a rendering of the author himself.  
Paradoxically, while the author of the text is present in the text, he is 
detached from that text. Ricoeur says that there are four specific traits that 
give a text its objectivity, and therefore a reason for interpretation: 
1. the fixation of the meaning, 
2. its dissociation from the mental intention of the author, 
                                                                                                                           
surroundings and the circumstantial milieu that discourse is fully meaningful; the return 
to reality is ultimately a return to this reality, which can be indicated ‘around’ the 
speakers, ‘around,’ if we may say so, the instance of discourse itself,” (Ibid., p. 148). 
62  “… in living speech, the ideal sense of what is said turns towards the real 
reference, towards that ‘about which’ we speak,” (Ibid., p. 148). 
63 “… the text is not without reference; the task of reading, qua interpretation, will be 
precisely to fulfil the reference,” (Ibid., p. 148). 
64 Ibid., p. 149. 
65 “… writing as an institution is subsequent to speech, and seems merely to fix in 
linear script all the articulations which have already appeared orally,” “… writing adds 
nothing to the phenomenon of speech other than the fixation which enables it to be 
conserved,” (Ibid., p. 146). 
66 Ibid., p. 149. 
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3. the display of non-ostensive references, and 
4. the universal range of its addressees.67 
In other words, the author is detached from his own discourse because as 
soon as he fixes his meaning in writing, the discourse ceases to have the 
spontaneity of dialogue (question and answer) and assumes the determined 
nature of a final word. Indeed, the writer cannot answer the questions of the 
reader or engage in a proper dialogical exchange.68 If the author changes 
his mind about the discourse he has fixed by writing, he has to write a 
statement amending the previous text. But in and of itself, each text stands 
on its own; therefore, every text is treated as its own entirety. This, of 
course, increases the complexity of interpreting the meaning of a text if 
there is another text to consider when deciphering the meaning. 
Having written the text within the confines of his own mental 
intentionality and world, references given within the text may, at times, 
remain obscure to the reader. In this way, the meaning that the author 
intended the reader to gain from his text may then be up for interpretation. 
As compared to the speech paradigm where the speakers cannot only make 
reference to themselves and the world around them through verbal cues, 
but they can also indicate their meaning through non-verbal gesticulation69 
there remains a void of specificity in the non-interlocution situation of the 
text. Both verbal cues and corporal gesticulation can convey meaning in 
such a way that leaves little room for interpretation by the second person. 
More specifically, within a face-to-face encounter, the I and the other can 
exchange messages conveying their intentionality more precisely and 
readily. When a question arises in a dialogical paradigm, the interlocutors 
are available to give clarifying answers that eliminate many possibilities for 
interpretation beyond the strict meaning of the speaker.  
Furthermore, in fixing the discourse by writing, the author creates a 
series of second persons to whom he is “speaking,” to whom he is 
addressing his message and directing his intentionality. “Instead of being 
addressed just to you, the second person, what is written is addressed to the 
                                           
67 P. RICOEUR, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text.” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Action. p. 210. 
68  “The writer does not respond to the reader,” (P. RICOEUR, “What is a text? 
Explanation and understanding.” Hermemeutics & the Human Action. p. 146). 
69 “At the limit, this real reference tends to merge with an ostensive designation 
where speech rejoins the gesture of pointing. Sense fades into reference and the latter 
into the act of showing,” (Ibid., p. 148). 
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audience that it creates itself.”70 This presents a difficulty for the author in 
terms of confining his meaning or isolating it to the context or world in 
which it was written. The problem is that in writing he is directing his 
intentionality in such a way that the other to whom he addresses himself, 
the many others, then “hear” him but not within the context in which he 
writes the discourse, rather, within the context in which they receive his 
message. The reader then has to decontextualize the text, gain an 
understanding of the references and recontextualize the discourse in his 
own situation or world in such a way that it makes sense and is relatable.71 
The discourse that is fixed by writing acquires a more complex quality 
because it involves interlocutors who are not present to each other in space 
and time. For Ricoeur, “…it is one thing for discourse to be addressed to an 
interlocutor equally present to the discourse situation, and another to be 
addressed, as is the case in virtually every piece of writing, to whoever 
knows how to read.”72 In other words, when the author fixes his discourse by 
writing, he is opening up the possibility for anyone who can read to interpret 
his meaning. The text then becomes intended or addressed to him whom the 
writer may never have conceived would be actually reading the text. 
The author is detached or removed from the text insofar as he remains 
within the time and context of the world in which he writes, while the text 
itself is a discourse, albeit fixed, it is conserved beyond the time and place 
in which it was fixed. As Ricoeur says, “writing renders the text 
autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text 
signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, 
textual meaning and psychological meaning have different destinies.”73 It is 
no longer a message strictly tied to the intentionality of the author, although 
it does conserve that author’s intentionality in written form. Instead, it is 
open to interpretation by applying the contexts to which any reader may 
bring to the text. 
                                           
70  P. RICOEUR, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as text” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 197. 
71 “In short, the text must be able, from the sociological as well as the psychological 
point of view, to ‘decontextualise’ itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualised’ 
in a new situation – as accomplished, precisely, by the act of reading” (P. RICOEUR, 
“The hermeneutical function of distanciation.” Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 
139). 
72 Ibid., p. 202. 
73 Ibid., p. 139. 
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The introduction of text as discourse fixed by writing created the very 
reason for interpretation [of meaning]. The removal of the speaker from the 
moment when the reader receives the message and the removal of the 
hearer from when the author writes his meaning create a disjunction of 
meaning. “If the objective meaning is something other than the subjective 
intention of the author, it may be construed in various ways.” 74  The 
meaning as intended by the author never changes, but rather it is what the 
reader receives and interprets as the author’s meaning that is at risk of 
differing from the original meaning. Because the author and reader are 
removed from each other’s paradigm of discourse, there remains a void in 
which the doubt of what the author intends may never be accurately filled 
by the reader.75 
The text, therefore, presents a breakout from that which the author 
intended that is perhaps unexpected. It presents an alternative way of 
looking at the world. Ricoeur explains it in terms of reference opening up 
the world. As he writes, “To understand a text is at the same time to light 
up our own situation. … it would be better to say that the references open 
up the world.”76 He contends that text is free from the “tutelage of the 
mental intention” and that freedom extends to the “limits of ostensive 
reference.”77 With text, the reader then becomes exposed to references that 
may not otherwise exist in his world. Consequently, the world of the reader 
then opens up to the world of the author in the references that the author 
makes. But there is another component at work here: the reader is not only 
exposed to the references made by the author, but he is free to interpret 
those references based on his own world and references.  
Ricoeur relates text to man’s world when he says, “Far from saying that 
the text is then without a world, I shall now say without paradox that only 
man has a world and not just a situation.” Breaking down the many 
assertions within this one statement: Ricoeur argues that man does indeed 
have a world and implies that the text is a rendition of that world inasmuch 
as he makes reference to his world in fixing his discourse by writing. In the 
act of writing his discourse, man is participating in his world, not merely in 
                                           
74  P. RICOEUR, “The model of text: meaningful action considered as text” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 211. 
75 “The problem of the right understanding can no longer be solved by a simple 
return to the alleged intention of the author” (Ibid., p. 211). 
76 Ibid., p. 202. 
77 “In the same manner that the text frees its meaning from the tutelage of the mental 
intention, it frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference” (Ibid., p. 201). 
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a situation of “inscribing directly in written letters what the discourse 
means,”78 but also in directing his intentionality and addressing a second 
person who is wholly anonymous to him. Man is, instead, conveying the 
world in which he experiences discourse by means of that inscription to the 
unseen second person to whom he addresses his meaning, to whom he 
directs his intentionality. The world that he conveys is a world of 
references.  
It is for this reason that Ricoeur says, “For us, the world is the ensemble 
of references opened up by the texts.”79 The references of the text remain 
multi-dimensional in interpretation, which renders various meanings 
possible (and many experiences of those same references). Because the text 
is not fixed in meaning but rather in discourse, the references may be 
experienced and interpreted according to how the reader receives it (or 
perceives it based on his interpretation), according to the reader’s own 
references to the world. 
As a means of drawing Part One and Two together, I submit the 
following proposition: In his teachings on the ethical demand, Levinas’ 
philosophy of the face can be credibly coupled with Ricoeur’s philosophy 
of text as discourse insofar as in writing the text, the author presents 
himself to the other in discourse. By means of text, the author invites the 
other into relationship by revealing his world (and himself) through 
references and using indicators. But instead of being in dialogical relation 
with the other, i.e. question and answer, the author, in writing the text, 
leave a trace of himself that will forever (or as long as the text survives) 
represent the person he was at the time and place when and where the text 
was written. The text, therefore, will never grow with the author as a 
person. The text will never represent the author’s change in ideas from the 
time and place where he affixed his discourse by writing. 
However, writing is always representative of the author’s person because 
it records or preserves his intention. According to Ricoeur, “…writing is 
discourse as intention-to-say and that writing is a direct inscription of this 
intention, even if, historically and psychologically, writing began with the 
                                           
78 P. RICOEUR, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding,” Hermeneutics & 
the Human Sciences. p. 146. 
79 P. RICOEUR, “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text,” 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 202. 
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graphic transcription of the signs of speech.”80 The inscription of man’s 
intentionality in his intention-to-say is a lasting record of his person at that 
time and place in which he is writing. Writing represents a footprint of 
sorts, a trace, of the person who fixes their discourse as text. Every piece of 
text written by a single person represents the person who they were and 
their world of references at the particular time and place; the text, therefore, 
is an event. That text does not change with man as he lives, experiences his 
world and grows in knowledge and wisdom. Nevertheless, the author has 
invited the other to discourse with the person that he is in the moment in 
which he writes the text. In this way the face of man leaves a trace of 
himself. It is always open to relation and invites the other to discourse. 
 
2.2 An analogy, the Face and Text 
In order to further link the philosophies of Levinas and Ricoeur, we will 
propose an analogy between Levinas’ philosophy of the face and Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of text [insofar as it is actualized language]. With this in mind, 
let us refer to the definition that Ricoeur uses for the word character. In 
Oneself as Another, more precisely in the fifth essay entitled “Personal 
Identity and Narrative Identity,”81 Ricoeur writes:  
Character, I would say today, designates the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized. In this way character is able to constitute the 
limit point where the problematic of ipse becomes indiscernible from that of 
idem, and where one is inclined not to distinguish them from one another.82 
While the definition touches on the problematics of ipse (self) and idem 
(same) as it relates to man’s identity, the questions of “Who am I?” (ipse) 
and “What am I?” (idem), speak to the very identity of man as the self and 
as the person who participates and relates with others in community. 
Drawing upon Ricoeur’s definition of character, we can understand text, 
too, as a lasting disposition of man’s person. 
The overarching point here is that the act of writing is the very 
presentation of the face in a particular place and time (constituting an 
event). In the manifestation of man’s being in the face, he invites the other 
                                           
80 P. RICOEUR, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding,” Hermeneutics & 
the Human Sciences. p. 147. 
81 P. RICOEUR, “Fifth Study: Personal Identity and Narrative Identity,” Oneself as 
Another. pp. 113-139. 
82 Ibid., p. 121. 
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to discourse and thus into relation. While the other, manifested in his own 
face does not have to accept the invitation to relation, he does engage in 
discourse, even to say he does not want to be in relation. Likewise writing 
is the intentionality of man being preserved as text which perpetually (or as 
long as the text exists) invites the other (whoever can read) to share in the 
references of his world – he invites the other into a discourse that is not 
dialogical 83  but rather situational in an intention-to-say 84 , thereby 
preserving the meaning of the discourse. 
3. Human Action and the I 
3.1  Ricoeur on Time 
Ricoeur’s criticism of the Augustinian theory of time includes the 
skeptical observation that time does not have being “since the future is not 
yet, the past is no longer, and the present does not remain.”85 In the next 
line, however, he admits that time does indeed participate in being insofar 
as man uses the verb to be when making reference to time. “We say that 
things to come will be, that things past were, and that things present are 
passing away.”86 In language, man manifests his conception of time thus 
giving it being, albeit perhaps only as something that is perceived by the 
mind that were it not for his perception may not exist.  
Ricoeur appreciates the role language plays in realizing the passage of 
time as it is through the articulation of anticipating (future) or bidding 
farewell (past) that man manifests his perception of that passage of time. 
He says, “It is remarkable that it is language usage that provisionally 
provides the resistance to the thesis of nonbeing. We speak of time and we 
speak meaningfully about it, and this shores up an assertion about the being 
of time.”87 In language, therefore, we have the most compelling testament 
                                           
83 “The writing-reading relation is thus not a particular case of speaking-answering 
relation. It is not a relation of interlocution, not an instance of dialogue,” and “Dialogue 
is an exchange of questions and answer; there is no exchange of this sort between the 
writer and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader,” (P. RICOEUR, “What is 
a text? Explanation and Understanding.” Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 146). 
84 “… writing is discourse as intention-to-say and that writing is a direct inscription 
of this intention,” (Ibid., p. 147). 
85 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative. p. 7. 
86 Ibid., p. 7. 
87 Ibid., p. 7. 
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to the being of time, and without language we are at a loss for providing 
evidence to the being of time. 
The idea that Ricoeur is tackling in these passages is the realization that 
man cannot speak of something that is completely devoid of being. For 
example, while a unicorn does not exist in the phenomenological world in 
which man himself is manifest, the fact that he can conceive of a horse-like 
creature with a single horn on its forehead indicates that a unicorn has 
being insofar as man has imagined it. In his imagination, the unicorn exists 
and man is therefore able to speak of it allowing language to make it 
manifest even if only as an idea of a phenomenological experience. To take 
this argument a step further, according to Augustine’s meditation on time, 
eternity and God, nothing exists outside of God’s word and his preceding 
will. Therefore, even the unicorn exists within the will of God. Does it 
mean, according to this reasoning, that time does indeed participate in 
being on some level; that it exists according to the will of God? 
Ricoeur astutely acknowledges the paradox between the existential 
uncertainty of time having being and the relative linguistic certainty of time 
indeed having being when he asks, “How can time exist if the past is no 
longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not always?”88 This 
question reflects that existential uncertainty. Man cannot prove, 
philosophically speaking (or even scientifically/empirically for that matter), 
the existence of time, the being that is time or the participatory quality that 
lends time being. Time, as Augustine and Ricoeur observe, does not exist 
in such a way that it can be observed on its own, without being posited 
against the movement of the world or the perceived movement (referring to 
the mind). Ricoeur, therefore, asks “How can we measure that which does 
not exist? The paradox of measurement is a direct result of the paradox of 
the being and nonbeing of time. Here again language is a relatively sure 
guide.”89 Ricoeur returns to Augustine to highlight how language is used to 
measure time, describing something as having taken a long time or a short 
time. The use of language, the indicators of proximity, manifests a 
perception of the passage of time. But, to the point of the skeptical 
argument, what is time beyond that perception? (Or does it even matter?) 
To complicate the linguistic proposition of time, Ricoeur turns to the 
fragile and fleeting concept of the present as it relates to the past and future. 
He goes back to Augustine’s question:  
                                           
88 Ibid., p. 7. 
89 Ibid., p. 8. 
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If future and past times exist, I wish to know where they are. But if I am not 
yet able to do this, I still know that wherever they are, they are there neither as 
future nor as past, but as present. For if they are in that place as future things, 
they are not yet there, and if they are in that place as past things, they are no 
longer there. Therefore, wherever they are, and whatever they are, they do not 
exist except as present things.90 
Of this, Ricoeur explains that we are witnessing the argumentation for a 
present that is forever in duration:  
It is thanks to a present expectation that future things are present to us as 
things to come. We have a “pre-perception” (praesensio) of this which enables 
us to “fore-tell” them (praenuntio). Expectation is thus the analogue to 
memory. It consists of an image that already exists, in the sense that it 
precedes the event that does not yet exist (nondum).91 
But it is in the present expectation of the future that man may perceive the 
past recognizing what is no more, anticipating what is yet to come and living 
in the moment in which he finds himself. Therefore, it may be fair to say that 
time is more than the linguistic evidence of the sequential unfolding of 
events as man experiences them. Rather, time is the culmination of linguistic 
expression, the perception of events that have come to pass and those 
anticipated as well as the ability to reflect on how it relates to and affects 
man as he experiences his world. The structure of linguistics and the ability 
to recall past events and anticipate those to come provide a basis for 
Ricoeur’s consideration of the merits of the narrative as it relates to time 
(and man). 
3.2  Narrative, Mimesis and Event 
Narrative is anterior to time insofar as it is only in the narrative that time 
is realized in the unfolding of the sequence of events. But before delving 
into the relationship between narrative and time, let us give a brief and 
broad description of narrative that includes a structural explanation related 
to language and not as tightly linked to time as such: narrative is the 
structured recording (text) or retelling (speech) of the human story based on 
                                           
90 “Si enim sunt futura et praeterita, volo scire ubi sint. Quod si nondum valeo, scio 
tamen, ubicumque sunt, non ibi ea futura esse aut praeterita, sed praesentia. nam si et 
ibi futura sunt, nondum ibi sunt, si et ibi praeterita sunt, iam non ibi sunt. ubicumque 
ergo sunt, quaecumque sunt, non sunt nisi praesentia” (ST. AUGUSTINE, The 
Confessions. Book XI, 18:23). 
91 P. RICOEUR, Time and Narrative. p. 11. 
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human action. The narrative represents human action and man’s ability to 
articulate (recite, retell or write) the story thus actualizing language to bring 
forth a world that is not necessarily represented in the present time and 
space in which the narrative is conveyed.  
Ricoeur uses the Greek philosophical term mimesis to explore the 
relationship between time and narrative. Mimesis comes from the Greek 
word mimos, which means actor or imitator. In philosophical terms it takes 
on the meaning of imitation, representation and mimicry among others. But 
instead of using mimesis according to traditional use, Ricoeur uses it to 
demonstrate the configuration of the structure of time and narrative, or 
rather the mediation between the two saying, “I am taking as my guideline 
for exploring the mediation between time and narrative the articulation … 
between the three moments of mimesis that, seriously and playfully, I name 
mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3.”
92 He then explains:  
… my thesis is that the very meaning of configurating operation constitutive 
of emplotment is a result of its intermediary position between the two 
operations I am calling mimesis1 and mimesis3, which constitutes the two 
sides [l’amont et l’aval] of mimesis. By saying this, I propose to show that 
mimesis2 draws its intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which is to 
conduct us from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side 
into the other through its power of configuration.93 
It is by means of the three mimeses that Ricoeur explores the intricacies of 
the narrative while at the same time explaining the nuances of the 
relationship between time and narrative.  
According to what Ricoeur designates as mimesis1, the narrative is 
structured, symbolic and temporal. 94  For the sake of clarity, Ricoeur 
understands symbolic as referring to man’s ability to understand the 
references from the narrative in such a way that he can deconstruct it from 
the strict context or world of the narrative, and reconstruct it within the 
context of the references of his own world.95 In this way, the narrative 
becomes a symbol96 and is not merely a story.  
                                           
92 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
93 Ibid., p. 53. 
94  “Whatever the innovative force of poetic composition within the field of our 
temporal experience may be, the composition of the plot is grounded in a 
preunderstanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic 
resources, and its temporal character” (Ibid., p. 54). 
95 “In passing from the paradigmatic order of action to the syntagmatic order of 
narrative, the terms of the semantics of action acquire integration and actuality. 
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The second mimesis is bound to the plot – the mediation of events, the 
synthesis and understanding of intentionality and the configuration of the 
plot in such a way that there is a beginning, middle and end. This moves 
Ricoeur to use the term emplotment over plot.97 In using emplotment over 
plot he distinguishes the operation of the plot or rather its mediation. He 
identifies three ways in which plot is mediating between time and the 
narrative: 
1. it is a meditation between the individual events or incidents and a story 
taken as a whole; 
2. it brings together factors as heterogenous as agents, goals, means, 
interactions, circumstances, unexpected results; and 
3. it has a temporal characteristic which allows us to call plot, by means of 
generalization, a synthesis of the heterogeneous.98 
These functions are imperative to the configuration of the whole. Indeed, 
Ricoeur says, “This configurational act consists of ‘grasping together’ the 
detailed actions or what I have called the story’s incidents. It draws from 
this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole.”99 In other words, 
the functions of the second mimesis is instrumental in understanding the 
sequence of events as a key element in gathering meaning from the 
narrative.  
Ricoeur uses the terms preunderstanding and postunderstanding to 
explain the way in which the emplotment brings the various elements of the 
                                                                                                                           
Actuality, because the terms, which had only a virtual signification in the paradigmatic 
order, that is, a pure capacity to be used, receive an actual [effective] signification 
thanks to the sequential interconnections the plot confers on the agents, their deeds, and 
their sufferings. Integration, because terms as heterogenous as agents, motives, and 
circumstances are rendered compatible and work together in actual temporal wholes. It 
is in this sense that the twofold relation between rules of emplotment and action-terms 
constitutes both a relation of presupposition and one of transformation” (Ibid., p. 57). 
96 “The term ‘symbol’ further introduces the idea of a rule, not only in the sense we 
have just spoken about rules for description and interpretation of individual actions, but 
in the sense of a norm” (Ibid., p. 58). 
97 “By placing mimesis2 between an earlier and a later stage of mimesis in general, I 
am seeking not just to locate and frame it. I want to understand better its mediating 
function between what precedes fiction and what follows it. Mimesis2 has an 
intermediary position because it has a mediating function. This mediating function 
derives from the dynamic character to that of plot and ordering to that of system” (Ibid., 
p. 65). 
98 Ibid., p. 65. 
99 Ibid., p. 66. 
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narrative together in a manner properly intelligible to whomever is able to 
read or to whomever happens to hear the recitation of the narrative: 
The dynamism lies in the fact that a plot already exercises, within its own 
textual field, an integrating and, in this sense, a mediating function, which 
allows it to bring about, beyond this field, a mediation of a larger amplitude 
between the preunderstanding and, if I may dare to put it this way, the 
postunderstanding of the order of action and its temporal features.100 
This is important because it recreates, in a textual paradigm, the references 
and signs found in the world of the author so that the reader or hearer of the 
narrative may relate to, understand and subsequently interpret the 
intentionality (and the meaning) of the author. Therefore, it is the function 
of the narrative to allow the intentionality of the author to traverse time and 
space by way of the text to the world of the reader (or hearer) allowing the 
reader to understand and interpret the references and signs of the text based 
on the signs and references in his own world.  
The configurative function of the mimesis2 and the way that it promotes 
the deconstruction of the textual elements gives way to a similarity between 
it and mimesis3.
101 It is the historical and traditional characteristics of the 
narrative that convey time and significance in such a way that mimesis2 
allows the narrative to remain relevant in the world of the reader.102 The 
scheme of mimeses that Ricoeur presents is what I imagine it to be 
triangular because the third mimesis connects to mimesis1 as it does 
mimesis2. It recalls the first mimesis in terms of it applying the elements in 
a practical way whereby the reader or hearer of the narrative relates to it 
                                           
100 Ibid., p. 65. 
101 “Two complementary features that assure the continuity of the process that joins 
mimesis3 to mimesis2 remain to be added to our analysis of the configurational act. 
More visibly than the preceding ones, these two features require the support of reading 
if they are to be reactivated. It is a question of the schematization and the character of 
traditionality characteristic of the configurational act, each of which has a specific 
relation to time” (Ibid., p. 68). 
102 “This schematism, in turn, is constituted within a history that has all the 
characteristics of a tradition. Let us understand by this term not the inert transmission of 
some already dead deposit of material but the living transmission of an innovation 
always capable of being reactivated by a return to the most creative moments of poetic 
activity” (Ibid., p. 68). 
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and is able to reconstruct the references and signs103 so that it is meaningful 
to them.104 
It is through the study of the three mimeses that Ricoeur is able to 
reconcile the structural elements of narrative to the perception of sequential 
events in the human experience that is designated by a linguistic expression 
of time. And it is through these mimeses that he constructs a framework in 
which he observes the interwoven nature of history, time and human events 
as they have come to pass.105 The temporal features of the narrative do not 
seem so daunting, ubiquitous and, contemporaneously, nebulously 
concrete. Time is still not purely phenomenological, 106  but within the 
structure of the narrative, it is able to be grasped in a way that we can 
discuss it meaningfully. 
It is in narrative discourse that time becomes apparent while 
simultaneously providing structure to the narration in the designation of the 
order of events, the sequentiality of human action. This is what Ricoeur 
calls the plot of the narrative. He says, “Plot, understood broadly… as the 
ordering of the events (and therefore as interconnecting the action 
sentences) into the total action constitutive of the narrative story…”107 He 
then expands the explanation and says that the plot “‘grasps together’ and 
integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, 
thereby schematizing the intelligible signification attached to the narrative 
taken as a whole.”108 While noting the place of the plot in the narrative 
                                           
103 “… I shall say that mimesis3 marks the intersection of the world of the text and the 
world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world configured by the 
poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific temporality” (Ibid., 
p. 71). 
104 “… narrative has its full meaning when it is restored to the time of action and of 
suffering in mimesis3” (Ibid., p. 70). 
105 “Is not every narrative told as though it had taken place, as is event from the 
ordinary usage of verbal past tenses to narrate the unreal? In this sense, fiction would 
borrow as much from history as history borrows from fiction. It is this reciprocal 
borrowing that authorizes my posing the problem of the interweaving reference between 
history and narrative fiction” (Ibid., p. 82). 
106 “By a pure phenomenology I mean an intuitive apprehension of the structure of time, 
which not only can be isolated from the procedures of argumentation by which 
phenomenology undertakes to resolve the aporias received from an earlier tradition, but 
which would not pay for its discovery with new aporias bearing a higher price” (Ibid., p. 
83). 
107 Ibid., p. 56. 
108 Ibid., p. x. 
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structure, that understanding the narrative is based on mastering “the rules 
that govern its syntagmatic order,” 109  we must also remember that the 
narrative is anchored in a human action that is already grounded in syntax, 
rules and convention.110 In man’s articulation, utterance of the word that 
was merely language without a world, he brings significance to events that 
are otherwise not present to him in a way that is relevant both to him and 
his interlocutor. 
3.3  Myth and the Narrative of Human Relation 
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur defines myth in this way:  
Myth will here be taken to mean… not a false explanation by means of images 
and fables, but a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at 
the beginning of time and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the 
ritual actions of men of today and, in a general manner, establishing all the 
forms of action and thought by which man understands himself in his world.111 
Therefore, myth, by its very nature appears as a narration of human action 
and a conveyor of truth insofar as it provides man with a mirror by which 
he may gauge his own behavior against the lessons he should have learned 
from the human actions recorded in the myth itself. Truth, in this case, is 
not based on historical fact but rather on the ontology (nature of his 
being)112 and cosmology113 (origin and end) of man. Ricoeur is very careful 
to point out that the myth is not an explanation of human behavior or 
action114; instead, myth reveals an exploratory significance in “its power of 
                                           
109 Ibid., p. 56. 
110  “If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already 
articulated by signs, rules and norms” (Ibid., p. 57). 
111 Ibid., p. 5. 
112 “… the myth has an ontological bearing: it points to the relation – that is to say, 
both the leap and the passage, the cut and the suture – between the essential being of 
man and his historical existence” (Ibid., p. 163). 
113 “… in recounting the Beginning and the End of fault, the myth confers upon this 
experience an orientation, a character, a tension. Experience is no longer reduced to a 
present experience; this present was only an instantaneous cross-section in an evolution 
stretching from an origin to a fulfillment, from a ‘Genesis’ to an ‘Apocalypse’” (Ibid., p. 
163). 
114 “ For us, moderns, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that 
time with the time of history as we write it, employing the critical method, nor can we 
connect mythical places with our geographical space. This is why the myth can no 
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discovering and revealing the bond between man and what he considers 
sacred.”115 The myth is the place that man retreats when he is looking for 
answers about where he came from, what his values should be, how he 
should behave and what mortality means. In short, the myth is man’s 
ethical and moral playbook – a proverbial guide to human action, reaction 
and consequences. 
Ricoeur distinguishes myth from fiction or a common narrative by 
relating myth to man’s cosmology and teleology, or rather his origins and 
his end (purpose). The myth is related to man in such a way that he uses it 
as a point of reference for how he should act instead of simply relating to 
the signs and references afforded him in the narrative. The purpose of the 
myth is to bring universality to mankind through the narrative, to give 
temporal orientation (the beginning and the end) and to answer questions of 
who man is. Ricoeur says, “By its triple function of concrete universality, 
temporal orientation, and finally ontological exploration, the myth has a 
way of revealing things that is not reducible to any translation from a 
language in cipher to a clear language.”116 Indeed, Ricoeur argues that the 
myth differs from the traditional narrative because it is a narrative that is 
revelatory – it is a retelling of the human story that is meant to give man a 
sense of self, of time and purpose. 
Given that the function of the myth as a narrative is so intimately linked 
to man’s ontology and cosmology, the intentionality differs greatly from 
that of a traditional narrative in that the myth leaves little room for 
interpretation – the meaning of the myth is plain and not necessarily 
dependent on being understood in a context that needs to be deconstructed 
and reconstructed for understanding and interpretation to arise. Ricoeur 
succinctly says, “… myth is autonomous and immediate; it means what it 
says.”117 Therefore, meaning requires little hermeneutical exercise. The key 
to the myth being autonomous and immediate revolves around the way it 
escapes the clutches of the temporality of the narrative while conveying a 
temporal orientation. As Ricoeur states, “modern man… alone can 
recognize the myth as myth, because he alone has reached the point where 
                                                                                                                           
longer be an explanation; to exclude its etiological intention is the theme of all 
necessary demythologization” (Ibid., p. 5). 
115 Ibid., p. 5. 
116 Ibid., p. 162. 
117 Ibid., p. 164. 
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history and myth become separate.”118 Likewise, he asserts that the myth 
evades the confines of any one geographical location. 119  As a result, 
without the limitations of time and place, the references and signs, 
therefore, focus primarily on man and his actions as the subject of the 
narration.  
If we take Ricoeur’s assessment of the myth as it relates to the narrative 
and time as a guide for discussing, gauging and evaluating human action so 
that its meaning endures as events continue to pass through time, then it is 
as a myth that man should examine his actions, but not only his actions – 
his intentionality and the ensuing consequences. The myth shakes off the 
relativizing weights of time and place to embrace the signs and references 
that are most related to the subjects of the narrative allowing any man to 
read the myth or hear it and appreciate its meaning. In appreciating the 
meaning of the myth, man does not understand and interpret the meaning 
but rather is able to readily incorporate the meaning into his own 
constitution as a man who is looking to understand his origins and his 
mortality, as a being who has a regard for his creator and as being who 
relates to the other who is like him but wholly different. Human action, 
therefore, must be recorded so that the superfluous details of time and 
space are stripped away and the intentionality of the interlocutors is laid 
bare and the meaning of the dialogue is plain. 
Indeed the difficulty with this proposition lies in the symbols of the 
myth. Regardless of the function of myth, it still is a narrative of sorts 
myth-narration; therefore, it retains the innovative force of poetic 
composition (referring to Ricoeur’s discussion about symbols in Time and 
Narrative), which means that it is grounded in a preunderstanding of the 
world of human action. Its meaning is still up for interpretation as the 
reader will inevitably have to apply a certain level of understand and 
piecing together context in order to uncover the intentionality of the author, 
no matter how plain the author intends his meaning to be.  
Instead of interpreting the entire meaning of the myth-narration, 
however, what ends up being interpreted are the elements in the myth-
narration that are symbols in their own right. It is here that we take notice 
                                           
118 Ibid., p. 161. 
119 “… mythical time can no longer be co-ordinated with the time of events that are 
‘historical’ in the sense required by historical method and historical criticism, because 
mythical space can no longer be co-ordinated with the places of our geography…” 
(Ibid., p. 162). 
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of the ritual act, mythical language and archetypes as symbols when 
Ricoeur alludes to it in this way: “… ritual action and mythical language, 
taken together, point beyond themselves to a model, an archetype, which 
they imitate or repeat; imitation in gestures and verbal repetition are only 
the broken expressions of a living participation in an original Act which is 
the common exemplar of the right and of the myth.”120 It is when all the 
symbols are understood together that there is a totality of meaning, the 
meaning that is still plain, autonomous and immediate. The symbols 
grasped as a whole point to an intentionality and meaning that are readily 
evident and understood thus relieving the reader of the need to interpret.  
The myth is the narrative that lets go of time and place, embraces the 
universality of what makes man who and what he is and aims to convey a 
meaning that transcends the confines of the world of the author and that of 
the reader. The myth is the narrative that maintains a universal meaning 
from which man may extract wisdom as it applies to his own nature and 
intentionality. To give a brief example, Ricoeur refers the myth of the 
Original Sin with Adam as the protagonist. Adam is the archetype of all 
men, the sinner who cannot not fall.121 It does not matter where Adam is 
from or when he lived (or if he lived at all) because the point of the myth is 
to give man an orientation in his cosmology and his place in the world as 
he relates to God, the Creator. 
Human life as an event (action, language and the relation between the I 
and the other) becomes the topic of discourse – there is no point in 
discourse if it is not about anything. Man’s discourse will always be about 
himself because he is his own sole point of reference, and there is no 
discourse without an interlocutor (or reader). The event of human life or the 
series of events that comprise it either happen in time or it is the actual 
passing of the events that makes time manifest in man’s world so that he 
experiences time thus giving way to a phenomenological quality to time 
regardless of its ontology or lack thereof. Man perception is that the events 
happen sequentially; the structure of the sequentiality of event (time) and 
the recalling of those events in a meaningful way bears us the fruit of the 
narrative. It is in the narrative that human action is conveyed into a text. 
                                           
120 Ibid., pp. 166-167. 
121 “By means of a time that represents all times, ‘man’ is manifested as a concrete 
universal; Adam signifies man. ‘In’ Adam, says Saint Paul, we have all sinned” (Ibid., 
p. 162). 
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As a text, man is able to reflect upon his actions as well as his 
intentionality. Text also gives him the occasion to observe himself with the 
benefit of hindsight (looking at events he perceives to be in the past) in 
such a way that he can gain insight into his nature, his behavior, his relation 
with the other and the consequences of those elements.  
The text that gives man the relatively clearer message or meaning is the 
myth-narration. It is stripped (again, relatively speaking) of any perceivable 
connection to historical time and place allowing man the freedom or relief 
from having to deconstruct the references, signs and indicators from the 
world of the author and reconstruct them relative to his own world so that 
he can understand them and thus be able to interpret the author’s 
intentionality and meaning. Rather, the myth is recorded in such a way that 
it focuses on the universality of what it is to be human – man’s ontology 
and cosmology. 
As we proceed in the study towards developing an ethic for human 
action as it relates to the corporation, we will return to the myth as a 
normative narrative, a text that may be deconstructed in terms of its 
individual symbols, but always reconstructed as a whole with a pointed 
meaning. We will rely on the text of the myth to guide us in examining 
human action in such a way that the time and place are relative to the 
meaning insofar as it gives context to the sequence of events. It is as a text 
that we will observe human action studying the relation between the I and 
the other and gauging the face-to-face encounters to determine the I’s 
responsibility to respond to the call, the demand of the other. We will be 
vigilant to the emergence of the human face from the text in order to relate 
as closely as possible to the person whose intentionality and meaning we 
are interpreting. The importance of this is to recognize the humanity that 
lies at the basis and throughout the text. The corporate ethic that we shall 
develop cannot lose sight of the humanity that it is meant to protect and 
serve; this includes the humanity of those who comprise the corporation 
(senior management, staff and contractors) as well as those with whom 




Responsibility and Hermeneutics 
We will now look at the dialectic of two concepts that are not seemingly 
related, but in the course of the discussion, their relation shall become 
apparent. Responsibility and hermeneutics, together, become a linchpin in 
the justification for regarding human action as text. It is in the 
determination of responsibility and hermeneutics, as we come to an 
understanding of these concepts beyond their obvious application in 
everyday usages that the dialectic emerges. And it is exactly this, the nature 
of responsibility and hermeneutics, that we will study so that we may 
discuss human action as it relates to justice, develop a system of ethics for 
corporations to follow and draw conclusions as to whether those ethics may 
be authentic [to the human interpersonal relation], applicable and render the 
corporation accountable considering the economic, political and moral 
paradigm in which we find ourselves. 
1. Responsibility 
Because we have already explored Levinas’ teachings as they relate to 
responsibility and set the groundwork for establishing the ethical demand, 
our current investigation into responsibility [and hermeneutics] will not 
make explicit reference to his teachings. Instead, we will use Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of responsibility to formulate the connection between 
hermeneutics (text), human action and justice. Without getting into a 
detailed comparison of Levinas’ and Ricoeur’s philosophies of 
responsibility and without getting into semantics, I submit that at the core 
of their respective philosophies, they are promoting a similar message: the I 
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is responsible for itself as well as the other. Furthermore, the central goal of 
our discussion as it pertains to responsibility will be to demonstrate that the 
dialectic as it relates to responsibility is not of responsibility but rather that 
responsibility is the dialectic of the just, respectful [and loving] relation 
between the I and the other. 
While Levinas takes a more relational approach to his investigation into 
responsibility – the analysis revolving around the relation between the I and 
the other and the ought between the two – Ricoeur takes a linguistic 
approach. That is to say, he analyzes the language man uses to attribute 
action, motivation and justification. Ricoeur then scrutinizes the attribution 
of action to the agent for the appropriate, true and just responsible person. 
In other words, rather than looking at the relation between the I and the 
other, as Levinas does, Ricoeur looks at the problematic from another angle 
– that of the relation between the action and the agent using language as an 
objective point of departure. 
Before we analyze the methodology of Ricoeur’s study of what it is 
essentially the ontology of responsibility as such, let us refer to his essay 
“The Concept of Responsibility” found in The Just.1 He writes:  
The purely juridical idea of responsibility, understood as the obligation to 
compensate for damages or pay the penalty, can be considered as the 
conceptual outcome of this displacement. Two obligations remain: that of 
acting, which the infraction violates, and that of compensation or pay the 
penalty. Juridical responsibility thus proceeds from the intersection of these 
two obligations, the first justifying the second, the second sanctioning the 
first.2 
Our discussion about responsibility will eventually be applied to society as 
a whole, but for the moment, I will focus on the relation between the I and 
the other. Once we gain an understanding of what that is, we can then 
explore a maxim that may impact society more fully as it relates to law, 
compensation and penalty. Therefore, we will simply keep note of 
Ricoeur’s thoughts on juridical responsibility and return to this passage 
once we have finished our preliminary analysis of his methodology as he 
takes a linguistic approach to the ontological study of responsibility. 
 
                                           
1
 P. RICOEUR, “The Concept of Responsibility.” The Just. Originally published as Le 
Juste by Éditions Esprit in 1995. Translated by David Pellauer. University of Chicago 
Press. Chicago, Illinois. 2000. 
2 Ibid., p. 19. 
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1.1  Responsibility and Imputability  
In studying Ricoeur’s methodology, we must take it one step at a time, 
so we will start with the metaphor of the account, which is where he starts 
his analysis of responsibility. He says, 
“put [the action], so to speak, on his account” – is extraordinarily interesting. 
It is not at all external to the judgment of imputation inasmuch as the Latin 
verb putare implies calculation, comput, suggesting the idea of a kind of moral 
bookkeeping of merits and demerits, as in a double-entry ledger: receipts and 
expenses, credits and debits, with an eye to a sort of positive or negative 
balance...3 
Ricoeur even cites the Robert4 dictionary to certify that to impute is indeed 
to attribute an action to someone so that you are putting it on their [moral] 
account.5 It is here that he begins to make the connection between language 
and morality, between what we do and how we express it and the resulting 
consequences. Giving credit where it is due, it must be noted that the idea 
of relating imputability to responsibility was not novel in Ricoeur’s 
exploration of its implications.  
Ricoeur refers to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason6 where Kant 
introduces the idea of action and agent: “The force of the idea of 
imputation in Kant consists in the conjunction of two more primitive ideas: 
the attribution of an action to an agent, and the moral and generally 
negative qualification of that action.”7 But before delving into the relation 
between the action and its agent, let us consider the following: 
This notion of imputablity – in the sense of a (moral and juridical) “capacity of 
imputation” – constitutes an indispensable key for comprehending the ultimate 
concern of Kant to preserve the double cosmological and ethical articulation 
(for which, as we have seen ordinary language still bears the imprint) of the 
                                           
3 Ibid., p. 14. 
4  Presumably Ricoeur is referring to Paul Charles Jules Robert’s Dictionnaire 
alphabétique et analogique de la langue française published in 1953. 
5 “The Robert dictionary cites in this regard an important text from 1771: ‘to impute 
an action to someone is to attribute it to him as its actual author, to put it, so to speak, on 
his account and to make him responsible for it’” (Ibid., p. 14). 
6
 I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason. Originally published as Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 14th Edition. Cambridge 
University Press. New York, NY. 1998, 1999, 2008. 
7
 P. RICOEUR, The Just p. 16. 
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term imputation, as a judgment of attribution to someone, as to its actual 
author, of a blameworthy action.8 
Ricoeur immediately brings together the question and subsequent study of 
man’s origin (and arguably correlative teleology) with that of man’s moral 
obligations. Before examining Kant’s text by articulating the theme using 
Kant’s words, Ricoeur allows his students and readers a gentle segue as he 
refers to the agent — the person to whom the action is attributed — as the 
author. This reference, in fact, follows his thematic of text and 
hermeneutics and creates a subtle connection between the two manners of 
speaking about man and his actions — agent and action, author and text. 
1.2  Freedom and Spontaneity  
Referring to Kant’s third “Cosmological Antinomy” of the 
Transcendental Dialectic as the source for his methodology in his 
investigation into responsibility, Ricoeur says it is “where the notion of 
imputation is placed in an aporetic situation from which it will never really 
be dislodged.”9  He starts by noting Kant’s thesis and antithesis, which 
consider causality from the standpoint of two possibilities: that causality is 
“in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the 
appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these 
appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, 
that of freedom,”10 and the other possibility, the antithesis, that “There is no 
freedom; everything in the world take place solely in accordance with the 
laws of nature.”11 So between freedom and no freedom, man is set to have 
the freedom to choose to act or that his actions are merely and solely 
reactions to the actions that have been set upon him by forces (causalities) 
other than him, that is to say, outside of himself, coming from the world 
around him.  
Ricoeur borrows Kant’s vocabulary when he uses the word spontaneity 
in reference to freedom as he considers these two possibilities: “Here is 
where we have to start, with these two ways for an event to happen – either 
by the effect of things or by the outpouring of a free spontaneity… the root: 
the originary capacity of initiative. The idea of imputability 
                                           
8 Ibid., p. 16. 
9 Ibid., p. 16-17. 
10
 I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, A444, B472. 
11 Ibid., A445, B473. 
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(Imputatabilität) introduced in the Observation flows from it.”12 Ricoeur is 
using spontaneity as Kant intended, which is to demonstrate that the action 
truly belongs to man as its causality and that it may not be attributed to 
anything or anyone outside or beyond the man to whom the action itself is 
attributed.13  
Along these same lines, Ricoeur is careful to point out that spontaneity, 
freedom and imputability have a determined radicality in the moral sense 
that may not be rectified with any other explanation of causality (since 
imputability applies to the thesis and not to the antithesis). Ricoeur says, 
“… the price for such radicalism is the confrontation with an ineluctably 
antinomic situation, where two kinds of causality, free causality and natural 
causality, are opposed to each other with no compromise possible.”14 It is 
in this metaphorical underbelly of Kant’s analysis that Ricoeur identifies 
the limitation of Kant’s Critique and begins to reveal his own philosophy of 
responsibility: “On the one side, the concept of transcendental freedom 
remains empty, waiting for its connection with the moral idea of a law. On 
the other, it is held in reserve as the cosmological root of the ethico-
juridical idea of imputability.”15 In two concise sentences, Ricoeur calls 
into question the connection between transcendental freedom and the moral 
idea of law as legitimate arguments for imputability.  
Ricoeur concedes that Kant rectifies this particular limitation in his 
second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason where Kant introduces 
the freedom as ratio essendi of the law and law as ratio cognoscendi of 
freedom 16  as he concludes, “Only now do freedom and imputability 
coincide.” But because Kant does not manage to bring these two together in 
a smooth and coherent way in the first Critique, Ricoeur is able to use this 
gap to introduce his own philosophy of responsibility while still using 
                                           
12
 P. RICOEUR, The Just p. 17. 
13 “The transcendental idea of freedom does not by any means constitute the whole 
continent of the psychological concept of that name which is mainly empirical. The 
transcendental idea stands only for the absolute spontaneity of an action, as the proper 
ground of its imputability. This, however, is, for philosophy, the real stumbling block; 
for there are insurmountable difficulties in the way of admitting any such type of 
unconditioned causality” (I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason. A448, B476). 
14
 P. RICOEUR, The Just. p. 18. 
15 “It is here that the second Critique introduces the decisive connection, that between 
freedom and law, a connection in virtue of which freedom constitutes the ratio essendi 
of the law, and the law constitutes the ratio cognoscendi of freedom” (Ibid., p. 18). 
16 Ibid., p. 18. 
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imputability as a point of departure. Additionally, he inserts a 
contemporary slant to his proposal in that he uses Peter Strawson’s theory 
of “ascription” detailed in the work Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive 
Metaphysics17 to make the connections that Kant struggles to make in his 
first Critique. It is here that we can start recalling Ricoeur’s thoughts on the 
“purely juridical idea of responsibility,” which we noted earlier in the 
discussion because it is here that imputability and ascription coincide in 
such a way that the nascent idea of juridical responsibility emerges. 
1.3  Imputability and Ascription 
Not only does Ricoeur reference Strawson, but he recalls H.L.A. Hart’s 
article “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights”18 to explore this facet 
of responsibility. Unlike assigning blame as is the ultimate connotation 
when using imputability, Ricoeur points out that Strawson uses ascription 
differently to mean designating a predicative19 operation to an agent, or in 
other words, “attributing an action to someone.”20 He then takes account of 
the three rules of ascription that Strawson identifies in his own work: (1) to 
ourselves we attribute physical and mental/psychic predicates; (2) to 
another we attribute the predicates body and mind together; and (3) the 
psychic predicates keep the same meaning regardless of what they 
predicating or to what they are being attributed.21  
                                           
17
 P. STRAWSON, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Originally 
published in 1959. Taylor & Francis Group. 2003. 
18 H.L.A. HART, “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, New Series. Vol. 49 (1948-1949). pp. 171-194. 
19  To understand what Ricoeur means when using the term “predicate” beyond its 
grammatical usage, we must refer to a question and answer that he proposes that will lead 
us to the series of three predicates that will soon follow in the body of the text. He says, 
“What predicates do we attribute to ourselves as persons? To answer this question is to 
define ‘ascription,’” (P. RICOEUR, The Just. p. 21). In general terms, when used in grammar, 
the predicate modifies (describes or provides particular information) the noun (usually the 
subject); similarly, in a metaphysical investigations such as this, the predicate acts as a 
means of providing particular information about the mind and/or body of the person. 
20 “Strawson makes use of the term ascription to designate the predicative operation 
that belongs to a unique genre consisting of attributing an action to someone” (Ibid., pp. 
20-21). 
21 “According to Strawson, there are only two such types: spatiotemporal ‘bodies’ 
and ‘persons.’ What predicates do we attribute to ourselves as persons? To answer this 
question is to define ‘ascription.’ Three answers are given: (I) we attribute to ourselves 
two sorts of predicates, physical predicates and mental/psychic predicates...; (2) it is to a 
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Ricoeur uses Strawson’s approach to the person as a “basic particular,” 
which he defines as a subject “of attribution of irreducible to any other, 
therefore presupposed in every attempt at derivation starting from 
individuals of an allegedly more fundamental kind.”22 Ricoeur observes 
that the rules of ascription “conjointly define the person as a ‘basic 
particular,’ both entangled with bodies and distinct from them.”23 In this 
one statement he recognizes the complexity of the human person, a being 
that is both mind and body, a being that cannot exist without the either one. 
(Later in his collection of essays in The Just, he will make observations and 
reflections that are reminiscent of Levinas’ teachings on the face.) 
Therefore, in this acknowledgement, he concludes that “There is no need, 
as regards what is essential, to attach this sui generis manner of attribution 
to a metaphysics of substances,”24 so it will be sufficient for him and his 
students/readers to follow the linguistic route that he has identified because 
he believes that is the way to go for what he has in mind.25 
Ricoeur’s interest in the linguistic value of this investigation becomes 
apparent in the following statement as he subtly juxtaposes the moral 
implications of the words ascription and imputation: 
The theory of ascription is of interest to us at this stage of our investigation in 
that among predicates it is those designated by the term action that are in fact 
placed at the center of the theory of ascription. The relation between the action 
and the agent is thereby covered by such a theory of ascription, that is, the 
attribution of specific predicates to specific basic particulars, with no 
consideration of any relation to moral obligation and from the single point of 
view of the identifying reference to basic particulars. This is why I place the 
theory of ascription among those attempts that seek to demoralize the notion 
of imputation.26 
By removing the immediate implication of moral obligation to attribute to 
whom the act belongs or from whom the act originated, the discussion 
                                                                                                                           
single entity, the person, not two distinct entities, say body and mind, that we predicate 
these two kinds of properties; (3) the psychic predicates are such that they keep the 
same meaning whether they are attributed to oneself or to another than oneself (I 
understand jealousy, whether it is said of Peter, Paul, or myself)” (Ibid., p. 21). 
22 Ibid., p. 21. 
23 Ibid., p. 21. 
24 Ibid., p. 21. 
25 “It suffices that we attend to the linguistic rules of identification by ‘ascription’ 
that cannot be ignored” (Ibid., 21). 
26 Ibid., p. 21. 
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begins to open up, and the focus shifts from assigning blame to truly 
understanding the causality of the action. Ricoeur then takes us through the 
paces of applying the theory of ascription to the speaking subject, using the 
promise as an example of the speech act27 and distinguishing between the 
semantic phase (the examination of an action sentence) and the pragmatic 
phase (the examination of the motivation for acting).28  
He contends that “it is a question of turning to action as a public event, 
to its intentions and its motives as private events, and from there to the 
agent as the one who can – that we discover unexpected conjunctions and 
overlapping between analytic philosophy and phenomenological and 
hermeneutical philosophy.”29 Without getting too far ahead of ourselves in 
this discussion, it may be appropriate to note the phenomenological 
implication of ascription. This is to say, beyond considering the simpler 
examples of ascription, “Brutus killed Caesar,” and “I promise,” we must 
also consider all of the other elements that contribute to the ascription 
model, which make the paradigm a complex one. Ricoeur sums up the 
other elements to the problematic and the complexities that we just 
mentioned quite succinctly:  
It is a question of the meaning attached to answers to the question “who?” 
(who speaks? who acts? who recounts his life? who designates herself as the 
morally responsible author of her acts?). The relation of an action to its agent 
is thus just one particular case, in fact, a highly significant one, of the relation 
of the self to the ensemble of its acts, whether these be thoughts, words, or 
actions.30 
Ricoeur’s point is that, in asking “Who acts?” we are either asking too 
feeble a question to handle the many [complex] answers that may abound 
or we are underestimating the complexity of the question itself.  
The complexity becomes more discernible when he makes the analogy 
between the action and its agent that produces it, and the child and its 
                                           
27 “We can then catch hold of the act of self-designation of the speaking subject and 
the acting subject and make the theory of ascription, which speaks of the person from 
the outside, combine with a theory of the speaker where the person designates him – or 
herself as the one who speaks or acts, or even acts in speaking, as is the case in the 
example of promising, taken as the model for every speech act” (Ibid., p. 22). 
28 “What it comes down to is that the theory of action has a semantic phase, with its 
examination of action sentences (Brutus killed Caesar), and a pragmatic phase, with its 
examination of the ideas of “reasons for acting” and “agency’” (Ibid., p. 22). 
29 Ibid., p. 22. 
30 Ibid., p. 23. 
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parent, based on a viewpoint of dependency when he says, “Actions that 
‘depend on us’ are to their agent what children are to their ‘parents’ or what 
instruments, organs, and slaves are to their ‘masters.’”31 At this point we 
begin to broach a clearer distinction between imputation and ascription 
insofar as there is not the sense of moral obligation or casting blame. 
Instead, there is a sense of ownership in terms of the agent who 
acknowledges that he or she is the source or causality of the action. Ricoeur 
writes: 
Ever since Locke, modern thinkers have added only one new metaphor, as can 
be seen in Strawson’s theory of ascription when he declares that the physical 
and psychic predicates of the person “belong to him,” that he “possesses” 
them, that they are “his.” This “mineness” of the ability to act does indeed 
seem to designate a primitive fact, the well-known “I can” so strikingly 
emphasized, for example, by Merleau-Ponty.32 
Interestingly, Ricoeur brings the reader back to the Kantian themes of 
natural and free causality when he addresses the need to recognize an 
intermediate causality – a causality that results from the human person, as 
the agent of his action, being one cause. He designates this as an initiative 
and causality of the world around him of which he has no control to which 
he refers as the intervention or even the interference.33  His point here, 
which he will carry throughout his discussion on juridical responsibility, is 
that even once the causality of a single action has been identified, the 
residual consequences of that single action may not be attributable, 
imputable or ascribable to the agent of the initial action.  
As we move forward in our analysis of Ricoeur’s study of responsibility, 
we must note the clear distinction he makes between a juridical concept of 
responsibility versus a concept of responsibility that may be applied to the 
subject/object paradigm, which may even extend to the object as the other 
others from Levinas’ model. He makes this distinction in order that we not 
apply the juridical concept to the subject/object paradigm:  
                                           
31 Ibid., p. 23. 
32 Ibid., p. 23. 
33 “For us, the continuity between natural and free causality is broken. We must pass 
through the clash of causalities and attempt a phenomenology of their interweaving. 
What then has to be thought through are the phenomena of initiative and intervention 
wherein we can catch sight of the interference of the agent on the course of the world, 
an interference that effectively causes changes in the world” (Ibid., p. 23). 
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The civil code continues to speak of faults in order to preserve, it seems, three 
ideas – namely, that an infraction has been committed, that the author knows 
the rule, and finally that he is in control of his acts to the point of having been 
able to have acted differently. In this way, in classic civil law, the idea of a 
fault is seen as dissociated from that of punishment, yet it remains attached to 
that of an obligation to give compensation.34 
The juridical concept of responsibility, which is managed by civil code, 
does not take into account an authentic consideration of causality, whether 
it be natural or free. Juridical responsibility, supported by civil code, 
focuses on the harm that has been committed, whether or not the 
knowledge that the action being done would cause harm and how to make 
recompense for the harm that was done. This concept of responsibility 
takes us a long way from what Kant or Levinas had in mind when they 
were making their cases for an ontology of responsibility. In fact, the point 
of juridical responsibility is not the relation between persons, but rather 
managing or codifying compensation and punishment for actions that may 
have caused damage to a person’s property or harm to their body. In short, 
juridical responsibility is looking to pinpoint the fault in regard to a certain 
matter. 
This approach also gives rise to issues of risk, indemnification and 
displacement [of responsibility]. Ricoeur observes that “today’s crisis in the 
law of responsibility has its starting point in a shift from the accent 
previously placed on the presumed author of the damage to a preference for 
the victim who is placed in a position of demanding compensation for the 
wrong suffered, which is to say, most often, indemnification.”35 This is of 
particular interest because the concept of responsibility moves further and 
further away from where we started with Kant’s causalities – that is to say, 
free and natural causality – the thesis and antithesis that he proposes in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. 
Ricoeur’s assessment of the juridical model of responsibility is even 
bleaker: “The objective evaluation of harm thus tends to obliterate the 
evaluation of the subjective link between an action and its author. From this 
is born the idea of responsibility without fault.”36 So here we encounter yet 
another facet of the juridical responsibility that seems to contradict itself 
insofar as we previously observed that the point was to find fault and assign 
                                           
34 Ibid., p. 24. 
35 Ibid., p. 25. 
36 Ibid., p. 25. 
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blame; at this point the concept of responsibility, in this paradigm, has 
evolved in such a way that fault becomes more an issue of maintaining a 
sense of solidarity (community), security (insuring against danger/harm) 
and managing risk37 because the responsibility for an act becomes stretched 
beyond the realms of immediate time and space in which the act was done 
– this is the displacement of the responsibility.38 We now begin to glean an 
understanding of what he intends when referring to risk and indemnity.  
Ricoeur says, 
At the limit, an acquired incapacity, perceived as a suffered harm, can open to 
a right to reparation in the absence of any proven fault. The perverse effect 
consists in the fact that, the more we extend the sphere of risks, the more 
pressing and urgent is the search for someone responsible, that is, someone, 
whether a physical or a legal person, capable or indemnifying and making 
reparation. It is as though the multiplication of instances of victimization gives 
rise to a proportional increase in what we might well call a social resurgence 
of accusation.39 
Given this explanation and the context in which indemnity trumps the idea 
of personal responsibility for a single action, we have further evidence as to 
why contemporary notions and application of juridical responsibility may 
not be used on the subject/object relation. The relation, if put under the 
authority of a juridical concept of responsibility, would then be reduced to 
collateral damage from the effects of assigning culpability, gauging injury 
or harm inflicted and determining a means of recompense and eventually 
indemnification for any future consequences attributed to the original act 
not yet realized. 
In regard to solidarity, Ricoeur indicates a particular paradox and 
observes that “in a society that speaks of solidarity, out of a deliberate 
concern to reinforce a philosophy of risk, the vindictive search for whoever 
is responsible becomes equivalent to a reintroduction of the culpability of 
                                           
37 “The recent history of what is called the law of responsibility, in the technical 
sense of the term, has tended to make room for the idea of a responsibility without any 
fault, under the pressure of concepts such as solidarity, security, and risk, which have 
tended to take the place of the idea of fault. It is as though the depenalization of civil 
responsibility must also imply the complete loss of the sense of culpability” (Ibid., p. 
25). 
38 “… the perverse effects of this displacement ought to put us on guard. They are 
encouraged by the incredible extension of the sphere of risks and how those risks have 
changed in terms of space and time” (Ibid., p. 26). 
39 Ibid., p. 26. 
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those identified as the authors of any harm done.” 40  In this paradigm, 
juridical responsibility, or law of responsibility as it is also called, is a 
means by which we redefine how man relates with the other. Instead of the 
I and other or subject/object relation, it becomes he/she or they who are 
impuned, ascribed or attributed culpability versus society, and this is 
evident in the American judicial system when you look at how cases are 
labeled, for example: Smith v. the State of Texas.  
Ricoeur explains without equivocation that this approach becomes a 
relationship based on contract rather than the persons participating in the 
contract 41 , and this is where the risk and the perceived need for 
indemnification arise. He writes, 
It is in light of these perverse effects that voices are raised today in favor of a 
more balanced problematic … wherein the imputation of responsibility and the 
claim for indemnification would be first clearly dissociated in view of being 
subsequently better coordinated, the idea of indemnification withdrawing to 
the rank of a management technique aimed at the risk dimension of human 
interactions. This would make clear the residual enigma of a fault that, kept as 
part of the background of the idea of responsibility, would not be once more 
recaptured by the idea of punishment.42 
He refers to the phenomenon of contractual relation as a perversion because 
it does not leave room for the very beings that are central to the relation 
itself, for the beings that may be impuned, blamed, found culpable or 
victimized to be fully actualized or represented. Furthermore, the 
perversion is also a subtle commentary on the claim for indemnification, 
which, again, is the idea that someone, anyone is to be held responsible for 
a perceived harm and reparations be made no matter how far reaching that 
responsibility may be judged to be.43 
                                           
40 Ibid., p. 26. 
41 “To the extent that, in the trial leading to indemnification, it is contractual relations 
that are at stake in a majority of cases, the suspicion and mistrust that accompany the 
hunt for whoever is responsible corrupt the capital of confidence upon which rest all the 
fiduciary systems underlying contractual relations” (Ibid., p. 26). 
42 Ibid., p. 27. 
43  A good example of this may be found in the insurance industry: if an ABC 
Insurance Broker buys the insurance policy of a person from XYZ Insurance Broker, 
and that person is healthy at the time the policy is purchased, then ABC Insurance will 
want an indemnification clause from XYZ Insurance in case the person falls ill and 
costs the company a lot of money. The same principle can be applied to a similar 
situation involving more brokers in the chain. If there were five insurance brokers who 
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After exposing the perversions, as Ricoeur calls them, he begins to 
demonstrate their limitations in an effort to reconcile the moral concept of 
responsibility with the juridical concept of responsibility. He sets out to 
“redraw” the “landscape” of juridical responsibility so that “solidarity and 
risk responsibility would find their just place.” 44  This is an important 
statement as Ricoeur asserts that juridical responsibility does have a 
particular function in society, but it must not be mistaken for the only way 
of defining responsibility (or means by which man may relate to the other). 
He leads into this endeavor by questioning the evolutions, displacements 
and transformation that have also occurred in respect to morality (as it 
relates to the person to person relation), which can help us to reshape how 
we conceive of responsibility [and even codify it for social purposes].45  
In attempting to reconcile the two, he suggests that we have given the 
juridical plane of responsibility too much consideration 46  and perhaps 
“inflated” its own predicates and induced the moments of evolution, 
transformation and displacement. Ricoeur lists the inflation and 
displacement in three distinct stages: 
1. The first inflation to consider is produced on the juridical plane itself. It 
affects the extension of the domain of risks, accidents, and hazards 
invoked by victims in a society where every form of harm seems to call 
for indemnification. … it is this same inflation that pushes public opinion 
in the direction of a search for responsible parties capable of making 
reparation and indemnifying the victims. ... whether the presumed 
inflation of the moral concept of responsibility must not be set in relation 
to a displacement that finds its origin in juridical responsibility, which 
places it above an action and its harmful effects, and pushes it more in the 
                                                                                                                           
purchased and sold the policy throughout the lifetime of the insurance policy, each one 
would probably request an indemnification clause from the first broker if not the 
preceding broker. The concept is that they perceive the responsibility having been with 
the first broker or the previous broker to ensure that the person was 100% healthy and, 
therefore, worthy of that policy and coverage. 
44 Ibid., p. 27. 
45  “The question now is whether other evolutions, transformations, and 
displacements that have occurred on the moral plane can contribute to this realignment 
of the concept of responsibility” (Ibid., p. 27). 
46 “What first strikes our eyes is the contrast between the withdrawal on the juridical 
plane of the idea of imputation, under the pressure of those competing concepts about 
which I have spoken, and the astonishing proliferation and dispersion of uses of the 
term responsibility on the moral plan. It is as though the shrinkage of the juridical field 
were compensated for by an extension of the moral field of responsibility” (Ibid., p. 27). 
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direction of required precautions, and prudence meant to prevent any 
harm;47 
2. The displacement then becomes a reversal: one becomes responsible for 
harm because, first of all, one is responsible for others;48 and 
3. Another displacement, which gives a new inflection, is added to this 
displacement of the object of responsibility, henceforth directed toward 
vulnerable others, and, through generalization, toward the very condition 
of vulnerability itself. We can speak here of an unlimited extension in the 
scope of responsibility, the future vulnerability of humanity and its 
environment becoming the focal point of responsible concern.49 
The path through these instances of inflation and displacement is not 
direct or even intuitive. After explaining the first inflation, Ricoeur 
questions if it is possible for a person to insure himself or herself against 
every possible risk as it relates to the law of responsibility and the ability to 
indemnify and make reparations. 50  Mathematically, the possible risks 
associated with any one action may be multiplied infinitely, especially 
when the variety of natural causalities are taken into consideration; 
therefore, Ricoeur’s question is rhetorical and makes the point that this 
approach (indemnification and reparation for every perceived wrong) is 
absurd and impossible to safeguard against every eventuality. 
Returning to the linguistic approach of his study, Ricoeur makes an 
observation about the grammatical expression of responsibility on the 
juridical plane versus the moral plane. He says, “On the juridical plane, one 
declares the author responsible for the effects of his or her action and, 
among them, any harm caused. On the moral plane, it is the other person, 
other people who are held responsible.”51 Now this may take his readers by 
surprise or even confuse some because it seems to be counter intuitive, 
right? In fact, the observation has merit because he is returning us to the 
subject/object relationship and evoking principles of the I and other 
paradigm of responsibility of which Levinas writes. What Ricoeur means 
                                           
47 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
48 Ibid., p. 29. 
49 Ibid., p. 29. 
50 “At the limit, we might ask whether there remains, at the end of an evolution 
where the idea of risk would have conquered the whole space of the law of 
responsibility, only a single obligation, that of insuring oneself against every risk! … 
This is what the unfolding evolution of the moral idea of responsibility seems to 
suggest” (Ibid., p. 28). 
51 Ibid., p. 28. 
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by his grammatical study is this: on the juridical plane, the author is indeed 
held responsible for the effects of his action while on the moral plane, the I 
is held accountable for the actions of the other because it is the I who is to 
be held accountable to and for the other.52 Furthermore, the I is not only 
held accountable for his own actions, he is indeed accountable for the 
actions of the other because there is what Ricoeur refers to as a “moral 
injunction” in which the other mandates the I be responsible for him as a 
being that is to be cared for or as Ricoeur calls it an “object of concern.”53  
He explains it in this way: 
It extends to the relation between the agent and the patient (or receiver) of an 
action. The idea of a person for whom one has responsibility, joined with that 
of the thing one has under one’s control, leads in this way to a quite 
remarkable broadening that makes the direct object of one's responsibility 
vulnerable and fragile insofar as it is something handed over to the care of an 
agent.54 
Ricoeur is telling us that regardless of the tenants of juridical responsibility 
or the displacement that occurs as a result of imputability and ascription, 
which consequently do have a place in society on a larger, penal scale, the 
crux of the personal relation will always come back to responsibility that 
one person has for the other.  
Taking a step back and relating this to the paradigm of juridical 
responsibility, we have to ask ourselves how far an individual person may 
be held responsible for their actions. How far does that ripple effect go in 
terms of time and space; how far and how long should they be held 
responsible? Where does it end? On that very point Ricoeur says: 
Stated in terms of its scope, responsibility extends as far as our powers do in 
space and time. The nuisances attached to the exercise of these powers, 
whether foreseeable, probable, or simply possible, extend just as far as these 
powers do. Hence a trilogy: powers-nuisances-responsibility. In other words, 
our responsibility for harm done extends as far as does our capacity to do 
harm.55 
                                           
52 “It is the other of whom I am in charge for whom I am responsible” (Ibid., p. 28). 
53 “… it is from others rather than from our inner conscience or heart of hearts that 
the moral injunction is said to proceed. By becoming the source of morality, other 
people are promoted to the rank of the object of concern, in respect of the fragility and 
vulnerability of the very source of the injunction” (Ibid., p. 29). 
54 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
55 Ibid., p. 29-30. 
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Can an individual be held responsible for harms done that are so unforeseen 
that would otherwise be covered by an indemnity clause for a corporation 
in a contract or insurance policy? Why is responsibility mentioned only 
when it comes to harm?  
The following observation can be related to the questions just posed:  
The idea of persons for whom one must answer certainly remains 
subordinated, in civil law, to that of objective damage or harm. Nonetheless, 
the transference in virtue of which the vulnerable other person or persons 
tends to replace the harm done as the object of responsibility is facilitated by 
the intermediary idea of an entrusted responsibility.56  
In other words, we cannot mistake the point of responsibility to that of 
assigning blame and seeking recompense. Rather, the point of 
responsibility as it relates to the interpersonal relation takes us back to 
defining responsibility as the dialectic of the just relation between the I and 
the other. To further our assertion, let us turn to Ricoeur when he says, “It 
is the other of whom I am in charge for whom I am responsible.”57 As we 
anticipated in the beginning of our discussion about responsibility, we have 
come to a point where Ricoeur’s philosophy of responsibility is similar in 
sentiment if not in syntax to that of Levinas. The I is responsible for the 
other, the I is responsible for the other of whom the I is in charge.  
2. Hermeneutics 
In studying Levinas’ philosophy of the ethical demand and its relation to 
responsibility and Ricoeur’s philosophy of action as text and the dialectic of 
responsibility, we must make a critical examination of the notion of 
interpretation in the face of the prospect of our ultimate goal of establishing a 
new code of ethics that may be applied to for-profit corporations. We want to 
ensure that when we consider human action and the relation between the I 
and the other or the I and other others, in effect we consider the contexts in 
which the actions take place, which include place, time, motivation and the 
phenomena that we may not yet perceive. Life does not happen in a vacuum 
where the circumstances are finite, predictable and determined. Quite to the 
contrary, as we discussed in the previous section about responsibility with 
Ricoeur, there is no way to predict or calculate the outcome of human action 
                                           
56 Ibid., p. 28. 
57 Ibid., p. 28. 
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because of the many variables that may intervene or interfere with that 
action. 
2.1  Historical & Philosophical Development 
Jean Grondin published a concise survey of the history of hermeneutics 
in which he gives a succinct account of its origins. In his book entitled 
L’herméneutique 58 , he explains that the term hermeneutic was not 
conceived until the 17th century when Johann Conrad Dannhauer coined it 
to refer to the art of interpretation, in German the Auslegungslehre 
(Auslegungskunst).59 According to Grondin, it was Dannhauer who first 
used the term hermeneutic in the title of his work Hermeneutica sacra sive 
methodus exponendarum sacrarum litterarum from 1654, which made use 
of the method of interpretation applied to the Sacred Scriptures60 as the 
meaning of the scriptures is not always readily discernible or clear.61 
Even after we understand that hermeneutics is the result of a German 
theologian coining the term for a methodological approach to scriptural 
interpretation, we only understand what the purpose of the term was; we 
still need to understand where the need came from and how the word itself 
came to be, i.e its etymology. 
Grondin explains that the term hermeneutics comes from the Greek verb 
hermēnéuein, which has two meanings: one is the process of speech or 
dialogue and the other is interpretation or even translation.62 He continues 
by explaining that in both cases there is a transmission of meaning in two 
directions, one from thought to the discourse and the other coming from the 
                                           
58
 J. GRONDIN, L’Ermeneutica. Originally published as L’herméneutique in 2006. 
Editrice Queriniana, Brescia. 2012. 
59 “Il termine ermeneutica non ha visto la luce che nel XVII secolo, quando il teologo 
di Stasburgo Sohann Conrad Dannhauer lo ha creato per designare ciò che prima di lui 
si chiamava l’Auslegungslehre (Auslegekunst) o l’arte dell’interpretazione” (Ibid., p. 13). 
60 “Dannhauer fu anche il primo a utilizzare il termine nel titolo di un’opera, nel suo 
Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrarum litterarum, del 1654, titolo 
che riassume da solo il senso classico della disciplina: l’ermeneutica sacra, intendendo 
il metodo per interpretare (exponere: esporre, spiegare) i testi sacri” (Ibid., p. 13). 
61 “Se c’è bisogno di un tale metodo, è perché il senso delle Scritture non è sempre 
chiaro come il giorno, L’interpretazione (exponere, interpretari) è qui il metodo o 
l’operazione che permette di accedere alla comprensione del senso, all’intelligere” (Ibid., p. 
13). 
62  “Il termine interpretazione viene dal verbo greco hermēnéuein, che ha due 
significati importanti: il termine designa sia il processo di elocuzione (enunciare, dire, 
affermare qualche cosa) sia quello dell’interpretazione (o di traduzione)” (Ibid., p. 14). 
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discourse back to thought.63 The dynamic is significant because it begins to 
establish the paradigm for the understanding (and perhaps 
misunderstanding as well) between interlocutors, those who are engaged in 
discourse, and even the speaker and the hearer, the writer and the reader. If 
there is meaning between thought and discourse and meaning between 
discourse and thought, who is to say that the two meanings are identical? 
Who is to say that the hearer gleans the same meaning as what the speaker 
intends to convey? In Grondin’s estimation, this is precisely the work of 
hermeneutics – the process of hermeneutics is the mediation of meaning 
that designates expression or translates thoughts into words. 64  This is 
indeed an example of hermeneutics understood as a dialectic of 
understanding and interpretation.  
There is an important historical transition from exegesis to hermeneutics, 
something Ricoeur explains very well in his essay “Existence and 
Hermeneutics” found in The Conflict of Interpretation, Essays in 
Hermeneutics. 65  Ricoeur explains the historic (and ideological) passage 
from exegesis to hermeneutics in this way: “… the hermeneutic problem 
was first raised within the limits of exegesis, that is, with the framework of 
a discipline which proposes to understand a text – to understand it 
beginning with its intention, on the basis of what it attempts to say.”66 The 
“it” to which Ricoeur refers in terms of the text is the scripture – exegesis 
was generally applied to the scriptures. 
Several elements can be attached to the problem: the text, 
understanding, intention and meaning; other factors that are implicit begin 
to render themselves more apparent as we continue to look closely and 
critically at the exegetical problem. With text necessarily comes context; 
explanation presupposes understanding (and interpretation); intention 
necessarily comes from the author and meaning is conveyed (and 
                                           
63 “Nei due casi si ha a che fare con la trasmissione di senso, la quale può avvenire 
in due direzioni: può 1) andare dal pensiero al discorso, oppure 2) risalire dal discorse 
al pensiero” (Ibid., p. 14). 
64 “Oggi noi parliamo di interpretazione solo per caratterizzare il secondo processo, 
il quale risale dal discorso al pensiero che si trova dietro, ma i greci pensavano già 
l’elocuzione come un processo ‘ermeneutico’ di mediazione di senso, che designa allora 
l’espressione o la traduzione del pensiero in parole” (Ibid., p. 14). 
65
 P. RICOEUR, The Conflict of Interpretation, Essays in Hermeneutics. Originally 
published as Le Confit des interprétations: Essais d’hérméneutique in 1969. Translation 
copywrited by Northwestern University Press. 2007. 
66 Ibid., p. 3. 
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received/interpreted) to an audience. So within Ricoeur’s identification of 
the hermeneutical problem as seen based on the limits of the exegesis, we 
have already been able to extract four elements and another four 
implications or complements based on those elements. 
Our author recognizes the problem of interpretation immediately, 
beginning with the exegetical context and how it becomes a hermeneutical 
problem: 
If exegesis raised a hermeneutic problem, that is, a problem of interpretation, it 
is because every reading of a text always takes place within a community, a 
tradition, or a living current of thought, all of which display presuppositions 
and exigencies – regardless of how closely a reading may be tied to the quid, 
to ‘that in view of which’ the text was written.67 
Ricoeur is outlining the conditions under which a hermeneutical study may 
take place, that is to say, he is defining context. What are the conditions in 
which the text was written; what are the conditions in which the words are 
spoken or recorded? Likewise, what are the conditions in which the text is 
being read? How do these contexts contribute to the writer and reader’s 
interpretation of the text; how does the context affect the meaning that is 
put into the text and gleaned from it respectively? We shall discuss this 
more as we understand the relation between hermeneutics and 
phenomenology. 
For the time being, let us continue to focus on the historic (and 
philosophical) aspects of what brought hermeneutics to the foreground of 
ontological studies in the 20th and 21st centuries. Ricoeur, in addition to 
being a philosopher, was an accomplished theologian familiar with both 
Hebrew and Christian scriptures as well as the ancient, mystic texts of the 
Jewish People. He was also an historian knowledgeable in classical Greek 
texts; as such he was able to draw insightful conclusions about 
hermeneutics as it relates to the exegesis of those texts. The following 
observation gives us some insight into the expertise that he has in Hebrew 
and Christian scriptures and Greek culture and mythology; the observation 
also provides examples of what he means by having to interpret a text 
based on the context in which it was written and the context in which it is 
being read: 
Thus based on philosophical principles in physics and in ethics, the reading of 
Greek myths in the Stoic school implies a hermeneutics very different from 
                                           
67 Ibid., p. 3. 
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the rabbinical interpretation of the Torah in the Halakah or the Haggadah. In 
its turn, the apostolic generation’s interpretation of the Old Testament in the 
light of the Christic event gives quite another reading of the events, 
institutions, and personages of the Bible than the rabbinical interpretation.68 
Ricoeur goes on to explain that when a text has more than one way in 
which it may be interpreted, perhaps a more historical or spiritual meaning 
versus taking the text at face value, he advises his reader not to settle and 
try for the more complex interpretation. He instructs us to seek or be open 
to the possibility for greater meaning in a text rather than falling for the 
simple version of the text, putting no more thought or effort into gleaning a 
deeper significance.69 
For Ricoeur, comprehension begets interpretation insofar as it is the first 
step to interpretation. He writes: 
This connection between interpretation and comprehension, the former taken 
in the sense of textual exegesis and the latter in the broad sense of the clear 
understanding of signs, is manifested in one of the traditional senses of the 
word “hermeneutics” – the one given in Aristotle’s Peri hermēneias. It is 
indeed remarkable that, in Aristotle, hermēneia is not limited to allegory but 
concerns every meaningful discourse. In fact, meaningful discourse is 
hermēneia, “interprets” reality, precisely to the degree that it says “something 
of something.”70 
So if hermēneia is not limited to allegory and may be applied to 
interpreting reality, then there must be meaning in reality that is not 
necessarily universal or univocal. Taking it a step further, if the meaning of 
reality is not univocal and the interlocutors must convey messages that 
contain meaning to each other, then there has to be a point at which they 
are able to clearly understand each other and be able to interpret the 
meaning of each others’ messages, otherwise, the point to their 
interlocution and their relation for that matter is not fulfilled or is missed 
completely. 
However, we know that the human relation is satiated by meaningful and 
intelligible interlocution; Ricoeur clarifies by saying, “discourse is 
                                           
68 Ibid., pp. 3-4.  
69  “More precise, if a text can have several meanings, for example a historical 
meaning and a spiritual meaning, we must appeal to a notion of signification that is 
much more complex than the system of so-called univocal signs required by the logic of 
argumentation” (Ibid., p. 4). 
70 Ibid., p. 4. 
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hermēneia because a discursive statement is a grasp of the real by 
meaningful expressions, not a selection of so-called impressions coming 
from the things themselves.”71 Notice that Ricoeur uses the word grasp; in 
the original French, in this context, saisie can be translated as grasp, seize 
or to take hold of. This is an interesting and important choice of words as it 
goes directly to the way in which we take significance within ourselves, the 
meaning itself. We shall discuss this in greater depth later in the chapter, 
but suffice it to say in this moment, that in grasping the meaning and 
bringing it into ourselves, we are able to make a part of our being, 
incorporate it into that which we understand ourselves to be – 
appropriation. 
Ricoeur also considers that “the first and most primordial relation 
between the concept of interpretation and that of comprehension” is 
primarily related to the articulation of the “technical problems of textual 
exegesis” with the “more general problems of meaning and language.”72 In 
this statement, he pinpoints a weakness intrinsic to exegesis: it does not 
address the gap between meaning and language. This is exactly what 
Dannhauer was aiming to do when he made a philological return to the 
classics (Greek philosophy and language) in his attempt to describe the art 
of interpretation in one word. However, without explicitly referring to 
Dannhauer, Ricoeur indeed makes reference to the return to the classical 
philology and historical sciences in moving from an exegetical study to a 
hermeneutical one, and he then recognizes the philosophic weaknesses that 
became apparent during the 18th and 19th centuries as Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) employed 
hermeneutics in their philosophical endeavors and investigations.73 Ricoeur 
focuses on Dilthey’s application of hermeneutics in the age of positivistic 
philosophy as he explains that it was epistemological74 because he was 
giving the “Geisteswissenschaften a validity comparable to that of the 
natural sciences.”75 In Ricoeur’s estimation,  
                                           
71 Ibid., p. 4. 
72 Ibid., p. 4. 
73 “But exegesis could lead to a general hermeneutics only by means of a second 
development, the development of classical philology and the historical sciences that 
took place at the end of the eighteenth century and the start of the nineteenth century. It 
is with Schleiermacher and Dilthey that the hermeneutic problem becomes a 
philosophic problem,” (Ibid., p. 5). 
74 “Posed in these terms, the problem was epistemological” (Ibid., p. 5). 
75 Ibid., p. 5. 
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…it was a question of elaborating a critique of historical knowledge as solid as 
the Kantian critique of the knowledge of nature and of subordinating to this 
critique the diverse procedures of classical hermeneutics: the laws of internal 
textual connection, of context, of geographic, ethnic, and social environments, 
etc.76  
Consequently, the resolution to this problem went beyond the capacity of 
epistemology 77  because “an interpretation, like Dilthey's, bound to 
information fixed by writing is only a province of the much vaster domain 
of understanding, extending from one psychic life to another psychic 
life.”78 In other words, Dilthey’s application of hermeneutics was limited in 
the way in which he approached the object of interpretation. Observing the 
object in such scientific contexts did not allow Dilthey to appreciate the 
possibility of an interpretation that went beyond the scientific method. 
Instead of taking a philosophical approach to the application of 
hermeneutics, which requires a critical consideration and examination of all 
conceivable possibilities, Dilthey mistook an open philosophical approach 
for the exacting and, more often than not, limited approach of the sciences 
which presupposes the preliminary philosophical scrutiny; Dilthey mistook 
psychology for philosophy, so as Ricoeur says: “The hermeneutic problem 
is thus seen from the perspective of psychology: to understand, for a finite 
being, is to be transported into another life.” 79  Dilthey attempts to 
understand the meaning of the message by deconstructing the 
speaker/writer’s psyche rather than doing what Ricoeur considers essential, 
which is to overcome the boundaries or obstacles of the context by 
deconstructing it.   
2.2  Hermeneutics & Phenomenology 
Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences is a collection of essays edited and 
translated by John B. Thompson that maintains a certain peculiarity, 
namely that the essays are indeed translations, but Ricoeur has approved of 
them.80 Additionally, Ricoeur offers his endorsement of the translation that 
                                           
76 Ibid., p. 5. 
77 “But the resolution of the problem exceeded the resources of mere epistemology” 
(Ibid., p. 5). 
78 Ibid., p. 5. 
79 Ibid., p. 5. 
80 “The essays in this volume differ in minor respects from the form in which they 
first appeared. With Professor Ricoeur’s approval, I have corrected the text at several 
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Thompson did. 81  The author talks here about the inpenetration of 
hermeneutics and phenomenology and refers to them as “mutually 
belonging” 82  to each other. In the essay “Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics,”83 Ricoeur explains:  
On the one hand, hermeneutics is erected on the basis of phenomenology and 
thus preserves something of the philosophy from which it nevertheless differs: 
phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics. 
On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a 
hermeneutical presupposition.84 
But why should hermeneutics and phenomenology mutually belong to each 
other? In order to answer, let us start with Ricoeur’s teachings on 
phenomenology. He writes: “The strangeness of phenomenology lies 
entirely therein: from the outset, the principle is a ‘field’ and the first truth 
an ‘experience’. In contrast to all ‘speculative constructions’, every 
question of principle is resolved through vision.”85 “Field,” “experience,” 
“speculative constructions” – what do these terms mean as they relate to 
Ricoeur’s explanation on phenomenology? He goes on to say, “… 
phenomenology is not situated elsewhere, in another world, but rather is 
concerned with natural experience itself, insofar as the latter is unaware of 
its meaning.”86 Ricoeur is relating these terms directly to the Heideggerian 
concept of the Dasein, Being-in-the-World. For Heidegger, 
                                                                                                                           
points. I have also deleted some material in order to reduce repetition. All such deletions 
are indicated in the text by ellipses in square brackets” (P. RICOEUR, “The model of the 
text: meaningful action considered as a text,” Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. p. 
27). 
81 “I should like, in this brief foreword, to express my gratitude to John Thompson 
for the considerable work which the translation of my essays represents. I am in 
complete agreement with his choice of terms for rendering French or German 
expressions that have no equivalent either in the British philosophical tradition or even 
in the English language. Of course, there is always a point at which a translation 
becomes an interpretation; but Thompson has ensured continuity and coherence in his 
choices. He has thus provided an English translation of my essays which is as readable 
as it is exact” (Ibid., p. 32). 
82 P. RICOEUR, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. “Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics.” p. 101. 
83 Ibid., pp. 101-128. 
84 Ibid., p. 101. 
85 Ibid., p. 103. 
86 Ibid., p. 103. 
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The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial signification 
of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting. But to the extent 
that by uncovering the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein in 
general we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those 
entities which do not have the character of Dasein, this hermeneutic also 
becomes a “hermeneutic” in the sense of working out the conditions on which 
the possibility of any ontological investigation depends.87  
Here we see that phenomenology and hermeneutics together may allow 
Dasein to glean the meaning of being. According to Heidegger, there is a 
certain redundancy in using the phrase “descriptive phenomenology” since 
according to his definition of the science of phenomena, phenomenology is 
intrinsically descriptive 88  – indeed, if it is not descriptive, it is not 
phenomenology. And he continues:  
Here “description” does not signify such a procedure as we find, let us say, in 
botanical morphology; the term has rather the sense of a prohibition – the 
avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration. The 
character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the λόγος, can be 
established first of all in terms of the “thinghood” [“Sachheit”] of what is to be 
“described” – that is to say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we 
encounter it phenomenally.89 
Description, therefore, is more than just a cataloguing of things; it is an 
appraisal of a being that is in the world in such a way that scientific 
objectivity may be applied to confirm certain characteristics and qualities 
that make its existence evident in this world experience. It is worth noting, 
if only briefly, that Heidegger dedicates much attention to ensuring that his 
reader understands what he means when using the term λόγος. He refers to 
λόγος as discourse and explains it as “to make manifest what one is ‘talking 
about’ in one’s discourse,” 90  and “[t]he λόγος lets something be seen 
(ϕαίνεσΘαι), namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either for 
the one who is doing the talking (the medium) or for the persons who are 
talking with one another, as the case may be.”91 όγος relates to discourse 
but it is more since it is the part of discourse that is manifested in such a 
                                           
87 M. HEIDEGGER, Being and Time. p. 62. 
88 “The expression ‘descriptive phenomenology’, which is at bottom tautological, has 
the same meaning” (Ibid., p. 59). 
89 Ibid., p. 59. 
90 Ibid., p. 56. 
91 Ibid., p. 56. 
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way that it becomes evident, or in Heidegger’s words seen, by the 
interlocutors. 
The phenomena, however, does not depend on the articulation or 
description of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger points out that “The 
signification of ‘phenomenon’, as conceived both formally and in the 
ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in 
itself, may be called ‘phenomenology’ with formal justification.”92 In other 
words, in recognizing the phenomena as such and studying it as it relates to 
the world, Dasein engages in the science of phenomenology; however, the 
phenomena is as such intrinsically independent of Dasein. 
According to Heidegger,   
… [phenomenology] is something that proximally and for the most part does 
not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which 
proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is 
something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so 
essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground.93 
So if phenomenology does not show itself, what exactly is it? It is, if we are 
to understand Heidegger’s explanation, the manifestation of the thing itself, 
the appearance, the being that is realized in this world as such. 
Phenomenology is the experience of the being itself – it is not the being 
qua being rather it is the manifestation of being in the world.  
According to Heidegger, 
… that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and 
gets covered up again, or which shows itself only “in disguise”, is not just this 
entity or that, but rather the Being of entities, as our previous observations 
have shown. This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes 
forgotten and no question arises about it or about its meaning. Thus that which 
demands that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a 
distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is what 
phenomenology has taken into its grasp thematically as its object.94 
The phenomena of being does not hide being as such, and being as such 
does not seek to be hidden – rather one may argue that it is through the 
phenomena (as in Levinas’ philosophy of the face) that being reveals itself 
as being-in-the-world or that which would perceive its being. The point of 
studying the phenomena as it relates to being in the world, according to 
                                           
92 Ibid., p. 59. 
93 Ibid., p. 59. 
94 Ibid., p. 59. 
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Heidegger, is to discover the meaning attached to the notion of being.95 In 
other words, Dasein attempts to find meaning in its existence by reflecting 
on the existence of other beings based on the phenomena through which it 
reveals itself. 
Even in the way that Heidegger explains it, the “authentic meaning of 
Being” is more than meaning in terms of the common musing found in 20th 
century literature “What does my life mean?” The authentic meaning of 
Being refers to an orientation towards an understanding or knowledge of 
being as such; when Heidegger says, “made known to Dasein’s 
understanding of Being,” the subtext is a reference to an appropriation of 
being as such. As Being-in-the-world experiences the phenomena and 
studies the being that is revealed through the phenomena itself, Being-in-
the-world is attempting to draw out the thing that is most like itself – the 
being qua being – and understand it, glean knowledge from it, and 
[re]incorporate it into itself. 
Yet if meaning depends on Dasein as being-in-the-world and its relation 
with the phenomena, then we can also conclude that there is no universal 
meaning, and that meanings may shift or change or lose or gain relevance 
depending on where Dasein is. 
Ricoeur understands meaning from different paradigms of 
phenomenology as it relates to hermeneutics and the relation between being 
and the world. He traces meaning to what he calls the pregiven, the existing 
and the being. More precisely, he refers to it all as a paradox: 
The paradox is that it is only through this loss that the world is revealed as 
“pregiven”, the body as “existing”, and nature as “being” [étant]. So the 
reduction does not take place between me and the world, between the soul and 
the body, between the spirit and nature, but through the pregiven, the existing 
and the being, which cease to be self-evident and to be assumed in the blind 
and opaque Seinsglaube [belief in being], becoming instead meaning: meaning 
of the pregiven, meaning of the existing, meaning of the being.96 
In giving this explanation, Ricoeur actually describes the 
phenomenological paradigm, shows how Dasein relates with the 
                                           
95 “In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it necessary that there should be a 
fundamental ontology taking as its theme that entity which is ontologico-ontically 
distinctive, Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem – the question of the 
meaning of Being in general” (Ibid., p. 61). 
96 P. RICOEUR, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. “Phenomenology and 
Hermeneutics.” p. 104. 
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phenomena and, finally, demonstrates how meaning develops in relation to 
Dasein. Firstly, he explains that the phenomenological study has ethical 
implications because the very exercise of studying the phenomena and 
attempting to understand its being based on its relation with Dasein 
requires self-reflection – Riceour calls this “a self-responsible act.” 97 
Having established an ethical element to phenomenology, he refers to the 
teachings of Husserl in order to coax out the nuances of the subject-object 
relationship: “The aspect of Husserlian idealism which hermeneutics 
questions first is the way in which the immense and unsurpassable 
discovery of intentionality is couched in a conceptuality which weakens its 
scope, namely the conceptuality of the subject-object relation.” 98  But 
without getting too far ahead of ourselves in the development of ideas, let 
us understand how the ethical implications relate to the subject-object 
relation. 
Interestingly, Ricoeur explains the subject-object relation while 
exploring the interplay of interpretation and understanding. He begins by 
proclaiming that “[T]he first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the 
problematic of objectivity presupposes a prior relation of inclusion which 
encompasses the allegedly autonomous subject and the allegedly adverse 
object.”99 While he does not explain why he characterizes the subject as 
“allegedly autonomous” and the object as “allegedly adverse” we can 
speculate that it has everything to do with the subject. The subject, being, 
as Heidegger teaches, Being-in-the-world, is aware of itself and aware of 
its self-reflection and search for being qua being. The subject supposes 
itself to be autonomous in its quest for knowledge whereas the object, 
being a phenomena that is to be understood and known by the subject can 
only be understood and known in a relative approximation, and, therefore, 
remains adverse to being known in its entirety as being qua being. 
Ricoeur argues against Husserlian idealism as it relates to hermeneutics 
because “it designates, in negative terms, an entirely positive condition 
which would be better expressed by the concept of belonging.”100 And he 
explains his endorsement of the term belonging inasmuch as it “directly 
designates the unsurpassable condition of any enterprise of justification and 
                                           
97 “The awareness which sustains the work of reflection develops its own ethical 
implications: reflection is thus the immediately self-responsible act” (Ibid., p. 104). 
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foundation, namely that it is always preceded by a relation which supports 
it.”101 
2.3  Interpretation: Understanding and Explanation 
As seen before, Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as a study of the 
interpretation of text and discourse, and he even goes so far as to define it 
as the art of interpretation. Fundamental to hermeneutics and necessarily 
interpretation under these definitions as Ricoeur has designated it, is 
understanding and explanation. We have already admitted that there can be 
no understanding without explanation; in other words, if there is not proper 
explanation of the message being conveyed by the speaker, then the hearer, 
in an interlocutionary paradigm, will not arrive to a point of understanding, 
and the interpretation will be a feat that the hearer will never reach. 
Therefore, proper explanation has to be at the basis of the message. 
In his essay “The hermeneutical function of distanciation,”102 Ricoeur 
begins by saying that “Hermeneutics…remains the art of discerning the 
discourse in the work; but this discourse is only given in and through the 
structures of the work.”103 Implicitly at least, Ricoeur is instructing the 
readers to examine the structure of the work (text), to deconstruct it 
objectively and to take it as an entity that may stand on its own. 
For him, “distanciation is not the product of methodology and hence 
something superfluous and parasitical; rather it is constitutive of the 
phenomenon of the text as writing.”104 The term distanciation signifies here 
that man must recognize that the text constitutes an entity that has an 
intrinsic being that must be related to as a being unto itself but in relation to 
the speaker/writer and hearer/reader. Distanciation is the reminder man 
needs in the face of the phenomenon of the text. 
Ricoeur then proceeds by adding that “to interpret is to explicate the type 
of being-in-the-world unfolded in front of the text.”105 Here, he returns to 
Heidegger’s terminology “being-in-the-world” in order to drive home the 
point that the experience with the text is always a phenomenological one; 
therefore, we have to consider the text in relation to “being-in-the-world” 
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and λόγος as the discourse, which is revealed by it. In doing so, Ricoeur 
explains, “A work opens up its readers and thus creates its own subjective 
vis-à-vis.”106 It is only then that the text may be understood, that it may be 
known or appropriated by Dasein. 
Ricoeur is careful to point out that “To begin with, appropriation is 
dialectically linked to distanciation characteristic of writing. Distanciation 
is not abolished by appropriation, but is rather the counterpart of it.”107 This 
is important because it must never be mistaken, forgotten or assumed that 
the text is ever anything other than autonomous and is, therefore, always its 
own being in the world. (Remembering Hegel’s definition of the dialectic, 
we understand Ricoeur’s reference to writing as the dialectic of the text 
insofar as it is the medium by which it is uttered or how it is manifested.)  
Rather than abolishing distanciation, appropriation is “understanding at 
and through distance.”108 What does this mean? Just as in relating to any 
other being, the subject cannot appropriate or know being intrinsically, but 
the subject can come into relation with another being (the other or object) 
in which the other may be known by approximation and in relation to. 
Besides the importance of appropriation in the dynamic of interpretation, 
Ricoeur also tells us about and the dialectic of explanation and 
understanding:  
… to understand is to understand oneself in front of the text. It is not a 
question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of 
exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self, which 
would be the proposed existence corresponding in the most suitable way to the 
world proposed. So understanding is quite different from a constitution of 
which the subject would possess the key. In this respect, it would be more 
correct to say that the self is constituted by the “matter” of the text.109 
In “What is a text?” Ricoeur continues his discussion on appropriation (and 
by implication, distanciation too), and expounds on the concept of self-
understanding in the face of understanding the text. He says, “By 
‘appropriation’, I understand this: that the interpretation of a text 
culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth 
understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply 
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begins to understand himself.”110 It is in this instance of appropriation that 
the text as a proposed world becomes a mirror in which subject, or 
Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world, may see itself and truly understand its 
own being in relation to the proposed world. The understanding that it 
gains of itself in relation to the proposed world may then give it an insight 
and understanding of its being in relation to the world in which it finds 
itself. 
According to Ricoeur, the distinguishing characteristic of explanation is 
methodological and the structure is linguistic as they necessarily pertain to 
the rules of language, text and speech. Explanation will never be entirely 
excluded from the human sciences because of its methodology, but it can 
never be fully accepted because it is not entirely objective. The experience 
of language, even in the methodological phase of explanation is never an 
entirely objective experience.  
The subject attempts objectivity in the exercises of distanciation and 
appropriation in order to understand the text, but because the subject 
approaches the text from his own worldview, the attempt at objectivity is 
already a failure from the perspective of the human sciences.  
We have journeyed with Ricoeur on the path of hermeneutics, “the art of 
discerning the discourse in the work,” which may also be understood as the 
art of interpretation [of text]. This path includes gaining a comprehensive 
view of what he means when he uses the terms understanding, 
distanciation, appropriation and explanation. But we have not asked the 
more pressing questions: why must we interpret; what purpose does 
interpretation serve; and where can it take us?  
Referring to his essay “Appropriation,”111 we shall answer these very 
questions. Ricoeur is careful to identify the relation between reader and the 
text and how that relation plays out when he says, “If it is true that 
interpretation concerns essentially the power of the work to disclose a 
world, then the relation of the reader to the text is essentially his relation to 
the kind of world which the text presents.”112 The relation between the 
reader and the text plays out in the act of reading and in the place of the 
proposed world. More specifically, regarding interpretation, Ricoeur says, 
“Interpretation brings together, equalises, renders contemporary and 
similar. This goal is attained only insofar as interpretation actualises the 
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meaning of the text for the present reader.”113 The text is the only place 
where the reader and the text can relate, so it is there where they can relate; 
as such, according to Ricoeur, it is through the reader understanding 
himself in front of the text that relation takes place. 
He goes on to say, “The interpretation is complete when the reading 
releases something like an event, an event of discourse, an event in the 
present time. As appropriation, the interpretation becomes an event.”114 If 
we accept Ricoeur’s teachings, then, of course, the interpretation becomes 
an event because the entire experience of reading and understanding, 
distanciation and appropriation, are events intrinsic to the phenomenology 
of the text. In this way, the text is not just an autonomous being, but it is an 
event in which the reader is participatory. 
In “The model of the text: meaningful action considered as a text”115 
Ricoeur is even more explicit in his description of interpretation when he 
says, “The disjunction of the meaning and the intention creates an 
absolutely original situation which engenders the dialectic of erklären and 
verstehen. If the objective meaning is something other than the subjective 
intention of the author, it may be construed in various ways.”116 We may 
infer from this passage that the very purpose of interpretation is the 
dialectic of erklären and verstehen – it construes a relation between the 
intention of the author and the objective meaning of the text. So why do we 
need interpretation? Let us refer to the following concise citation as an 
answer: “The problem of the right understanding can no longer be solved 
by a simple return to the alleged intention of the author.” 117  We need 
interpretation because we cannot be guaranteed a precise understanding of 
the author’s intentions to glean a pristine meaning of the text, so 
interpretation is the best dialogical device we have at our disposal. 
2.4  Hermeneutic Circle 
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In “Metaphor and the central problem of hermeneutics,”118 Ricoeur notes 
that the concept of interpretation seems to oppose the explanation on an 
epistemological level, but he gives his reasoning “… interpretation has 
certain subjective connotations, such as the implication of the reader in the 
processes of understanding and the reciprocity between interpretation of the 
text and self-interpretation.”119 This is to say that while interpretation is 
deemed subjective, explanation may also be seen or understood as 
subjective because what it is ultimately leading to is self-interpretation, 
despite its characteristic of objective methodology. Ricoeur goes on to call 
this reciprocity the hermeneutic circle and says, “it entails a sharp 
opposition to the sort of objectivity and non-implication which is supposed 
to characterise the scientific explanation of things.”120 The reciprocity that 
is the hermeneutic circle is the interplay or relation between the text and the 
reader in terms of being in the world. 
Ricoeur uses the term hermeneutic circle to describe other features of the 
complexity and ambiguity of hermeneutics. As we observed in the previous 
section, it is impossible to define or describe hermeneutics without using 
interpretation and understanding in a cyclical or back-and-forth articulated 
motion. Ricoeur does not ignore this circular motion between interpretation 
and understanding within the construct of hermeneutics. But instead of 
referring to it strictly in terms of understanding and interpretation he also 
uses the term belief and its derivatives.  
In order to understand his references, let us first note this: Ricoeur’s 
application of hermeneutics is not limited to the realm of text or the spoken 
word. Instead, he applies hermeneutics to all signs and symbols (of which 
the text and the spoken word are but one particular representation). Simply 
stated, “For every symbol gives birth to understanding by means of an 
interpretation,”121 and “in multiple ways, the phenomenology of symbols 
brings to light an internal coherence, something like a symbolic system. On 
this level, to interpret is to bring out a coherence.”122 Ricoeur contends that 
hermeneutics may be applied to anything that can be experienced – this is 
the way in which phenomenology and hermeneutics complement each 
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other as Being-in-the-world attempts to see himself and know himself in 
the world. 
Ricoeur mentions the following peculiarity of the hermeneutic circle: 
“we can only believe by interpreting.”123 If we take the entire structure of 
hermeneutics and interpretation that Ricoeur proposes to be true, then this 
does not come as a surprise. Rather, the following explanation seems to be 
a natural conclusion: “This is the ‘modern’ modality of belief in symbols; 
expression of modernity’s distress and cure for this distress. Such is the 
circle: hermeneutics proceeds from the preunderstanding of the very matter 
which through interpretation it is trying to understand.”124 So what Ricoeur 
is suggesting is that from the very beginning we are always approaching the 
phenomena, whether it is text, speech, symbol or act, with an attitude of 
pre-understanding and an intention of interpretation. But let us question the 
logic of that statement: if we can only believe by interpreting, does that 
mean we must believe everything we interpret? Does that belief change 
with the shift in understanding and interpretation? 
Returning to the teachings of Heidegger, we must remember that the 
desire of Dasein is to explain being as such and that explanation requires 
interpretation, understanding, distanciation and appropriation. But along 
with that comes the need for Dasein to believe that which it understands; 
this is necessary so that the knowledge that Dasein acquires or apprehends 
stands out in full relief in the world that it believe it knows. In other words, 
understanding and belief are the cornerstones for Dasein’s meaningful 
experience in the world. 
Heidegger articulates the hermeneutic circle in this way: “The ‘circle’ in 
understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter 
phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein – that is, in 
the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-
world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.”125 
If we think about what Ricoeur teaches about the structure of interpretation 
and understanding, then the circle of in understanding belonging to the 
structure of meaning is not a foreign concept, rather it makes sense. The 
process of understanding is the event of interpretation, belief and 
understanding that happens when Being-in-the-world put itself in front of 
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the thing that is being interpreted, when Being-in-the-world reflects on 
itself in the proposed world that the thing inspires. 
Heidegger clarifies that being in the world is not caught up in the 
hermeneutic circle but rather that the circle itself constitutes an event: “If, 
however, we note that ‘circularity’ belongs ontologically to a kind of Being 
which is present-at-hand (namely, to subsistence [Bestand]), we must 
altogether avoid using this phenomenon to characterize anything like 
Dasein ontologically.” 126  Being-in-the-world may not be described or 
classified as “circularity” because it is not a being that is present-at-hand – 
it is a being that is aware of itself, aware of its surroundings and other 
beings; therefore, the circularity is an event, which Dasein may witness or 
experience but may not be a “victim” of, nor can the hermeneutic circle 
“happen” to Dasein. 
3. The Dialectics of Responsibility and Hermeneutics 
As Dasein seeks relationship, it does so in a paradigm of responsibility. 
In addition to considering the responsibility, Dasein also encounters the 
other in discourse and text; therefore, the hermeneutical study can be 
applied to enrich its experience of itself as well as its experience of (and 
relation with) the other. Indeed, relationship is exactly what hermeneutics is 
about: the work that Dasein does to understand the text (sign, symbol, etc) 
– put distance between itself and the text in order to recognize the 
autonomy of the being of the text, and appropriate knowledge, not of the 
text, but of itself in light of the phenomenon of the proposed world of the 
text. 
While the encounter between Dasein and another Dasein does not 
necessarily reflect the I and other relation outlined by Levinas, it does 
constitute a relationship. This is relationship insofar as Dasein is relating 
with other beings – the limit on what constitutes an authentic relationship 
for Being-in-the-world is that he may relate to it (being), that he may be 
able to impose his ontological curiosity on that being. 
Having said this, we still have to clearly establish what responsibility 
and hermeneutics have to do with each other because until now, they do not 
have any intuitive connection. I submit that it is through hermeneutics that 
the subject or the I as being in the world has greater latitude to explore his 
relation with the other; to be more specific, in using the structure of 
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hermeneutics and interpretation outlined by Ricoeur and applying it to the 
interpersonal relation, the subject has a better chance of seeing the other or 
other Beings-in-the-world as autonomous beings in their own right. The 
subject will be able to interpret their discourse, including speech, gestures, 
signs and symbols according to a proposed world that he appropriates from 
the text he receives in the discourse. That proposed world is the worldview 
of the other whom the subject encounters – through hermeneutics, the 
subject is able to understand, interpret and relate by allowing the other to 
share the world as they see it with him. 
Hermeneutics allows the I to appreciate the other on the terms of the 
other rather than on the terms imposed by the I; and because hermeneutics 
is constantly considering various contingencies of text, the way in which 
the I may relate to the other is never fixed. Similar to Ricoeur’s explanation 
of indemnification and reparations as it pertains to responsibility, it is 
impossible to insure against every possibility, it is also impossible to say 
that there is a certain determined relation between two Beings-in-the-world 
that may offer each other two very different proposed worlds (world views) 
as they attempt to understand, get in front of, appropriate and interpret each 
others’ text. 
In this way, hermeneutics has a strong implication on responsibility, or if 
we were to put it in terms of the dialectics: Hermeneutics as the dialectic of 
what is read has strong implications on responsibility which is the dialectic 
of the just, respectful [and loving] relation between the I and the other. 
Breaking this down even further, we could say that the art of interpretation 
affects the way in which the I and the other relate to each other, 
encouraging a just, respectful [and loving] relation between the two. This is 
because as the subject relates with the other, he is coming to a better 
understanding of himself as being qua being as well as being in the world. 
The task will be to apply the dialectics of responsibility and 
hermeneutics to the corporation, but first we must study the agent and his 
actions, the actions of the subject, which necessarily includes his 
motivation. Recalling our discussion on responsibility, we will have to 
establish the difference between social justice and juridical justice. In doing 
so, we shall have a strong basis for our criticism of current corporate action 





Human Action and Justice 
To complete the final part of our investigation before we begin to draw 
conclusions and synthesize a system of corporate responsibility, we shall 
proceed with confronting the ideas of human action and justice. We do this 
having just explored the dialectics of text and action as well as those of 
hermeneutics and responsibility and come to an understanding of how they 
contribute to the constitution of the inter-personal, face-to-face relation as 
Paul Ricoeur proposes based on his study of the text and the self. The 
purpose is to use our preliminary study to guide others in determining 
whether their human action in the context of the corporation is responsible 
and just. 
The central thesis of this chapter is that discourse is the dialectic of just 
human action, and we shall refer to some of Ricoeur’s texts that we have 
already used in the previous chapters, including Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences, The Just, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the 
Surplus of Meaning, and Oneself as Another. We shall also use the Italian 
translation of his Amour et Justice.1 
1. Meaningful Action 
Before exploring meaningful action and considering its significance in 
relation to text and the greater scheme of our endeavor to establish a 
connection between corporate action and the responsibility that the 
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corporation has toward itself and its stakeholders, let us first look at 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the agent as in his Oneself as Another.2   
1.1  The Agent 
Ricoeur approaches this endeavor by way of the semantics and analyzing 
how words are used to identify relationships that may reveal more about a 
being’s ontology. However, it is worth noting that Ricoeur relies on 
Aristotle’s classic wisdom and credits the Greek Philosopher with making it 
“apparent that action depends on the agent, in a specific sense of the relation 
of dependence.”3 He hails Aristotle as one of the first to “verify and codify 
the relevance of the linguistic choices made by orators, tragic poets, and 
magistrates, and also those made in ordinary usage, whenever it is a matter 
of submitting action and the agent to a moral judgment.” 4  Aristotle’s 
philosophy lends itself nicely to Ricoeur’s method of investigation and 
study, particularly in terms of codification (semantics and the study of 
linguistics).  
Ricoeur further justifies his choice in using Aristotle and the 
Nicomachean Ethics5 in particular as a foundation for his research when he 
says, 
… in order to have a point of anchorage on the level of action for his detailed 
study of virture, that is, of the features of excellence belonging to action, he 
undertakes in book 3 of the Nicomachaen Ethics an initial distinction pairing 
actions performed despite oneself (arkōn, akousios) with those performed 
freely (hekōn, hekousios), then makes a finer distinction within this first circle 
of those actions expressing a choice – more precisely a preferential choice 
(proairesis), which is priorly determined through deliberation (bouleusis).6 
So for the sake of the argument at hand, we shall restrict our discussion to 
the parameters of voluntary action readily conceding that there is a whole 
other side of the action that requires attention and analysis; however, 
involuntary human action does not contribute an added value to our 
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investigation insofar as we are studying how deliberate human action may 
be formed by responsible human relation – an involuntary action 
committed by Dasein does not qualify.7 
To wit, Ricoeur recalls this very argument as he discusses the relation of 
the agent as the principle cause of the action using the Greek term arkhē, 
which is to say he regards the agent as the source of action when he says, 
“The most concise expression of this relation is found in a formula that 
makes the agent the principle (arkhē) of his actions, but in a sense of arkhē 
that authorizes us to say that the actions depend on (preposition epi) the 
agent himself (autō).”8 Therefore, if the act depends on the agent, then 
there is an ethical implication to the act insofar as the agent makes a 
deliberate decision to act towards someone or something for a purpose 
(telos). We will submit for consideration that, it may be argued that for 
every source there is a purpose or end, and along these same lines, the act, 
originating from the agent is meant for something. 
Now we shall not get ahead of ourselves, but the point that we shall 
focus on at the moment is that the agent is acting with an end in mind, the 
agent has a motive and there is intentionality that forms the being that is the 
act (using Aristotelian vocabulary). But beyond the question of 
intentionality, the ethical implication is evident in the agent as subject or 
Being-in-the-world in Heideggerian terms. The agent is not just a source of 
action; the agent is a source of action who is aware of himself, his being, 
his awareness of being aware of being and all the intricacies that we have 
already explored with Heidegger’s help when we discussed Dasein.  
What we want to bring to the fore as it relates to Dasein, therefore, is that 
the agent is Dasein; the agent is the I among others, the agent is the human 
person who is aware of himself. There is a self to consider when discussing 
the agent. Ricoeur asks and proposes the following, “Does not ethics, in fact, 
demand that we ‘see’ the principle ‘as’ self and the self ‘as’ principle? In this 
sense the explicit metaphors of paternity and of mastery would be the only 
way of putting linguistic form the tie arising out of the short circuit between 
principle of self.”9 The self is the principle from which the action originates – 
the self is the agent. Beginning with this principle, the I among others, Dasein 
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among other Beings-in-the-world, the agent becomes the arkhē of the action; 
coupling this understanding of agent as the source of action with the question 
of motivation and intentionality, the telos of action takes on ethical 
implications. 
Human action is only meaningful if it is done willfully and with 
deliberation as Ricoeur explains when he uses the term ascription to 
describe the agent taking responsibility for their actions: “Ascription 
consists precisely in this reappropriation by the agent of his or her own 
deliberation: making up one’s mind is cutting short the debate by making 
one of the options contemplated one’s own.”10 At this point Ricoeur has 
been able to insert ascription within the structure of the agent’s deliberation 
in committing an act thus assigning responsibility, but we must also 
determine the motivation and intentionality, the telos, of the action.  
We have been referring to motivation and intentionality together, not 
because they are synonymous, but because as Ricoeur explains, “As 
concerns the notion of motive, to the extent that it is distinguished from the 
intention with which one acts, principally as a retrospective motive, the fact 
of its belonging to an agent is just as much a part of the meaning of this 
motive as its logical tie to the action of which it is the cause.” 11  The 
motivation and intentionality, while they may share similar characteristics, 
are not the same because the motivation comes from the needs, wants and 
desires of the agent and the intentionality is related to the end result of the 
act; the motivation may be more closely related to the why of the agent 
needs, wants or desires to commit the act while the intentionality has more 
to do with the purpose for the act being committed. 
There are two facets to ascription that Ricoeur explores: that of simply 
naming the agent who committed the act (or the agent taking responsibility 
himself), and that of tracing the act back to its principle or agent based on 
the motivation and intentionality. Ricoeur designates these two ways in 
which one may go about ascribing the act to an agent as the terminable and 
interminable investigations: 
On the one hand, searching for the author is a terminable investigation which 
stops with the designation of the agent, usually by citing his or her name: 
“Who did that? So and so.” On the other hand, searching for the motives of an 
action is an interminable investigation, the chain of motivations losing itself in 
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the unfathomable haze of internal and external influences: psychoanalysis has 
a direct relation to this situation.12 
Motivation and intentionality become key factors in efforts to determine 
what agent committed which act, that is to say, when we say, “Who did 
that?” Unlike the determining the author of a text, determining the agent of 
an action unseen can become problematic. The author of the text is ever 
present within the text even though the text is immediately independent of 
the author as soon as it is written.  
But, as Ricoeur points out, “[it] does not keep us from tying the 
interminable investigation of motives to the terminable investigation of the 
agent; this strange relation is part and parcel of our concept of ascription.”13 
It is within these parameters of ascription that the difficulties begin to 
appear because in ascription, we tend to refer to the agent as another object 
or a thing. Ricoeur makes the following observation: 
The person, as a referential term, remains one of the “things” about which we 
speak. In this sense the theory of basic particulars finally remains captive to an 
ontology of “something in general” which, faced with the demand for 
recognition of the ipse, develops a force of resistance comparable, although set 
forth in a somewhat different way, to that of the ontology of events.14 
The very nature of the agent (who is subject or even Dasein) refuses to be 
relegated to a thing among other things in the world in which the event 
takes place and the action is committed; the agent’s refusal is the resistance 
to which Ricoeur refers, and it presents a difficulty insofar as in it there is a 
proclamation of selfhood and a demand for recognition. The event, then, 
becomes a quagmire of beings through which one must sift to determine 
where the motivation and intentionality originate in order to identify the 
subject to whom the action may be ascribed. 
1.2 Action 
According to Ricoeur, meaningful action is equivalent to the fixation of 
discourse by writing under the condition of the objectification of the 
sciences, but why? What about the objectification of the sciences puts 
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meaningful action and the fixation of discourse by writing on the same 
field of objectification? 15 
In a partial response to our inquiries that will allow us to glean a fuller 
answer later, Ricoeur writes: “action itself, action as meaningful, may 
become an object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, 
through a kind of objectification similar to the fixation which occurs in 
writing.”16 
Meaningfulness emerges when the action is directed at something or 
someone for an end; there is an intentionality in the agent committing the 
action, and that intentionality is made evident by the fixation as in the 
instance with the discourse to writing and objectification when submitting 
action to scientific scrutiny. Ricoeur explains this dynamic in terms of a 
dialectic of intentional exteriorization, which places action within the 
paradigm or context of an event from which the meaning may be made 
plain. He says, 
This objectification is made possible by some inner traits of the action which 
are similar to the structure of the speech-act and which make doing a kind of 
utterance. In the same way as the fixation by writing is made possible by a 
dialectic of intentional exteriorisation immanent to the speech-act itself, a 
similar dialectic within the process of transaction prepares the detachment of 
the meaning of the action from the event of the action.17 
So according to Ricoeur, meaningful action is made an object of science or 
an object for our consideration and scrutiny because, like the speech-act, it 
is an intentional exteriorization immanent of the act itself. But he does not 
specify where the intention originates, and the question lingers: where does 
the intentional exteriorization come from in terms of the subject’s 
constitution of being?  
For the purposes of this discussion, I submit a bandage of sorts, which is 
this: the intention that is exteriorized comes from our inner volition and 
will, the needs, wants and desires of the person, the subject, the I. If we 
accept, even for the moment, that the inner volition and will are the 
intention that is exteriorized, then perhaps we can move forward with the 
exploration without leaving too much in doubt. 
Ricoeur continues the comparison between meaningful action and text as 
fixed discourse when he says, “In the same way that a text is detached from 
                                           
15 Ibid., p. 203. 
16 Ibid., p. 203. 
17 Ibid., p. 204. 
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its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences 
of its own.”18 We shall make two points from this citation: firstly, Ricoeur 
is able to make the connection or point out similarities between text and 
meaningful action because text is the very result of a meaningful action; the 
text is the result of the inner volition and will being that has purpose and is 
directed at someone (intentionality) is exteriorized by the act of fixation, 
the act of writing. The second point brings us back to our discussion from 
“Chapter V: Responsibility and Hermeneutics” when we explored 
distanciation and appropriation as it relates to understanding and 
interpretation: as soon as the agent has committed the act, as in the case of 
the author and the text or the speaker and the speech, the act becomes 
autonomous and independent of the agent from which it originated. The 
act, then, may be considered and scrutinized as a being in and of itself 
independent of the agent. However, like the text, in order to interpret the 
act and glean meaning from it, the agent should be taken into consideration 
when going through the process of understanding and interpretation. 
The philosopher supports this last assertion when he says, “An action is a 
social phenomenon not only because it is done by several agents in such a 
way that the role of each of them cannot be distinguished from the role of 
the others, but also because our deeds escape us and have effects which we 
did not intend.”19 In what way does this citation support our assertion? 
While action is its own being as soon as the agent commits it, due to the 
intentionality or the volition and will that motivate the commission of that 
action thus giving it meaning in the first place, it is indeed a social 
phenomenon; therefore, in order to understand its meaning, the agents 
involved should be taken into consideration and their motivations, volition 
and intentionality examined. 
For the sake of clarity, Ricoeur confirms for us that the phenomenon of 
the action is indeed separate from its agent with the same distance as that of 
the speaker or author from the text.20 But again, even in interpreting a text, 
in understanding the context of the text, one must also study the author – 
and in the same way, in understanding the meaning of action, an act that 
was committed with deliberation by the subject, one must study the inner 
                                           
18 Ibid., p. 206. 
19 Ibid., p. 206. 
20 “The kind of distance which we found between the intention of the speaker and the 
verbal meaning of a text occurs also between the agent and its action,” (Ibid., p. 206). 
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volition of that agent, which is to say, the dialectic of intentional 
exteriorization immanent to the act itself.  
Let us not neglect the last part of that citation when Ricoeur refers to the 
“detachment of the meaning of the action from the event of the action.”21 
This assertion from Ricoeur is interesting because he is saying that just as 
the act is independent from the agent, so too is the meaning from the event. 
His point may be made clearer with this follow-up quote: “With complex 
actions some segments are so remote from the initial simple segments, 
which can be said to express the intention of the doer, that the ascription of 
these actions or action-segments constitutes a problem as difficult to solve 
as that of authorship in some cases of literary criticism.”22 Returning to 
Ricoeur’s assertion that action is a social phenomenon, we begin to see 
how deciphering the meaning of a single action among many in the midst 
of an event may become cumbersome if not problematic.  
As with the speech-act and interlocution, in a social setting, there may be 
action, reaction, [inaction] and interaction within a single event. 
Determining what agent committed a certain act among various agents and 
various actions, the initial action that prompted the reaction versus the 
general interaction can be a feat. Therefore, we have a paradigm in which 
the agents, actions, reactions, [inaction] and interactions constitute an 
event, but that event does not necessarily give us meaning – it may give us 
context, but it does not give us meaning. 
Beyond the event from which we may be able to apprehend a context, 
Ricoeur instructs us to be aware of the pattern of action, more specifically, 
he says, “An action leaves a ‘trace’, it makes its ‘mark’ when it contributes 
to the emergence of such patterns which become the documents of human 
action.”23 An action leaves a trace or a mark, which is to say that whether 
or not others register its meaning, the significance of that action remains 
embedded in the world. The text, even if it is burned after having been 
written, has made an indelible mark insofar as the author fixed his 
discourse with the intention that someone read it; likewise, the speaker 
makes an indelible mark insofar as he utters his words to someone for a 
purpose.  
Regardless if the reader or the hearer acts on the meaning of the text or 
the uttered words, the mark has been made, the bell has been rung. The text 
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23 Ibid., p. 206. 
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and speech take their characteristic of indelibility from the indelibility of 
action in that they too are acts – the act, whether heard, seen, felt, perceived 
in any way or not, when done with deliberation with the intention of 
meeting a need or fulfilling the desire or want of the subject, the human 
person, the I, leaves a trace and becomes documentation of the dialectic of 
intentional exteriorization of inner volition and will. 
Ricoeur takes the trace and mark of meaningful human action even 
further when he writes that “a meaningful action is an action the 
importance of which goes ‘beyond’ its relevance to its initial situation,”24 
and that any “important action, …, develops meanings which can be 
actualised or fulfilled in situations other than the one in which this action 
occurred.”25 Again, he is emphasizing that the meaningfulness of an act is 
not tied to the event in which the act was committed; rather, he goes further 
to say that the meaningfulness may be deemed greater if it can be realized 
outside the context of the event in which it was committed. To give a 
practical example to this theoretical proposition, consider for a moment the 
storming of the Bastille in 1789 from the French Revolution: that single 
action meant something to those French who were fighting in the moment, 
during the actual event, but the significance of the Storming of the Bastille 
changed over the centuries and became a beacon of freedom and 
democracy in a new age of government that eventually went beyond the 
borders of France. 
Reinforcing the example, Ricoeur says, “… the meaning of an important 
event exceeds, overcomes, transcends, the social conditions of its 
production and may be re-enacted in new social contexts. Its importance is 
its durable relevance and, in some cases, its omni-temporal relevance.”26 
This is exactly the point that we are making with the example of the 
Storming of the Bastille; the meaningfulness of the actions of that single 
event has transcended the intentions of the agents who were immediately 
involved and has become a symbol of freedom to which other peoples have 
referred for inspiration as they revolted against tyrannical government and 
sought their independence. 
Everytime a person considers the meaningfulness of human action, he is 
reading the text, the documentation of humanity, and he interprets the 
meaning. This is what we understand the significance of human action as 
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25 Ibid., p. 208. 
26 Ibid., p. 208. 
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text to be. The meaning does not change because meaning is intrinsic to the 
one who apprehends it, but the readers change as time passes, details fade 
and perspectives shift. Human action is the discourse that is affixed to the 
history of humanity as text, and the human being as Being-in-the-world, an 
I among others, interprets its meaning depending on the context of the 
event in which it was committed but also depending on the context in 




1.3  Action and Rights 
Having established the case for meaningful human action, we have 
deliberately overlooked one important factor in the subject committing an 
action willfully, deliberately and with intention: the capacity to do so. In 
Ricoeur’s work The Just,27 he discusses the agent’s capacity to commit an 
action, but in this elaboration, he writes about it in terms of the “capable 
subject.” As we mentioned in the previous sections, identifying who 
committed an act can be categorized as either a terminable when it is a 
given who that committed the act because someone witnessed the 
commission of the act, or an interminable investigation if the commission 
of the act goes unseen and is, therefore, unable to be assigned to an agent 
with certitude without one coming forward to take responsibility for having 
committed the act. As such, the agent is identified as the who especially 
when the act is witnessed in the ascription of “He did it.” 
The point is that in ascribing the act to an agent, something else is being 
said; that is to say that there is a subtext: the agent is capable of committing 
the act. By way of introducing this very topic, Ricoeur says, “It is by 
examining the most fundamental forms of the question ‘who?’ and the 
responses to it that we are led to give its full meaning to the notion of a 
capable subject.”28 In ascribing the act to the agent and thus accusing the 
agent of being capable of having committed the act, Ricoeur delves into an 
ontological discussion that has far reaching implications. He explains it in 
this way: “The notion of capacity will be central to my presentation. It 
constitutes in my view the ultimate referent of moral respect and of the 
                                           
27 P. RICOEUR, The Just. Originally published as Le Juste by Éditions Esprit in 1995. 
Translated by David Pellauer. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Illinois. 2000. 
28 Ibid., p. 1. 
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recognition of a human being as a subject of rights.”29 This cuts to the very 
heart of where we are going with the present discussion – the rights of the 
subject, the rights of the agent, the rights of man, of the human person. 
To illustrate his point, he begins by expanding on a philosophy in The 
Just that he proposes in Oneself as Another, that of the difficulty of 
assigning responsibility or ascribing the action to the agent. As we will see, 
this goes directly to the capability of the subject and has implications on the 
rights of man. He writes: 
The identification of an agent, hence the assignment of an action or of a segment 
of an action to someone, is often a difficult operation – for example, when one 
undertakes to evaluate the degree of implication of this or that person in a 
complex enterprise involving several agents. The problem arises constantly on the 
plane of historical knowledge or in the course of juridical procedures aimed at 
uniquely identifying the responsible individual who will eventually be forced to 
compensate an injury or to suffer the penalty for some delinquent or criminal 
act.30 
In this one citation, we find other indications besides that of action and the 
agent; there are those of event, collusion or involvement, recompense (and 
implicitly, fault), responsibility, justice and a social element of memory and 
judgment. These implications play a major part in Ricoeur’s arguments and 
philosophy for the capacity of the subject and his rights.  
The human person, a self-aware being among other self-aware beings 
with the ability to act deliberately and with intention based on his own will 
and needs is able to take responsibility for his action; in the same way, he is 
able to identify the actions of other human persons and attempt to ascribe 
them to the appropriate agent. As a consequence, according to Ricoeur “… 
the capacity of a human agent to designate himself as the author of his acts 
has considerable significance for the subsequent assignment of rights and 
duties.”31 What significance is that, one may ask. The significance is quite 
specific: if a human agent can deliberately act on his own behalf from his 
own will based on their own volition and needs, then he can act in a way in 
which he can reap benefits and gains from the world in which he exists. As 
Ricoeur writes, “our experience of the power we exercise over our bodily 
members and, through them, on the course of things” appears as the power 
that “is presupposed by the ethico-juridic concept of imputation, so 
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30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 Ibid., p. 3. 
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essential to the assignment of rights and duties.”32 This is to say, the agent, 
the human person can, through his deliberate action, exercise a power by 
which he demands rights and, by the same token, has a responsibility (a 
duty) to himself and other human persons of whom he is demanding those 
rights.33  
That which allows the subject to be declared an act as good or bad, 
virtuous or immoral, is the very thing within him that allows him to esteem 
himself and the other as good or bad, virtuous or immoral. The author 
writes: “We ourselves are worthy of esteem or respect insofar as we are 
capable of esteeming as good or bad, or as declaring permitted or 
forbidden, the actions either of others or of ourselves.”34 The very fact that 
the subject is able to esteem himself, the other, his actions and the actions 
of others has various meanings: it means that the subject has an internal 
value system that he shares with his community, a value system that is 
open for discussion; it means that he is capable of making a distinction and 
judgment based on said value system; and it means that the subject is 
indeed capable of acting (the locutionary act if necessary) to mitigate 
another action with the motivation of preserving the worthiness of the self-
esteem and self-respect of the person.  
For Ricoeur, “It is here that the notion of a capable subject reaches its 
highest significance.”35 The subject as capable defines his worth: in his 
very being-in-the-world, the being is an action that is the catalyst for the 
ethic, the investigation into his worth, his self-esteem and self-respect, as 
well as the ought that exists between him and the other based on his worth, 
his self-esteem and self-respect. While the act of being qua being may not 
be voluntary as such, the acts that the subject as being qua being commits 
based on will and need are; therefore, the ethic is born from dynamic of 
interaction between the subject as being-in-the-world, a capable subject 
who acts and is among other beings-in-the-world. 
The subject, as the capable subject, defines the ethical and moral 
dimension of his selfhood, that is to say, what it means to be him among 
other beings-in-the-world:  
                                           
32 Ibid., p. 3. 
33 As a side note, it appears that the structure of Ricoeur’s understanding of human 
capacity as it contributes to intrinsic rights and duties may be classified, according to 
Aristotelian causality, as efficient cause. 
34 Ibid., p. 4. 
35 Ibid., p. 4. 
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… there is a bond of mutual implication between self-esteem and the ethical 
evaluation of those of our actions that aim at the ‘good life’ (in Aristotle’s 
sense), just as there is a bond between self-respect and the moral evaluation of 
these same actions, submitted to the test of the universalization of our maxims 
of action (in the Kantian sense).36  
In order for us to understand Ricoeur’s assertion of the subject’s ethical 
and moral dimension, let us consider the following: “Taken together, self-
esteem and self-respect define the ethical and moral dimension of selfhood, 
to the extent that they characterize human beings as subjects of ethico-
juridical imputation.” 37  Here, we have an interesting illustration of the 
capable subject’s conscience (ethical and moral dimension of selfhood), the 
part of the self that values reflexively and takes the world around it into 
consideration, good or bad, virtuous or immoral, life-giving or ruin.  
Ricoeur demonstrates that in esteem and respect, the subject does so 
from his capacity to do so when he states, “We esteem ourselves capable of 
esteeming our own actions, we respect ourselves in that we are capable of 
impartially judging our own actions. Self-esteem and self-respect are in this 
way reflexively addressed to a capable subject.”38 The cycle may seem to 
be self-centered and self-fulfilling, but it is necessary because the subject’s 
experience of being in terms of esse (Latin infinitive of to be) and in terms 
of action (noun) begins with him; therefore, esteem and respect must start 
with the self – value must start with the self. Otherwise, the subject will 
never have a true sense of esteem, respect, value or worth for anything in 
his world including other beings-in-the-world whom he encounters. 
Having followed Ricoeur’s teachings, we can say that the subject is a 
capable subject, one among other beings-in-the-world who are capable of 
acting out of their own volition and needs; the subject is a capable subject 
who, based on his ability to value or esteem and respect his actions and 
those of other beings-in-the-world, has a right to being in terms of esse and 
in terms of action. The subject, in his self-awareness and capacity to act, 
esteems and respects based on the esteem and respect he has for himself. 
With himself as the source of his value system from which he determines 
good and bad, his rights to act are not granted to him but rather are imposed 
on him. It is imposed on him by the very power that he has exercises over 
his own being and “bodily members.” 
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2. Discourse, Text and Law 
As the discussion segues from meaningful action towards justice we 
understand how it is constituted within our discourse as the dialectic of just 
human action, we must, too, understand the relationship between law and 
text, or law as text, and the meaning it can have for the human relation. To 
engage in this study, we shall remain faithful to Ricoeur’s collection of 
essays, The Just, and refer to one in particular, “Conscience and the Law, 
the Philosophical Stakes.” 39  In this essay, Ricoeur separates human 
conscience from law in order to make a singular distinction that must not 
be confused by conflating the two: the evaluation of good and evil (law) 
complements the pronouncement of wise judgment, but the evaluation does 
not form wise judgment. What do we mean by that? 
2.1  Law and the Moral Imperative 
Ricoeur explains conscience and law in terms of poles setting “on the 
side of the pole of the law the most elementary discrimination between 
good and evil, and on the side of conscience the emergence of a personal 
identity constituted in relation to this basic discrimination.”40 According to 
Ricoeur, therefore, either way, on either pole, law or conscience, a person 
should be able to discriminate between good and evil, evaluating based on 
the structure or precepts of the law or conscience, whichever is called to 
task. Ricoeur explains it in this way: 
The term “evaluation” expresses the fact that human life is not morally 
neutral, but, once it is examined, following the precept of Socrates, lends itself 
to a basic discrimination between what is approved as the better and what is 
disapproved as the worse. If the term “law” does not quite fit at this 
elementary level, at least in the strict sense I have spoken of, strong 
evaluations do present a series of characters that set us on the way to the 
normative sense attached to the idea of the law.41 
Perhaps it is with this explanation that we may make an important 
observation: Ricoeur teaches that the law, in its most basic form, represents 
an evaluation of a sort; the evaluation then may be taken as an action – a 
meaningful, voluntary action on the part of the subject. The significance of 
this is rife because it indicates to us that law (evaluation) pertains to a 
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greater part of the experience of the subject; if the action is voluntary, done 
willfully and deliberately, it, therefore, has meaning and may be a matter 
for interpretation by the subject and others whom he encounters. 
To complete the distinction between law and conscience, as we stated 
earlier in the previous section, conscience [of the capable subject] is the 
ethical and moral dimension of the selfhood. But Ricoeur goes further to 
make it clear what the conscience is when he references fellow philosopher 
Charles Taylor and says,  
Here too I will follow the suggestion of Charles Taylor by pairing the idea of 
the self and that of the good. This correlation expresses the fact that the 
question who? – Who am I? – presiding over every search for personal 
identity, finds a first outline of an answer in the modes of adhesion by which 
we respond to the solicitation of strong evaluations. In this respect, we can 
make the different variations of the discrimination of good and evil correspond 
to different ways of orienting oneself in what Taylor calls moral space, ways 
of taking one’s stand there in the moment and of maintaining one’s place over 
time.42 
Just as the capable subject starts from himself in esteem and respect (self-
esteem and self-respect) in order to determine how and to what degree to 
esteem and respect beings beyond himself, he is likewise orienting himself, 
starting from the self, in terms of discriminating good and evil and 
evaluating the moral space in which the phenomena occurs.  
Ricoeur continues, “As a moral being, I am someone who assumes an 
orientation, takes a stand, and maintains himself in a moral space. And 
conscience, at least at this first level is nothing other than this orientation, 
this stance, and this holding on.”43 Yes, conscience, in line with everything 
we have explored until now, is the orientation and the stance, but it is also 
the holding onto because it is within the self, it is the anchoring from which 
the capable subject cannot escape. Even when a person denies their 
conscience, their sense of orientation toward what is good and away from 
what is bad, that denial is still a turning away from the self, an anchor, a 
point of reference that fundamentally never moves. Therefore, we shall 
suggest, at least for the moment, that the conscience is stable. 
How can the conscience be stable if, as Ricoeur recognizes, we often 
question “what ought I to do?” and he even says that question, “is 
secondary in relation to the more elementary question of knowing how I 
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might wish to live my life”44? The conscience is stable to the degree that 
the capable subject asks the question. As soon as he ceases asking the 
question “what ought I to do?” or “how ought I live my life?” then there is 
an indication that the conscience is no longer discriminating between 
good and bad, and, therefore, the orientation toward the good is no longer 
foundational for that capable subject. 
Notwithstanding the fundamentality of the human conscience as it 
orients the capable subject towards the good, it must too be recognized that 
the conscience is personal. That is to say, while there may be some 
commonly held values and characteristics that orient individual capable 
subjects, their individual consciences are particular to themselves. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to have a normative system by which 
capable subjects may orient themselves towards the good as a community.  
Ricoeur explains that it is as a community that the subject, recognizes the 
moral obligation intrinsic to a community of subjects, capable subjects 
whose particular conscience orients them toward the good, and it is here 
that he gives a glimpse of a working definition of law: a “bond between 
ethics and the juridical” which “is necessary for a correct evaluation of the 
role of conscience at [the communal] level.”45 The introduction of law into 
community is the very birth of subject’s capacity to relate to other 
subjects 46  in order to determine worthiness, value, good and beauty 
(borrowing from Aristotelian language) based on esteem and respect he has 
for himself, and themselves; it is this communal-esteem and communal-
respect that is codified in a way what has been approved by convention 
within the community that is law. 
Ricoeur examines three distinct features of law that constitute subject’s 
experience of it as law qua law, the phenomena of law as such within the 
prescribed context of the capable subject’s ethico-juridical concept of 
imputation: interdiction, universality and human plurality – “inasmuch as 
they indicate the anchoring point of the dialectic of internalization.”47 Of 
interdiction he says that it “is the stern face the law turns toward us.”48 That 
does not mean much until he explains further by calling to mind the 
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46 Let us keep in mind that the reference to “subjects” in this case refers to other 
beings whom our initial subject encounters in his experience of the world; these are 
beings who in their own experiences of the world experience it as subject. 
47 Ibid., p. 148. 
48 Ibid., p. 149. 
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example of the Ten Commandments and pointing out the interdiction 
imposed within the grammar of the commandment: “Even the Ten 
Commandments are stated in terms of this grammar of negative 
imperatives: you shall not kill, you shall not bear false witness, and so 
on.”49 The negative imperative is the stern face of the I demanding the 
other not to kill him, as we put it in Levinasian terms. While the negative 
imperative may seem confining or restrictive, within the phenomenon of 
the human relation, Ricoeur maintains that the negative impulses of 
humanity are repressed.50 He specifies:  
By withdrawing an alleged right to vengeance from the victim, penal law sets 
up a just distance between two acts of violence, that of the crime and that of 
punishment. And it would not be difficult to offer the same demonstration for 
the prohibition of false testimony, which, in protecting the institution of 
language, helps establish the bond of mutual confidence among the members 
of a linguistic community.51 
For Ricoeur, it is by the interdiction of the law that beings-in-the-world 
(who are subjects of their own experience of being) are able to live 
amongst and with each other even when wrongs are committed – the 
interdiction limits the extent to which a victim may seek vengeance, if 
vengeance may be sought at all. And it is here that Ricoeur introduces an 
interesting and, perhaps, far-reaching concept – the just distance.  
He first introduces the notion of just distance in another of his essays 
found in The Just, “Sanction, Rehabilitation, Pardon.”52 He refers to this 
distance as that “between the hideous crime that unleashes private and 
public anger, and the punishment inflicted by the judicial institution,” and 
he continues by explaining that within the juridical context, the trial 
institutes the just distance between victim and avenger, “Whereas 
vengeance short-circuits the two forms of suffering, that undergone by the 
victim and that inflicted by the avenger.”53 The interdiction of law supports 
the just distance because it is a declaration of behavior that will not be 
                                           
49 Ibid., p. 149. 
50 “At first glance, we might be tempted to see in the interdiction only its repressive 
dimension, to see… only the hateful desire concealed therein. But then we would risk 
not taking into account what we might call the structural function of the interdiction” 
(Ibid., p. 149). 
51 Ibid., p. 149. 
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53 Ibid., p. 134. 
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tolerated within a community of beings-in-the-world as represented by 
language, signs and symbols with negative grammar or indicators imposing 
the stern face of the I to the other. 
For our author, universality, the second feature of law, as a moral norm – 
a standard of behavior that the community of subjects is able to agree on by 
convention that is either spoken or unspoken but nevertheless understood. 
More specifically, Ricoeur says, 
The second feature common to the juridical and the moral norm is their claim 
to universality. I say “claim” because on the empirical plane social norms vary 
to a greater or lesser degree in space and time. But it is essential that in spite of 
this factual relativity, and through it, a validity in principle is intended. The 
prohibition of murder would lose its normative character if we did not hold it 
to apply to everyone, in every circumstance, and without exception.54 
It may be obvious to the reader that this second feature of law is not strictly 
respected in every instance, especially in the case of war. 
Anyone familiar with the modern judicial systems knows that the 
superior courts are inundated with cases for the problems related to 
universality as well as that of the third feature, plurality. But for the 
moment, let us consider the problem of universality. Governments that 
continue to carry out the death penalty contribute to the problem of 
universality to the extent that they attempt to punish those who have 
committed murder by committing the very same act as retribution or 
vengeance. To right the wrong that was committed, the government that 
has lawful state sanctioned executions commits a similar, if not equal, 
wrong. The feature of universality, in this case, therefore, is pushed to the 
side for the moment, for the justifiable exception to the universal rule. 
The third feature is no less interesting but perhaps more complicated, 
plurality. Ricoeur introduces it in this way: “The third feature I want to 
retain concerns the connection between the norm and human plurality. 
What is forbidden, universally condemned, are in the final analysis a whole 
series of wrongs done to others. A self and its other are thus the obligatory 
protagonists of the ethico-juridical norm.” 55  By the very nature of the 
subject being a being among other subjects, he is necessarily going to 
encounter the situation in which conflicts arise, agreements will have to be 
made and compromises will have to be reached. Within that, laws, as a part 
of the dialogue between the I and the other, also necessarily, must be 
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negotiated in order to aid in distinguishing where the phenomenon of the 
subject’s world begins to encroach on the phenomenon of the world of the 
others, other subjects whom he encounters in what he supposes is his 
world. 
Ricoeur refers to Kant when he explains it by calling it the “unsociable 
sociability,” and in doing so, he points out how fragile the interhuman bond 
is.56 He calls it a bond, which it is, but we must not forget that it is a 
relation with a foundational interdiction, a demand, “Do not kill me.” 
Again, why is the I demanding of the other not to kill him? He makes that 
demand because the other is already getting too close, the other is already 
imposing himself on the world that the I has “claimed” as his own. Let us 
not forget that the I’s only point of reference is himself, and his worldview, 
the point from which he experiences himself and other beings is from 
where he is in what he perceives to be his world. In this case, the other will 
always be a guest (either welcome or unwelcome) in the I’s world. 
2.2  The Capable Subject, Rights and Duties 
Living the moral and ethico-juridical concept within the capable subject 
as a member of a community of other capable subjects living with and 
among other capable subjects and acting on it within this context becomes 
internalized, not just within the individual capable subject, but within the 
community, and characteristics of self-esteem and self-respect become 
features of law. Ricoeur says, “… it is not difficult to understand in what 
sense the process of internalization, through which mere social legality is 
raised to the level of morality, is completed in moral conscience.”57 With 
this re-exploration of the phenomenology of the subject’s worldview, the 
interdiction becomes more understandable. Ricoeur writes,  
…the role of prohibition, what fundamentally distinguishes legality from 
morality comes to light. Legality only demands an external obedience, what 
                                           
56 “A self and its other are thus the obligatory protagonists of the ethico-juridical norm. 
What is thereby presupposed, by law as well as by moral philosophy, is what Kant called 
the state of ‘unsociable sociability’ that makes the interhuman bond so fragile. In the face 
of this permanent threat of disorder, the most elementary requirement of the law, this 
same philosopher says in his ‘Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right,’ is 
separating what is mine from what is yours. Here we rediscover the idea of a just distance, 
applied this time to delimiting the competing spheres of individual liberties” (Ibid., p. 
150). 
57 Ibid., p. 151. 
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Kant called mere conformity to the law, in order to distinguish respect for the 
law from love of duty. To this external character of legality we can add 
another feature that distinguishes it from morality, namely, the authorization 
of the use of physical force, as a way of restoring the law, of giving 
satisfaction to victims – in short, of allowing, as we say, the last word to the 
law.58 
So not only is the I demanding the other not to kill him, but he is also 
reserving the right as the capable subject and by authorization implicit by 
the interdiction to use physical force if the other does not heed the demand. 
In this way, the community of subjects has established amongst themselves 
through a convention that the demand of the I, “Do not kill me,” that 
interdiction and the others that follow are laws that require no other 
interpretation because the font of the moral and ethico-juridical concept is 
the self-esteem and self-respect of the capable subject as soon as he 
pronounces the demand. 
The law is the last word because it is in the norm of the human 
conscience that the concept of law itself is universal. It is also within the 
human conscience, that the claim to universality finds what Ricoeur calls 
personal autonomy, which, again, he borrows from Kant: 
The claim of legality to universality, morality presents a second aspect of 
internalization. Opposed to the idea of an external legislator is that of a 
personal autonomy, in the strong sense of the term autonomy, interpreted by 
Kant as legislation that a freedom gives to itself. Through autonomy, a rational 
will emerges from a merely arbitrary one, by placing itself under the synthesis 
of freedom and rule-governedness. However, the admiration we may have for 
the Kantian elegy of autonomy must not prevent us from taking into account 
the price we pay for this internalization of the law considered in terms of its 
universal angle. Only a formal rule, such as the test of universalization to 
which all our projects, all our life plans, in short, what Kant calls maxims of 
action must be submitted, can claim the kind of universality that ordinarily 
leaves things to mere social legality.59 
The personal autonomy that universality affords is autonomy inasmuch as 
it is recognition that as a subject living with and among other subjects, 
there is a freedom from the other because the I perceives that the other is 
governed by a similar set of moral standards. The [unspoken] recognition 
between the I and the other of their mutually held moral standards, perhaps 
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not identical but more or less comparable, is enough to establish the ethico-
juridical plain on which the system of law within the community rests. So 
again, the moral and ethico-juridical establishment of law within the 
context of the phenomenal experience of the subject as he lives with and 
among other subjects, is a second facet of the feature of universality.  
While the second way of looking at universality brought with it more 
interesting and even complicated ways of exploring law and the way in 
which the capable subject relates to himself and the other, it is arguably a 
more authentic application of the feature. Contrary to the first and, perhaps 
more obvious application of universality as it pertains to law, as a feature it 
is many times an exception rather than a standard feature – that is to say, it is 
a rarity that you find laws being applied according to a universal standard. 
This is not a criticism but rather an observation. Without getting too far 
ahead of the discussion at hand, applying laws universally without discretion 
may be an indication of a faulty government, a lack of good judgment or a 
lack of wisdom within the community. In an answer to this observation, as 
we shall return to the concepts of judgment and wisdom momentarily, we 
know that for Ricoeur “… conscience is nothing other than an inward, 
willing obedience to the law as law, through pure respect for it and not out of 
mere conformity to the statement of the rule.”60 In other words, while the 
capable subject may rely on the law to set a standard of behavior within the 
community, it is still his responsibility to use his own conscience to 
determine whether and to what degree the law is just [as it pertains to the 
situation].  
Here again, universality and conscience are complementing the personal 
autonomy of the capable subject, but the capable subject as the subject 
living with and among other subjects is responsible for himself and for 
them as well. Autonomy does not mean solitude; rather it means he has a 
responsibility to think for himself at all times; autonomy means that Being-
in-the-world esteems and respects himself and in doing so, is able to value 
the other. His personal autonomy and his conscience are related insofar as 
it is through his conscience self-esteem and self-respect that he is able 
demand “Do not kill me” demonstrating an awareness of self-worth and 
creating a distance and a distinction between himself and the other, but by 
that same token he is also able to esteem and respect the other. Knowing 
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that his own life is important because his conscience is telling him so, he 
also knows that the life of the other is important, it is just as important.61 
As we just stated, albeit briefly, applying laws universally, regardless of 
the situation, not taking into consideration the circumstances under which 
actions were committed, may not orient a community of subjects toward 
the good, either collectively or individually (notwithstanding the argument 
against capital punishment). Consequently, it is incumbent on the capable 
subject to help guide the community to what Ricoeur calls wise judgment 
and conviction.  
Ricoeur acknowledges that applying norms to particular cases can become 
“extraordinarily complex” because it “implies a style of interpretation 
irreducible to the mechanism of the practical syllogism.”62 In other words, 
the complexity of applying norms to particular cases originates simply 
because the case is not a logical problem or a supposition for consideration 
with certain variables to scrutinize or ignore. The complexity lies in the very 
complexity of the phenomenon of the case to which the norm is being 
applied. 
However, instead of being burdened by the complexity of applying the 
norm to the particular, we shall explore the subject’s ability, as the capable 
subject, to apply his own conscience when evaluating the way in which the 
norm is applied to the particularity of the case. But in order for the subject 
to apply his conscience in this way, he must do so in a procedural way – the 
hearing or trial. We must not forget that he is doing this in a forum, in 
public either with or among other subjects for whom he is also responsible. 
While Ricoeur does not explicitly discuss this aspect of the phenomenon 
of the moral judgment [in a public forum], he alludes to it as he proceeds 
with the study into what he calls the dialectic of moral judgment in a 
situation. Referring to the relation between law and moral judgment and 
taking note of the complexity of the particularity of the single case when 
applying the norm. As Ricoeur writes,  
The complex process at the end of which a case is placed under a norm 
involves two interwoven processes of interpretation. On the one side, that of 
the case considered, the problem is to reconstitute a plausible, a reasonable 
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my own...” (Ibid., p. 152). 
62 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
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history, the history or rather the interweaving of histories constitutive of what 
we call a case, or better an “affair.”63 
Our author also explains the intricacies of the hearing we begin to 
understand why the subject’s role as arbiter is so difficult and important: 
“The hearing, as the centerpiece of the trial, reveals how difficult it is to 
disentangle a univocally true narrative from the confrontation between the 
rival versions proposed by the parties involved in litigation.”64 On the one 
hand, in an attempt to determine what happened, what agent committed 
which action(s) to cause the resulting effects, the subject tries to simplify a 
complex operation; on the other hand, in doing so, in taking into 
consideration at least two “interwoven” accounts of a series of actions, the 
subject then is tasked with interpreting the interpretations of the perceived 
phenomena of other subject in order to apply a moral judgment based on 
his own conscience.  
Yet we cannot put the entire weight of moral judgment on the subject, 
because as Ricoeur explains it, “The difficulty is no less on the side of the 
norm. It is not always immediately clear that this case should be placed 
beneath this norm. What is called the qualification of a litigious act results 
from a work of interpretation applied to the norm itself.”65 The subject 
must determine which norm or law must be applied to the particular case 
before adjudicating it. This, too, requires a certain amount of interpretation, 
perhaps a hearing to disentangle certain particularities of the interwoven 
histories of the series of actions constituting an event. For Ricoeur,  
A judgment in situation thus comes about at the point of intersection of these 
two lines of interpretation. We can say that argumentation and interpretation 
are inseparable, the argumentation constituting the logical framework and the 
interpretation the inventive framework of the process ending in the making 
of a decision.66 
Such an assessment of the judgment, seemingly, may be simplistic insofar 
as it omits a sense of deliberation. He is correct to partner argumentation 
with interpretation, but by seemingly excluding deliberation from the 
partnership to create a dynamic triad leaves the understanding of judgment 
and law with a gaping hole. Additionally, in order to get to the concepts 
that we mentioned earlier, wise judgment and conviction, one would 
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evidently have to make a leap. But instead of making a leap, based on our 
own understanding of Ricoeur’s teachings of hermeneutics, interpretation, 
understanding and responsibility, not to mention everything we have 
gained in this last section, let us try to put it all together in a way that he 
may have appreciated while bringing in the concept that seems to be 
missing. 
In order to do just that, let us consider briefly what Ricoeur says 
regarding the relation between law and conscience:  
… it is a question of saying what the law is in a determined circumstance. In 
this regard the pronounced sentence would not have any juridical meaning if it 
were not deemed fair, equitable, in the sense that Aristotle gives the term 
“equity” when the norm covers a singularity equal to that of the case 
considered.67  
What is it that the subject is determining to be fair or equitable, and how is 
he going about it? Now the task at hand is not to answer that question, but 
to consider how we would answer it. It goes back to the concept of 
deliberation. 
That which we shall designate, for the purposes of this discussion, as 
deliberation is directly related to Ricoeur’s explanation of human 
conscience; he defines the conscience as “nothing other than the inner 
heartfelt conviction that inhabits the soul of the judge or the jury, equitably 
pronouncing the judgment.”68 What we have identified as deliberation is the 
result of the activity of the human conscience, the “heartfelt conviction” and 
wisdom.  
Ricoeur refers in particular to John Rawls in order to enhance his 
position and so introduces Rawls’ concept of “reasonable disagreement,” 
which refers to “the fragmentation of political ideals, of spheres of justice, 
and, even in the juridical domain, the multiplication of sources of law and 
the blossoming of codes of jurisdiction.” 69  The concept of reasonable 
disagreement gains traction as we consider the fragility of law and the 
tension between [personal] inner conviction and law that is, by definition, 
communal and social. Ricoeur explains:  
…things become more serious when it is no longer just norms that enter into 
conflict–once the respect owed to the universal norm confronts the respect 
owed to singular persons. It is indeed a question of the tragic dimension of 
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action when the norm remains recognized as a party in the debate, in the 
conflict that opposes it to solicitude for human poverty and suffering.70 
Where does the subject and the community to which he belongs draw the 
line when it comes to honoring and respecting personal conviction and 
honoring and respecting the laws set forth for the good of the community? 
The concept of “reasonable disagreement” goes to the heart of this very 
question because it puts the authenticity of the “tie between inner 
conviction and the speech act” at the center of the analysis to determine 
how to judge the circumstances of a situation justly. As Ricoeur rightly 
states, the conflict often times juxtaposes the strength of communal 
convention – law – against the solitude of human poverty and suffering of 
the individual person. Determining what is just in the face of this 
juxtaposition presents its own complexities and problems. 
Ricoeur, then, proposes that the subject use wisdom in judging. 
Specifically, he says, “Wisdom in judging consists in elaborating fragile 
compromises where it is a matter less of deciding between good and evil, 
between black and white, than between gray and gray, in the highly tragic 
case, between bad and worse.”71  In other words, wisdom in judging is 
man’s ability to distinguish and evaluate the subtle details that lend to the 
significances that constitute the varying levels of esteem and respect 
granted by personal conviction and conventional law. 
In fact, Ricoeur distinguishes between the judge and the ethicist, saying 
that the judge is “charged with stating the law in a singular situation,”72 
while the ethicist is “faced with the tragic dimension of action, states the 
better or the less bad, as it appears at the end of a debate where norms 
weigh no less than do persons.”73 Interestingly, the paradigm between the 
judge and the ethicist, is that in order for their arbitration to succeed, they 
must work together. Ricoeur, in speaking about the ethicist, says, “his inner 
conviction has as its objective correlate the apparent better thing to do in 
the circumstance.”74 Within the sequence of the sentences, the grammatical 
structure and syntactical construct, it is apparent that the possessive 
pronoun that Ricoeur uses refers to the ethicist, but let us still consider the 
question “about whom he is referring?” Considering that the judge and the 
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ethicist have to work together to render a just decision as it relates to the 
tension and the juxtaposition between the personal conviction and the law 
(and that very tension and juxtaposition play a part in the arbitration), let us 
submit this proposal which may seem obvious for some: the judge is the 
ethicist and the ethicist is the judge, but this is not to say that there is only 
one person arbitrating the matter. Rather, Ricoeur states, 
Wisdom in judging and the pronouncement of wise judgment must always 
involve more than one person. Then conscience truly merits the name 
conviction. Conviction is the new name that the strong adhesion of our first 
analysis now receives, after having traversed the rigor, intransigence, and 
impartiality of abstract ethics, and having confronted the tragic dimension of 
action.75  
Ricoeur’s argument is that it is by wisdom that the subject, in community 
with others, may judge a situation, evaluate it based on his own self-esteem 
and self-respect and determine what is just. However, that wisdom is 
garnered and decisions are made based on the common conviction since it 
is through the convening of subjects that the dialogue about their personal 
inner convictions, its tension with the communal law and how a particular 
situation may be judged in light of the conviction, the communal law and 
the eventual tension among the two. Ricoeur writes that it is better  
…to conserve the vocabulary forged on the occasion of the juridical judgment 
in situation, issues from an intersecting play of argumentation and 
interpretation, the decision taken at the end of a debate with oneself, at the 
heart of what we may call our innermost forum, our heart of hearts, will be all 
the more worthy of being called wise if it issues from a council…76 
The question that remains is this: if wisdom comes by way of council, the 
convening of subjects to determine the virtues of personal conviction 
versus communal law as it applies to specific situations, does that mean 
that the individual person, the subject himself cannot be wise? If the answer 
is no, then how can any decision man makes without the benefit of council 
be deemed wise? In the United States of America, persons who have been 
accused of a criminal act have the option of trial by a jury of their peers or 
bench trial where they are tried in front of a single judge. In the event that 
the accused chooses a bench trial, can it ever be said that the decision was 
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wise? Perhaps this is an argument for another thesis, but the doubt that 
Ricoeur’s teaching on wisdom and justice remains. 
Returning to agent, act, law and justice, in many situations, a damaging 
act has already been committed against a person or group of persons. It is 
then the responsibility of the judge, the person or entity (group of persons) 
to whom the responsibility of arbitrating the matter has been assigned, to 
determine the severity of harm done, the agent of the action that caused the 
damage, as well as rendering judgment about how that damage may be 
valued – if the damage should be valued more in accordance with the 
conventions of law or closer to the personal inner conviction. These 
questions must be considered seriously and remain contemporary issues 
because no matter how often laws are updated, they are antiquated to a 
degree relative to the living (the act) of the subject who conceive of them 
and agree on a convention. 
Furthermore, let us not forget that, based on Ricoeur’s explanation [and 
our interpretation], law as text is still discourse fixed by writing. Therefore, 
as soon as the discourse is fixed, it ceases to exist in the now and is subject 
to the rigors of time and hermeneutics. That is to say, the subject must seek 
it, refer to it and interpret it. In this way, law falls under the same structure as 
any other text in terms of explanation, understanding and interpretation – 
hermeneutics. 
2.3  Justice and the dialogical event 
The law as text is exceptional because of its place in time as it relates to 
the subject’s experience of the world and the text that is written perhaps by 
a another subject who has experienced the world in a very different context. 
That is to say, the context in which the law as text is written must be taken 
into account when the subject reads it with a hermeneutical filter. But in 
order for the subject to apply the law to a situation considering the various 
particulars (no two situations are exactly the same), he must understand and 
interpret the text that is the law taking into consideration the context in 
which it was written. 
In this way, time becomes a crucial factor in the hermeneutics of law as 
the subject seeks to impart justice. In order for us to understand how time 
affects the context of text and, in particular, law as text, we have to 
consider the subject’s worldview. To rectify the disconnect between the 
context of the text and the worldview for the sake of justice, the subject 
must enter into critical dialogue with others whom he encounters in his 
experience, other Beings-in-the-world with whom he is in community. 
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To do this, we must engage in three exercises: firstly, we must be sure 
that we understand justice based on the thesis that we proposed at the 
beginning of this chapter77; secondly, we must explore the dialogical event, 
the subject’s place in it, his relation with others with whom he must 
convene to discuss his personal convictions in order to develop a 
communal conviction; and thirdly, we must explore, if only momentarily 
and hypothetically, how or if that dialogue affects the subject’s inner 
convictions. 
We return to the first chapter of Ricoeur’s The Just where he discusses 
“The Dialogical and Institutional Structure of the Subject of Rights.” 78 
While introducing the discussion, Ricoeur writes: 
It can be tempting for a dialogical philosophy to limit itself to relations with 
other individual people, which are usually placed under the heading of an I-
thou dialogue. It is precisely these relations with other individuals that are held 
to be worthy of being qualified as interpersonal. But this face-to-face relation 
lacks the relation to a third party that seems just as primitive as the relation to 
an individual ‘you.’ This point is of the greatest importance if we want to 
account for the transition from the notion of the capable human being to that 
of the real subject of rights.79 
In this admission we have the beginnings of a clearer understanding of 
justice as it pertains to the capable subject and his relation with the other. 
Ricoeur is setting the stage for the transition from the I-thou relation which, 
as we have seen, is based on the face-to-face encounter, to the inclusion of 
the relation between the I and the third party. Who that third party is will 
vary depending on the situation, but let us say that the third party is the you 
who may not be present to the I; the third party is the you whom the I has 
not encountered in a face-to-face experience. And yet, the third party is a 
subject who commands the same respect and consideration as the I and the 
you who is indeed present to the I in the face-to-face encounter. 
The relation with the absent or unseen third party is crucial to the 
understanding of justice because “Only the relation to the third, situated in 
the background of the relation to the you, gives us a basis for the institutional 
                                           
77 We must also consider it in confrontation with what we have learned about text, 
responsibility, hermeneutics and human relation from Ricoeur (the understanding of 
justice that we gain in this exercise will also help to illuminate the concept in the face of 
love, which we shall explore in the final section of this chapter). 
78 Ibid., pp. 5-10. 
79 Ibid., p. 5. 
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mediation required by the constitution of a real subject of rights – in their 
words, of a citizen.”80 The mediation that Ricoeur mentions is the I-you 
relation, but there is a third party who completes the subject of rights, and 
that mediation, by otherness, distinguishes the other as you and the other as a 
third party. Ricoeur continues with this statement, “… mediation by 
otherness in general and that of the distinction between the other as a ‘you’ 
and the other as a third party – can be established on the plane of 
fundamental anthropology to which we appealed in order to elaborate the 
notion of a capable subject.”81 Therefore, there is a triadic constitution to the 
interpersonal form of otherness, which, we shall see, introduces the concept 
of institution; the triadic constitution is the I-you-3rd person relational 
structure. 
To further illustrate his philosophy about the triadic constitution, Ricoeur 
returns to the discussion of the capable human being and relates it to the 
speaking subject:  
We placed the principal accent on the capacity of the speaker to designate 
himself as the unique speaker of his multiple utterances. But we pretend to 
ignore that it is in this context of interlocution that a subject of discourse can 
identify and designate himself. Within this context, and corresponding to the 
first-person speaker, there is a second-person hearer of what is said.82  
In a face-to-face encounter, the I is able to relate to the other or you as the 
correlative interlocutor; in this event of relation, the I is able to see that the 
other is, as Ricoeur says, “like me.” He explains it in terms of the use of 
personal pronouns, “Our mastery of the personal pronouns is not complete 
so long as the rules for this exchange are not fully understood. This mastery 
contributes in the following way to the emergence of the subject of rights: 
like me the other can designate himself as an I when he speaks.”83 In the I’s 
recognition that the other is “like me” he is admitting or recognizing the 
other in terms of their rights as a capable subject and their duties to their 
self.84 
Given that the I does not have the vocabulary or the innate concept of the 
third party with whom he is in relation although he cannot readily perceive 
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82 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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84 “The expression ‘like me’ already announces the recognition of the other as my 
equal in terms of rights and duties” (Ibid., p. 6). 
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it, his ability to include the third party in his recognition of equality as it 
regards rights and duties is limited. The I uses, he/she/it to refer to the third 
party, but he does not relate to it as a you, an equal: 
… we lack the reference to the very institution of language in which the 
interpersonal relation is framed. In this sense, he/she/it represents the 
institution, inasmuch as it encompasses all the speakers of one natural 
language who know themselves and who are bound together by the 
recognition of the common rules that distinguish one language from another.85 
The other, therefore, is not a you with whom the I is in a readily 
recognizable relation; instead the other is a manner of speaking to refer to 
the Beings-in-the-world who are absent to the I or, rather, unseen or not 
perceived. But it is in the common rules of language that the I is able to 
maintain contact if not a perceivable relation with the other; and it is 
through language [and the you] that the I is able to establish an 
understanding of the interpersonal relation that goes beyond the I-you 
construct to include the other as an institution or an encompassing concept 
of yous whom the I will not encounter face-to-face and will refer to as 
he/she/it. 
And it is through language and the relation with the you that the I is able 
to relate to the other and engage and interact in such a way that 
conventions are established for standards of behavior and ethics. Ricoeur 
demonstrates this when he says, “I expect that each will mean what he or 
she says. This confidence establishes public discourse on a basis of trust 
where the other appears as a third party and not just as a ‘you.’ In truth, this 
fiduciary base is more than an interpersonal relation, it is the institutional 
condition for every interpersonal relation.” 86  The confidence that 
establishes public discourse originates in language and in the relation with 
the you; trust starts with the rule of sincerity, in the I meaning what he says 
and trusting that the you means what he says. Likewise, the trust continues 
to the third party as other insofar as the I has accepted, through language 
and his relation with the you, that the other is a you removed from his 
immediate experience with whom he is in relation and, consequently, in 
whose word he can trust. 
It is, therefore, this trust on which justice is based because the 
convention of laws is also ultimately, first and foremost, based on the trust 
that exists within the triadic structure, the I-you-3rd party relation. With this 
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said, we can then conclude that justice is based on inter-human relation and 
originates in the dialogical event, between the interlocutors – the speaker 
and the hearer – as well as the third party who is not immediately present to 
the I with whom the I is nevertheless in relation. 
In examining the construct of the I-you-3rd party relation, we have not 
only come to a better understanding of justice, but we have also begun to 
gain an understanding of the subject’s place in the dialogical event, his 
relation to others within the dialogical paradigm and the affect that 
dialogue may have on his inner convictions. 
We understand that the subject as the I is central to his understanding 
and interpretation of his own experiences, and that his relation with the you 
as another subject is based on that centrality. We understand that his 
relation with the you is based on a face-to-face encounter and is further 
enriched by language. We also understand that his relation with the third 
party, the yous whom he does not encounter face-to-face and does not 
readily perceive as being in relation with them is indeed based on his 
recognition of the you with whom he has the face-to-face encounter as 
equal in terms of rights and duties as a capable subject. The I’s relation 
with the other, therefore, is institutional and not fully realized since he 
refers to the other as he/she/it rather than the personal you. 
3. Love and Justice 
As a final exercise that will conclude this chapter on Human Action and 
Justice (Part II of this dissertation), we will veer from the proverbial beaten 
path and include the concept of love in our discussion about justice. While 
love remains an ethereal if not ultimately a personal, subjective concept, we 
will give it real estate in this project because Ricoeur found it relevant to 
justice. In his short work entitled Love and Justice87, in identifying what he 
determines to be the central problem of love to be ethical, “Il problema è 
tutto qui: l’amore ha, nel nostro discorse etico, uno statuto normativo 
comparabile a quello dell'utilitarismo o anche dell'imperativo 
categorico?”88 and exploring its implications, he embarks on this exercise 
by way of investigating the dialectic between love and justice.  
                                           
87 The text Love and Justice was only found in Italian, so all citations will be in 
Italian. P. RICOEUR, Amore e giustizia. Originally published as Amor et Justice in 1990. 
Translation by Ilario Bertoletti. Editrice Morcelliana. 2007. 
88 Ibid., p. 8. 
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It must be noted that Ricoeur develops his understanding and 
interpretation of love as it relates to justice based on the biblical (Hebrew 
and Christian Scriptures) teachings of love and justice. Notwithstanding the 
source from which he develops his philosophy, we continue referring to 
Ricoeur’s teachings because of its universality, which is to say, the 
principles are not limited to the scope of Christianity or Judaism. 
3.1  The Concept of Love 
Having identified the problem of love, Ricoeur proceeds with his 
investigation by taking into consideration the link between love and a 
prayer of praise, the strangeness of the way in which the commandment to 
“love the Lord your God… so too you must love your neighbor as you love 
yourself” is imposed; and the problematic between the affection or 
attachment associated with love and the command to love. Ricoeur explains 
that from the point of view of the prayer of adoration or praise, the three 
components of pleasing (gratifying or indulging), seeing and raising the 
object of love to a higher status, fulfills one with a sense of joy. In this way 
love is deemed as a valuation of the other, so much so that a person 
esteems sings the others praises, sees them as a subject in their own right 
and in doing so raises them al di sopra or to a plain of adhering to their 
personal command, “Do not kill me, rather, love me!” 
The second aspect of love is what Ricoeur calls the strangeness of the 
discourse of love as it regards the baffling imposition of the commandment, 
“Love the Lord your God … love your neighbor as you love yourself.” In 
his explanation, he refers to Kant’s teachings on morality, and explains that 
Kant avoids the difficulty distinguishing “practical love” in respect of the 
persons as ends in themselves, from “pathological” love that does not have 
a place in morality. 89  In other words, Kant identifies a problem with 
“practical” love as it relates to morality because “loving” someone in an 
attempt to get something out of them goes to the center of the moral issue. 
Loving regards seeing and relating to the other as a subject in their own 
right and treating them with the respect and deference that their being 
demands. 
Finally, we approach the last aspect which is a question of reconciling 
the first and second aspects: confronting the difficulty of rectifying the 
                                           
89 “Kant evita la difficoltà distinguendo l’amore «pratico», in quanto respetto delle 
persone come fini in se stesse, dall’amore «patologico» che non ha posto nella sfera 
della moralità” (Ibid., p. 13). 
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affection that is associated with love and that of being commanded to love 
– especially extending love to a person for whom one has no affection. 
Ricoeur subtly identifies and suggests that the key to a moral approach to 
love is in the very act of love. In the locutionary act, the subject is given the 
commandment to love the other as he loves himself. Analogously, love is 
not to be seen as a noun that is either subject or object, but rather an action 
verb. In posing these questions, Ricoeur suggests that love is the action of 
being obedient to the command of the other, “Do not kill me, rather, love 
me!” It is from here that the ethics of love emerges.  
Referring to the Hebrew Scriptures and the writings of Franz 
Rosenzweig (1886-1929), particularly The Star of Redemption90, Ricoeur 
makes an important distinction about love as a commandment and action 
verb and love as a gift to the other: he says that love is a solemn act of 
being open to the human experience.91 Still with reference to Rosenzweig’s 
writings, particularly the second part on Revelation, Ricoeur concurs with 
Rosenzweig when he supports the idea that love is ultimately an intimate 
relation or communion between God and a single soul.92 
3.2 The Commandment “Love me!” and the Law  
For Paul Ricoeur, the commandment originates from love whereas the law 
originates from man. He goes on to say, “L’amore è oggetto e soggetto del 
comandamento, o, in altri termini, è un comandamento che contiene le 
condizioni della sua propria obbedienza grazie alla tenerezza 
dell'esortazione «Amami!».” 93  Love is not only the origin of the 
commandment, it is the fulfillment of the commandment: the obedience to 
the commandment “Love me!” is in itself an act of love. 
In this case, therefore, Ricoeur asserts that the relation between the 
commandment “Love me!” and the song of praise is essentially a moral 
                                           
90 F. ROSENZWEIG, The Star of Redemption. Originally published as Der Stern der 
Erlösung in 1921. Translated by Barbara Galli. The University of Wisconsin Press. 
Madison, Wisconsin. 2005.  
91 “La Torà, a questo stadio della meditazione di Rosenzweig, non è ancora un 
insieme di regole – o piuttosto, può diventare tale in quanto è preceduta dal solenne 
atto di apertura di tutta l’esperienza umana al linguaggio paradigmatico della 
Scrittura” (P. RICOEUR, Amore e Giustizia. p. 14). 
92 “All’inizio della sezione Rivelazione, Rosenzweig considera unicamente il colloquio 
intimo tra Dio e un’anima sola, prima che entri in scena il ‘terzo’ nella sezione 
Redenzione” (Ibid., p. 15). 
93 Ibid., p. 16. 
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imperative, an obligation as it refers to the spark in the human inclination94 
[to be in relation with the other]. What that means is the commandment 
(and obedience) of love as the foundation for the moral imperative by 
which the subject should relate to others. Love, therefore, is the basis for 
the ethic of what the subject ought to do as it relates to the other. More 
specifically, that ought, which is the ethic governing how the I relates to the 
other, is always going to be love. 
But to understand more fully the relation between love and justice, let us 
consider the following assertion as we continue to delve into Ricoeur’s 
reflection on love and justice: the dialectic of love and justice is the very 
commandment and obedience of love – the act of love is a just one. 
Keeping this definition of the dialectic of love and justice in mind, we shall 
follow Ricoeur’s lead and refer to 1 Corinthians, Chapter 13. As we 
examine this well-known chapter from Saint Paul’s epistle to the followers 
of Jesus of Nazareth in Corinth, let us also take note of a particularity as it 
relates to love: love is being! 
What do we mean by this? Love, insofar as the subject can conceive of 
it, speak of it, do it (love is an action verb) and on certain levels, feel it, is 
being. Love has a phenomenological characteristic because it can be 
experienced. What exactly is love beyond the commandment and 
obedience to the commandment, our ontological endeavor may never 
reveal to us. But insofar as the subject can experience love, issue the 
commandment and obey it, love is being. 
In verses four through seven in Chapter 13 of the First Letter to the 
Corinthians, Paul speaks of love in terms of its ontology – what it is. He 
says, “Love is patient, love is kind. It is not jealous, [love] is not pompous, 
it is not inflated, it is not rude, it does not seek its own interests, it is not 
quick-tempered, it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over 
wrongdoing but rejoices with the truth. It bears all things, believes all 
things, hopes all things, endures all things.”95 In describing love, Paul does 
two things: he defines it clarifying what it means to be obedient to the 
command, and in doing so he also explores the commandment in greater 
depth. The commandment is more than “Don’t kill me, but rather love me!” 
                                           
94 “In virtù di questa parentela tra il comandamento «Amami!» e il canto di lode, il 
comandamento d’amore si rivela irriducibile, nel suo tenore etico, al’'imperativo 
morale – imperativo legittimamente equiparato da Kant all'obbligazione, al dovere, in 
riferimento al recalcitrare delle inclinazioni umane” (Ibid., p. 17). 
95 The New American Bible, 1 Cor 13:4-7. 
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The commandment is humble and seeks relation with the other. The 
commandment, just like the obedience to the command, is patient and kind, 
it is not inflated or rude or seeks its own interest; the commandment is not 
quick-tempered and does not brood over injury; and the commandment 
does not rejoice over wrongdoing. In seeking relation with the other, the 
commandment bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things and 
endures all things. 
Again, what does this mean? If love is all of these things [and more], it 
cannot be and is not argumentative. According to Ricoeur, justice, on the 
other hand, is argumentative. “La giustizia argomenta, e in modo molto 
particolare, confrontando le ragioni pro o contro, ritenute plausibili, 
comunicabili, degne di essere discusse dalle parti in causa.” 96  Justice, 
unlike love, will attempt to confront reason, rationalizing the pros and cons 
of a situation. Justice engages in discourse in a way that love does not. 
Love does not argue the commandment, weighing the various possibilities 
of obedience; love demands, and that is it. Justice, instead, regards the 
communicative part of the subject’s relationship with the other. Ricoeur 
says, “la giustizia è una parte dell’attività comunicativa: il confronto di 
argomenti davanti ad un tribunali è un esempio significativo di impiego 
dialogico del linguaggio.”97 Justice is a part of the relation between the 
subject and the other – it is the communicative part that arbitrates between 
subjects who question if they are being loved, if their commandment is 
being obeyed. 
For Ricoeur, just is the mechanism by which the subject, in community 
with others, arbitrates the moral implications of man’s actions – especially 
when those actions are contrary to the commandment and obedience of 
love. Moreover, in arbitrating these conflicts, justice is not just a means of 
arguing the various points, the pros and cons of a series of events to 
determine where the responsibilities lie. Justice also appears as the 
judgment of that responsibility and the corresponding moral implications. 
Justice, in argumentation, arbitration and judgment attempts to bring 
balance to the commandment and obedience of love. 
3.3  Proximity and the Dialectic 
                                           
96 P. RICOEUR, Amore e giustizia. p. 24. 
97 Ibid., p. 24. 
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Ricoeur goes into greater depth with this investigation be exploring the 
implication of this paradigm of justice on the individual as well as on 
society at large – what we shall understand as part of the concept of 
proximity. He discusses the responsibility that this model of justice imposes 
on a person and society. 98  Depending on the justice system, a single 
individual may be entrusted the responsibility of arbitrating a conflict, 
weighing the merits of a series of events and determining who or what 
entity is responsible; in this same instance, it is up to that individual judge 
to issue a sentence in order to re-establish a balance within the moral fabric 
of that community. 
In terms of distributive justice, the crux of the problem is that persons 
must participate in society in order to enjoy the benefits of justice rendered 
by that society. Consequently, any persons who do not participate within 
said society or remain on the margins of that society, may not be granted 
the same levels of consideration and representation that would protect their 
rights to action that would, therefore, fall under the purview of justice. 
It is at this point that we should probably acknowledge a common way of 
conceiving justice is to relate it directly to equality.99 Justice as equality is 
intrinsically related to the distribution theory because it assumes that in 
order for their to be justice, things must be distributed equaly. In an 
understated way, Ricoeur challenges this notion by posing this question: 
“Ma che ne è delle distribuzioni notoriamente diseguali in materia di 
riddito e proprietà, autorità e responsabilità, onori?”100 Is it truly possible, 
under the guidance of this theory, to have equality when it comes to that 
which is intangible but Dasein, nevertheless, values – as Ricoeur points 
out, authority, responsibility and honor? How does the theory of 
distribution provide for an equal [and just] distribution of these intangibles? 
Is it even possible? And who determines what is equal? 
Aristotle was the first to confront this issue, distinguishing proportional 
equality from mathematic equality; he deals with the question of in a 
society, distribution should be proportional or if everyone gets an equal 1:1 
share of the goods.101 Ricoeur juxtaposes Aristotle’s investigation into the 
                                           
98 Ibid., p. 25. 
99 Ibid., p. 27. 
100 Ibid., p. 27. 
101  “Aristotele è stato il primo ad essersi confrontato con questa difficoltà, 
distinguendo l’eguaglianza proporzionale dall’egualianza artimetica. Una ripartizione 
è giusta se è proporzionale al contributo sociale delle parti” (Ibid., p. 28). 
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concept of equality to John Rawls’ assertions of equality as justice. 
“All’altra estremità della storia del problema ritroviamo lo stesso tentativo 
in John Rawls: giustificare l’equazione tra giustizia ed eguaglianza nelle 
ripartizioni diseguali, chiedendo che l’aumento dei vantaggi per i più 
favoriti sia compensato dalla diminuzione degli svantaggi per i più 
sfavoriti.”102 With all do respect to Rawls and his attempt to propose a 
viable theory of justice, we must disagree with his conclusions. 
The objections to his theory are in his understanding of justice as 
fairness. He says, “… the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for 
the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement,”103 
and “Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation 
choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic 
rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.”104 He 
specifies what he means with these statements: justice as fairness “conveys 
the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that 
is fair,”105 and “Justice as fairness begins… with one of the most general of 
all choices which persons might make together, namely, with the choice of 
the first principles of a concept of justice which is to regulate all 
subsequent criticism and reform of institutions.”106 The first objection we 
shall propose to Rawls’ theory is that it is devoid of any possibility or 
condition for a relation between the I and the other; it does not take into 
account the phenomenology of the subject’s interaction with the other and 
the implication of the resulting (and inevitable) relation.  
Proceeding to Rawls’ explanation of what he deems are the two 
principles of justice, the first is “each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for others.” 107  The second is “social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected 
to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices 
open to all.”108 The principles are representative of equity, but as they are 
conceived, the person who is to be granted rights, liberties and justice is in 
                                           
102 Ibid., p. 28. 
103 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. President and Fellows of Harvard 
College. USA. 1971 & 1999. p. 10. 
104 Ibid., p. 10. 
105 Ibid., p. 11. 
106 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
107 Ibid., p. 53. 
108 Ibid., p. 53. 
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relation with the scheme of equality rather than with the persons that 
constitute the society in which rights, liberties and justice are promulgated, 
protected, defended and upheld. The instances of equalities that Rawls 
mentions are not reflective of humanity or on humanity (the self reflection 
that man engages in when considering his existence and its relation to the 
rest of existence). Rather Rawls’ concept of justice and the principles on 
which he bases it are centered on the system of distribution; it does not 
reflect on why that distribution is necessary or the non-material benefits 
that it may afford the individual and society. 
Rawls’ attempt to include the self is a shallow and faulty philosophy 
because he does not demonstrate that he truly understands the ontology of 
the self. He says, “All social values – liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s 
advantage.”109 If we take Ricoeur’s teachings on the origin of the esteem 
the subject has for himself a viable argument and reasonable understanding 
of the self that contributes to his ontology, the assertion of self-respect 
having a basis in society, is erroneous as we have already witnessed the 
demonstration that the esteem for the self begins within the self – the 
subject’s esteem of himself originates within himself. The way in which he 
values everything else in the world that he experiences is based, then, on 
how and to what degree he values himself. The self, therefore, and the 
respect or esteem that it has reflexively cannot come from anything or 
anyone else – that is to say, self-respect is based on the subject’s intrinsic 
value. Society does not grant respect to the self. Esteem and respect for the 
self originates in the relation the subject has with himself. 
These objections that we have just submitted to Rawls’ theory of justice 
and the corresponding guiding principles, coupled with the following 
assessment Ricoeur gives in his work The Just, shall demonstrate why it is 
not being referred to any further than this in the present discussion: 
Fairness, in the first place, characterizes the procedure of deliberation that 
should lead to the choice of those principles of justice recommended by 
Rawls, whereas justice designates the content of the chosen principles. In this 
way, the whole book aims at providing a contractualist version of Kantian 
autonomy. For Kant, the law is the law freedom would give itself if it could 
remove itself from the inclination of desires and of pleasure.110 
                                           
109 Ibid., p. 54. 
110 P. RICOEUR, The Just. p. 39. 
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The full breadth of love and all that it implies infinitely surpasses the 
finite phenomenological references that the subject can articulate and 
submit for debate; that is to say, the laws that the subject and his 
community of others create to ensure that relations between individual 
persons as well as relations between individual persons and their 
community are ultimately insufficient to ensure that commandments are 
obeyed.  
If this is indeed the case, that the subject’s laws are insufficient, then 
justice as we have just observed Ricoeur define and illustrate it, can never 
fully achieve its goal. Instead, should we consider that justice may be the 
loving, reciprocal relation between the subject and the other, the subject 
and his community, the subject and his environment and, finally, the 
subject and his Creator – or that from which subject’s being originates? 
Taking this paradigm of justice, we can then apply it more liberally and 
amply to instances of conflict between subject and the other 
aforementioned beings with whom he is in relation. I submit for 
consideration this alternative dynamic of justice as it relates to love: when 
the subject has not loved (acted) as he ought or was not loved (cared for) as 
he ought have been, in the case of having acted less than lovingly, the just 
action is for the subject to ask for forgiveness and seek reconciliation, to re-
enter a loving relation with the other; in the case of having his demand for 
love not obeyed, the just act would be for the subject to welcome the other 
to re-enter a loving relation whenever the other is ready to seek 
reconciliation [and forgiveness]. 
Returning to the dialectic between love and justice, I submit that 
ultimately the key is the proximity between the subject and the other, that is 
to say, the relation between the I and the other. Insofar as justice is 
understood in terms of love, the commandment and obedience, it is present 
in a loving relation between the subject and the other, between the subject 
and the community to which he belongs, the subject and his environment 
and the subject and his Creator. The just act is a loving act; conversely, 
love as action, commandment and obedience, is part of justice. 
Applying the approach of love and justice to our development of a 
corporate ethic based on a personal response to the call of the other, we will 
say this: if we accept that justice is the loving, reciprocal relation between 
the subject and the other, then we not only acknowledge the responsibility 
that those who comprise the corporation have in answering the call of the 
other and third persons as Is in their own experience of the world, but that 
that response, which is immediate, appropriate and positive, is love and the 
result of that acknowledgment is justice. Therefore, the corporation (those 
224  PART TWO: HUMAN ACTION AS TEXT, PAUL RICOEUR 
 
 
persons who comprise it) that responds immediately, appropriately and 
positively to the call of the other and third persons with whom it is in 
relation by way of the proximity of the other acts in a way that promotes, 
supports and defends human dignity. It is from here that justice emerges in 
corporate action. 
Finally, as we have studied and commented on the human action, 
intentionality, capability, subjectivity and phenomenology, we can draw 
one more conclusion that is crucial to the development of our corporate 
ethic: corporate action in se does not exist because the corporate as a being 
cannot act of its own will and desires. Coupling Ricoeur’s investigation of 
the self with Heidegger’s Dasein, the corporation does not qualify as an 
entity that can be referred to with the attributes, qualities and accidents of a 
human person. The corporation has no single point of reference by which to 
refer to itself as a self,111 nor is it a being-in-the-world that is aware of its 
being. The corporation as such does not have a self, will or desires. The 
corporation as a conglomerate of persons, human beings who are aware of 
their selves can act only insofar as those persons work together to in the 
name of the corporation (this represents an agreement). On the other hand, 
some persons who are members of the community that is the corporation 
can act on behalf of the corporation. These are the two ways that the 
corporation may act, but it must be understood that the term corporate 
action is a short-hand way of articulating the human action that is taking 
place within the corporation or on behalf of the corporation – corporate 
action is human action. 
So any corporate ethic that either we or anyone else develops using 
Ricoeurian or Heideggerian philosophy of the person (the subject, self and 
Dasein) should refer to the human persons who comprise the corporation 
and those with whom the corporation is in relation as the point of departure 
as well as the impetus and end for the ethic. Responsibility to and for the 
other is the paradigm of human relation and the precept on which we will 
develop our corporate ethic. We contend that it is from this paradigm that 
justice may emerge in a corporation. 
 
                                           
111 The poverty of language sometimes demands that we use words in a circular 




Integrating Responsibility and Justice:  
Towards a Corporate Ethic 
Now that we have explored Levinas’ ethical demand and Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics, we are now ready to propose our system of corporate ethics. 
The development has perhaps been subtle as we have occupied ourselves 
with metaphysical inquiries into the nature of man and his relation with 
other men as well as with interpretation theory as it applies to action as 
text. As we present our system of corporate ethics, we will explain each 
component as it relates to either Levinas’ or Ricoeur’s philosophies, and we 
will demonstrate its relevance and applicability in the contemporary 
context of the corporation. 
We will continue by outlining ten questions that persons who comprise 
the corporation can ask themselves to determine how they as individuals in 
the corporation and the corporation as a whole respond to the call of the 
other. We will then briefly compare traditional understandings of business 
and economic ethics to our newly developed system of corporate ethics to 
see what value it can add to the way persons and corporations behave and 
evaluate their behavior. And finally, we will apply our ethics to a 
contemporary corporation; we will use the case study to demonstrate its 
relevance and applicability to how corporate action is evaluated. 
We will use this last part to bring our ideas and understandings of the 
personal ethical demand, hermeneutics, text, action and phenomenology to 
present a clear and concise model of how man must act when in relation 
with another man and other men with whom he may not have direct 
contact. The ethics that we are proposing is within the context of the 
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corporation, but more generally, it must be understood that the context is 
that of humanity. The ultimate question that we are addressing is “How 
ought man act when he is in relation with the other?” The corporation is 





Personal Responsibility and the Corporate Ethic 
1. From Levinas to Ricoeur  
Using the philosophies of Levinas (ontology of man and his relationship 
with the other) and Ricoeur (hermeneutics and text as action), we shall 
develop a system of corporate ethics based on the I’s personal 
responsibility to answer the call of the other while applying interpretation 
theory to how we understand human action. The apex of our proposed 
system of ethics is that it is incumbent on the corporation (a group 
comprised of two or more persons working together to provide a product or 
render a service) to respond to the call of the other and other others (third 
persons) with whom it is in relation (by way of the persons who comprise 
the corporation) immediately and in a positive manner that supports, 
promotes and defends human dignity; corporate action, then, should be 
analyzed, interpreted and understood (as text) according to the 
hermeneutical exercise, allowing for a greater understanding of the action, 
its implications for both the agent, those effected by the action and any 
reconciliation (often understood as punishment in the juridical sense) 
needed to be done. 
The focal points of this system of ethics are the human being, his dignity 
as a person and the dignity of the other person with whom he is in relation 
– our system of ethics does this by setting standards for how they relate to 
each other, by recognizing and holding the corporation accountable by 
holding the many Is that comprise it accountable; it highlights the 
responsibility the I has to and for the other to the point that the I is also 
responsible for the other’s responsibility; this system of ethics aims to 
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promote, support and defend the dignity of those persons who comprise the 
corporation as well as those with whom the corporation is in relationship, 
including those persons who are represented by the category, other other or 
third person. 
In a corporation adopting this system of ethics and adhering to its 
standards, the corporation is no longer just an entity within the economic 
system that is prone to the whims of economic trends; in taking 
responsibility and holding itself accountable based on the personal demand 
to respond to the call of the other, it transcends the dictionary definition of 
“an association of individuals, created by law or under authority of law, 
having a continuous existence independent of the existences of its 
members, and powers and liabilities distinct from those of its members”1 
and “Corporations are taxable entities, which shields the individual owners 
or shareholders from personal liability for the liabilities and debts of the 
corporation, with some limited exceptions – such as unpaid taxes”2; the 
corporation then becomes a conglomerate of responsible persons gathered 
together working for a common goal of providing a product or rendering a 
service for a benefit that they have defined among them while promoting, 
supporting and protecting human dignity.  
The distinction may be fine, but it is there: instead of being defined as an 
association of individuals or an artificial person or legal entity, the 
corporation is understood from within as a group of persons who are 
responsible for their own actions and the actions taken in the name of the 
corporation as well as within the context of the corporation. In this 
transcendence, we reaffirm and laud the personhood and dignity of each 
human being that works within the corporation and the dignity of those 
human beings who are clients, suppliers, partners and competitors. 
Finally, we must make one more distinction: The integrity of man’s 
dignity as a human being among other human beings starts with his 
command to other men not to harm him and instead care for him. In this 
way, man’s dignity is intrinsic to his being. As he encounters other men, his 
human dignity is affirmed or denied depending on the justice he 
experiences in the paradigm of the person-to-person relationship with other 
men whom he encounters (face-to-face). As the I encounters the other, he 
hears the call and command of the other; the I’s immediate, positive and 
appropriate response to the other’s call upholds, promotes, supports and 
                                           
1 www.dictionary.com. 
2 www.hg.org/corporate-law.html. 
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even protects the human dignity of the other. The deliberate and conscious 
actions of the I to respond immediately, positively and appropriately to the 
other’s call reaffirms the human dignity of the other.  
Therefore, we maintain that human action, action that is deliberately and 
consciously committed by man, directly affirms or denies the human 
dignity of the other. This is to say, man as the agent of action has a direct 
impact on the upholding or tearing down the other’s dignity. Furthermore, 
we assert that it is the I’s responsibility to respond to the call of the other in 
a way that affirms the other’s dignity – that response must be an action that 
is immediate, positive and appropriate with regard to the other’s demand. 
By the same token, in affirming the other’s dignity through responsible 
and just human action, the I affirms his own human dignity. As we have 
come to understand from Levinas’ ontologies of man and the human 
relation, one of the ways man is able to transcend the state of his existence 
is through just human relationships. So, man as the agent of human action 
affirms the human dignity of the other as well as his own when he responds 
immediately, positively and appropriately to the call of other men. The 
corporation or the community of men working together for a common goal 
can either be the vehicle for responsible and just human action or the 
context for such action. 
2. The Corporation as the Agent vs. the Context of Human Action 
In studying Ricoeur’s philosophy of hermeneutics, we understand that 
we must consider all aspects of the context that are perceivable when we 
are reading, interpreting and understanding a text. The context includes but 
is not limited to the author’s time and place, the time and place of the 
reader and the message that the author intends to convey. The absence of 
the author from the reader contributes greatly to the context of the text 
because the burden of rendering the message intelligible falls heavily on 
the author and the interpretation and understanding on the reader. 
As we look at human action as a text, we must consider the various 
elements that contribute to the context, which are not restricted to the 
perceived notions of cause and effect. When examining human action, we 
must look beyond the agent and action to interpret and understand the 
action; like the written text, we must look at human action as having an 
author but recognizing that the author or agent may not be obvious to the 
naked eye, or even that there may be various agents contributing to what 
may be perceived as a single action. We have to take into account the entire 
context of the action, the agent as the author of the text and the action as 
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the text. And just as the author and reader’s absence from each other 
contributes to the context, so does the absence of the agent and he who 
perceives the action contribute to the interpretation and understanding of 
the action. 
When corporations act, one of the elements of the context of human 
action that we may not readily appreciate is that the corporation seen as the 
agent of action may instead be the context of human action. More precisely, 
all too often, we tend to regard a group of persons working together as a 
single entity rather than an entity comprised of human beings, and in not 
keeping this in perspective, we readily attribute actions committed by the 
persons within the group to the group as a whole, as if the group were an 
autonomous, free-thinking person in se. Instead, while acknowledging the 
phenomenological entity that is the group comprised of individual persons, 
we cannot conflate the actions done by individual persons within the 
context of the group (and even perhaps in the name of the group) with the 
actions committed by the conglomerate of persons acting as one.  
The same holds true for the corporation: we must be judicious in how we 
interpret actions committed by the corporation; we must also be critical in 
identifying the corporation as the agent of human action. The point is not to 
backtrack on our assertion that the corporation has an inherent 
responsibility to itself, its staff/employees, partners, suppliers, environment 
and even competitors to conduct itself and engage in action that supports, 
promotes and defends human dignity. Rather, our point is to demonstrate 
that within this system of corporate ethics, we acknowledge that while two 
or more persons working together to produce a good or service can affect 
human action together and are, therefore, demanded as a corporation to 
respond to the call of the other; we also recognize that not all action done 
in the name of the corporation is done by the corporation. 
Sometimes, human action is committed within the context of the 
corporation, and in this case, we must be critical of the human action as an 
action committed by one or more persons who may not necessarily 
represent the desire and vision of the whole conglomerate. For example, if 
a ABC Corporation has the mission to produce X product while offering Z 
services, the persons who comprise the company understand that this is the 
mission and have agreed to that mission – the actions to bring X product 
and Z services to their consumers are corporate actions because they are 
actions in the name of the corporation to which all persons comprising the 
corporation have agreed participate; on the other hand, if a few persons 
within ABC Corporation commit actions to defraud their suppliers, partners 
and consumers without the expressed knowledge and agreement of all 
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persons comprising the corporation, then the ABC Corporation becomes 
the context of the human action of those who committed the action of 
fraud. So in both cases, we must be attentive in ensuring that we identify 
the agent correctly. 
 
3. The Theory of Corporate Ethics 
Based on Levinas’ theory of the personal ethical demand “Do not kill 
me” and “Love me” and Ricoeur’s theory of action as text to which the 
hermeneutical exercise may be applied, I propose the following system of 
corporate ethics based on three distinct requirements:  
1. corporate ethics ought to be a standard of behavior that respects 
and obeys the demand of the human person with the aim of 
supporting, promoting and defending human dignity;  
2. moreover, the corporation ought to recognize the call of the human 
person and respond accordingly to that call; and 
3. finally, in order not to become ensconced with the question of 
blame and fault, the corporation ought to review its actions and the 
consequent effect on its stakeholders by applying the hermeneutics 
of interpretation theory of action as text.  
In other words, corporate ethics ought to be a standard by which 
corporations act, take responsibility for those actions and hold themselves 
accountable for the effects their actions have on themselves, their clients, 
partners, supplier, environment and, even, competitors. Instead of dodging 
blame or pointing the finger at other possible agents of action, the 
corporation ought to evaluate their actions looking at them as if they were 
texts that are subject to interpretation based on context and understanding. I 
will explain this standard of corporate ethics by answering the following 
questions:  
 Why must a corporation adjust its behavior to reach this high, and 
perhaps, unattainable standard? 
 What is the point of an ethical system based on the personal call to 
responsible action? 
 Why is it important to consider corporate (human) action as a text? 
 When coupled with the hermeneutical exercise, what impact could 
a system of corporate ethics based on personal responsibility have 
on the corporation’s perception of itself, its responsibility and its 
contribution to the integrity of human dignity? 
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 Why is the ethic qualified by the word ought? 
3.1  Why Must a Corporation Adjust Its Behavior to Reach This High, and 
Perhaps, Unattainable Standard? 
The succinct answer to this question is the key to this system of 
corporate ethics – each person within the corporation is an I from their own 
point of view and is, therefore, called to respond to the demand of the 
other; this responsibility does not disappear when they enter the 
corporation, instead, it is amplified by the number of others and other 
others (third persons) with whom the I is in relation. This is based on our 
assertion that responsibility is the dialectic of the just, respectful relation 
between the I and the other.3 
Keeping responsibility as a dialectic in mind, let us break this down a bit 
further by applying our understanding of the person-to-person relation: the 
corporation is an organized body of persons working together for a 
common goal, but at the base of this exercise is the human relation, the 
person-to-person relationship by which the corporation functions. The 
corporation does not function based on technology or a good idea – the 
corporation functions thanks to the concerted efforts of people working 
together, persons who are in a constructive and meaningful relationship. 
Again, for the purposes of this project, we understand the corporation to 
mean two or more persons who come together in relationship to accomplish 
a goal upon which they had already agreed; these persons have agreed to 
provide a product or render a service for a specific end (either money or 
other gains that the persons perceive as beneficial). 
So among themselves, founders of a corporation are responsible to and 
for each other. Each person must respond to the call and demand of the 
other person(s) with whom they are in relation. In this way, we understand 
that the corporation is not an escape into a void where human relation is 
ambiguous and undefined, but rather is the setting for many human 
relations to play out in a way that has a greater effect on the persons in 
relationship as well as their communities and environments. The 
corporation becomes a part of the context of that human relation and 
subsequent human actions.4 
                                           
3 See Chapter V Responsibility and Hermeneutics. 
4  “While people work in organizations to satisfy their individual needs, the 
workplace always draws people out of their private lives and connects them to a wider 
social world. That connectedness is not just a means to the end of earning a paycheck 
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Moreover, when persons enter the corporation, either as founders or as 
employees/staff, they are not exempt from fulfilling their responsibilities as 
Is to the others with whom they are in relation. Participation in the 
corporation does not divorce them from their relationships or 
responsibilities. The other calls regardless of the I’s status as founder or 
employee of a corporation, and it remains incumbent on the I to respond to 
the call he hears. The corporation can be seen as an institution5 in which the 
I has occasion to be in relation with those whom he may never have been in 
relation were it not for his participation in the corporation; however, 
fundamentally, the corporation must be reduced to the interpersonal 
relations that sustain it. 
Once we acknowledge these qualities of the corporation, that it is 
comprised of human beings who are in relation with each other and 
provides a context for that relation, we can move on to the second part of 
the answer: the corporation tends to have a greater impact on the lives of 
those within it as well as those with whom it does business than the 
individual person acting alone. This is a more complex answer because it 
involves the intentionality of those running the corporation.  
According to our understanding of the nature of the corporation, to say 
that the purpose of The Coca-Cola Company®, for example, is to sell cola 
would be erroneous, but to say that the purpose of the human persons being 
in relationship (the founders, current heads and employees of the 
corporation) is to sell cola for a profit by means of The Coca-Cola 
Company® would be a more accurate statement. The corporation, 
understood as an institution, does not have an intrinsic purpose6 other than 
                                                                                                                           
but an important end of human life itself. ... The satisfaction we derive from being 
connected to others in the workplace grows out of a fundamental human desire for 
recognition. ... [E]very being seeks to have his or her dignity recognized ... by other 
human beings” (F. FUKUYAMA, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity. Free Press. New York, NY. 1995. pp 6-7). 
5 “By ‘institution,’ we are to understand here the structure of living together as this 
belongs to a historical community – people, nation, region, and so forth – a structure 
irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with these in a remarkable sense 
which the notion of distribution will permit us later to clarify. What fundamentally 
characterizes the idea of institution is the bond of common mores and not that of 
constraining rules” (P. RICOEUR, “The Self and the Ethical Aim.” Oneself as Another. p. 
194). 
6  “But an institution cannot have purposes… Only individuals can intend, plan 
consciously, and contrive oblique strategies” (M. DOUGLAS., How Institutions Think. 
Syracuse University Press. Syracuse, NY. 1986. p. 92). 
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to serve the will of those who created it and run it.7 This is because the 
corporation itself does not have a will, it does not have the capacity to 
reason for itself, and it does not have a self or a self-awareness that is 
intrinsic to its being. In other words, the corporation cannot function or 
even exist without the human beings who comprise it, so it, as a being, 
cannot direct itself or its actions with a specific intention. 
The way we perceive the Coca-Cola Corporation® has nothing to do 
with the corporation’s sense of self; instead, it has everything to do with 
how those who drive the corporation would like us to perceive it. In other 
words, the corporate identity, or the way it presents itself to its staff, 
clients, partners, suppliers and competition, depends on those who are 
charged with determining its purpose and driving its action. This is why 
corporations that have had major changes in leadership usually have a 
perceivable change in corporate identity – this includes branding, 
approaches to internal and external corporate communications, policies and 
overall strategy for sales, growth and profitability. If the corporation were 
an entity that were capable of reason and exerting a will independent of the 
men who comprise it, then there would be no perceivable shift in its 
identity and the actions of the individual men would not have any baring on 
its existence. 
Allow me to illustrate this point with one last piece of phenomenological 
evidence: The corporation never presents itself as an I. Despite recent laws 
in various countries that recognize or authorize the corporation to act as a 
person when in comes to political contributions 8  and other similar 
activities, the corporation is not an I in and of itself. It is and will always be 
a collection of persons who have come together in relationship to work 
                                           
7 For the sake of brevity and staying on topic, we will not delve into the theories about 
the relationship between institutions and the thoughts of individuals, though we readily 
admit that this particular study could contribute interesting theories to the applicability of 
our system of corporate ethics. “When institutions make classifications for us, we seem to 
lose some independence that we might conceivably have otherwise had. This thought is 
one that we have every reason, as individuals, to resist. Living together, we take 
individual responsibility and we lay it upon one another. We take responsibility for our 
deeds, but even more voluntarily for our thoughts. Our social interaction consists very 
much in telling one another what right thinking is and passing blame on wrong thinking. 
This is indeed how we build the institutions, squeezing each other’s ideas into a common 
shape so that we can prove rightness by sheer numbers of independent assent” (Ibid., p. 
91). 
8 See ruling for the US Supreme Court Case of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. 
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towards a common goal. Those persons who are Is in their own experience 
of existence do not confer upon the corporation an I nor a sense of self, a 
volition nor the gift of reason. Therefore, the corporation has no 
personhood. 
This brings me to the last point in answering the initial question: since 
the corporation is not an I, has no intrinsic volition or gift of reason, it is 
incumbent on the persons who comprise it to ensure that its actions, which 
are the result of their very human volition, reason and action, and 
subsequent impact are informed by the personal ethic, their response to the 
call of the other. The corporation must (ought) adjust its behavior to 
achieve the high standard of corporation responsibility because it is 
comprised of persons who are called to respond to the demand of the other, 
and that responsibility is amplified by its size and influence in the [local 
and global] market. More to the point, there is no such thing as corporate 
action, there is only human action committed within the paradigm or 
context of the corporation. 
A final note regarding the attainability of this ideal or standard: without 
setting high standards for ourselves, we may be destined to achieve much 
less than what we are actually capable of; when we accept mediocrity as a 
norm, then mediocrity becomes the standard. Instead, high standards push 
us to strive for excellence – when striving for excellence, we are often able 
to achieve greatness. 
3.2  What Is the Purpose of a System of Ethics Based on the Personal Call 
to Responsible Action? 
The purpose of a system of corporate ethics based on the personal call to 
responsible action is to have a convention whereby all persons within the 
corporation may be held accountable for their actions (and hold others 
accountable for theirs). This system of corporate ethics also recognizes 
human relationships as the impetus for all corporations. The system 
improves awareness of the implications and impact of human action while 
creating a standard of behavior, which we can use as a guide. Finally, it 
provides the opportunity for the other to call on the I saying that it is 
experiencing injustice.  
A system of corporate ethics based on the personal call to responsible 
action makes the question of what X Corporation should do a personal 
question. The question becomes “What ought I do?” and “How ought I act 
given the situation, information and resources at my disposal?” There is no 
anonymity in terms of hiding behind the façade of the corporation. Each 
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person within the corporation, from the founder, chief executive officer 
(CEO) and chief operating officer (COO), to the hiring manager, to the 
cleaning staff, is responsible for the actions of the corporation inasmuch as 
they themselves contribute to the phenomenon of the corporation. 
What does this mean? If any person within the corporation notices or 
becomes aware that the corporate action, which we have just admitted is 
human action, is not just, then it is up to that person to take restorative 
action by either reporting it to his supervisor if he is not in a position to 
make changes or rectifying the situation himself. If the person reports the 
injustice to his supervisor, the supervisor is then responsible for either 
making the change and rectifying the injustice or bringing it to someone 
with the ability to make the proper change. This holds true for all levels of 
the corporation, from the top to the bottom: if the CEO determines that 
there is unjust action being done in the name of the corporation, then it is 
up to him to either rectify it according to his capacity as CEO or work with 
other managers of the corporation to rectify the matter.9 By the same token, 
if the cleaning crew (most people consider them the lowest level of the 
corporation) finds that there is unjust human action being done in the name 
of the corporation, the person who finds the unjust action is responsible for 
either rectifying the action if they are able or taking it to someone who can. 
If a manager receives information from a subordinate that there is unjust 
human action being committed in the name of the corporation, then the 
manager also becomes responsible because he comes to hear the call of the 
other. Within this same paradigm, the subordinate is not relieved of the 
responsibility once he notifies the manager because he does not stop 
hearing the call of the other who is being done an injustice. (He does not 
stop hearing because he cannot stop hearing the call of the other. As soon 
as he hears that call, he is aware of the demand and cannot not hear it.) The 
subordinate and the manager then must cooperate in their person-to-person 
relationship to rectify the situation. Neither Is in this paradigm (the 
subordinate nor the manager) may ignore the call of the other, so they must 
work together to rectify the injustice. 
                                           
9  “Participation moves from top to bottom, bottom to top, and all across the 
organization. Governance guides the operation; management executes. … Governance 
is, by definition, participation. Not to participate is not to meet the responsibilities of 
governance” (W.J. BYRON, The Power of Principles, Ethics for the New Corporate 
Culture. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, NY. 2006. p. 104). 
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The responsibility that each person has to promote and support just 
human action within a corporation also extends to recognizing actions 
committed in the past that have had or continues to have a negative impact 
on the corporation’s stakeholders. This is to say, if a person becomes aware 
of an action committed in the past that has had or continues to have a 
negative impact on someone or group of people, then it is that person’s 
responsibility to bring that action to the attention of those who committed 
the act, those who have the ability to make reparative actions and hold 
themselves accountable before those who were affected. The corporation, 
the persons who comprise it, must be held accountable for its actions 
because the personal ethical demand demands it. More precisely, the 
corporation, those who comprise it, must hold themselves accountable 
because the personal ethic demands it. 
 
 
3.3  Why Is It Important to Consider Corporate (Human) Action as a Text? 
Understanding hermeneutics as the dialect of the text that is read, we can 
employ the hermeneutical exercise so that we may consider all of the 
known contingencies of a text, or in the case of the corporation, action, to 
determine whether it was just. We employ hermeneutics because through 
interpretation theory, the I may appreciate the other according to the 
other’s own ontology and phenomenology by considering the other’s 
worldview. When we examine human action, we must do so keeping in 
consideration the agent of that action who contributes to its context; but in 
examining the action, within the paradigm of hermeneutics as a dialectic, 
we must consider the agent of the action as a person who is an I from his 
own point of view. In remembering this, we have more latitude to regard 
the action not as an extension of the agent but as a separate entity. For 
instance, when we consider a text that was written, it is important who 
wrote it, but it is even more important (depending on what it is) what the 
text says, what the message is. If I receive a text that says “The building is 
on fire,” then I am not concerned with who wrote it, but rather making sure 
I evacuate the building that may be burning. On the other hand, if I receive 
a text that says, “I love you,” I would be extremely interested in knowing 
who wrote it. 
Similarly, we have to examine human action. If X Corporation releases 
bio-hazardous material into the local water supply, the immediate question 
then is not who did it, but rather why and how can we address the resulting 
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problems. Assigning blame at that point may undermine the effort to 
understand how and why it happened. The who may be arbitrary depending 
on the circumstances as in the case of receiving the text about the burning 
building. This is not to say that we are not interested in the agent of the 
action, but we do not want to lead this system of ethics with accusations and 
assigning blame. The purpose of this approach is to encourage a constructive 
examination of human action within the paradigm of the corporation and 
ensure that action is just and respectful to the persons with whom the 
corporation (those persons participating in the corporation) has a 
relationship. 
Moreover, this system of ethics does not have the aim of assigning blame 
or punishing the guilty. Instead, we recognize that it is impossible to ensure 
against every possible risk, but in using hermeneutics, we can better 
determine what action is just and respectful that will promote the good of 
the corporation while providing that the person-to-person relation remains 
within the dialectic of responsibility. The human action that is committed in 
the name of the corporation must either be benign in nature where, while 
either contributing to reaching its corporate goals (achieving its corporate 
mandate), does not cause harm; otherwise, it must be in response to the call 
of the other with whom the corporation is in relation.  
As we saw in Chapter V, with reference to indemnification and the 
juridical understanding of responsibility, there is little room for growth 
when we try to prove fault because proving fault does not contribute to the 
just relationship between two persons. Instead, it focuses on a single action 
and seeks to assign blame and indemnify. Based on the dynamics of a just 
and responsible person-to-person relationship (where the I responds 
authentically, immediately and appropriately to the call of the other), the 
question of fault then transforms the persons involved into collateral 
damage from the effects of assigning blame and gauging injury or harm. 
In using hermeneutics, our goal is to preserve the integrity of the person-
to-person relationship by providing a means of examining human behavior 
without impuning the person or agent who committed the action; both the I 
and the other retain their personhood and dignity within their relation 
despite the possible unjust act that may be in question. 
3.4  When Coupled With the Hermeneutic Exercise, What Impact Could a 
System of Ethics Based on Personal Responsibility Have on the 
Corporation?  
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A corporation that embraces a culture 10  of ethics based on personal 
responsibility and an appreciation for the person-to-person relationship 
would tend towards an integrated governance and management style that 
allows and encourages participation of employees and staff at all levels to 
contribute to the corporation’s business and behavior. In his book The 
Power of Principles, William J. Byron writes:  
In any workplace anywhere, you will find persons across the full range of 
employment responsibility – top to bottom in rank, newcomer or veteran in 
seniority – who share a common human longing. They want to be respected as 
persons; they want to be treated with dignity; they want to find meaning in 
their lives and work.11  
The point is that a corporation that embraces the responsibility it has to and 
for its people, its community, will have encountered, heard and responded 
to the call of those persons who comprise the community, which is the crux 
of the proposed system of corporate ethics.  
Furthermore, in doing so, each person within the corporation, as 
staff/employee and management, would feel that their word, presence, 
participation and very person are all valued and respected for their 
uniqueness as human being. This is crucial to the respectful person-to-
person relation or face-to-face encounter that takes place between the I and 
the other. More specifically and within the context of the corporation, the 
other (whom we designate as the employee or staff member) must be free 
to participate in the governance or rather the way in which the corporation 
conducts its business. Byron says, “Every human person in any workplace 
has a right to have some say in the decisions that affect his or her 
livelihood. To be shut out of all discussion is to be denied respect for one’s 
human dignity.”12 This is not to say that all employees and staff of every 
level of the organization will have a final say in the decisions of how the 
corporation conducts its business, but their input and feedback must be 
taken into consideration in such a way that they understand and perceive 
that their contribution has a meaningful impact on how those decisions are 
made. 
                                           
10 “A culture is a set of shared meaning, principles, and values. Values… define 
cultures. Where values are widely shared, and the sharing bonds together with common 
ties those who hold the same values, you have an identifiable culture” (Ibid., p. 2). 
11 Ibid., p. 89. 
12 Ibid., p. 103. 
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In embracing an ethic based on personal responsibility, the corporation 
will also embrace the reality of the others and other others or third persons 
to and for whom it is responsible. The corporation will be attentive to the 
call from the others and third persons with whom it is in relation and 
respond according to the respect and dignity demanded in the person-to-
person paradigm. For example, in 1982 the Johnson & Johnson Services, 
Inc, recalled all of its Tylenol® products (paracetamol, mild analgesic) 
because seven people from the Chicago, Illinois areas were killed by 
tainted products. When discussing the decision to recall all of its products 
with Byron, the then CEO of the Johnson & Johnson, James E. Burke, 
explained his responsibility to the other others with whom he did not have 
direct contact saying, “You can’t put a product on the market that killed 
seven people and not take responsibility for it.”13 Burke heard the demand 
of the other and the third person “Do not kill me,” and responded in a way 
that not only possibly saved other lives, but also acknowledged the 
corporation’s responsibility. That articulation was important because it said 
that the Tylenol Company valued the lives and well-being of those whom it 
serves. 
This type of personal responsibility in the context of the corporation 
shapes the culture of the corporation; it sets a standard of expectation and 
behavior from within the corporation. Those who comprise the corporation 
know that their actions, both proactively and reactively, contribute to the 
corporate action (as well as the perceived corporate identity). 
Coupling this ethic with the hermeneutical exercise of interpreting action 
as if it were a text, we can reflect on corporate action in real time or with 
the benefit of hindsight taking into consideration the various elements that 
contribute to its context. Taking the example of the Tylenol recall, the 
context of the issue was this: the tainted Tylenol products were found in the 
Chicago area and seven people died as a result of ingesting the tainted 
product. There was no direct or implied evidence at the time that Johnson 
& Johnson was at fault or that other Tylenol products had been tampered 
with or tainted in other areas of the United States. Given the context, which 
includes the situation, the available information and the consequent effects, 
Burke determined the best course of action was to recall all of the Tylenol 
products throughout the United States. Based on the context, he might have 
been justified in recalling just the products in the Chicago area; he could 
have even decided to spot check the products in lieu of a recall. Instead, he 
                                           
13 Ibid., p. 32. 
CHAP. VII: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATE ETHIC  241 
 
 
took responsibility and held Tylenol or the Johnson & Johnson Company 
accountable for the health and wellbeing of its clients/customers. 
On the other hand, let us look at the recall of some of Toyota 
automobiles in 2009. Bill Vlasic and Nick Bunkley of The New York 
Times covered the issue in 2009 as the problem was being discovered:  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration started scrutinizing the 
issue of jammed gas pedals after a high-speed crash in August near San Diego. 
A Lexus ES350 hit another vehicle at more than 120 miles per hour, killing 
four people. Moments before the crash, a passenger called 911 and said the gas 
pedal was stuck and the driver could not stop.14 
Again in 2010, the company issued a recall for similar problems with the 
gas pedal: the pedals would catch or stick causing the drivers to lose 
control of the vehicles resulting in car accidents. Between 2009 and 2010, 
over nine million Toyota cars and trucks were recalled but only after more 
than 60 cases were reported, 30 of which resulted in fatalities. The context 
of this corporate action to recall the vehicles may be more complex, but 
taking a general look we can list these elements: the gas pedal was faulty in 
at least the vehicles that were reported and at least 30 people were killed in 
accidents that were caused by the faulty gas pedal. 
In applying interpretation theory to the corporate actions of Toyota taking 
into consideration the situation or problem, the information that was 
available at the time and the resulting effects, we can say that perhaps 
Toyota acted justly and prudently, or we could say that perhaps Toyota could 
have been more proactive by recalling the vehicles before so many lives had 
been lost. 
The point is that when considering corporate action as text for the 
purposes of applying hermeneutics, we must concentrate on the action and 
not necessarily the agent in order to ascertain what the just course of action 
may be. The purpose is to engage in constructive dialogue so that we may 
encourage just corporate (human) action, and that is possible when the 
question of just action becomes broader than the question of fault and 
blame. 
3.5  Why is the Ethic Qualified By the Word Ought? 
                                           
14 B. VLASIC, and N. BUNKLEY, “Toyota Will Fix or Replace 4 Million Gas Pedal.” 
The New York Times. Published November 25, 2009. 
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As we discuss the system of corporate ethics that are based on Levinas’ 
philosophy of the [personal] ethical demand, we use the word ought to 
demonstrate an understanding between what a person and the corporation 
should do in a given situation versus what it actually does. Just because I 
should treat the other with respect and deference for their personhood, I 
should be a good citizen with respect to my neighbors and others in my 
community with whom I do not have a direct relationship and I should 
behave with respect and deference for my own personhood, I do not have to 
do these things. Likewise, according to our system of corporate ethics 
based on personal responsibility, the corporation should behave in a certain 
way with respect and deference to the personhood of those whom it affects 
and their dignity as human beings; however, there is nothing compelling 
the corporation to act accordingly except its own desire15 to uphold the 
standards of behavior that it has embraced. 
In other words, we use ought as an expression of interpersonal relativity 
that reflects the paradigm of the should versus what actually transpires. 
When we say that the I ought to treat the other with respect and deference 
for the other person’s unique being, we are recognizing the dichotomy 
between what the I should do versus what he may actually do as he relates 
to the other. In kind, when referring to the ethical demand with regard to 
the corporation, a being comprised of persons working together to render a 
common service and/or product, we must continue to recognize the 
dichotomy between what should be done versus what is actually done by 
those persons comprising the corporation as they relate to others within the 
context of the corporation. 
4. The Normative (and Not Relative) Quality of This System of 
Corporate Ethics Is the Personal Ethical Demand 
                                           
15  As stated previously, we understand that the corporation per se is a being 
comprised of two or more human beings, persons gathered together to produce a 
common service or a good. When we refer to the desire of the corporation, we are 
referring to the collective acceptance and endorsement of an idea that becomes a part of 
the corporation’s culture. With regard to our system of corporate ethics, the corporate 
desire to embrace a standard of behavior based on the personal ethical demand is an 
agreement between those persons who comprise the corporation to behave according to 
the standards. The agreement between those persons comprising the corporation 
compels them to embrace those standards for themselves as individual members of the 
corporation (as a community) and expect others to adhere to and uphold those same 
standards. 
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You may ask how a system of ethics based on the personal demand to 
respond to the call of the other is normative insofar as it may be applied to 
all persons and corporations regardless of differences in value systems. The 
answer is found in Levinas’ ontology of man and the resulting personal 
demand for the I to respond to the call of the other. According to Levinas’ 
philosophy of the personal ethical demand, as soon as the I hears the call of 
the other, it is incumbent upon him to respond to that call. As such, 
Levinas’ philosophy is applicable to all persons. If one would like to 
question the integrity of this ethical system, the question then lies in their 
understanding and agreement with Levinas’ ontology, but in and of itself, 
as a system of ethics, there are no apparent questions of relativity or doubts 
in its applicability based on varying social, cultural or personal values. 
4.1  Every I Has a Responsibility to Respond to the Call of the Other 
Regardless of Perceived Difference in Social and Cultural Values 
As Levinas explains, within the ontology of the person-to-person 
relation, between the I and the other, the I must respond to the other in an 
immediate and positive manner that respects the other’s command not to be 
killed [or harmed] and his demand to be loved [or cared for]. The way 
Levinas has outlined this philosophy, and the way in which we are applying 
it to define this system of corporate ethics, there is no proposition of a 
common good. The question of the common good can be perceived as 
problematic in a discourse on ethics because there is an assumption that 
there is a convention of what that good may be. When the assumed 
convention of the common good is challenged, then the fundamental 
argument supporting the system of ethics begins to crumble. In other 
words, if we were to base our system of corporate ethics on a central effort 
to contribute to the common good A of a community, anyone in that 
community could challenge that ethic by saying that the common good that 
they perceive is not A but is B; and still another person within the 
community could argue that the common good is C.  
By constructing a system of ethics based on a personal call to respond to 
the other, it becomes more difficult to relativize the system of ethics. If 
anything becomes relativized within this system it is the manner in which 
each person as an I understands that he may be called to respond to the 
other – not every response will be the same. This is another issue all 
together because the crux of Levinas’ philosophy and the system of ethics 
that we are proposing today is that the I must respond, or rather the 
relationship between the I and other create an ought in how they relate to 
244 PART THREE: INTEGRATING RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE 
 
 
each other, specifically the I to the other because it is the I who is 
responsible for his responsibility and that of the other. In the absence of the 
common good, there is no question of what the good may be, its construct 
as a good and who may perceiving it as good. 
4.2  The Personal Ethical Demand Based on Responsibility Is Universally 
Applicable 
My wish is not to burden the reader with repetition, but it must be clear 
that this system of ethics is based on an ontology of man as understood and 
taught by Levinas, and that the standard of behavior (the ought) that he 
promotes between the I and the other is a standard based on that ontology. 
The I, as a being in the phenomenological world who is aware of himself, 
the world around him and his own awareness (awareness of being aware), 
must respect the other who too is aware of his being (self) in the 
phenomenological world, the world around him and his awareness of being 
aware. They must respect and respond to each other’s demand, but because 
we can only express ourselves from our own points of view as subjects in 
the phenomenological world that we share with the other, Levinas 
articulates his philosophy in terms of the I and his relation with the other. 
In these terms and according to this understanding of the ontology of 
man and the ontology of the relationship between the I and the other, the 
ethical demand may be applied universally to all men, to each I as it relates 
to the others and other others with whom they share the phenomenological 
world and encounter either directly in the face-to-face encounter or 
indirectly when the I encounters the other other by way of the other. In 
every instance, no matter where that person is in the world, their religious 
or moral convictions or their accepted societal norms, the I is commanded 
by the other not to kill (or harm) him and to love (feed, shelter, clothe and 
care for) him.  
An example of how this normative personal ethic can be observed is in 
the meeting of two persons regardless of being acquainted: when two 
persons meet, it is standard, no matter where they are in the world, their 
religious or social backgrounds, to greet each other. The greeting may 
differ from place to place or based on social status, etc, but they will greet 
each other. The greeting is the acknowledgement that they each exist as 
beings who are strangers in this phenomenological world and yet the same 
in the nature of their being. The greeting is an exchange of communication 
identifying themselves each to the other as Is from their own perspectives 
in the experience of having met, and in the greeting each I recognizes that 
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while they perceive the other as such, they understand the other to be an I 
in his experience of the phenomenological world. 
When two persons meet and they do not greet each other or one attempts 
a greeting but the other does not reciprocate, it could be perceived either by 
one or both as a rejection and may even be perceived as an act of 
aggression. The point being that even in the simple act of two persons 
greeting each other, there is an appreciation and response to the personal 
ethical demand that comes from within their beings as they encounter each 
other. 
5. The Novelty of a System of Corporate Ethics Based on the Personal 
Ethical Demand 
In the coming chapter, we will explore some current systems of business 
ethics and ethics of the economy, and we will look at what sets this system 
of corporate ethics apart from other traditional systems of business and 
economic ethics. For now let us highlight six innovative features of our 
system in order to conclude the description of the synthesis of the ethic. We 
have already discussed the following four features in detail: 
 rather than focusing on the ideal of the common good, it focuses on 
the human being, the persons that are the I and the other as they 
engage in relationship with the I responding to call of the other; 
 in recognizing all persons comprising the corporation as intrinsic to 
the responsibility of the corporation based on their own personal 
responsibility to respond to the call of the other, it empowers all 
persons to take responsibility for corporate action; 
 it approaches ethics as a standard of behavior based on a 
responsibility promoting, supporting and defending human dignity; 
and 
 its approach is normative and, therefore, more difficult to relativize. 
Let us consider the two other features that distinguish our system of 
corporate ethics as original. 
 
 
5.1  Personal Responsibility Within the Paradigm or Context of the 
Corporation 
For a moment, let us return to the assertion that we must distinguish 
between human action committed by the corporation and human action 
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committed by persons within the context of the corporation: while this is a 
new approach to understanding and interpreting human action [as text in 
terms of a hermeneutical exercise], there is a complementary element. By 
considering personal responsibility as the fundamental structure of this 
system of corporate ethics, the corporation provides a context for the 
smaller (less visible) human actions that take place within the corporation; 
the corporation becomes a paradigm in which persons interact with each 
other and act with regard to the phenomenological world outside the 
corporation.  
So instead of regarding the corporation as a single entity that commits 
actions to, for or against humanity, we must also regard it as context in 
which persons undertake action; in other words, the corporation becomes 
part of the context in which the agent (author) commits (writes) the act 
(text). In acknowledging these nuances about the corporation, we can 
promote a more comprehensive understanding of the corporation, which 
enables us to interpret and understand human action in a way that is more 
authentic to the experience while identifying agent(s) and action(s) more 
accurately and in a manner that is meaningful to the hermeneutical 
exercise. 
5.2  Corporate Responsibility is Personal Responsibility Magnified by Size 
and Degree of Influence 
The final feature of this system of corporate ethics that separates it from 
other systems of business and economic ethics: Basing the standard of 
corporate behavior on the personal ethical demand of all persons who 
comprise the corporation, we recognize that there is a degree to which each 
corporation has the potential to affect promote, support and defend human 
dignity by means of its corporate (human) action. The corporation’s 
responsibility to itself, staff/employees, partners, suppliers, environment 
and competitors is magnified by its size and degree of influence.  
A corporation like Wal-Mart that has a global presence either as a 
vendor, a partner or supplier, must consider and respond to its 
responsibility to promote, support and defend human dignity based on the 
breadth of its reach (how many persons comprise the corporation and its 
geographical locations) as well as degree of its influence within the 
relevant areas of society (specifically in government). On the other hand, 
while a smaller corporation like a diner or family run restaurant has the 
same responsibility to respond to the call of the others that it encounters 
through the persons who comprise it, that responsibility is relative to the 
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number of persons who comprise it and the influence it has in its 
community. 
6. Applying the System of Corporate Ethics 
As a means of demonstrating the applicability of this system of corporate 
ethics as a standard of behavior with a definable goal and means of 
evaluating corporate action, we have listed ten questions any corporation or 
organization can ask itself. The questions are meant to gauge a 
corporation’s awareness and commitment to achieving its corporate goals 
without exploiting anyone stakeholder. It must be kept in mind that the 
corporation is the community of staff, management and senior leadership. 
So we use the word “corporation” in these questions, we understand it to 
mean the community of persons that comprise it. (We are not treating the 
corporation as a person in se.) 
1. Is the corporation meeting its goals? 
a. If the corporation is not meeting its goals, then work has to be 
done to understand why and if perhaps the goals should be 
reconsidered. 
b. If the corporation is indeed meeting its goals, then it may be 
an indication of corporate health and moving in a positive 
direction. 
c. The point of this question is to gauge the corporation’s short 
and long-term sustainability, growth and relevance as it relates 
to the market. 
2. Are the corporation’s short and long-term goals beneficial not only 
to itself (corporate fiscal responsibility for maintenance and growth), 
but also to its customers/clients, partners, suppliers, environment and 
even competition? 
a. The point of this question is to gauge the overall effect that the 
corporate goals may have on the various stakeholders. 
b. The corporation’s goals must also be beneficial to the 
competition in such a way that it maintains a competitive edge 
in the market. If the corporate goals strive to make competition 
obsolete, then customers, partners and suppliers may suffer. 
3. Does the corporation consider its various stakeholders, weighing the 
impact of its actions (the benefits and damage it may cause) when 
deciding on a strategy for corporate action? 
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a. Here we want to encourage critical thinking, corporate “self-
evaluation” and recognition of who the stakeholders are and 
how they may be affected. 
b. If the answer to the question is yes, then the follow-up 
questions would be “how and to what extent? 
4. Does the corporation support, protect and advocate for human 
dignity by means of ethical and responsible corporate action? 
a. The corporation is an intrinsic, human part of society. It has a 
voice that is amplified by the size, buying power and influence 
it has in the market. If the answer to this question is 
ambivalent in any way, or if the answer is no, then there is 
much work to be done in leading the corporation to a positive 
response. 
b. Without passing judgment on the corporations themselves, if 
any corporation sells a product or service or promotes 
behavior that is detrimental to the human person, family, 
society or environment, then that corporation should question 
its original goals, for examples: producers of tobacco products. 
5. Does the corporation review its actions once they have been 
executed to determine what benefit and/or damage may have been 
caused to all of the known stakeholders? 
a. This question is intended to get corporations to engage in 
corporate “self-reflection.” How has the corporate action 
affected the corporation itself and the world around it? 
b. This also presents a learning opportunity for the corporation: 
what actions they may want to repeat for beneficial results and 
what actions they want to avoid having caused harm. 
6. Does the corporation take responsibility for mistakes and errors in 
judgment? 
a. If the corporation can say yes, then it already acknowledges its 
social responsibility and has a sense of accountability. The 
follow-up question would then be, “What actions did it take to 
rectify the matter or make sure that type of action does not 
happen again?” 
b. If the response is negative, then there is room for 
improvement. The corporation should implement policies and 
strategies for self-evaluation, taking responsibility and holding 
itself accountable for its corporate (human) action. 
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7. Does the corporation have and enact policies that support its goals 
while also supporting and protecting its staff, partners, 
customer/clients, suppliers and environment? 
a. This question aims to scrutinize the corporate culture that 
starts with written and unwritten policies. 
b. If any group is exploited for the benefit of the corporation or 
to reach any goal, then the corporate action is not just, it is not 
responsible. 
8. Do corporate contracts and policies exploit any one stakeholder for 
the benefit of the corporation? 
a. This is an opportunity for the corporation to not only 
scrutinize its policies for exploitative behavior, but also its 
contracts, which include those between the corporation and its 
partners, the corporation and its suppliers and, finally, the 
corporation and its staff. 
b. If any stakeholder is being exploited, then the corporation 
should take steps to determine how best to rectify the 
situation. 
c. The concept is basic: the corporation may not sacrifice or 
exploit any stakeholder for its benefit because the benefit is 
limited and will not last in the long-term. Neither the human 
person nor his dignity can be used as a means to obtaining an 
end. 
9. Are staff and employees referred to in terms of the resources they 
bring the corporation or their humanity? 
a. The point of this question is to encourage corporations to 
reflect on how they talk about the people that enable them to 
reach their corporate goals. 
b. The way you talk about something or someone is the manner 
in which you will address them and treat them. If the 
corporation refers to their staff and employees in terms of their 
humanity (with their dignity and well-being in mind), then 
they will approach their staff and employees in the same way. 
10. Has the corporation ever been accused of immoral, amoral or 
unethical action/behavior? 
a. If the answer is yes, this is another opportunity for the 
corporation to look at its past behavior to determine how it 
exposed itself to this type of criticism or accusation and how it 
may act more responsibly in the future in order to reduce its 
exposure to unfavorable corporate action. 
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b. If the answer is no, then this is still an opportunity to take a 
critical look at its policy and action to determine if there are 
any areas that present a risk. 
c. If the corporation has a habit and culture of shirking 
responsibility and not holding itself accountable for its 
corporate action, then there may be an underlying problem 
related to how decisions are made and how/if the shareholders 
are taken into consideration. 
These questions are not exhaustive, but they can lead any person 
participating in a corporation to conduct a comprehensive reflection on the 
corporate culture, carefully scrutinizing policies, common practices and 
accepted norms as they relates to its regular functionality. In completing 
this reflection, the executives and senior managers can choose if and how 
they would like to change the corporate culture and standard of behavior; 
additionally, staff can think about how they may approach their managers 
about perceived issues or problems.  
It is important to point out that the reflection and eventual change does 
not have to come from the executive officers of a corporation; staff and 
employees at all levels can use these questions to determine whether the 
corporation has a standard of behavior that promotes, supports and protects 
human dignity. Admittedly, a dependent of a corporation (staff and 
employees) would be taking a risk presenting their observations to their 
senior management; the management could consider their observations 
negatively and take punitive action or management, if it is open to change, 
could take the observations as constructive criticism and reconsider the 
value of embracing this ethic. If an employee believes they work for a 
corporation that does not value their human dignity or does not embrace 
their responsibility to and for the other, then this exercise could also 
prompt the employee to find a corporation that provides an environment 
that is receptive to or already embraces that responsibility. 
The crux of this system of ethics is that everyone is responsible. The 
executive is responsible for ensuring that the culture of the corporation 
embraces its responsibility, and the staff/employee is responsible for doing 
what it can when it hears the call of the other even when the culture runs 
contrary to that call.  
7. A comparison with contemporary understandings of business and 
economic ethics 
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In proposing this system of ethics, we must, if only briefly, compare it to 
contemporary systems and understandings of business and economic ethics 
so that we may have an appreciation for the value that it can add when 
considering and dialoguing about the corporate ought and its action. To do 
so, we will conduct a succinct survey of the explanations and 
understandings of business and economic ethics of two philosophers, Jesús 
Conill Sancho and Amartya Sen. We have chosen Conill Sancho because 
he approaches business and economic ethics from a phenomenological 
point of view; in other words, he discusses these systems of ethics from the 
point of view of how man experiences business and economics. Sen, on the 
other hand, is a key proponent in the contemporary debate regarding man’s 
dignity in the face of development. As we review their philosophies and 
understandings of business and economic ethics, our aim is not to disprove 
their assertions or conclusions, but rather to demonstrate a void that our 
proposed system of ethics can fill.  
7.1  Conill Sancho on Business and Economic Ethics 
In Horizontes de Economía Ética 16 , Jesús Conill Sancho explains 
business ethics with regard to the activity of business whereas economic 
ethics refers to the ethical application of systems of economics. 17 More 
specifically, he explains business and economic ethics within the context of 
the contemporary economic systems of capitalism (and in some cases 
communism) using the 1970s as a point of departure saying,  
En efecto, en los años setenta del siglo pasado se produjeron cambios 
decisivos que exigieron nuevas concepciones de la empresa, distintas a la de 
un puro mecanismo. La empresa, según las nuevas concepciones, es un ámbito 
de racionalidad social, del que forman parte procesos humanos de enorme 
                                           
16  J. CONILL SANCHO, Horizontes de Economía Ética. Editorial Tecnos (Grupo 
Anaya, S.A.), Madrid. 2004. 
17  “La ética económica se refiere, o bien a todo el campo en general de las 
relaciones entre economía y ética, o bien específicamente a la reflexión ética sobre los 
sistemas económicos; una reflexión que ha venido a convertirse en ética del capitalismo 
o, mejor dicho, en ética del capitalismo, que investigan las posibles formas de conexión 
entre la democracia y el systema capitalista. La ética empresarial, por su parte, se 
centra principalmente en la actividad de las empresas y, aunque en los años setenta del 
siglo XX, quando surgió con fuerza, hubo un animado debate sobre su ámbito de 
reflexión, actualmente se refiere sobre todo a la empresa entienda como organización 
económica y como institución social” (Ibid., p. 17). 
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importancia para la competividad como la actividad directiva, la atención a 
los recursos humanos, la toma de decisiones, o la cultura corporativa.18 
He continues his explanation by exploring various understandings of what 
business ethics is:  
1. the business man creates the market, opportunities and invention19 
with the purpose of increasing the public’s confidence in business 
and the market20 citing that the moral basis of economic systems 
are the business man, the risks he takes, the creation of new values 
and amoral machinations of the system, which are brought about 
by the creativity and courage of the business man21;  
2. the strategies and ways decisions are made in business meaning 
that ethics is not meant to control or change the way people do 
business, but rather assist them in making better decisions by 
encouraging them to reflect on the reasons they adopted a certain 
course of action22; and 
                                           
18 Ibid., p. 18. 
19 “… autores como Gilder consideran a los empresarios como «heroes de la vida 
económica», en cuyas manos radica el verdadero sentido creativo y productivo de la 
economía, mucho más que en los programas políticos de los gobiernos. La verdadera 
economía sería la de los empresarios: la del crecimiento y el progreso. Desde esta 
perspectiva, el empresario es un creador de mercados, un revelador de oportunidades, 
un inventor, un innovador, y no hay recuperación económica sin favorecer la 
creatividad empresarial” (Ibid., p. 18). 
20 “Una función que ejercería la ética empresarial sería aumentar la confianza en el 
mundo empresarial y superar la incomprensión que todavía perdura en la sociedad, por 
la que el empresario aparece como un enano moral, egoísta y maléfico” (Ibid., p. 19). 
21 “... el empresario es un creador de mercados, un revelador de oportunidades, un 
inventor, un innovador, y no hay recuperación económica sin favorecer la creatividad 
empresarial. La auténtica base moral del sistema económico serían los empresarios, su 
arriesgada, laboriosa y sacrificada creación de nuevos valores y no los «mecanismos 
amorales». La clave de la vida económica y la condición del progreso sería la 
creatividad y coraje de los individuos que aceptan lo riesgos que generan riqueza: los 
empresarios con voluntad e imaginación” (Ibid., pp. 18-19). 
22 “Otros autores refieren la tarea de la ética de la empresa a las estrategias para la 
toma de decisiones. La ética non intentaría cambiar o controlar la conducta de las 
personas, lo cual sería propio de una «ética de reglas», sino más bien ayudar a tomar 
mejores decisiones. Esta «ética de la toma de decisiones» sería operativa: pondría de 
manifiesto el lugar de la ética en el proceso de toma de decisiones dentro de las 
organizaciones. Consistiría en generar recursos para tomar mejores decisiones: así, 
por ejemplo, la comprensión de la responsabilidad como recurso para responder a los 
retos de la organización empresarial. La ética entra aquí en el proceso de reflexión 
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3. the management and organization of business because it develops 
a systematic reflection on business, organizations and the people 
at the heart of those organizations.23 
The first explanation appears to be an ambition of business and economics. 
In the second explanation, Conill Sancho highlights the element of 
responsibility when reflecting on the appropriate course of action. He also 
discusses the rationale for that course of action saying that there is an intent 
to integrate individual and collective responsibility, along with the morality 
of actions on the part of business and the institutions. 24  While Conill 
Sancho admits there is a sense of responsibility in this understanding of 
business ethics, the sense of responsibility is merely perfunctory because 
the understanding of responsibility is not a response to anything – instead, 
it is an admission or recognition of challenges or threats that could work 
against the organization. 
The third explanation has an element of responsibility insofar as it is the 
responsibility of business to ask itself if it is inseparable from corruption25 
(these considerations are the result of business scandals that have shaken 
the public’s confidence, e.g. Watergate in 1972, Enron in 2001, WorldCom 
in 2002). Even here, the concept of responsibility is not one of ownership, 
accountability or response; instead it is portrayed as a reflective activity to 
determine how business and markets may maintain favor with the public. 
                                                                                                                           
sobre las razones que existen para adoptar un determinado curso de acción entre 
posibles alternativas” (Ibid., p. 19). 
23 “Continuando con otras posiciones, ha expertos que prefieren hablar de «gestión y 
organización», porque consideran que la ética empresarial ha de desarrollar una 
reflexión sistemática sobra las empresas, las organizaciones como tales y las personas 
en el seno de las organizaciones” (Ibid., p. 20). 
24  “Desde una óptica complementaria, se ha entendido la ética de la actividad 
empresarial como un campo especial de la ética profesional. En este sentido, se intenta 
integrar la responsabilidad individual y colectiva, la moralidad de las acciones y de las 
instituciones o estructuras. El paradigma de la ética empresarial sería el de las 
coordenadas metodológicas marcadas por la «ética civil», aunque con la advertencia de 
que se requiere pasar de la ética procedimental a una ética social sustantiva, con 
contenidos ya concretos en favor de dinamismos de humanización creciente” (Ibid., p. 
20). 
25 “Las razones que se suelen aducir para explicar este creciente interés por la ética 
empresarial son de diverso género. En principio, la pérdida de confianza en las 
instituciones y en las grandes empresas, «gracias» a escándalos como los del 
Watergate, lleva a pensar sobre la responsabilidad de las empresas y a preguntarse si 
la empresa es inseparable de la corrupción” (Ibid., p. 21). 
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The overarching theme throughout the various understandings of business 
ethics is that it requires a reflection on the relationship between the 
economy and ethics because business is an element within an organized 
system of economic activity and it cannot be understood without the 
putting it into the context that is the system of economics in which it 
functions.26 
Conill Sancho looks at two different understandings of economic ethics 
to give a comprehensive explanation: 
1. Understanding economic ethics based on positivism or a 
pragmatic concept of economics, 27  which inspires us to regard 
economics as a historic science as well as a hermeneutic science 
because it can offer interpretations and an understanding of 
society 28 ; he says that more than an ethic, this understanding 
proposes a rhetoric, a methodology in using the linguistics of 
ethics to persuasively refer to the function of economics.29 
2. Based on a theory of economics being a system comprised of 
subsystems, ethics or morality is not an authentic subsystem [that 
contributes to the greater system] because it is difficult to 
coordinate into codes30; since it is not a codified subsystem, it has  
                                           
26  “... la ética empresarial, boyante en los últimos treinta años, requiere una 
reflexión sobre las relaciones entre economía y ética, porque la empresa es un elemento 
dentro de un sistema de organización de la actividad económica y no se entendería bien 
su sentido sin enmarcarla en el sistema económico en que se encuentra inserta” (Ibid., 
pp. 23-24). 
27  “En primer lugar, hay quienes rechazan el enfoque económico marcado por el 
positivismo y la econometría, pero mantienen una posición al menos ambigua en relación 
con una ética de la economía. Frente al «positivismo oficial de la economía» dan paso a 
una orientación pragmatista, más interesada en la utilización del conocimiento que en sus 
fundamentos, y que quiere estudiar primordialmente «la retórica de la erudición 
económica»” (Ibid., p. 25). 
28 “Desde esta perspectiva, la economía se ve más como una «ciencia histórica» que 
como una «ciencia predictiva»; incluso como una ciencia hermenéutica, porque 
intentaría ofrecer una interpretación y autocomprensión social, más que predicciones” 
(Ibid., p. 25). 
29  “Más que una ética, propone pues una retórica, en la tradición humanista 
occidental; cosa que no admite la «ética lingüística» habermasiana…” (Ibid., p. 25). 
30 “En segundo lugar, quisiera aludir a la teoría de sistemas en la formulación de 
Niklas Luhmann. En la teoría social de Luhmann se entiende la sociedad como un 
sistema de subsistemas diferenciados, que se rigen en cada caso por una codificación 
binaria; y, aunque la moral no constituye en auténtico subsistema, según Luhmann, sí se 
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no concrete or quantifiable place in economics. 31  Therefore, 
economic ethics does not exist.32 
So according to these two understandings of economic ethics, either it is a 
form of rhetoric contrived to persuade someone to act in a certain way or it 
does not exist because it lacks concrete relevance when confronted with the 
functions of economics. 
In terms of business, ethics is relegated to a guideline for making better 
decisions at best, to a reflection on how not to lose favor with the public at 
worst; and economic ethics is either considered a rhetorical devise when 
discussing the functions of systems of economics or an irrelevant, 
unquantifiable subsystem that we may discuss within the context of the 
greater system that is society. In neither case do we perceive that ethics has 
anything to do with the human relation, instead they are portrayed as devices 
to be used for persuasion, determining better decisions and courses of action 
for a determined end or reflection on how to understand and interpret 
[business] actions within the context of society. When the ethics are not 
being cast aside because of their perceived irrelevance as it relates to the 
constructs of the mechanization of society and its enterprises, it is being used 
as a means to an end or a means of justifying business decisions and 
activities. 
Applying understandings of business and economic ethics of these sorts 
completely miss the point of ethics. As Herbert Johnston points out in his 
book Business Ethics33,  
Ethics is Concerned with What Ought to be Done. The judgment in question is 
not in the form of a simple statement of fact about human conduct, but in the 
form of the statement of an obligation. In logical terms, the copula of the 
                                                                                                                           
ordena según un código (aprecio/desprecio) que, sin embargo, no es fácil coordinar con 
los códigos por los que se rigen los cada vez más complejos subsistemas sociales” (Ibid., 
p. 26). 
31 “La ética, en nuestro caso la ética económica, no puede servir para nada en 
nuestra sociedad actual, porque resulta irrelevante para los procesos comunicativos 
que se establecen en los sistemas funcionales” (Ibid., p. 26). 
32 “La presunta ética de la economía en realidad no existe, y lo que Luhmann se 
preguntaba es si la ética era la forma teórica con la que se podía hacer frente a la 
situación de la sociedad de fines del siglo XX” (Ibid., p. 26). 
33 H. JOHNSTON, Business Ethics. Pitman Publishing Corporation. New York, NY. 
1956. 
256 PART THREE: INTEGRATING RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE 
 
 
conclusion is not “is” or “will be,” but rather “should” or “ought” or “is to 
be.”34  
Not only is ethics concerned with what ought to be done, but he says it is 
concerned with human conduct, “When we say that ethics concerns 
judgment about conduct, we mean about human conduct. And this means 
more than just actions done by a human being, by a man; it means actions 
done by a man as man, when he knows what he is doing and wants to do 
it.”35 According to Johnston’s definition, the action has to be intentional for 
it to be human and, therefore, judged against an ought. Although he does 
not say this explicitly, we can understand that the ought is about the way in 
which the I relates (treats, communicates with, responds to) the other.  
With that said, if ethics is concerned with or is a matter of what ought to 
be done and that doing, more specifically, is human (intentional) action, 
then the ethics of business and economics as Conill Sancho explains it are 
not ethics at all. Rather, as business ethics and economic ethics have 
continued to develop from the 20th to the 21st Centuries, we begin to 
understand that using the word ethics is more of a connotation to improving 
the human condition (justice and liberty) through social and economic 
development.  
There is a recognized obligation to attend to the human condition, but the 
exact obligation and means of carrying out that obligation are not specified. 
Conill Sancho articulates it in terms of justice and liberty when he says,  
Uno de los retos más importantes y significativos del mundo actual es el de 
hacer compatible el mecanismo del mercado y las exigencias de justicia. 
Iluminar este desiderátum y promover su realización constituyen, a mi juicio, 
tareas de una ética económica contemporánea que quiera ser fecunda.36  
He tends to speak about ethics as it relates to the development of human 
liberties through just action. Conill Sancho is going in the right direction, 
but he is using the wrong language and tools to implement his ideas: his use 
of ethics is still missing the element of obligation, ought and human action 
that serves to foster just human relationships to support, protect, and 
promote human dignity. 
Our proposal for corporate ethics is not a means to an end or a 
justification for a predetermined course of action; it is a standard of 
                                           
34 Ibid., p. 1. 
35 Ibid., p. 2. 
36 J. CONILL SANCHO, Horizontes de Economía Ética. p. 214. 
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behavior by which men and women engaging in business (to use the 
language of business and economic ethics) activities can strive as they 
participate in the functions of the system of economics in which they 
conduct business.  
To state our proposal for a system of corporate ethics in terms that are 
traditional to business and economics, it is applying a standard of behavior 
and regard for the other person that is based on personal responsibility to 
and for the other person in such a way that the business may participate 
fruitfully in the economic system(s) that host it; furthermore, this standard 
of recognizing, accepting and acting on personal responsibility within the 
context of business requires a hermeneutical reflection that allows for 
human action within the context of business (commerce) to be interpreted 
and understood within the greater contexts of economics and society, thus 
recognizing that economics is not necessarily part and parcel to society but 
rather a subsystem of society. 
In other words, our system of ethics as a standard of behavior, based on 
personal responsibility, is not a means to an end, but rather is the means as 
well as one of the ends to business and the functions of the systems of 
economics. When we consider that “the primary purpose of business is to 
create wealth in a legally responsible way,”37 we see more clearly that 
business is in the service of man. Likewise, the system in which business 
functions, the economy, is also at the service of man for man’s sake, health, 
prosperity, longevity and dignity. We must, therefore, treat business and 
economics as means of fulfilling our obligation and articulate it as such 
rather than behaving as if man is the means of ensuring the health, 
longevity and dignity of business and economics for the sake of business 
and economics. 
7.2  Amartya Sen on Business Ethics 
Taking a bird’s eye view of his stance on business ethics, in his book 
Development as Freedom 38 , Amartya Sen frames the discussion on 
business ethics in terms of justice, corruption, public policy and social 
values:  
                                           
37  G. AHNER, Business Ethics, Making a Life, Not Just a Living. Orbis Books, 
Maryknoll, NY. 2007. p. 59. 
38 A. SEN, Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press. Oxford, UK. 1999. 
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Policy makers have two distinct, though interrelated, sets of reasons for taking 
an interest in the values of social justice. The first – and the more immediate – 
reason is that justice is a central concept in identifying the aims and objectives 
of public policy and also in deciding on the instruments that are appropriate in 
pursuing the chosen ends. … The second – more indirect – reason is that all 
public policies are dependent on how individuals and groups in the society 
behave.39 
Although Sen never articulates a proposal for ridding society of 
corruption,40 he does make it clear that justice as a motive and human 
action (behavior) are central to a society or organization rejecting 
corruption and embracing values that they determine are important to them.  
He continues: “For the making of public policy it is more important not 
only to assess the demands of justice and the reach of values in choosing 
the objectives and priorities of public policy, but also to understand the 
values of the public at large, including their sense of justice.”41  Public 
policies ought to be based on the values of the persons that it represents, the 
persons who will be affected by it; likewise, the corporate policies and 
strategies, products and services must reflect the values held by those who 
comprise the corporation. According to Sen, the policies must do this either 
while answering the demand for justice or in an answer to the demand for 
justice. 
In addressing how to deal with corruption, Sen refers to social values and 
behavior norms saying, “What is at issue is not just the general sense of 
dutifulness, but the particular attitude to rules and conformity, which has a 
direct bearing on corruption.”42 Here he begins to discuss ethical behavior 
in terms of not just an obligation to following the rules, but following the 
rules and behaving in a certain way because everyone else is behaving in 
prescribed manner. This is not to say that we should not value rules and 
proper behavior for their own sake,43 but that “how people behave often 
depends on how they see – and perceive – others as behaving.”44 In saying 
                                           
39 Ibid., p. 274. 
40 “I am not trying to propose here an ‘algorithm’ for eliminating corruption” (Ibid., p. 
278). 
41 Ibid., p. 274. 
42 Ibid., p. 277. 
43 “Giving priority to rules of honest and upright behavior can certainly be among the 
values that a person respects. And there are many societies in which respect for such 
rules provides a bulwark against corruption” (Ibid., p. 277). 
44 Ibid., p. 277. 
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so, Sen asserts that ethical behavior could be the result of conforming to 
perceived norms or what he calls “relative justice,”45 which entails making 
comparisons against actions that have been determined to be acceptable to 
the public. The problem with relative justice is that it can lead to corruption 
if the standard of comparison is in itself unjust. 
The sections of Sen’s book that we have been referencing are entitled 
“Ethical Values and Policy Making” 46  and “Corruption, Incentives and 
Business Ethics.”47 This is a point of interest because, while we agree with 
the principles of Sen’s argument about justice, public policy and the work 
that must be done to eliminate corruption, we must point out that, in terms 
of outlining a system of ethics, he never gives a concrete suggestion on 
what business ethics are.  
Sen outlines approximations of the types of behaviors that are favorable 
to an ethical society or organization, but three definitive elements are 
missing:  
 there is no cohesive argument or proposal for how a policy maker 
or the public should act in order to promote justice;  
 he discusses justice with regard to ethical behavior, but he does 
not portray a sense of relationship between persons, which is the 
context for justice; and  
 there is no standard of behavior one could say they are striving to 
uphold. 
7.3  Within the Context of Contemporary Business and Economic Ethics 
While we respect both Conill Sancho and Sen for their contributions to 
the global discussion about ethics as it relates to business, society and the 
quest for justice, the observations that we have made are only meant to 
demonstrate the void that our proposal for a system of corporate ethics can 
fill. To date, there are many ideas and articulations of how corporations 
should act with regard to themselves, their staff/employees, clients, 
partners, suppliers, environment and, even, competitors, but beyond 
proposing an idea, we are proposing a concrete standard by which 
                                           
45 “Much depends, therefore, on the reading of prevailing behavioral norms. A sense 
of ‘relative justice’ vis-à-vis a comparison group (in particular, others similarly placed) 
can be an important influence on behavior” (Ibid., p. 277). 
46 Ibid., p. 274. 
47 Ibid., pp. 275-278. 
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corporations and organizations, the persons who comprise them, may 
determine if their actions are ethical.  
Our proposed system of corporate ethics presents the following: 
 a clear goal – to promote, support and protect the human dignity 
of all stakeholders, known and unknown;  
 a coherent standard of behavior – each person within a 
corporation, regardless of rank or job function takes responsibility 
for the call, command, demand of the other and responding to that 
call immediately, positively and appropriately; 
 a distinct means of evaluating or reflecting on corporate 
action – applying a hermeneutical approach to how we appraise 
corporate action, taking into account the various known elements 
of the context of that action. 
In providing a goal, a standard of behavior and a way in which we can 
evaluate the behavior, we are providing a structured system of ethics that 
any corporation can adopt, provided that they subscribe to the requisite 
ontology of man and the I-other relation. 
Our final assertion, as it relates to contemporary systems of business and 
economic ethics, is that our proposed system of corporate ethics, if applied 
within an organization that truly embraces all elements of the system, could 
inspire better decisions and strategies for corporate action, create more 
opportunities in the long-term and boost public confidence in the 
corporation (and perhaps in the market too) while addressing concerns of 
corruption, favoritism, impropriety, greed and fraud. A corporation that 
embraces a system of ethics that promotes, supports and protects human 
dignity through just human relation has a culture that is open to everyone, 
fostering community and creativity and renouncing anything that is 





The Application, A Case Study 
Let us now apply our system of corporate ethics to an organization, using 
as evidence of their proposed values, culture and corporate action their 
documented mission, policies and practices published for public 
information. As our test subject, we will look at one of the organizations 
within the United Nations common system, for two reasons: the UN has 
stated values that revere if not promote and protect human dignity as its 
five areas of work are to “maintain international peace and security,” 
“promote sustainable development,” “protect human rights,” “uphold 
international law” and “deliver humanitarian aid” 1 ; and the mission, 
policies and practices of the UN organizations are more widely available to 
the public. 2  Therefore, we will look at several aspects of the values, 
policies and practices of the Food and Agriculture of the United Nations 
(FAO) based on their public documents. Specifically, we will review 
FAO’s documentation regarding its staffing habits with special attention to 
its use (policies and practices) of consultant contracts. 
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate how our proposed system 
of ethics works and can be beneficial to a corporation; the purpose is not to 
cast aspersions against FAO or to engage in gratuitous criticism. As such, 
we will attend the following methodology for this chapter: 
                                           
1 http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/index.html 25 June 2015. 
2 The United Nations and its specialized agencies are sustained by public and private 
funding; therefore, the larger scope of their practices, policies and procedures are a 
matter of public domain. 
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1. embark on a brief introduction to the UN and FAO, which will 
include a look at how the UN is organized, FAO’s place within the 
UN common system and their respective mandates;  
2. look at the UN’s standards of promoting, supporting and 
protecting human dignity;  
3. review FAO documentation (that has been made public) on its 
policies and practices as well as the motives for those policies and 
practices;  
4. juxtapose FAO’s policies and practices with the UN standard of 
human dignity along with the standards of employment as stated 
by the International Labour Organization and an independent 
review conducted by the UN regarding the use of consultancy 
contracts within the UN common system; and 
5. refer to the ten questions from Annex 2 to help us gauge FAO’s 
ethical standards that promote, support and protect human dignity. 
As we follow this methodology, we will also consider FAO, its values, 
policies and practices, within the context of the greater UN common 
system, which is guided by the Secretariat in New York and Geneva.  
Again, the point is not to laud FAO as an example by which other 
organizations and corporations should judge themselves, nor is it to vilify 
the organization based on any shortcomings that we may discover; the 
point is to demonstrate how the system of corporate ethics that we have 
developed may be applied to an organization or corporation in a way that is 
meaningful and constructive – in a way that can facilitate positive changes 
in the values, culture and actions of that organization or corporation 
moving towards a greater appreciation of the human person with the 
ultimate goal of protecting, promoting and supporting human dignity. 
1. Background on FAO and the UN Common System 
As a means of understanding the context in which FAO is placed within 
the UN common system, we must understand that the UN is an 
organization comprised of six main organs: the General Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trustee Council, 
the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice. Their purpose is: 
a. to maintain international peace and security; 
b. to develop friendly relations among nations; 
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c. to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting 
respect for human rights; and 
d. to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.3 
With the exception of the International Court of Justice, which is located in 
the Hague, these organs are located in New York City.  
Beyond these six organs of the UN, the United Nations is also comprised 
of specialized agencies that, while autonomous in terms of governance, are 
bound to the UN by special agreements and were established using the 
Charter of the UN. FAO is one of 16 specialized agencies. The governance 
of FAO as well as each of the other 15 specialized agencies is self-
contained insofar as FAO has its own governing body and its own 
collection of member countries who contribute to financing and regulating 
the agency as well as managing the mandate and mission of the agency. 
The caveat to this arrangement is that these agencies must defer to the 
International Civil Servants Commission (ICSC), which is another 
specialized agency that regulates the pay, benefits and overall treatment of 
those who work for the UN and its specialized agencies.4 Additionally, the 
agencies must work within the general mandate of the UN, humanitarian 
efforts, peacekeeping, human rights, gender equality for the advancement 
of women, protecting the environment, etc.5 Therefore, FAO’s mandate is:  
                                           
3 http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/about.shtml 25 June 2015. 
4 “The Commission’s mandate covers all facets of staff employment conditions, but 
the type of action it is empowered to take in a specific area is regulated under its statute. 
On some matters (e.g. establishment of daily subsistence allowance; schedules of 
post adjustment, i.e. cost-of-living element; hardship entitlements), the Commission 
itself may take decisions.  
In other areas, it makes recommendations to the General Assembly which then acts 
as the legislator for the rest of the common system. Such matters include Professional 
salary scales, the level of dependency allowances and education grant.  
On still other matters, the Commission makes recommendations to the executive 
heads of the organizations; these include, in particular, human resources policy issues” 
(http://www.icsc.un.org/about/mandate.asp 24 July 2015). 
5  “Most of us have heard about United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance. But the many other ways the UN affects all our lives are not always so well 
known. This website takes a look at the United Nations – how it is set up and what it 
does – to illustrate how it works to make the world a better place for all people. The UN 
is central to global efforts to solve problems that challenge humanity. Cooperating in 
this effort are more than 30 affiliated organizations, known together as the UN system. 
Day in and day out, the UN and its family of organizations work to promote respect for 
human rights, while also promoting gender equality and the advancement of women, 
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Achieving food security for all is at the heart of FAO’s efforts – to make sure 
people have regular access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy 
lives. Our three main goals are: the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and 
malnutrition; the elimination of poverty and the driving forward of economic 
and social progress for all; and, the sustainable management and utilization of 
natural resources, including land, water, air, climate and genetic resources for 
the benefit of present and future generations.6 
As FAO works to achieve the goals of its mandate, it must do so while 
honoring the mandate, initiatives and goals of the UN and its other 
specialized agencies. For example, the World Health Organization, another 
specialized agency of the UN, promotes smoking cessation programs 
throughout the UN Common system; FAO, therefore, must incorporate 
smoking cessation into the medical services that it offers its dependents. 
Likewise, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the 
Chief Executive Board for Coordination (CEB) have initiated a program 
called Greening the Blue7 , which is a UN based initiative for climate 
neutrality. FAO must also participate in the Greening the Blue initiative to 
do what it can within its own governance to contribute to the UN goal of 
climate neutrality. 
The context of FAO’s corporate action is fundamental to a hermeneutical 
analysis of that corporate action, so it is necessary to have a comprehensive 
appreciation for the UN (the system of organs and specialized agencies) as 
a part of that context. We will refer to this part of the context as we move 
forward in analyzing FAO’s policies and corporate action (practices) 
regarding the way it uses consultancy contracts.  
2. The UN Standard of Human Behavior and Interaction 
We will continue to explore the context in which FAO operates as it 
works to achieve its mandate by taking into consideration the social and 
ethical standards of behavior as identified by the UN Secretariat. To begin, 
                                                                                                                           
protecting the environment, fighting disease and reducing poverty. UN agencies define 
the standards for safe and efficient air travel and help improve telecommunications and 
enhance consumer protection. The United Nations leads the international campaigns 
against drug trafficking and terrorism. Throughout the world, the UN and its agencies 
assist refugees, set up programmes to clear landmines, help expand food production and 
lead the fight against AIDS” (http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/index.shtml 25 
June 2015). 
6 http://www.fao.org/about/en/ 25 June 2015. 
7 http://www.greeningtheblue.org/. 
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the UN Secretariat on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights issued 
the following statement: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world… Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law... 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.8 
While the statement does not go into detail, here the UN is acknowledging 
the inherent dignity of the human person and establishing standards of 
freedom for that dignity through just human action. The Declaration sets 
specific standards for promoting, supporting and protecting human dignity 
as it relates to employment in the 23rd Article, 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) 
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of 
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary by other means of social 
protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.9 
Finally, the Declaration stipulates that “Everyone has the right to rest and 
leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay.” 10  These are the standards of human dignity in the 
workplace that the UN promotes in its Declaration of Human Rights, and 
these are the standards that it is supposed to be supporting and protecting in 
its deeds as it carries out its mandate. That is to say, these are the standards 
of human dignity in the workplace that the specialized agencies of the 
United Nations should be promoting, supporting and protecting according 
to their accord with the UN. 
2.1  The Staff Contract Versus the Consultancy Contract 
                                           
8 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 
9 Ibid., Article 23. 
10 Ibid., Article 24. 
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Before we can assess FAO’s policies and practices (and the precipitating 
motive) with regard to issuing consultancy contracts, we must understand 
the differences between the consultancy contract and the staff contract. To 
do this we will refer to the “Employment Relationship Recommendation, 
2006 (No. 198)” by the International Labour Organization (ILO), which 
gives definitions and guidelines for employment. Although the ILO 
addresses its policy paper to nations (it refers to “national policy of 
protection for workers”), the concept is the same when they say,  
For the purposes of the national policy of protection for workers in an 
employment relationship, the determination of the existence of such a 
relationship should be guided primarily by the facts relating to the 
performance of work and the remuneration of the worker, notwithstanding 
how the relationship is characterized in any contrary arrangement, contractual 
or otherwise, that may have been agreed between parties.11 
And the ILO goes further to identify when a staff contract is appropriate 
and when a consultancy contract is appropriate, saying, 
Members should consider the possibility of defining in their laws and 
regulations, or by other means, specific indicators of the existence of an 
employment relationship. Those indicators might include: (a) the fact that the 
work: is carried out according to the instructions and under the control of 
another party; involves the integration of the worker in the organization of the 
enterprise; is performed solely or mainly for the benefit of another person; 
must be carried out personally by the worker; is carried out within specific 
working hours or at a workplace specified or agreed by the party requesting 
the work; is of a particular duration and has a certain continuity; requires the 
worker’s availability; or involves the provision of tools, materials and 
machinery by the party requesting the work; (b) periodic pay of remuneration 
to the worker; the fact that such remuneration constitutes the worker’s sole or 
principle source of income; provision of payment in kind, such as food, 
lodging or transport; recognition of entitlements such as weekly rest and 
annual holidays; payment by the party requesting the work for travel 
undertaken by the worker in order to carry out the work; or absence of 
financial risk for the worker.12 
With this definition of a regular employer-employee relationship, we can 
turn to the UN’s document on the “Administrative instruction, Consultants 
                                           
11 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION., The Employment Relationship. Geneva, 
Switzerland. 2007. Article 9, p. 56. 
12 Ibid., Article 13. p. 57. 
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and individual contractors”13 for a positive perspective of the consultancy 
contract. The UN gives the following definitions:  
A consultant is an individual who is a recognized authority or specialist in a 
specific field, engaged by the United Nations under a temporary contract in an 
advisory or consultative capacity to the Secretariat. A consultant must have 
special skills or knowledge not normally possessed by the regular staff of the 
Organization and for which there is no continuing need in the Secretariat. The 
functions of a consultant are results-oriented and normally involve analysing 
problems, facilitating seminars or training courses, preparing documents for 
conferences and meetings or writing reports on the matters within their area of 
expertise on which their advice or assistance is sought.14 
And the definition of a contractor is: 
An individual contractor is an individual engaged by the Organization from 
time to time under a temporary contract to provide expertise, skills or 
knowledge for the performance of a specific task or piece of work, which 
would be short-term by nature, against the payment of an all-inclusive fee. The 
work assignment may involve full-time or part-time functions similar to those 
of staff members, such as the provision of translation, editing, language 
training, public information, secretarial or clerical and part-time maintenance 
services or other functions that could be performed by staff. An individual 
contractor need not work on United Nations premises.15 
Addressing the ILO’s provision to the requirement that the assignment (and 
contract) have a finite duration, the UN Secretariat states, “The duration of 
the contract shall be directly linked to the terms of reference as set out in the 
consultant’s or individual contractor’s contract.” 16  Furthermore, the UN 
Secretariat gives instructions on handling consultancy (and contractor) 
contracts in the event that an organization or agency hires the same person 
for more than one contract (multiple contracts in succession) they says, “In 
order to limit the repeated use of the same consultant, either to perform 
different tasks within the work plan or a series of tasks within the same 
project, no consultant shall provide services for more than 24 months in a 
36-month period, whether continuous or not, and irrespective of the 
                                           
13 “Administrative instruction, Consultants and individual contractors” ST/AI/2013/4 
19 December 2013, UN Secretariat. 
14 Ibid., Section 2. 
15 Ibid., Section 2. 
16 Ibid., Section 5, para. 5.7. 
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cumulative months of actual work.”17 A person fitting these criteria is a 
contractor or consultant and, therefore, has the following relationship with 
the UN:  
The consultant or individual contractor (hereinafter called ‘contractor’) shall 
have the legal status of an independent contractor vis-à-vis the United Nations, 
and shall not be regarded, for any purposes, as being either a staff member of 
the United Nations, under the Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United 
Nations, or an official of the United Nations, for purposes of the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the 
General Assembly on 13 February 1946. Accordingly, nothing within or 
relating to the contract shall establish the relation of employer and employee, 
or of principle and agent, between the United Nations and the contractor. The 
officials, representatives, employees or subcontractors of the United Nations 
and of the contractor, if any, shall not be considered in any respect as being the 
employees or agents of the other, and the United Nations and the contractor 
shall be solely responsible for all claims arising out of or relating to their 
engagement of such persons or entities.18 
In summation, these are the qualities that justify granting consultancy or 
contractor contracts: 
 the person is hired for a specific task, project or assignment;  
 they are hired for a specific timeframe in which they must provide 
predetermined deliverables; 
 they possess expertise that the existing staff do not already have; 
 they are not expected to keep regular [staff] hours, nor are they 
expected to be onsite (report on a regular basis for duty); 
 they are not expected to conduct themselves as employees, staff 
or dependents of the organization or agency; and 
 their remuneration is not expected to be their sole or primary 
source of income. 
On the other hand, the staff member has an employee-employer 
relationship with the organization or agency in which they are expected to 
perform regular duties that contribute to the regular functions of the 
organization or agency; it is understood that that job/position is the 
person’s main means of income; they are required to report for duty 
regularly and keep pre-agreed work hours. 
                                           
17 Ibid., Section 5, para. 5.8. 
18 Ibid., Annex I, para. 1. 
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2.2  The Implications of the Staff Contract Over the Consultancy Contract 
In return for meeting these requirements, the staff member can expect a 
regular paycheck (remuneration), holiday leave, annual leave, medical 
insurance and a provision for their pension. According to the definition and 
the guidelines for how the consultant or contractor will interact with the 
organization or agency, he or she may not expect any of the 
aforementioned benefits and entitlements. This arrangement is equitable 
(and perhaps just) if it is applied in accordance to the guidelines.  
 
 
3. FAO’s policies and practices 
Before delving into FAO’s policies and practices in how they use 
consultancy contracts, it is important to know that the persons within the 
organization, those who comprise FAO, are working in earnest to meet the 
mandate to eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. The persons 
who work for FAO are implementing programs to make agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries more sustainable and productive; they are working to 
reduce rural poverty and enable inclusive and efficient agricultural and 
alimentary systems while increasing the resilience of livelihoods to threats 
and crises. The work that FAO is doing benefits persons who would not 
have the means to access nutritious food or have agricultural infrastructures 
that support their rural and impoverished communities; it is beneficial to 
those whom it serves directly, the rural poor, as well as the developed 
world because it brings countries together so that they may work as 
partners to solve global issues related to nutrition and sustainable food and 
agricultural development.19  
                                           
19  “Putting information within reach and supporting the transition to sustainable 
agriculture. FAO serves as a knowledge network. We use the expertise of our staff – 
agronomists, foresters, fisheries and livestock specialists, nutritionists, social scientists, 
economists, statisticians and other professionals – to collect, analyse and disseminate 
data that aid development. Strengthening political will and sharing policy expertise. 
FAO lends its years of experience to member countries in devising agricultural policy, 
supporting planning, drafting effective legislation and creating national strategies to 
achieve rural development and hunger alleviation goals. We advocate for the 
implementation of these policies and programmes, encouraging sufficient financial 
resources to be made available, the right organizational structures to be in place, and 
importantly, ensuring adequate human capacities.  
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Understanding the benefits that FAO brings to local and global 
communities is important because it, too, contributes to the context in 
which FAO as an organization exists. Let us keep in mind that when we 
refer to FAO, we understand it to be a community of persons working 
together to achieve the aforementioned mandates. We are not referring to 
FAO, the organization, as an autonomous person that has a will of its own, 
a sense of self or an awareness of being as such. 
3.1  The Definition of the Consultancy Contract for FAO 
As we continue to understand the context in which FAO uses 
consultancy contracts, we must be able to appreciate what a consultant is 
and how he or she works with or for FAO. According to FAO,  
Consultants… are persons who are recognized authorities or specialists in a 
specific field and whose services are utilised in an advisory, consultative or 
demonstrative capacity. They are considered officials of the Organization. 
They are engaged when the assignment in question requires the provision of 
assistance of an advisory or consultative nature to the recruiting Department or 
Division and have duties that are envisaged as requiring them to represent the 
Organization in either of the following capacities; (i) Assume management 
responsibilities impacting on the Organization's financial and human 
                                                                                                                           
Bolstering public-private collaboration to improve smallholder agriculture. As a 
neutral forum, FAO provides the setting where rich and poor nations can come together 
to build common understanding. We also engage the food industry and non-profits in 
providing support and services to farmers and facilitate greater public and private 
investments in strengthening the food sector. On any given day, dozens of policy-
makers and experts from around the globe convene at headquarters or in our field 
offices to forge agreements on major food and agriculture issues.  
Bringing knowledge to the field. Our breadth of knowledge is put to the test in 
thousands of field projects throughout the world. FAO mobilizes and manages millions 
of dollars provided by industrialized countries, development banks and other sources to 
make sure the projects achieve their goals. In crisis situations, we work side-by-side 
with the World Food Programme and other humanitarian agencies to protect rural 
livelihoods and help people rebuild their lives. Supporting countries prevent and 
mitigate risks. FAO develops mechanisms to monitor and warn about multi-hazard risks 
and threats to agriculture, food and nutrition. We are there to inform countries on 
successful risk reduction measures that they can include in all policies related to 
agriculture. When need arises, we make sure disaster response plans are coordinated at 
all levels” (www.fao.org/about/how-we-work/en/, 26 June 2015). 
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resources; or (ii) Coordinate activities with external entities and take decisions 
on behalf of the Organization.20 
FAO’s definition of the consultant is by and large consistent with that of 
the UN Secretariat. Besides the consultant, FAO also engages persons on a 
Personal Service Agreement (PSA) contract.21 It, too, is very similar in 
definition to the UN’s definition of the contractor.22 
With this in mind, let us review FAO’s statement on the composition of 
their human resources found on the organization’s website under “Who we 
are,” 
As of 1 November 2013, FAO employed 1795 professional staff (including 
Junior Professional Officers, Associate Professional Officers and National 
Professional Officers) and 1654 support staff. Figures only refer to staff 
holding fixed term and continuing appointments. Approximately 58 percent 
are based at headquarters in Rome, while the remainder work in offices 
worldwide. During the last 15 years, the proportion of women in the 
professional staff category has nearly doubled, from 19 percent to 37 
percent.23 
At this point we can already see a possible challenge as it relates to their 
policies and practices in using consultancy contracts: there is no mention or 
representation of those persons who serve the organization as consultants or 
through employment using a consultancy contract. I make a distinction 
between those persons who are consultants and those who are employed 
using a consultancy contract, and you will see why momentarily. 
3.2  The Reasons FAO Uses the Consultancy Contract 
                                           
20 “FAO Use of Contractors and Retirees,” Finance Committee, 123rd Session, Rome, 
6-10 October 2008 (FC 123/17 E), para. 6. 
21 For the purposes of this discussion, we will include PSAs into the general category 
of consultancy because there is nothing that distinguishes one from the other when 
considering the ethical use of these contractual modalities. 
22 “PSA … individuals required to perform, without direct supervision, specific tasks 
or services of an intermittent or discontinuous nature and of limited duration, different 
from those performed by staff members on a continuing basis, and which do not require 
them to travel regularly on behalf of FAO, to work regularly on FAO premises, or to 
represent the Organization. The individuals are considered independent contractors (or 
in the case of a PSA with a Lending Employer, an employee-on-loan from that 
Employer); they are not considered officials of the Organization and are not authorised 
to commit the Organization's financial and human resources” (Ibid., para. 7). 
23 www.fao.org/about/who-we-are/en/, 26 June 2015. 
272 PART THREE: INTEGRATING RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE 
 
 
FAO’s explanation for why it uses the consultancy contract as a means 
of employment is outlined in their document “FAO Use of Contractors and 
Retirees”24, which was produced by the Finance Committee in 2008. The 
primary reason they list for using consultancy contracts is because it 
provides flexibility in recruiting people to complete a job or task: “The use 
of contractors is a common practice throughout the UN Common System. 
The primary reason is the flexibility this type of arrangement offers for the 
recruitment of individuals to carry out specific tasks or services that are to 
be delivered within a defined period of time.”25 Recruiting staff members is 
a long, cumbersome and, often, bureaucratic process, so hiring a person 
using a consultancy contract can reduce the time, paperwork and call for 
candidates (issuing a vacancy announcement) otherwise required when in 
recruiting a staff member. 
In applying hermeneutics to the analysis of this statement, we can focus 
on the initial part of the statement to glean a less obvious meaning: “The 
use of contractors is a common practice throughout the UN Common 
System.” The use of contracts in the UN common system is not a reason, it 
is a justification of the practice. The question that follows would be, why 
does FAO feel compelled to justify the practice? If the motives that they 
give are equitable and just as it relates to their engagement and treatment of 
consultants and contractors, why would they need to justify the practice by 
saying that it is a common practice within the UN common system? 
Likewise, FAO’s Finance Committee justifies the employment of UN 
retirees as consultants by pointing out that it “is also a common phenomenon 
and widespread practice throughout the UN Common System.” 26  They 
continue saying, “This practice allows organizations such as FAO to employ, 
through only to a limited degree, the most experienced and qualified former 
members of staff whose expertise is considered valuable. Again, these 
arrangements are cost-effective because of limits on remuneration with 
respect to former UN staff.”27 There are no obvious (publicly documented) 
infractions against the practice of hiring retirees as consultants, so if the 
retiree is hired to work in a different department or a different 
organization/agency from which he retired, there should be no problem. But 
                                           
24 “FAO Use of Contractors and Retirees,” Finance Committee, 123rd Session, Rome, 
6-10 October 2008 (FC 123/17 E). 
25 Ibid., para. 2. 
26 Ibid., para. 3. 
27 Ibid., para. 3. 
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if he is being hired as a consultant to do the job that he was doing prior to 
retirement or even a similar job, why was the position not filled when he 
retired? If a retiree is hired back as a consultant for the same or similar 
position that he was occupying as a staff member, it follows that the position 
continues to be essential to the regular program of the organization/agency; 
therefore, it stands to reason, the position should be occupied by a staff 
member. 
The Finance Committee continues to explain its motivation for using 
consultancy contracts when it says,  
Typically, NSHR undertake very specific time-bound tasks of a specialised 
nature – they do not carry out functions that are normally undertaken by 
regular staff. As such, they are a cost-effective means of providing the 
necessary skills as and when the need arises, without creating a longer term 
financial liability for the Organization, as is the case with the establishment of 
a fixed-term post.28 
So another important motive for using consultants [and contractors] is 
financial. Because consultants are supposed to be engaged with the 
organization for a limited, and presumably short, amount of time, FAO 
does not have to invest in the person’s long-term well-being, i.e. vacation 
time and social security benefits (medical insurance, life insurance and 
pension). It is interesting that the document refers to these investments as a 
liability; applying hermeneutics to this statement, it can be interpreted that 
FAO perceives its staff who are entitled to long-term financial implications 
as a liability rather than an asset. Could this be the case? 
Regardless of how FAO perceives its staff, according to the rules and 
regulations by which FAO manages the use of consultancy (and PSA) 
contracts, the organization acknowledges the possibility of hiring a 
consultant for a longer period of time.  
The contractual arrangements under which NSHR are recruited reflect the 
time-bound task-based nature of their employment. In the case of Consultants 
and PSAs, contracts cannot exceed a period of 11 months in any 12-month 
period, after which a mandatory “break-in-service” of at least one month is 
necessary. Furthermore, their employment may not exceed 44 months in a 48 
month period, at which point they must take a mandatory six month break-in-
service.29 
                                           
28 Ibid., para. 2. 
29 Ibid., para. 10. 
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It is not hard to imagine that a project or assignment could last for a year, 
so the provision that consultants not work more than 11 months in a 12-
month period may be reasonable. But for FAO to add the provision that 
consultants cannot work more than 44 months in a 48-month period means 
that the organization acknowledges the possibility that a person could be 
hired using the consultancy contract for a longer-term assignment than is 
appropriate for that type of contract. This is to say, one can reasonably 
conclude that for FAO to put language into their rules and regulations 
limiting the number of months a consultant can work in a four-year period 
there have been consultants, at least some, who have worked for the 
organization on a longer term and perhaps continuous capacity that is not 
necessarily representative of consultancy work, but rather more 
representative of a staff position. 
In fact, FAO clarifies in a following article that “It is these limits on 
duration, and additionally in the case of retirees the limits on remuneration, 
that ensure that NSHR are not used for work of a continuous nature which 
would be more suitably carried out by a regular staff member.” 30  The 
problem with this set of rules is that the limit for how long a person can be 
engaged with the organization using the consultant contract does not ensure 
that they are not used for work of a continuous nature, which would be 
more suitably carried out by a regular staff member.  
Instead, this set of rules enables the organization to hire people using a 
consultancy contract indefinitely as long as they adhere to 11 months out of 
a year and 44 months out of four years rule. How would this work? A 
person is hired as a consultant for 11 months, takes a month break, is 
rehired for another 11 months and takes another month break until he 
reaches the 44 months in a four year period; as soon as that person has 
completed their six month break, they are then rehired as a consultant for 
another 11 months, and the cycle continues. We are not accusing FAO of 
improperly using the consultancy contract – but at the same time, we do 
acknowledge the possibility that the organization or persons within the 
organization may not adhere to the spirit of the rule and, instead, employ 
consultants for long-term assignments (positions) that should be completed 
(filled) by staff.  
The question is, is this indeed the case? If so, is this a one-off or is this 
an organizational practice? 
                                           
30 Ibid., para. 12. 
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3.3  FAO’s Practice of Using the Consultancy Contract 
As an introduction to our examination of FAO’s practice of using the 
consultancy contract, we will once again refer to the document FC 123/17 
when they disclose the number of consultants working for the organization 
in 2008. “As at 30 June 2008, the total number of NSHR employed by the 
Organization was 1744, down from 1791 at 31 December 2007 and well 
below the peak of 1961 as at 31 December 2006. Of these 1744, just over 
9% were retirees (160).” 31  Besides communicating the number of 
consultants working for the organization as of 30 June 2008, the Finance 
Committee is conveying another message: the number of consultants has 
decreased in the last two years. 
Taking into consideration the way in which the articles are written, 
including justifications for the practice rather than simply listing a reason, it 
can be interpreted that FAO is continuing to justify its use by highlighting 
the downward trend. Another interpretation is that FAO is writing a more 
forgiving narrative by listing statistics that are higher from the previous 
years to give the impression that the use of consultancy contracts is indeed 
on the decline. But if this is not the case and the practice of using 
consultants is truly common place in the UN system and/or if FAO is using 
the consultancy contracts in accordance with its own rules, then why is the 
Finance Committee, a governing body of FAO, using this type of language 
that gives the impression that it is justifying its corporate action? 
Granted, not all of the 1744 consultants included in the count as of 30 
June 2008 are located at FAO’s Rome, Italy headquarters. The Finance 
Committee reports that 63% of the consultants were recruited to work in 
locations outside of Rome32 (country offices or field projects), as such the 
Finance Committee concludes that “these statistics indicate a strong link in 
the use of NSHR in areas such as temporary field projects, where the nature 
of the assignment is ideal for the use of such contracts rather than recruiting 
staff members.”33 The Finance Committee’s assertion may indeed be more 
than a correlation, but it provides no statistics to support the claim; the 
missing statistics are the numbers of consultants working in the field or in 
country offices and the length of their contracts. An accompanying statistic 
                                           
31 Ibid., para. 15. 
32 “With regard to the location of NSHR, as indicated in Annex 2, at 30 June 2008 
63% of NSHR were recruited to serve in locations away from Headquarters” (Ibid., 
para. 16). 
33 Ibid., para. 16. 
276 PART THREE: INTEGRATING RESPONSIBILITY AND JUSTICE 
 
 
to the length of the contracts is the number of times within a 12-month 
period and 48-month period consultants have been issued contracts. This is 
to say, if a consultant working for a field project or in a country office is 
issued a contract for two months, the following statistic needs to be the 
number of times that particular person was issued a contract to do the same 
or similar work within the 12-month and 48-month timeframes. 
The picture becomes more interesting when we read  
From 1 January to 30 June 2008, US$45,369,118 was spent on NSHR, for 
services that amounted to a total number of 876 persons, i.e. the sum of 
contract days each year divided by 365… By dividing the total expenditure by 
the number of person years for the same period, the average annual costs of a 
NSHR thus far in 2008 can be estimated as US$51,772.34  
This statement is interesting because we can still apply interpretation theory 
to understand what is being said (and what is not being said), but first we 
have to ask why the Finance Committee is presenting the expenditure on 
876 persons instead of the full 1744 consultants they counted as of 30 June 
2008. In the document, there is no explanation for the use of the 876 count 
instead of the 1744, so there is no way to ascertain the logic or judge the 
merits of the statement.  
Nevertheless, we find it interesting that FAO has already said 
consultants cannot work more than 11 months in a 12-month period, and 
yet the Finance Committee has calculated the expense of a single 
consultant against a 12-month period. We are not questioning the logic 
because we understand the Finance Committee has to report on the fiscal 
activity that takes place within a 12-month timeframe. What we are 
questioning is how the statistic of US$51,772 per year is reported and the 
information that is missing. How many contracts do the US$45,369,118 
total for 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2008 and the estimated US$51,772 per 
consultant for 2008 represent? What are the durations of those contracts 
and what are the successions in renewing consultancy contracts for the 
same person doing the same or similar work? We pose these questions to 
make two points: the Finance Committee has reported on the financial 
implication of issuing these types of employment contracts without taking 
into account the persons who are being affected; and there are also crucial 
pieces of information missing, information that would give a more 
accurate picture of how consultancy contracts are used, which gives a 
                                           
34 Ibid., para. 18. 
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more complete view of whether FAO is adhering to its own rules and 
regulations. 
More than that, the information that is missing is preventing FAO as a 
self-contained organization (those who comprise it), its governing bodies 
(including the Finance Committee) and its observers from taking an 
objective, comprehensive and critical inventory of its corporate action with 
respect to its consultants. The proper statistics and surveys would allow the 
organization, its governing bodies and observers to determine if there are 
any infractions to the rules and regulations regarding consultancy contracts 
and if those infractions are isolated incidents or systemic problems. 
Without those essential pieces of information, it is difficult to make a 
meaningful determination without imposing speculation. 
In 2009, the Finance Committee published the “Revised Policy and 
Implementation of FAO Use of Contractors and Retirees” in which it states 
“A target of a 60:40 ratio of staff to non-staff was envisaged so as to allow 
for a greater flexibility in delivering the Organization’s programme of work 
in times of substantial budgetary constraints.”35 At this point we can begin 
a meaningful criticism based on documentation because the Finance 
Committee has said that FAO will be using consultants to fill 40% of its 
workforce; they did not qualify the statement by saying that the consultants 
will be completing assignments or working on projects on a temporary 
basis. They continue saying, 
The lower cost of NSHR, together with the flexibility that such human 
resources offer, have contributed to the extensive and prolonged used of non-
staff contractual instruments. The average yearly cost of an NSHR at 
Headquarters in 2008 was approximately USD 58,300, and since NSHR are 
generally employed to carry out professional level work, this represents a far 
more economical alternative to create a professional post (by more than 50%) 
to meet programme delivery requirements. The budgetary constraints of 
previous biennia have increased the Organization’s reliance on non-staff 
human resources to deliver essential ongoing programme activies.36 
Consultants are intrinsically cheaper labor because there is no long-term 
financial liability, so, of course, they have a weaker impact on the overall 
working budget for the organization. Here, we have definitive evidence that 
FAO is breaking its own rules and regulations concerning the use of 
                                           
35 “Revised Policy and Implementation of FAO Use of Contractors and Retirees.” 
Finance Committee 126th Session, Rome, 11-15 May 2009. (FC 126/15 E). para. 5. 
36 Ibid., para. 8. 
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consultancy contracts: the organization uses consultants to deliver on the 
essential, on-going programs and activities.  
What does this mean? It means that consultants can be hired to do the 
work that staff should be doing because they are much cheaper to hire and 
much easier to sever ties with. The FAO rules from the previous document 
issued by the Finance Committee (FC 123/17) is clear about how and when 
consultant contracts should be used. In fact, the Finance Committee makes 
special efforts to demonstrate that the use of consultants is not only in 
accordance with FAO’s rules and regulations, but it is within the standards 
of the UN common system. However, as stated in the document FC 126/15 
E, FAO is no longer concerned with following its stated rules and 
regulations, nor is it concerned with demonstrating its alignment with the 
UN common system. Rather in this statement, the Finance Committee 
justifies the misuse of the consultancy contract by saying that there is no 
other way forward, i.e. FAO’s budget has been cut significantly, so the only 
option is to cut staff and hire consultants to take the place of the staff 
positions that were cut. 
In FAO’s public document “The Director-General’s Medium Term Plan 
2014-2017 and Programme of Work and Budget 2014-2015,” which is a 
report of the strategy and budgetary decisions made at the 38th Session of 
the Conference from 15-22 June 2013, there is one article that talks about 
consultants and considers their use in the overall framework of FAO’s 
program of work:  
… the contracting of consultants and other non-staff human resources will also 
be carefully monitored at a corporate level in order to enable optimal use of 
these resources. The use of non-staff human resources provides the flexibility 
required in undertaking programmatic activities, and therefore it is important 
that adequate overall funding be available in this regard. The improved 
monitoring and control in this area will ensure more strategic use of non-staff 
human resources supporting the implementation of the Strategic Objective 
action plans.37 
The meaning of this article seems ambiguous at best, but we can glean 
several messages: FAO will continue to use non-staff human resource 
contracts or consultancy contracts; FAO reaffirms their reason for using 
consultants insofar as they are cheaper labor that can be recruited and let go 
quite easily in comparison to recruiting and letting go of staff; and 
                                           
37 The Director-General’s Medium Term Plan 2014-2017 and Programme of Work 
and Budget 2014-2015. FAO. Rome. 2013. para. 264. 
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consultants will continue to be used to achieve the organizational goals and 
mandates (strategic objective). The language that renders the message 
seemingly ambiguous or obtuse is the suggestion that the use of 
consultancy contracts will be carefully monitored at a corporate level. The 
reason this part of the message is problematic is that there is no substance 
to the statement to make it meaningful. 
Regardless of the minor observations and criticisms that we have offered 
in reviewing the policies and documented practices of how FAO uses the 
consultancy contract in light of the mandates and values as stated by FAO 
and the UN, we have not begun our ethical criticisms based on our system 
of corporate ethics based on personal responsibility for the dignity of the 
other. As a means of introducing our own criticisms based on our system of 
corporate ethics, we will look at some of the criticisms of FAO’s policies 
and practices that were offered from within the UN common system. 
4. Criticisms of FAO’s Policies and Practices 
In 2012, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) of the UN Secretariat conducted 
a review of the policies and practices of using consultancy contracts within 
the UN common system. The review takes into consideration several of the 
UN specialized agencies including FAO. The objective of the report was to 
“provide an assessment of the use of individual consultants in the United 
Nations system by analysing relevant policies and practices. … The present 
review therefore also includes broader considerations of similar issues 
regarding non-staff contractual modalities.”38 Conducting an analysis of the 
policies and practices of the use of non-staff contractual modalities is 
useful inasmuch as it provides guidance or sets standards for ensuring that 
the modalities (contracts) are used in a way that is not exploitive to the 
persons working as consultants. It appears that without explicitly saying so, 
the Joint Inspection Unit is attempting to do just that when they say, 
Consultants and other non-staff personnel are becoming an important part of the 
workforce of the United Nations system organizations. However, policies and 
regulations do not always provide clear criteria for the use of these human 
resources, and the implementation of the policies is a matter of concern from the 
perspective of fair and socially responsible employment practices, particularly 
when individuals are working for extended periods of time under short-term non-
                                           
38  “Review of Individual Consultancies in the United Nations System.” 
(JIU/REP/2012/5) Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations. Prepared by Cihan Terzi. 
Geneva, 2012. p. iii. 
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staff contracts. The pressure to deliver under inadequate funding and inflexible 
staffing models, coupled with permissive non-staff policies and the lack of 
oversight, lead organizations to use non-staff contractual modalities excessively.39 
This statement is an introduction to the rest of the document; the message is 
clear: the JIU recognizes that consultants are an important part of the 
workforce and that the UN and its specialized agencies do not always 
employ consultancy contracts in accordance with their own rules and 
regulations. While the JIU appreciates consultants as human resources have 
become essential to the UN and its specialized agencies as the 
organizations strive to achieve their goals and fulfill their mandates, the 
other message is that this behavior is not acceptable. 
Before getting into any of the findings, the JIU notes three things: the 
distinction in the contractual modalities, the need for clear consultancy 
policies and the ineffectiveness of current policies with the resulting 
implication (and perhaps accusation) that some agencies are abusing the 
consultancy contracts. The JIU says,  
When there is an employment (employer-employee) relationship for the 
execution of work, the contractual modality should be a staff contract; if it is 
an independent contractor relationship, the contractual modality should be a 
consultancy or other non-staff contract… Some United Nations organizations 
have specific consultancy policies. However, the policies of many 
organizations lack a clear definition of individual consultancy or do not use a 
specific contractual modality or adequate practical guidelines for using 
consultants. In practice, consultancies and other similar non-staff contracts are 
used interchangeably. Most importantly, these contracts are used for work 
which should entail staff contracts… The existing policies allow organizations 
to grant successive consultancy contracts which add up to long-term 
assignments, with or without short mandatory breaks. This practice is no 
longer in line with the nature of a consultancy contract and creates conditions 
for inappropriate use of contractual modalities. The remuneration levels 
applied both within each organization and across the system are not consistent 
and there are no guidelines for proper implementation. Likewise, social 
benefits provided though these contracts vary significantly across the 
organizations.40 
In the last two sentences about remuneration and social benefits, the JIU 
demonstrates an appreciation for what is at stake for those persons who may 
                                           
39 Ibid., p. iii. 
40 Ibid., p. iii. 
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be hired as consultants despite working as staff. This is the crux of the 
problem: if a person is working as a staff member, then they should receive 
the benefits and security to which staff are entitled. More than that, if a person 
is in continuous employment with an organization, then, according to the 
guidelines and values put forth by the International Labour Organization, that 
person should receive appropriate and commensurate remuneration and social 
benefits.  
If one person is issued a consultancy contract despite being expected to 
perform the tasks that are essential to the regular function of the organization or 
agency while not receiving the appropriate remuneration and social benefits, it 
is a problem because the organization or agency is exploiting a person whom, 
per the organization’s stated mandates and values, it should be protecting. One 
person issued a single inappropriate contract based on the work, expectations 
and relationship between the person and the organization can be interpreted as a 
mistake, but issuing that same person an inappropriate contract more than once 
in succession over a period of time that constitutes a long-term employment 
relationship is not a mistake – at best, it is a misuse of the contract modality.  
Moreover, if several persons are issued a consultancy contract despite 
the type of work, expectations and the relationship between the persons and 
the organization being that of employer-employee, then the problem is not 
isolated; instead, it is a systematic problem. We can assume there is a 
misuse of consultancy contracts since, according to the JIU, “According to 
some rough estimates, non-staff personnel in the United Nations system 
constitutes on average over 40 per cent of the total workforce.”41 At this 
point we are still careful in how we categorize or refer to the practice of 
using consultancy contracts because even though the total workforce within 
the UN and its specialized agencies is approximately 40%, this is not 
explicit evidence of malpractice. It is, however, an indication that the 
proportion of work being done for the regular program of work is 
disproportionate considering the type of work (time bound special 
programs, results-oriented, analytical projects, etc.) expected from a 
consultant. 
The JIU concedes that many organizations have succumbed to using 
consultancy contracts instead of the more appropriate staff contract because 
“Over the years, the governing bodies have been expanding the mandates and 
responsibilities of the organizations. However, the resources, including the 
human resources, have generally been stagnant or not increasing in a 
                                           
41 Ibid., p. 4, para. 16. 
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commensurate manner.” 42  Therefore, “such expansion, combined with 
additional pressure to deliver with inadequate funding, has substantially 
increased the need for short-term non-staff personnel, and has led to the use of 
such personnel for work that should be performed by regular staff.”43 The 
problem is as we have already mentioned, that “[t]hese contracts, in general, 
do not involve long-term obligations and do not provide social benefits.”44 
The JIU refers to the document from FAO’s Finance Committee (FC 126/15 
E) that envisioned a 60:40 staff to non-staff ratio is evidence of this trend, but 
going further they highlight the inflexibility of hiring staff with regard to the 
approved program and budget 45 , the ease of recruiting and terminating 
consultants46 and the cost savings to the organizations and agencies.47 
                                           
42 Ibid., p. 4, para. 17. 
43 Ibid., p. 4, para. 17. 
44 Ibid., p. 4, para. 17. 
45 “Under severe budget constraints, project managers often opt for non-staff contractual 
modalities instead of staff contracts, for flexibility and cost-saving reasons. By using non-staff 
contracts, they can also exercise more discretion at various levels, such as selection, 
remuneration, etc. Although it seems that managers perceive the non-staff contractual 
relationship as the best option, the reasons put forward are not always convincing nor in full 
compliance with United Nations values and good international labour practices” (Ibid., p. 4, 
para. 20). “In many organizations, the resources allocated to staff posts have been frozen or 
have not increased adequately over the years. These situations naturally lead organizations to 
resort to non-staff workforce. Legislative and governing bodies are aware of the situation and 
some have requested the heads of organizations not to use consultants for work that should be 
done by staff personnel” (Ibid., p. 4, para. 21). “In most organizations, the number and level 
of staff posts for each department/office are approved in the programme-budget by the 
governing body with little flexibility for adjustment during the budget year/biennium. The 
flexibility of consultancy and other non-staff contracts compensates the rigidity and 
constraints related to the creation and management of staff posts (short or fixed term)” (Ibid., 
p. 5, para. 22). 
46 “Subject to corporate rules and procedures, the recruitment of staff is a relatively 
lengthy process that includes, inter alia, advertisement, competition and interview panels. 
Brining on non-staff personnel, on the other hand, offers more flexibility since there are less 
procedural requirements: it is easier to establish and terminate non-staff contracts and 
recruitment is much faster. This flexibility is particularly important in a dynamic work 
environment and emergency situations” (Ibid., p. 5, para. 23). “Managers often anticipate 
difficulties at the termination phase of fixed or short-term staff contracts and therefore 
prefer non-staff contractual modalities” (Ibid., p. 5, para. 24). 
47 “In general, fixed-term or short-term staff contracts are costly in comparison to 
non-staff contracts as they include a series of social benefits (e.g. retirement pension, 
medical insurance and education grant), whereas non-staff contracts do not. 
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Indeed, the JIU found the following:  
…many consultant and other non-staff personnel often work under an 
employment relationship with repeated or extended short-term non-staff 
contracts. The organizations provide them with office space, telephones, email 
accounts, monthly remuneration, and ground passes. Some consultants have 
been working for more than two years under various types of successive 
contracts of limited duration, and without social benefits. All these elements 
indicate the presence of an “employment relationship” rather than an 
“independent contractor relationship” which implies that these people are staff 
by de facto employment relationship.48 
The admission that at least some UN organizations and specialized 
agencies are engaging in employment relationships with persons who were 
hired on a consultancy contract is significant because it is a recognition that 
the practice goes against the values of the UN.49 This is the point at which 
we can categorically call the policies and practices that FAO has adopted 
unethical because they run contrary to the UN statement for human rights 
and dignity. Furthermore, it suggests that there may be a push for a change 
so that the practices are in line with organizational values. Beyond the 
question of values, which, of course is fundamental, there is the question of 
risk. 
One of the basic risks is that throughout the UN common system, there is 
no consistent application for how consultancy contracts are used, and there 
is no common code of conduct for consultants. The challenge of not having 
a common code of conduct becomes relevant when consultants [are 
expected to] work on the premises of the UN organization50; if consultants 
                                                                                                                           
Furthermore, there is room to adjust remuneration levels downward in non-staff 
contracts which is not the case with staff contracts” (Ibid., p. 5, para. 25). 
48 Ibid., p. 8, para. 38. 
49 “This debate is essential and the United Nations system organizations must ensure 
that their employment practices are in line with all the values that they are promoting” 
(Ibid., p. 8, para. 38). 
50 “The review also found that there is no common approach regarding a code of 
conduct for consultants. Consultants often work on the premises of the organizations 
and constitute a significant part of the organizations' workforce, and therefore a proper 
code of conduct should be applied. The approach to this issue differs greatly across the 
organizations. Some include a few clauses in the contracts as part of the standard 
conditions of contract, while others stipulate that the code of conduct for regular staff is 
applicable to consultants. A few organizations, such as the United Nations Secretariat 
and UNIDO, provide consultants with relevant documentation at the time of their 
engagement; some organizations require consultants to comply with other related 
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who represent 40% of the UN workforce work on the premises, then their 
conduct becomes more significant than if they were working remotely; that 
is to say, what they say and do and how they say and do it reflect on the 
UN organizations because there is little to no outward indication to 
distinguish the consultant from the staff member. 
Along these same lines, the JIU specifies that the risk of increasing the 
percentage of non-staff or consultants is “the formation of two parallel 
workforces with different rights and entitlements.”51 They list various risks 
to organizations and agencies that invest heavily in consultants rather than 
staff, but those risks are focused on reputation52, losing control of core 
functions and services53, losing institutional knowledge54 and endangering 
accountability 55 ; however, the JIU notes two significant risks that are 
directly linked to the organization’s legal liability and internal culture,  
1. “Exposing the organization to legal disputes if a de facto employment 
relationship exists but is not recognized by corresponding contractual 
modalities and benefits,” and  
2. “Blurring of organizational culture, causing tension and low morale 
among the workforce by creating various statuses and providing 
different benefits for similar work.”56  
At this point, the JIU is putting the organizations and agencies that use 
consultancy contracts inappropriately on notice: organizations and agencies 
are exposing themselves to a significant risk of legal action on the part of a 
person who has worked or is working for an organization under a 
consultancy contract when, indeed, they are working as if they were staff.  
                                                                                                                           
policies, such as prohibition of sexual harassment at work, whistleblower policies and 
code of ethics” (Ibid., p. 15, para. 69). 
51 Ibid., p. 6, para. 28. 
52 “Loss of reputation because of unfair employment practices that may be contrary 
to United Nations values and international labour practices” (Ibid., p. 6, Box 1: Risks in 
the use of non-staff workforce). 
53 “Losing control of core functions and services if they are increasingly transferred 
to temporary workforce” (Ibid., p. 6, Box 1: Risks in the use of non-staff workforce). 
54 “Loss of institutional knowledge due to increasing temporary workforce” (Ibid., p. 
6, Box 1: Risks in the use of non-staff workforce). 
55 “Endangering the accountability framework through discretionary recruitment and 
use of significant amount of temporary personnel” (Ibid., p. 6, Box 1: Risks in the use of 
non-staff workforce). 
56 Ibid., p. 6, Box 1: Risks in the use of non-staff workforce. 
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This is not a small risk because if a person were to lodge a complaint 
against the corporate policy and practice, the organization would either be 
exposed to a single law suit constituting significant damages, or the 
organization would be exposed to a class action law suit if the plaintiff 
could demonstrate a systemic abuse of the consultancy contract. In fact, 
this is exactly what the JIU is warning against.  
An even more damaging outcome is to have a corporate culture that is 
rife with tension, mistrust and resentment for the disparity of using two 
different contracts for the same or similar work being done. If two people 
are doing the same or similar work and one receives a regular paycheck (at 
a standardized level), vacation time, sick time, maternity leave, paternity 
leave, health insurance and pension options while the other person receives 
a remuneration that is not based on a standard rate with little to no health 
insurance and no annual leave or sick time, it could create a situation where 
the two persons have problems working together or trusting their 
management teams. The mistrust and resentment may not necessarily be 
reserved for the consultant – the staff member could be mistrustful if they 
perceive that the consultant is getting other benefits or a larger 
remuneration. Therefore, the risk of an unhealthy culture can be significant 
and affect many players. 
Having conducted interviews with consultants in various UN 
organizations, the JIU goes further saying,  
The interviews revealed that non-staff personnel, particularly consultants, often 
work on the premises of the organizations, follow regular working hours and 
receive a monthly remuneration, just like other staff members. Their services 
are used in a wide range of areas, including information systems, human 
resources, finance, training or programmes and project management. Employing 
consultants and other non-staff personnel for extended periods, like staff under 
an employment relationship, create precarious statuses and the situation is not 
sustainable for either the employees or the organizations which are facing a 
dramatic change in their workforce composition. Introducing different statuses 
of personnel for similar work within the organizational workforce, which is no 
longer subject to a common set of rules and regulations, is not a fair or socially 
responsible employment practice. It creates discrimination in the workplace by 
not providing equal benefits for equal work.57 
The last two sentences of this statement sum up the problem: the common 
practice of using consultancy contracts to compensate for the lack of 
                                           
57 Ibid., p. 8, para. 37. 
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funding for staff is wrong (unfair and socially irresponsible) and creates 
derision in the work environment. The question then becomes, how can a 
system of organizations working to protect human rights and deliver 
humanitarian aid, among other things, reconcile itself with a wrong that is 
common, systemic and seemingly essential in providing services and aid 
with limited resources? 
The JIU attempts to address this question as it recognizes the challenges. 
It also offers a solution when it proposes preventative measures saying,  
In order to prevent inappropriate use of non-staff contractual modalities, 
organizations need to address the root causes of the problem with measures 
implemented on multiple fronts, such as effective oversight and accountability, 
improving and clarifying policies, requesting governing bodies to provide 
adequate funding, and increasing flexibility in the use of staff resources.58 
Having the necessary resources and flexibility to apply results-based 
management instead of resource-based management59 is not something that 
just happens. Organizations and agencies need two fundamental things:  
 a management team that is willing push back on the member 
countries and donors when they demand expanded mandates on a 
smaller budget and  
 a willingness to demonstrate the inability to achieve the mandates 
and goals without the appropriate human resources. 
For FAO, an organization working towards eradicating hunger, eliminating 
poverty and creating sustainable ways to manage and use natural resources, 
it would seem that working in a way that affirms the dignity of its staff and 
consultants would be an unspoken mandate. And yet, according to the 
documents from the Finance Committee, that mandate is not being met.  
5. Applying the Corporate Ethic to FAO 
According to our system of corporate ethics, let us consider FAO as the 
I, the consultant as other and the responsibility that FAO has to and for the 
consultant. We will also look at what FAO’s responsibilities are with 
regard to the consultant as other, how FAO can take steps to right the 
wrong that it has employed so systemically and what it can do differently 
                                           
58 Ibid., p. 7, para. 33. 
59 “Organizations must have the necessary resources and flexibility to apply result-
based management rather than resource-based management” (Ibid., p. 7, para. 35). 
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with regard to its human resources policies and practices (staff and 
consultants) while still meeting its organizational mandate.  
Maintaining that the corporation ought to adopt a standard of behavior 
(corporate action) that promotes, supports and protects human dignity while 
working to produce a good or render a service while taking responsibility 
for those actions and hold itself accountable for the effects its actions have 
on itself, its clients, partners, suppliers, environment and, even, 
competitors, we can apply this same standard to FAO as an international 
humanitarian organization. As FAO strives to meet its mandate to eradicate 
world hunger, eliminate poverty and sustainably managing natural 
resources, it must do so while promoting, supporting and protecting human 
dignity; it must do so while engaging in just corporate (human) action as it 
encounters the many faces of the others and third persons with whom it is 
in relation. This includes but is not limited to how it cares for its 
consultants. 
In reviewing FAO’s public documents and taking from them evidence of 
their policies and practices with regard to the use of consultancy contracts, 
we have done so within the context of the UN common system and have 
taken into consideration the observations, criticisms and recommendations 
made by the JIU, an internal UN review board. This step of understanding 
the context is important in this system of corporate ethics because we will 
interpret the corporate action as if it were a text within the greater context 
of humanitarian aid, organizational mandates, policies and administration 
as well as the context of the United Nations common system (the policies 
and practices that are common among the various UN organizations and 
specialized agencies). 
Understanding that the questions that we outlined in Annex 2 are to be 
answered by those who comprise the corporation or organization, we can 
only arrive at an approximation since we are limited in our resources 
(public documents). As such, we will assess FAO’s commitment to 
promoting, supporting and protecting human dignity through just corporate 
action and provide suggestions on how it may improve its behavior 
(administration, policies and practices) with relation to its human resources 
(use of consultancy contracts). Because some of the questions require 
detailed knowledge that may only be available from within the 
organization, some responses will not be as comprehensive as the senior 
management or staff would be able to provide given the knowledge to 
which they are privy. However, we will continue to use the documentation 
that we have at our disposal to construct reliable and viable responses. 
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5.1  Is the Corporation Meeting Its Goals? 
According to the Director-General’s statement in FAO’s Medium Term 
Plan 2014-2017 (Reviewed) and Programme of Work and Budget 2016-17, 
the organization has achieved over 80% of the output indicators established 
in the previous Programme of Work and Budget from 2014-2015.60 Indeed, 
the Programme Implementation Report 2012-2013 published in May of 
2014 and presented to the FAO Conference in June of 2015 highlights the 
achievements FAO has made in eradicating hunger; the document also lists 
the various strategic and functional objectives and the levels based on 
specific indicators by which progress may be measured. 
5.2  Are the Corporation’s Short and Long-Term Goals Beneficial Not 
Only to Itself, But Also to Its Customers/Clients, Partners, Suppliers, 
Environment and Even Competitors? 
Intrinsically, FAO’s short and long-term goals are beneficial on a global 
level. Eradicating world hunger, eliminating poverty and managing natural 
resources in a sustainable manner benefits all human beings in both the 
short and long-term. There are no stakeholders who would suffer from 
FAO achieving its goals. 
5.3  Does the Corporation Consider Its Various Stakeholders, Weighing the 
Impact of its Actions When Deciding on a Strategy for Corporate 
Action? 
FAO is focused on serving the hungry, the poor and those who need 
agricultural development in rural and impoverished areas. Its corporate 
action is strictly tied to achieving its goals within a specific budget and 
provision of resources. Because of a budget that has been reduced over the 
previous biennia and the expectation to deliver more on that smaller 
budget, the organization has taken actions that put consultants as one of its 
stakeholders at risk. The Director-General addresses delivering more 
services and aid on a reduced budget saying, 
                                           
60 “As the Mid-term Review of the 2014-2015 Programme of Work and Budget 
shows, over 80% of our output indicators are on track to achieve the results we want 
and we have exceeded expectations in over half of them” Medium Term Plan 2014-
2017 (Reviewed) and Programme of Work and Budget 2016-17. Director-General’s 
Foreword. 
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We have elevated our global goal from reducing to eliminating hunger, food 
insecurity and malnutrition. … Conscious of the financial restrictions many 
countries face, we identified and achieved an unprecedented USD 108.2 
million in savings, significantly increased our efficiency, integrated our 
administrative work through technological solutions… and pursued cost-
reducing joint initiatives with the United Nations Rome-based agencies. This 
is delivering best value for money.61 
As we saw in the documents from the Finance Committee, one of the ways 
FAO increased its efficiency in the last biennium was to use consultancy 
contracts instead of staff contracts as a means of maintaining the personnel 
necessary to get the job done with the financial resources available. 
Therefore, while responding to the call of the other and other others who 
are hungry, poor and need agricultural resources, FAO ignores the call of 
the consultant who is an other with whom the organization has direct 
contact. How does FAO ignore the call of the consultant? FAO hires 
persons who need a job to make a living; instead of hiring them with the 
proper contractual modality, which is the staff contract, FAO hires them 
using a consultancy contract in order to avoid the financial burden that goes 
with hiring a person as a staff member. In hiring a person as a consultant 
while expecting them to do the work of a staff member and engaging with 
them as an employee rather than a contractor, FAO denies that person 
(those persons since this is a systematic problem) the dignity of appropriate 
pay for the work done, time off (vacation and sick leave), proper health and 
life insurance, pension options and the security that comes with being 
recognized as staff. 
5.4  Does the Corporation Support, Protect and Advocate for Human 
Dignity Through Ethical and Responsible Corporate Action? 
This is a very broad question and can be applied to all aspects of a 
corporation or organization, not just to the issue of human resources. But 
with regard to FAO’s human resource policies and practices of using 
consultancy contracts instead of staff contracts as a means of saving money 
and time, the answer is no, FAO does not support, protect and advocate for 
human dignity. In hiring persons using the consultancy contract instead of 
the staff contract with the expectation that those persons compensate for the 
staff positions that the organization cannot afford or does not have time to 
fill, FAO is making them de facto employees of the organization. At the 
                                           
61 Ibid., Director-General’s Forward. 
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same time, FAO is denying those persons the pay and social benefits that 
should be due to them as employees. 
Furthermore, by creating two parallel workforces, FAO is creating a 
work environment that can be fraught with resentment, distrust and even 
hostility. It is the responsibility of the organization to recognize the 
humanity of the persons whom it hires and treat them with the respect that 
their personhood demands. This includes hiring persons with the proper 
work contract and honoring that contract; it includes ensuring that both 
staff and consultants have a work environment that is accommodating and 
supportive of their roles within the organization. 
5.5  Does the Corporation Review Its Actions Once They Have Been 
Executed to Determine What Benefits and/or Damage May Have Been 
Caused to All of the Known Stakeholders? 
It is apparent from the many documents from the various councils and 
conferences over the years of FAO’s existence that there is an annual and 
biannual review of corporate action as it relates to achieving its goals and 
fulfilling its mandate. But with regard to its human resources policies and 
practices, there is no evidence from the public documents that suggest FAO 
reviews its actions in the face of its relationship with either staff members 
or consultants in its employ. The evidence is clear that the organization 
strategizes in the best way to use its financial resources to hire and mobilize 
the human resources, but in terms of reviewing how those actions affect the 
persons hired and mobilized, there is nothing in the public documents that 
gives an indication to the affirmative. 
5.6  Does the Corporation Take Responsibility for Its Mistakes and Errors 
in Judgment? 
In response to the JIU’s report on the use of consultancy contracts 
throughout the UN common system, FAO issued a document from the 149th 
Session of Council in June of 2014 in which it states,  
FAO endorses the JIU report, as well as the CEB62 comments on the ‘Review 
of Individual Consultancies in the United Nations System.’ FAO strongly 
supports all the substantive recommendations contained in the report, which 
have been considered and incorporated into FAO’s new corporate guidelines 
on the employment of consultants issued in November. … While generally 
                                           
62 United Nations System Chief Executive Board for Coordination. 
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supportive of recommendation 1363, FAO believes that any harmonized policy 
must take into account the different needs, resources and work of individual 
organizations within the system and contain the necessary flexibility to allow 
them to use non-staff to meet their specific needs.64 
Beyond this statement, FAO has not committed to anything in its public 
documents that give evidence of its endorsement of the JIU’s observations, 
criticisms and recommendations. In fact, in the Programme of Work and 
Budget for 2016-2017, there is no mention whatsoever of non-staff human 
resources in the way of policy, practices or expenditure. According to the 
organization’s documentation, which we can use to gain insight about its 
policies and practices, FAO has not done anything to acknowledge, take 
responsibility for or rectify the problem that is using consultancy contracts 
in lieu of staff contracts. 
5.7  Does the Corporation Have and Enact Policies That Support Its Goals 
While Also Supporting and Protecting Its Stakeholders? 
Taking the documents from the Finance Committee that we have already 
reviewed as evidence, the answer is no. The documents detail a strategy for 
using consultancy contracts so that it can save money by those persons less 
as consultants in comparison to the pay they would receive as staff doing 
the same or similar work; as such, FAO has policies and practices in place 
that enable it to circumvent its obligation of providing the appropriate pay 
and social benefits that would be due to a person carrying out work for the 
organization in an employee relationship. 
5.8  Do Corporate Contracts and Policies Use Any One Stakeholder for the 
Benefit of the Corporation Without Ensuring Reciprocity at a 
Commensurate Level or Rate? 
According to the documents released by the Finance Committee, FAO 
uses its consultancy contracts to hire persons to work in an employment 
                                           
63  Recommendation 13 – “The Secretary-General of the United Nations, as the 
Chairperson of the CEB, should, through the HLCM/HR network, initiate the 
development of a common policy approach for the implementation of recommendations 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 of this report. For this purpose, the establishment of a specific task 
force should be considered” [“Review of Individual Consultancies in the United Nations 
System.” (JIU/REP/2012/5) Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations]. p. 38 
64  149th Session Council, Rome, 16-20 June 2014, “Review of individual 
consultancies in the United Nations system”. (CL 149/INF/6 E). 
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relationship with the organization rather than a contract relationship for 
which the consultancy contract is designed. Consequently, yes, FAO uses 
persons hired as consultants but instead work as staff without providing 
the appropriate compensation and proper benefits. The organization takes 
advantage of those persons in the fact that some consultants work as if 
they were staff members while receiving none of the benefits that are 
appropriate and just for such a working arrangement. The relationship 
between FAO and its consultants hired to work as staff is not a just 
relationship because FAO actively and deliberately deprives those persons 
of what should be rightly theirs, according to the rules, regulations and 
values outlined by the United Nations, the International Labour 
Organization, the Joint Inspection Unit and FAO. 
 
5.9  Are Staff and Employees Referred to in Terms of the Resources They 
Bring to the Corporation or Their Humanity? 
It is understandable that FAO refer to those persons who are in either an 
employment or contractual relationship with it in terms of how they will 
enable the organization to meet its goals and achieve the objectives, but in 
referring to those persons only in terms of resources, there is no 
acknowledgment that FAO is in relation with persons who are the subjects 
of their own existence and are demanding to respected and cared for as Is 
rather than being used as objects. However, throughout the documents 
released by the various governing bodies of FAO (the Finance Committee, 
the Council and the Conference), persons hired by FAO using the 
consultancy contract are referred to as “non-staff human resources.” While 
the meaning is plain that a consultant is not to be considered as staff, the 
use of the suffix “non” with reference to a person is automatically 
pejorative and diminishing to that person’s being, dignity and personhood. 
It focuses on what the person is not and inappropriately assigns certain 
qualities and attributes to that person and attempts to define that person by 
those qualities. For example, a person is neither staff nor consultant, but it 
is convenient to apply those categories when writing a contract modality 
and establishing rules and regulations for those who contribute to the 
organization achieving its mandate. The categories are a convenient way of 
making reference to the type of contract a person holds, but those 
categories are not to be used as a definition of that person’s being. That 
person’s existence is regardless of the corporation or organization. Even 
references to actual staff are based on the resources they bring to the 
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organization and the burden they pose to the organization rather their 
humanity.  
Therefore, it is apparent from the way in which FAO refers to 
consultants and contractors, non-staff human resources, that it does not 
consider the personhood of those persons who hold consultancy contracts. 
FAO does not approach its consultants (or staff) in terms of their 
personhood, humanity or subjectivity as Is. Instead, FAO uses those 
persons as means of attaining a goad, achieving an objective and fulfilling a 
mandate. 
5.10  Has the Corporation Ever Been Accused of Immoral, Amoral or 
Unethical Action/Behavior? 
Beyond the report from the JIU of the United Nations, we have not 
found any evidence that FAO has been accused of immoral, amoral or 
unethical behavior within the context of FAO’s policies and practices with 
regard to using consultancy contracts to hire persons to work as if they 
were staff. 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Understanding that FAO is an organization comprised of persons 
working together to eradicate hunger, eliminate poverty and manage natural 
resources in a sustainable manner, we contend that those persons are 
responsible to and for themselves as well as the others with whom they are 
in relation by way of the organization. We also understand that FAO is an 
organization or corporation and does not have personhood, self-awareness 
or even a self. Those persons who comprise it are not divorced from their 
responsibility to and for themselves and the others when they act within the 
physical confines of the FAO premises or within the abstract that is the 
context of FAO. Rather, the responsibility of each person as an I is 
multiplied by the other persons with whom they are in relation and the third 
persons with whom they have no direct contact but with whom they are 
nevertheless in relation because of their relation with a common other. So 
when we talk about the corporate action of FAO as an organization, we are 
referring to the individual human actions committed by persons as a 
conglomerate that is FAO or the actions committed by a few in the name of 
FAO.  
With this said, based on our system of corporate ethics established by the 
personal call of responsibility to and for the other, with regard to question 
of inappropriate use of consultancy contracts, we conclude that FAO, as an 
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organization or corporation, is not engaging in just, ethical or responsible 
corporate action. More specifically, FAO has a corporate strategy of using 
consultancy contracts to hire persons to complete work that is essential to 
the regular program of the organization; those persons hired using 
consultancy contracts are expected to work as if they are staff without 
receiving the pay and social benefits to which staff are entitled. Since 2010, 
this strategy has taken the place of its official policy on the use of the 
consultancy contract. The strategy and practice are contrary to its own 
stated values and goals, and they are contrary to the values and goals of the 
United Nations. So not only is FAO committing an injustice against one of 
its fundamental stakeholders on a regular basis throughout the organization, 
it is also falling short of its own moral code and commitment to social 
justice through humanitarian aid. In short, FAO is not fulfilling its 
responsibilities to and for the persons who have consultancy contracts but 
fill the role and positions of staff; those persons who comprise the 
management and decision-making body of FAO are not responding to the 
call of the consultants. 
There are many opportunities to apply hermeneutics to this case. To 
analyze the corporate action of using the consultancy contract to hire 
people to actually serve as a cheaper version of staff who are easier to get 
rid of, we looked at the context in which the decision is made: the member 
countries and donors demanded significant budget cuts and increased the 
program of work. Per the documents released by FAO, the organization’s 
senior management determined that the only way to deliver the program of 
work on the reduced budget was to cut staff costs (cut staff posts) and hire 
consultants to do the work that the staff were doing and should be doing. 
We also considered the context of FAO as an organization working for 
social justice through humanitarian aid. The problem becomes more 
complex because in its effort to feed the hungry, provide for the poor and 
ensure the sustainable use of natural resources, it is sacrificing the dignity 
and wellbeing of one or more persons, the consultants who work as staff. 
This is fundamentally unethical: one person’s dignity and wellbeing cannot 
be the means by which another person maintains or gains his dignity and 
wellbeing – in other words, one man cannot be sacrificed for another. 
Granted, the indignity that a person may suffer because they were given an 
improper contract, not paid at a commensurate rate and denied social 
benefits may not compare with the indignity of hunger and starvation. But 
the question is not who suffers a greater indignity, rather the question is 
how we promote, support and protect the dignity of all persons, regardless 
of their lot in life. 
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Additionally, we looked at the context of FAO as an organization within 
the UN common system. The ethical dilemma becomes more precarious 
because as one of the larger UN specialized agencies, FAO is an example 
by which other UN specialized agencies gauge their own policies and 
practices. FAO must consider its sister agencies as stakeholders, the 
persons who work within those agencies as others to whom and for whom 
it is responsible, and it is FAO’s responsibility to provide clear, ethical and 
responsible guidance in policies and practice, even if only by example. 
The micro-contexts that we must consider are two-fold: the individual 
hiring manager and the person being hired as a consultant. The context of 
the hiring manager is complex with far reaching implications because the 
manager as an I must ask himself if his actions in using the consultancy 
contract to hire the other with whom he is in direct relationship are just. He 
must ask himself if he is responding to the call of the other immediately, 
appropriately and positively. Furthermore, he must ask himself if he is 
promoting, supporting and protecting the dignity of the other by hiring the 
other using the consultancy contract. Finally, he must ask himself if the 
consultancy contract is truly appropriate for the work he expects the other 
to perform. The self-reflection on responsibility continues: is this strategy 
of using consultancy contracts to hire persons to do the work that should be 
done by staff just and responsible? If not, then what is the responsible 
action to ensure a just relationship between him and the other? 
The micro-context of the person being hired as a consultant is equally 
complex. Regarding the responsibility he has to and for himself, the person 
being offered a consultancy contract must ask himself if the contract 
represents an equitable and just arrangement for the work that he will be 
performing for the organization. He must also ask himself if he can afford 
not to take the contract if he deems it inequitable and unjust because he still 
must provide for himself and his family. 
Keeping these contexts in mind, the recommendations for how FAO can 
remedy the situation hinges on what we identified that they need: a 
management team that is willing push back on the member countries and 
donors when they push for expanded mandates on a smaller budget as well 
as a willingness to demonstrate the inability to achieve the mandates and 
goals without the appropriate funding and human resources. The 
recommendations are the following:  
 FAO, the persons who comprise senior management, those who 
are mid-level managers, staff and consultants, must acknowledge 
the injustice of using consultancy contracts as a problem.  
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 FAO must hold itself accountable for the problem, which means 
that all persons must openly recognize the way in which they 
colluded in allowing the problem to develop and be perpetrated.  
 The persons who comprise FAO as an organization, especially 
senior management, must commit themselves to responsible and 
just human action that promotes, supports and protects the human 
dignity of all persons who are contracted to work for the 
organization, staff and consultants alike. 
 Senior management must be open and honest with the member 
countries and private donors about what can be done to achieve 
the organizational goals with the approved budget. 
 Senior management, member countries and private donors must 
accept the limitations on the organization’s ability to provide 
services and deliver programs. 
 Mid-level managers must be willing and able to push back on 
senior management when they are instructed to use the improper 
contract modality. They must hold themselves accountable for the 
responsibility they have to and for those others whom they hire; 
similarly, senior management must hold themselves accountable 
for the responsibility they have to and for the mid-level managers 
by not putting them in positions to perpetrate this injustice. 
All of these recommendations follow two fundamental prerequisites: the 
persons who comprise FAO from staff to mid-level managers, senior 
managers to those who represent the member countries and private donors, 
must be educated about their responsibilities according to our newly 
developed system of corporate ethics; and they must buy into this system of 
ethics. As with any other organization or corporation, if those who 
comprise the organization or corporation are not aware of their 
responsibilities, then it is more difficult for them to conduct the self-
examination necessary to make this system of ethics effective. 
Additionally, if they do not buy into this system of ethics, then it is harder 
for them to understand the nature of their relationships and more difficult 
for them to commit to just human action based on an understanding of their 
responsibility to and for the other. 
Some other infractions people commit within the context and/or in the 
name of the corporation, which may not be considered as egregious as what 
we have just discussed, are the following: gossiping; revealing confidential 
information intentionally or unintentionally; and making promises or 
commitments that end up not being fulfilled. One of the more serious 
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breaches of ethics that many people have experienced is when an 
organization or corporation advertises a job opening, they respond to the 
announcement, some are selected to be interviewed, a single person is 
selected for the position and the rest never hear anything else from the 
organization. The ethical issue is with the person responsible for hiring or 
filling the vacant position: he or she is an I who has heard the call of the 
other who is looking for employment; many times, instead of notifying all 
persons who applied and were interviewed for the position that the position 
is being filled by someone else, the hiring manager selects the preferred 
candidate and ignores their responsibility to close the dialogue with the 
others whom were not selected. It is a matter of respect for those persons 
who are waiting to hear the outcome. The disappointment of a negative 
answer is still preferred to being left to wonder for days or weeks and 
finally deduce that they did not get the job based on the lack of 
communication. This concept holds true for all manner of communication 
and dialogue – the I has a responsibility to the other to inform him of that 
which affects him, positively or negatively. Better still, the I has a 
responsibility to and for the other insofar as he must respond to the call of 
the other. Simple. 
As such, in educating persons who interact with others, working as a 
group to provide a product or render a service, for commercial consumption 
or even in service of humanity, we must remember that one of the ways in 
which we improve our condition as human beings is through just human 
relationship. We must face each other, as the I to the other, with respect for 
the other’s personhood. We must respond to the call and demand of the 
other when we hear them say, “Do not kill me,” and “Love me.” We must 
respond to them immediately and according to their needs, and we must not 
impose our needs or wants on them. This, we must do regardless of the 
context in which we find ourselves. In the face-to-face encounter, the other 
commands us, and we must answer. 
The context of the corporation is just one of many contexts in which we 
find ourselves relating with the other and with the other other whom we 
may never meet face-to-face. Our proposed system of corporate ethics is an 
ethic that can be applied to all areas of life. The I is always in relation with 
an other and it is that I’s responsibility to and for the other that must form 
his actions as he responds to their call. We are focusing on the way in 
which the I responds to the call within the context of the corporation 
because so many people spend much of their time working with others, 
being in relation with others, and because of the potential effect a 
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corporation can have on unknown others, we have to be especially aware of 
our responsibilities, actions and impact that those actions can have. 
This project is an attempt to answer the call of the others who have been 
objectified by corporate action, human action either committed within the 
context of the corporation or committed per an agreement among those 
who comprise the corporation. Those persons who have been objectified, 
those whose call has been ignored or not answered immediately, positively 
and appropriately are still calling. Perhaps the proposed system of 
corporate ethics will guide a corporation or organization to a better 
understanding of their responsibility, enable them to engage in just 
corporate action and respond immediately, positively and appropriately to 





In bringing together the philosophies of Levinas and Ricoeur and 
complementing them with teachings from other ethicists, economists and 
human development analysts, my aim was to develop a system of ethics 
that may be applied to or used in corporations and organizations, both large 
and small, all over the world. As a student of philosophy and a professional 
in the global corporate world, I contend that any system of corporate ethics, 
nay! ethics in general must begin with the human person, acknowledging 
his being as such, the phenomenology of that being in the world and his 
relationship with other beings that are the same in nature but otherwise 
absolutely strange to him. 
It is important to make this the point of departure for any system of 
ethics, systems that guide us in how we ought to relate to and treat each 
other. In any system of ethics, we must be guided to recognize and 
acknowledge our own subjectivity as we approach the world from our 
separate and unique I points of view while also recognizing and 
acknowledging the fact that every person whom we encounter experiences 
his being and world as subjects too. Therefore, systems of ethics ought to 
guide us to treat other persons whom we encounter with the dignity and 
respect that their very persons, their human being demands. 
In a corporate context one may perceive it as easier for them to forget or 
divorce himself from that demand since the corporation provides him a 
sense of anonymity (one I working among many other Is under the name 
and façade of one entity that is the corporation). Because the I is only one 
among others in a corporation, his actions can be seen, understood and 
interpreted as actions of the corporation. In this way, there is less personal 
accountability for actions taken in the corporate setting. As such, the person 
working in the corporation relinquishes his responsibility as well as the 
accountability for those actions. However, based on the philosophy of 
Levinas in particular, human actions (in addition to providing a product or 
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rendering a service) ought to be a response to the call of the other to be 
loved and cared for (this is the positive articulation of the command).  
Additionally, anchoring this ethic in an interpretation of Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of hermeneutics, we are first able to discern corporate action as 
human action – action either committed by persons working together for 
the goals of the corporation or committed by specific persons in the name 
of the corporation. We are then able to examine that human action as if it 
were a text, discourse fixed by writing, freeing us from the tendency to cast 
judgment and blame and instead consider the action in a context that 
informs our understanding and interpretation of that action.  
Hermeneutics allows us to discuss human action without pointing fingers 
at who we assumed is an obvious agent of that action. Engaging in the 
hermeneutical exercise encourages us to consider the text and the context 
(the act and the context in which it was committed) to glean a meaning or 
interpret the message; applying this philosophy to human action enables us 
to see beyond the traditional understanding and interpretation of cause and 
effect and be more critical of the motives, results and overall implication of 
human action, which then could reveal a more complex understanding of 
the agent of the action. This is to say, in applying the hermeneutical 
exercise to understanding and scrutinizing human action, the agent of 
human action can be revealed as greater than the single person or group of 
persons who committed the action and include mitigating circumstances, 
problems or requirements that influenced those human beings to commit 
the act. 
Uniting the personal ethical demand with a hermeneutical approach to 
human action enables us to acknowledge the authenticity of the I-other 
relationship insofar as it is a phenomenological encounter of being qua 
being. Even though the I ought to act dis-interestedly as he responds to the 
call of the other, there is a possible reciprocity when he accepts his 
responsibility to and for the other: in the other’s call being answered, justice 
emerges from the authentic human relation of the I-for-the-other and the I 
can experience transcendence. Even in the corporate context, man can 
experience transcendence as he answers the call of the other and third 
persons as one I among other Is who comprise the corporation. That 
transcendence, as Levinas explains it, is an acceptance of the alterity of the 
other as well as his own strangeness as he, the metaphysician, seeks being 
qua being. 
The system of ethics that we have developed could help address some of 
the more devastating social ills including hunger, homelessness, lack of 




people to be in relation with those whom they encounter in a way that 
affirms both of their humanity, their subjectivity and their calls to be loved 
and cared for. Our proposal for corporate ethics, which is based on the 
personal response to the call of the other, aims to do exactly that within the 
context of the corporation. I hope that it will be used and applied in the real 
world and that it may demonstrate the ways in which humanity may be 
supported, promoted and defended through corporate action from which 
justice may emerge. I hope that people do not concentrate on the seemingly 
impossible high standards that these ethics require and instead focus on the 
spirit – justice emerges from a human relationship in which the I answers 
the call of the other immediately, appropriately, positively and dis-
interestedly and yields a relationship that respects the authenticity of the 
human being, one-for-the-other. This is indeed transcendent. 
Our newly developed system of corporate ethics cannot eliminate all of 
the problems and deficiencies that plague humanity, but if those who 
comprise corporations and other organizations would approach their 
relationships with others keeping this philosophy in mind, the smaller, 
everyday deficiencies and problems may be easier to eliminate and the 
bigger problems becomes more surmountable. 
Finally, in the very least, I hope that those who comprise corporations and 
other organizations think twice about the impact their individual human 
actions may have on those with whom they are in relation. The behavior may 
not change right away, but the intentionality may shift towards a better 
understanding of our ontology and that of our relationship with others with 
whom we are in relationship. If after reading this thesis, you recognize that 
the question of corporate ethics and responsibility is greater than (while 
encompassing) the issues of sexual harassment, fiscal impropriety, conflicts 
of interest, philanthropy and assigning blame, then I will have accomplished 
my goal of bringing Levinas’ philosophy of the ethical demand together with 
Ricoeur’s philosophy of hermeneutics and text to establish a system of ethics 
(or even a deeper understanding) of human relations and its implication in 
promoting, supporting and protecting human dignity. If you arrive at the 
understanding that greeting a colleague in the corridor with respect and 
dignity instead of averting your eyes (ignoring them) is an ethical issue, and 
that the greeting is an immediate, positive and appropriate response to their 
command, then I will have accomplished my goal. The ethical issues that 
corporations face are not always related to the balance book and may not 
always be as obvious as sexual harassment, so this is a preliminary effort in 
developing and providing guidance to persons in all areas of the corporation, 
from top to bottom, about hearing, receiving and responding to the call of the 
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The Dialectic as It Concerns Human Relation and Action 
The dialectic is more than a rhetorical device1; it belongs to the nature of 
being insofar as it “is the immanent transcending, in which the one-
sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding 
displays itself as what it is, i.e. as their negation. That is what everything 
finite is: its own sublation.”2  Let us note that the word translated into 
English as determination (singular) is Hegel using the German 
Bestimmungen (plural), which can be translated in various ways. For the 
purposes of the discussion on the dialectic, one could argue that it has been 
appropriately interpreted because both Bestimmungen and determination 
may denote a development or movement towards to an end. How 
Bestimmungen is interpreted is important because Hegel explains the 
dialectic in terms of transcendence and progression. He uses words that 
refer to motion and life directly and indirectly. 
In fact, he states without equivocation: “It is of the highest importance to 
interpret the dialectical [moment] properly, and to [re]cognize it. It is in 
general the principle of all motion, of all life, and of all activation in the 
actual world.”3 In other words, the dialectic is precisely the transition from 
one state of being to another. Hegel even demonstrates this in terms of time 
                                           
1 “According to its proper determinacy, however, the dialectic is the genuine nature 
that properly belongs to the determinations of the understanding, to things, and to the 
finite in general” G.W. F. HEGEL. The Encyclopaedia Logic, Part I of the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze. § 81. 
2 Ibid., § 81. 
3 Ibid., § 81. 
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in the first three words of his reflection, “The dialectical moment…”4 Here, 
he alludes to the transition of being in time, what the state of being is from 
one minute to the next. 
The dialectic is revealed when considering or attempting to understand 
the ontological process of transcendence. It is made evident when we move 
away from what Hegel refers to as sophistry, “and all the principles of the 
ethical life are thrown overboard in arguments like that.”5 It is then that 
“the dialectic diverges essentially from that procedure, since it is concerned 
precisely with considering things [as they are] in and for themselves, so 
that the finitude of the one-sided determinations of the understanding 
becomes evident.”6 The dialectic is the transcendence of being, a transition 
(if not a transformation) or a process, and the dialectic is not revealed 
without man engaging in an objective dialogue or investigation into the 
nature of being. It is man’s desire for the appropriation of knowledge that 
brings the dialectic to the fore. 
The dialectic may also be considered that which brings cohesion 
between the study of being as such and the endeavor to understand it 
beyond its physical properties, that is to say, its ontological properties. 
Considering the inclination to investigate by moving from that which is 
physically evident to that which may be less evident, Hegel, too, considers 
the dialectic from a scientific paradigm shifting, then, to a metaphysical 
determination. He explains it in this way: “Hence, the dialectical constitutes 
the moving soul of scientific progression, and it is the principle through 
which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of 
science, just as all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be 
found in this principle.”7 As man makes an objective investigation in order 
to understand the nature of a being (in order to appropriate that being) he 
too is experiencing a dialectical moment – that of determination and 
transcendence. 
Hegel substantiates his definition and use of dialectic as a determination 
of the capacity to understand by referring to its originator, Plato, and its 
purpose of inspiring objective argumentation or dialogue when he says, 
Among the Ancients, Plato is called the inventor of the dialectic, and that is 
quite correct in that it is in the Platonic philosophy that dialectic first occurs in 
                                           
4 Ibid., § 81. 
5 Ibid., § 81. 
6 Ibid., § 81. 
7 Ibid., § 81. 
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a form which is freely scientific, and hence also objective. With Socrates, 
dialectical thinking still has a predominantly subjective shape, consistent with 
the general character of his philosophising, namely, that of irony. Socrates 
directed his dialectic first against ordinary consciousness in general, and then, 
more particularly, against the Sophists.8 
By making reference to the history of the dialectic and how it was used to 
objectively debate against the often times subjective fallacies of sophism9, 
Hegel gives various examples to make the point: the dialectic is not a 
means of subjective justification. 10  He promotes objectivity and the 
sciences as they relate to the dialectic when he says,  
In the motion of the heavenly bodies, for example, a planet is now in this 
position, but it also has it in-itself to be in another position, and, through its 
motion, brings this, its otherness, into existence. Similarly, the physical 
elements prove themselves to be dialectical, and the meteorological process 
makes their dialectic apparent.11 
Yet Hegel is open to considering that which is beyond what the sciences 
can tell us about what he calls the natural world: in his reflections on 
metaphysics, he allows the possibility for the spiritual world. 12  Hegel 
acknowledges movement or transcendence in the spiritual world insofar as 
it relates to the relation between man and the other, which is evident when 
he says, “As to the occurrence of the dialectic in the spiritual world, and, 
more precisely, in the domain of law and ethical life, we need only to recall 
at this point how, as universal experience confirms, the extreme of a state 
                                           
8 Ibid., § 81. 
9 “... the dialectic is not to be confused with mere sophistry, whose essence consists 
precisely in making one-sided and abstract determinations valid in their isolation, each 
on its own account, in accord with the individual's interest of the moment and his 
particular situation” (Ibid., § 81). 
10 “... my subjective freedom is an essential principle of my action, in the sense that 
in my doing what I do, I am [there] with my insights and convictions. But if I argue 
abstractly from this principle alone, then my argument is likewise a piece of sophistry, 
and all the principles of ethical life are thrown overboard in arguments like that” (Ibid., 
§ 81). I would suggest that the dialectic may be applied to the consideration of the 
determination of the relation between the I and the other or the transcendence that 
happens when the I relates to the other and accepts the other as a being who, like the I, 
is self-aware and makes the demands that were discussed in Part I. 
11 Ibid., § 81. 
12 “the dialectic also asserts itself in all the particular domains and formations of the 
natural and spiritual world” (Ibid., § 81). 
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or action tends to overturn its opposite.”13 Hegel even goes so far as to 
relate the dialectic of the natural and spiritual worlds by citing the human 
emotions of joy and pain.14  
The moment of transcendence within one man as he moves from one 
state of being to another is the dialectic, but the interesting dynamic in this 
paradigm is in how the natural world and spiritual world interact or depend 
on one another. Hegel gives two examples: the emotion of joy may conjure 
a physical reaction that is closely related to pain, tears; but the tears, too, 
provide the relief that man requires in order not to be overwhelmed by his 
joy; the other side of the coin is the smile that gives a person’s sadness 
away.15 
And it is in observing Hegel’s application of the dialectic to the spiritual 
world (and relating it to the natural world) that we shall employ the 
determination of understanding to elucidate the connection between the 
philosophies of Levinas and Ricoeur in order to draw a final conclusion 
about the corporation’s responsibility to its staff/employees, stakeholders, 
clients, community, environment and itself. 
Using the concepts that we developed in our discussion from Part One 
on The Ethical Demand, we will identify the dialectic of action and text, 
responsibility and hermeneutics and human action and justice as a 
determination in order to develop a disinterested and constructive argument 
for a normative system of ethics that may be applied to any corporation, 
regardless of its size or business model. By identifying the dialectic, we 
shall attempt to avoid the pitfalls that tend to plague ethical discourse – that 
of relativity. By removing “the individual’s interest of the moment and his 
particular situation,”16 we may indeed accomplish what Plato attempted to 
teach his students and Hegel is reminding us to do, to engage in 
dispassionate dialogue that allows us to orient our understanding towards 
being as such rather than subjective argumentation based on our own 
insights and convictions. 
 
                                           
13 Ibid., § 81. 
14 “Feeling, too, both bodily and spiritual, has its dialectic” (Ibid., § 81). 
15 “It is well known how the extremes of pain and joy pass into one another; the heart 
filled with joy relieves itself in tears, and the deepest melancholy tends in certain 
circumstances to make itself known by a smile” (Ibid., § 81). 




Applying the Ethic 
The following ten questions are meant to gauge a corporation’s 
awareness and commitment to achieving its corporate goals without 
exploiting anyone stakeholder. We must keep in mind that the corporation 
is the community of staff, management and senior leadership. So we use 
the word “corporation” in these questions, we understand it to mean the 
community of persons that comprise it. (We are not treating the corporation 
as a person in se.) 
1. Is the corporation meeting its goals? 
a. If the corporation is not meeting its goals, then work has to 
be done to understand why and if perhaps the goals should 
be reconsidered. 
b. If the corporation is indeed meeting its goals, then it may be 
an indication of corporate health and moving in a positive 
direction. 
c. The point of this question is to gauge the corporation’s short 
and long-term sustainability, growth and relevance as it 
relates to the market. 
2. Are the corporation’s short and long-term goals beneficial not only 
to itself (corporate fiscal responsibility for maintenance and 
growth), but also to its customers/clients, partners, suppliers, 
environment and even competition? 
a. The point of this question is to gauge the overall effect that 
the corporate goals may have on the various stakeholders. 
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b. The corporation’s goals must also be beneficial to the 
competition in such a way that it maintains a competitive edge 
in the market. If the corporate goals strive to make 
competition obsolete, then customers, partners and suppliers 
may suffer. 
3. Does the corporation consider its various stakeholders, weighing 
the impact of its actions (the benefits and damage it may cause) 
when deciding on a strategy for corporate action? 
a. Here we want to encourage critical thinking, corporate 
“self-evaluation” and recognition of who the stakeholders 
are and how they may be affected. 
b. If the answer to the question is yes, then the follow-up 
questions would be “how and to what extent?” 
4. Does the corporation support, protect and advocate for human 
dignity by means of ethical and responsible corporate action? 
a. The corporation is an intrinsic, human part of society. It has 
a voice that is amplified by the size, buying power and 
influence it has in the market. If the answer to this question 
is ambivalent in any way, or if the answer is no, then there 
is much work to be done in leading the corporation to a 
positive response. 
b. Without passing judgment on the corporations themselves, if 
any corporation sells a product or service or promotes 
behavior that is detrimental to the human person, family, 
society or environment, then that corporation should question 
its original goals, for examples: producers of tobacco 
products. 
5. Does the corporation review its actions once they have been 
executed to determine what benefit and/or damage may have been 
caused to all of the known stakeholders? 
a. This question is intended to get corporations to engage in 
corporate “self-reflection.” How has the corporate action 
affected the corporation itself and the world around it? 
b. This also presents a learning opportunity for the 
corporation: what actions they may want to repeat for 
beneficial results and what actions they want to avoid 
having caused harm. 
6. Does the corporation take responsibility for mistakes and errors in 
judgment? 
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a. If the corporation can say yes, then it already acknowledges 
its social responsibility and has a sense of accountability. 
The follow-up question would then be, “What actions did it 
take to rectify the matter or make sure that type of action 
does not happen again?” 
b. If the response is negative, then there is room for 
improvement. The corporation should implement policies 
and strategies for self-evaluation, taking responsibility and 
holding itself accountable for its corporate (human) action. 
7. Does the corporation have and enact policies that support its goals 
while also supporting and protecting its staff, partners, 
customer/clients, suppliers and environment? 
a. This question aims to scrutinize the corporate culture that 
starts with written and unwritten policies. 
b. If any group is exploited for the benefit of the corporation 
or to reach any goal, then the corporate action is not just, it 
is not responsible. 
8. Do corporate contracts and policies exploit any one stakeholder 
for the benefit of the corporation? 
a. This is an opportunity for the corporation to not only 
scrutinize its policies for exploitative behavior, but also its 
contracts, which include those between the corporation and 
its partners, the corporation and its suppliers and, finally, 
the corporation and its staff. 
b. If any stakeholder is being exploited, then the corporation 
should take steps to determine how best to rectify the 
situation. 
c. The concept is basic: the corporation may not sacrifice or 
exploit any stakeholder for its benefit because the benefit is 
limited and will not last in the long-term. Neither the human 
person nor his dignity can be used as a means to obtaining an 
end. 
9. Are staff and employees referred to in terms of the resources they 
bring the corporation or their humanity? 
a. The point of this question is to encourage corporations to 
reflect on how they talk about the people that enable them 
to reach their corporate goals. 
b. The way you talk about something or someone is the manner 
in which you will address them and treat them. If the 
corporation refers to their staff and employees in terms of 
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their humanity (with their dignity and well-being in mind), 
then they will approach their staff and employees in the same 
way. 
10. Has the corporation ever been accused of immoral, amoral or 
unethical action/behavior? 
a. If the answer is yes, this is another opportunity for the 
corporation to look at its past behavior to determine how it 
exposed itself to this type of criticism or accusation and 
how it may act more responsibly in the future in order to 
reduce its exposure to unfavorable corporate action. 
b. If the answer is no, then this is still an opportunity to take a 
critical look at its policy and action to determine if there are 
any areas that present a risk. 
c. If the corporation has a habit and culture of shirking 
responsibility and not holding itself accountable for its 
corporate action, then there may be an underlying problem 
related to how decisions are made and how/if the 
shareholders are taken into consideration. 
These questions are not exhaustive, but they can lead any person 
participating in a corporation to conduct a comprehensive reflection on the 
corporate culture, carefully scrutinizing policies, common practices and 
accepted norms as they relates to its regular functionality. In completing 
this reflection, the executives and senior managers can choose if and how 
they would like to change the corporate culture and standard of behavior; 
additionally, staff can think about how they may approach their managers 
about perceived issues or problems.  
It is important to point out that the reflection and eventual change does 
not have to come from the executive officers of a corporation; staff and 
employees at all levels can use these questions to determine whether the 
corporation has a standard of behavior that promotes, supports and protects 
human dignity. Admittedly, a dependent of a corporation (staff and 
employees) would be taking a risk presenting their observations to their 
senior management; the management could consider their observations 
negatively and take punitive action or management, if it is open to change, 
could take the observations as constructive criticism and reconsider the 
value of embracing this ethic. If an employee believes they work for a 
corporation that does not value their human dignity or does not embrace 
their responsibility to and for the other, then this exercise could also 
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prompt the employee to find a corporation that provides an environment 
that is receptive to or already embraces that responsibility. 
The crux of this system of ethics is that everyone is responsible. The 
executive is responsible for ensuring that the culture of the corporation 
embraces its responsibility, and the staff/employee is responsible for doing 
what it can when it hears the call of the other even when the culture runs 
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